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TOWARDS A SOCIOLOGY OF CULTURE IN INDIA

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ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF PROFESSOR D.P. MUKERJI

edited by

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PREFACE

Professor Dhurjati Prasad Mukerji was an outstanding Indian whose versatile interests have made land-marks not only in the field of Sociology but also in those of Economics, Literature, Music and Art. Yet Sociology has benefited most from his erudite contributions. Professor Mukerji, besides being a scholar, was an extremely cultured and sensitive person. His personality was remarkable for its power in influencing and moulding the young people who came in touch with him. The editors of this volume had the privilege of being his students and this volume is brought out in his honour.

Professor Mukerji joined the Department of Economics and Sociology at the University of Lucknow in 1922 and adorned it for more than three decades. He retired as Professor and Head of the Department in 1954. For one year (1953) he was a Visiting Professor of Sociology at the International Institute of Social Studies, the Hague. After his retirement from the University of Lucknow, he was invited to the Chair of Economics at the University of Aligarh, which he occupied with great distinction during his last five years of active academic life. He was the first President of the Indian Sociological Conference. He was also a Vice-President of the International Sociological Association.

His early publications include : *Basic Concepts in Sociology* and *Personality and the Social Sciences*. Some of the other publications are : *Modern Indian Culture ; Problems of Indian Youth ; Indian Music ; Views and Counterviews* and *Diversities*. Apart from these, he enjoys a unique place in Bengali literature as a novelist, essayist and literary critic.

Perhaps of much greater importance than his writings were his lectures, discussions and conversations. It was through these that he shaped the minds of youth and trained them to think for themselves. "Shaping men is enough for me" he often told his students, "where do I have the time to make books." And indeed, the contribution he made to the growth of social sciences in this way is incalculable.

His command over diverse fields of knowledge was incomparable ; he talked with equal facility on the subtelties of systems of philosophy, history of economic thought, sociological theories, and

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theories of art, literature and music. He combined in a unique manner a profound scholarship with an extremely well developed critical faculty which enabled him to relate all scholarly details to the problems facing men and culture today. In acuteness of thought and brilliance of expression, he had no peer. These qualities of Professor Mukerji have inspired innumerable students and in whatever they do they carry his deep impress.

Professor Mukerji was a pioneer in the field of Sociology of Culture. This volume is an endeavour to focus upon an area which was dear to his heart. It is only a modest attempt and it may have many deficiencies but we feel that there is a convergence of ideas that make a unified theme. It is hoped that this work will elicit interest among sociologists and scholars in the related fields.

We take this opportunity to express our deep sense of gratitude to all the scholars who have contributed to this volume. We also acknowledge our gratitude to various periodicals for permitting us to reprint some of the articles included in this volume.

We are indebted to Mrs. D. P. Mukerji who has given us constant inspiration all along and made available to us a valuable photograph of Prof. Mukerji which was treasured by her.

Our thanks are due to Mr. Anant Prakash Sharma for his assistance in typing out the manuscript.

We are indeed grateful to Mr. Robert L. Donaho and M/s. Prentice-Hall of India (P) Ltd., New Delhi for bringing out this publication.

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

D. P. MUKERJI

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D. P. MUKERJI : A PORTRAIT

Dhurjati Prasad Mukerji carried his scholarship lightly, without dragging with him turgid textbooks with their forests of footnotes. He was a man of books and loved the little universe of his library, where he was free to enjoy his freedom. Between his private world and the world of life, he built a bridge for himself and for others. This was only in the physical sense ; he did not want the squalidness of life to disturb his need for detachment. Books were also life for him, ideas squeezed between the covers, and he pored over them with piercing glances, marking the margins, making notes, smoking and smoking, that was to kill him cruelly in the end. The slightest disturbance and he would look up, with a smile that rebuked intervention, and then life seemed to have intruded and he would talk about books, about affairs, about men. It was effortless, but daintily done ; there was light and shade and there was variety, finite but boundless like Einstein's universe. He talked on and on, on sociology, economics, music, student discipline, the Renaissance, Mann, Mauriace, or the day's news. The thin, sensitive frame sheathed a mind made of stainless steel. It was athletic, aesthetic, encyclopaedic. This was not everything for him, and as he thought of the larger life outside, his curiosity was roused, his anxiety would increase, and the frail man, carefully dressed, delicately poised, would move out armed only with his mind. The encyclopaedist was at large.

D.P., as he was endearingly known, would have been delighted to be Diderot's contemporary. The encyclopaedias are now mass efforts, but when the first encyclopaedias were the enterprise of a few men, D. P. would have been the soul of enterprise. Naturally, he is thought of primarily as a sociologist and this volume is sociology's tribute to him, for sociology is the most comprehensive of the social sciences and is affirmation of the unity of knowledge. D. P. did not bother himself to be thought of as versatile, contrary to the impression he created by his wide-ranging interests on those who judged him superficially. He went through various disciplines, though not only enjoying freedom from discipline but becoming by his nature incapable of it. First he was a student of history, which included economics at that time ; then he took a degree in economics ; he was

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a man of letters in Bengali and almost a man of affairs ; he taught economics and sociology for years ; he took interest in the whole of knowledge ; he was in the end a sociologist and was internationally recognized. His knowledge of music was immense and he was often in the company of *ustads*, besides himself rendering *ragas* accurately. Then there was his study of Marxism. He was no more a Marxist than Karl Marx was and in his despair, partly because of his Brahmanical instincts and middle class extraction, described himself sometimes as a Marxologist. Political movements and trends were to him a part of social and economic change. He was a fascinated student of the processes, though they did not fulfil themselves in a revolution to his intense disappointment. The extent of his knowledge helped him to achieve integration, and whatever he talked, wrote, or did, he was a personality of poise and charm. He did not aspire for honours or a halo.

D. P.'s bare career reads as bare as the record of a don who likes to be donnish, scorns decorative adjuncts, and does not like to be encumbered by obligations. He was the product of a middle class Brahmin family of Bengal, and in 1894, when he was born, Bankim Chandra was a strong literary influence and Rabindranath Tagore and Sarat Chandra Chatterjee were enriching the literary renaissance. There was distinction in his basic degrees, but, in his search for knowledge, he had no time for more degrees. Nor was he attracted to the accumulation of derivative knowledge. To one who could think instinctively and was gifted with self-expression, life seemed larger than even academic distinction. His first published articles revealed his range. When neither democracy nor industry was developed, he wrote on democracy in industry ; when capitalism had not had even a short life, he was foreseeing the break-up of capitalism into group economics ; he was an intellectual, probably not yet sufficiently impressed by life, but he was watching the social influence of anti-intellectualism. He was a high-brow contributing to *Parichaya* ; he was studying music and wrote audacious bits of literary and music criticism ; and he was writing fiction, which, to his regret, he could not pursue, and in which he is not forgotten. Among the more ardent spirits of the modern renaissance in Bengal, he came close to Tagore, and was the only one who was co-author of a book with him. This could be dilettantism or youthful intellectualism, which was more creative than critical in which self-discovery was more important than rewards, even the reward of recognition.

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In 1922, D.P. joined the Lucknow University as a lecturer in Economics and Sociology, a rudimentary combination of two embryonic sciences. To the young teacher, from Bangbasi College, following the profession of his family, the future must have seemed exciting and the renaissance ripening into a revolution. There was much to teach, but there was much to learn, and he was both learning and teaching. D.P. then must have been someone to listen to, with the arrogance of his youth, the confidence of achievement behind him, and the eagerness of an inquiring spirit ready to express itself fluently and in cultivated accent. Lucknow then must have been prepared to accept him as the foundation member of the academic structure of the new university and he taught a generation of students inspiringly. There were also dark ages in the short life of the university, and then, against the background of feudal charm and debilitating ennui, he got stuck. There was an interlude as Director of Information when the Congress assumed office in U. P. and he brought to public relations the spirit of an intellectual approach. Amidst the things he did, the Bureau of Economics and Statistic lives. He returned to the university when the Congress relinquished office on the war issue, for though he was not near the turmoil of politics, he was close to the nationalist movement without a trace of fuss. In 1947, he was employed as a member of the U. P. Labour Inquiry Committee, where he impressed economics and sociology on a mere wrangle about wages. It was only in 1951 that he was made professor, a late recognition which had never made him bitter, and then Lucknow University had a professor who could pit himself in discussion against any other professor from any university in the world.

It seemed to him ripeness was all. For over thirty years, with two reputations, in widely different regions, he did not accumulate much capital in reputation, but in the closing years of life, he came into his own. A year before his retirement, at Lucknow, in 1953, he was invited to head the Department of Economics at Aligarh, which he reorganized and adorned for five years, till illness incapacitated him completely, though the university considered his mere presence a stimulating honour. He went to the Hague as a visiting Professor of Sociology at the International Institute of Social Studies. He was a founder member of the Indian Sociological Association and one of the members of its Managing Committee and its Editorial Board. He represented the association on the International Sociological Association, of which he became Vice-President. He made brilliant

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excursions into Paris at the invitation of UNESCO. This was his brightest period ; it was followed by his worst. Cancer of the throat, which he dreaded his friends might contract, struck him down. It was a cruel fate for one who had always liked to talk so much and talked so fascinatingly. He was rushed for an operation to Zurich ; it prolonged his life. His voice became gentler than ever, his scepticism more deliberate. His work at Aligarh continued for some time. His letters were still lively and literary and his reactions as sharp as ever. There was no complaint or remorse. In the same spirit, he accepted death on December 5, 1962, when the future must have seemed more exciting than ever and when he had to say so much on so many things.

D.P. for most of his life was working in an intellectual wilderness. After independence, political issues predominated. He watched political movements intently but he was no politician, in any sense, and he was not too near even to the one politician teacher who fascinated him, Rafi Ahmad Kidwai, or to the one political teacher with whom he liked to correspond, Jawaharlal Nehru. He was, however, free to write. After his early works, *Basic concepts in Sociology* (1932) and *Personality and the Social Sciences* (1924), he worked a *Modern Indian Culture* (1942), evidence of his originality and talent for analysis and theory. *Tagore : A Study* appeared in 1943. He attached great value to *On Indian History* (1945), which is a reminder that his first love was history. *Introduction to Indian Music* (1945) and *Problems of Indian Youths* (1946) did not take much of his time. *Views and Counter Views* (1946) was a collection. *Diversities* (1958), another collection, was his best work and characteristically discursive. To every subject, he brought critical criteria from as many fields as possible. He had the faculty of looking at every problem from a new angle. His output of literary criticism was not considerable, but on the modern novel, for instance, he could be penetrating because he was a sociologist and knew that the novel had its roots in sociology. To suggestions that he should do a *magnus opus*, he remained deaf. He did not like padding. No original work could be protuberant to him ; seminal work was slim. This is, however, not the place for a critique on his work.

The dry chronicle of his career does not explain him. A first-rate mind was at work in an aid in which atmosphere, philistinism flourished, but his life was dry only as the progress of a mind as described in John Stuart Mill's *Autobiography* could seem dry. He was a dialectician and loved dialectics, but he was not fond of dessication.

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He had warmth. Faced by the compulsion to state the truth, he rejected the intellectual foppishness of dons, smiled at the smallness of the world in which he lived and at the sectarianism of scholarship. He was not scared of trial and error. Though he belonged to the oligarchy of intellect, he believed in the democratic process. For a man of so many opinions, he seemed to have too many convictions. His openness of mind had forbidding moments of fervour. His thinking was sine nothing massive or muscular or even organized, but delicate and sensitive, unafraid of new knowledge. Appreciation was easy for him, but in confidence and trust, he was fiercely sincere, intellectually honest and courageous. There were few in whom he could confide, to whom he could confess. He found too many solecisms all round, too many pretending to be not what they were. Authority was blind. Teachers did not love students. There was no recognition of the restlessness of the proletariat. Anti-intellectualism was encouraged in the name of nation-building. People laughed at the wrong places in the cinema.

D.P.'s aesthetic sensibilities were not overcrowded by his absorption in economics and sociology, and led him to his interest in style, even in the style of his dress. He seemed to be in search of the proper garments of his mind ; he loved his slimness and would not accumulate any fat or allow even an extra pound of weight. The style of his writing was sharp, spare, incisive. It had few excrescences. It was a style meant for analysis, which could reduce a subject to a skeleton and a pile of bones. Where he wanted to be literary or just funny, he was capable of corrosive phrasing. His talk had the same elements. It was not ponderous or pompous. There was nothing Meredithean or Shawian about it, though he had argument and wit to back him. The monologues were few. He was far from a Johnsonsian figure, with so much to say with such finality ; he could have shone in Bloomsbury and been a whimsical pin-pricking friend of Virginia Woolf. It was conversation, more than talk, if people were prepared for it. He was at his best in talking to foreigners. With them, he was at home, not only equal but often better, enlarging the impression that Lucknow University could make on them. Ideas came to him easily and cerebration was aided by articulation. He could destroy reputations by his candour. At times, he could be angry, but anger was humiliation for him, not to be expressed ; if he expressed it, it would be pungent fun, ridicule, raillery, or satire. To the young, he made concessions. Among them, he was a Socrates in the coffee house.

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There are professors of all kinds, dons of different character. D.P. belonged to no category, not even to Oxford or Cambridge. He was of an Anglo-Bengalee blend, which produced much of prose and poetry in English, many chroniclers, raconteurs. and teachers, D.P. loved to be a teacher. and by the interest he awakened, he was a great teacher, loved by students. Any man familiar by his sobriquet could not be forbidding except to students awed by hints of omniscience. He did not pretend to be omniscient or profess to be a professor. He encouraged a dialogue. He was a co-student, a co-inquirer, and he extended a helping hand. He believed in intellectual intercourse. The result was a renaissance in the student community for nearly thirty years, a rapport on equal terms. He provoked them, denigrated them, and made intellectuals of even unpromising material in the end, his was an influence more than achievement, but there is no greater achievement than to be an influence. Jowett of Balliol lives not because of his Greek, Arnold of Rugby not because of his histories. D.P. lives in many other lives, of those who think or write or work in many walks of life.

In this golden age of criticism, which is becoming the most important literary form, D.P. was a critic. He was an art critic, a music critic, a literary critic, a drama critic, a critic of life. The generosity of his judgement vanished when he was forced to give his considered opinion on a person, a book, or an event ; then he was on his guard about his integrity. In spite of the two cultures, he could be understood by everyone. The delicacy and perspicacity of his judgement and the delight in discovery were more French than English or American. His critical faculty enabled him to simplify Patrick Geddes, Lewis Mumford, or Joan Robinson, and when he suspended his critical faculty in an effort to understand jargon which he did not know, he remained quizzical.

D.P. was a sceptic, not a passionate sceptic like Bertrand Russell, but a sceptic, who sowed doubt liberally. He achieved easy sophistication and refinement and may have seemed over-refined. He was equal to any eminence and was a certain pricking instrument for any balloon. There was no lack of unity behind the dissertations of his "Diversities". He had a bookman's authority over those who took pride as men of action because they could do small or big things. He may have only laid down outlines of knowledge, in the manner of Wells, but they were clear outlines. He indulged in subtlety, especially semantic subtlety, but he was not afraid of truth, for truth was to him an ally of progress, though he admitted its manysidedness. He

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was an essayist ; he essayed many things. The result was no text-book. He had his commitments, when others were only evasive even when they seemed to act. He was committed to socialism, to planning, to the underdog, to the students, to inquiry ; he was committed against class and privilege. This he never concealed. Nevertheless, he was fundamentally a sceptic, who understood commitment but believed in questioning belief. These could be detected traces of egotism in him, for he was an egoist who stood by his judgement, and he was an escapist, trying to escape from escapism. He had his lighter moments, a smile that did not intend mischief but threatened to tell a mischievous story, a humour that carried compassions with it, and often a show of cynicism in his clownish moods.

The intellectual's life in modern India has not been easy. Everything is drawn into the nation-building process and even statistics are subjected to log-rolling. D.P. had sympathy with the process but stood apart, a lonely and splendid figure falling back on the intellect. He rarely revealed his emotions, for they were not to be exhibited but to be fused with the intellectual process. There were moments of despair especially in the last dark period, but there was no loss of dignity. He understood the intellectual's weakness and the intellectual's strength and never showed intellectual pride. Not a cloistered mind, he was an indefatigable mixer. In another age, he may have remained in scholastic, but not in this age of conflicts. Many influences went into his make-up but he remained himself, belonging to the calendar of scholars who leave an influence behind and deserve the tribute of scholarship.

M. CHALAPATHI RAU

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Part I

Towards a Sociology of Culture in India

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CHAPTER I

Towards a Sociology of Culture in India

—T. K. N. Unnithan

—Indra Deva

—Yogendra Singh

The categories employed for the analysis of culture have been constantly changing. These changes have come about as a result of increased application of systematic logico-empirical methods employed for understanding of social phenomena, in response to the changing background of intellectual milieu. The changes thus introduced have been a result of the emergence of a scientific world-view; a dynamic interactionistic and relativistic conception of social reality. A total perspective into the varieties of explanations of cultural phenomena would bring out the ever changing and cumulative qualities of the categories and abstractions which from time to time lead to a conceptualisation of culture. These have, broadly speaking, varied from metaphysical to behaviouristic and empirical. Within this range of variation adaptations have constantly taken place on the basis of changing fundamental assumptions. The major polarisation in regard to the latter has been between 'natural' versus 'historical' and 'realist' versus 'nominalist' conceptions of the nature of social reality.

The theories of culture that were propounded by early sociologists and historians of culture showed common characteristic of being by and large speculative, endowed with ethical purpose and a deterministic framework. In the writings of August Comte, Oswald Speng-

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ler, Arnold Toynbee and Sorokin emphasis on these aspects of culture is evident. All these writers accord priority to society over individual, thus taking the realist rather than nominalist position. Comte accepted that society is ultimately anchored in human nature yet individual is not the simplest unit of socio-cultural enquiry[1]. Spengler in his *Decline of the West* formulates an organic theory of culture and civilisation. To him culture is "the organic living entity" and civilization the "dead external shell and monuments of the one time living culture."[2] The former is an organic process to be studied analogically or historically, the latter a mechanical phenomenon to be understood through mathematical laws and principles of causality rather than destiny. Thus, a distinction is also made between 'natural' and 'historical' forms of reality. Arnold Toynbee similarly accepts that unit of historical study of civilisation is neither a nation state nor whole of mankind but "a certain grouping of humanity that we have called society."[3] Toynbee calls primitive societies as non-civilized society and explains the process of growth in civilization through "challenge and response" a process of great consequential potentialities that he finds commonly present in mythology and science.[4] The tendency towards organic interpretation of culture and civilization is present in Toynbee as in Spengler. However, the former is not as deterministic and pessimistic about the future of civilization as the latter. Toynbee foresees the possibility of many rythms of "routs and rallies" before a civilization may be overstandardised on its way to disintegration.[5] This to Spengler is, on the other hand, one straight cycle of growth, maturation and decay.

Sorokin is critical of all organismic explanations and interpretations of culture which only argue on the basis of analogy[6] between individual

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1. Martindale, Don : *Nature and Types of Sociological Theories* Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, p. 63.
2. *Ibid.* p. 111.
3. Toynbee, Arnold : *A Study of History*, Abridged Volumes I-VI by D. C. Sommerwell, Oxford University Press, 1947, p. 11.
4. *Ibid*, pp. 60-68
5. Sorokin, P. A. : *Contemporary Sociological Theories*, Harper & Brothers New York, 1928, p. 207.
6. For a review, of the theories of Spengler and Toynbee, see also Sorokin's *Social Philosophies in an Age of crisis*, Boston Beacon Press, 1950. For a comprehensive development of Sorokin's theory, *see* his *Social and Cultural Dynamics*, Vols. I-IV. New York, American Book Company, 1937-41.

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organism and cultural wholes. What is valid in these theories, he summarises as "that sociology has to be based on biology; that the principles of biology are to be taken into consideration in an interpretation of social phenomena; that human society is not entirely an artificial creation and that it represents a kind of living unity, different from a mere sum of the isolated individuals. These principles could scarcely be questioned. They are valid." This, however, helps to explain also the theoretical position of Sorokin in relation to above theories of culture and civilization. Sorokin postulates the process of imminent change in culture within the framework of 'integral truth' of which various stages of culture, e.g. ideational, idealistic and sensate are different aspects. He differentiates his explanation of culture from "externalistic explanations" attempted in causal and functional theories.

In spite of certain differences in the approach of these writers and their methodological orientation, all of them share a number of common characteristics. The differences, with the exception of Comte,[1] who was in search of general laws in socio-cultural phenomenon like 'laws of gravity' in physics (positivistic sociology), are of minor nature among Spengler, Toynbee and Sorokin, because all of them belong to various shades of organicism. Besides this similarity the other uniform aspects of the theories of all the four writers include firstly, speculative generalisation on the basis of a body of historical facts which could also have alternative explanations; secondly, search for some uniform and universal process in culture and civilisation in terms of growth, development and disintegration; and thirdly, value judgements on the merits of culture or civilizations at various stages, thus introducing an ethical bias. This, however, seems to be relatively

1. Even in Comte emphasis on positivism declines in his theory of 'humanity' where he thinks of an ideal society based on highest ethical principles and altruistic motives in action. Martindale calls it a synthesis of organicism and positivism as a result of intellectual climate in France after the French Revolution which could not rest content with conservative *ideology* implicit in idealism. He says, "The world was unwilling to abandon either the idealistic or conservative image of society or the programme of science. The Comtean synthesis of these two intellectual and social tendencies was so significant that the new point of view spread, was copied and soon became an independent discipline..... The three great original founders of sociology adopted the synthesis of *organicism* and positivism to the social and intellectual *environments* of their respective countries. Comte for France, Spencer for England and Lester F. Ward for the United States," Martindale, *Nature and Types of Sociological Theories*, p. 77.

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more predominant in Comte, Spengler and Sorokin than in Toynbee.

Yet another approach to the theory of culture is discerned in the contributions of Hegel, Karl Marx and Fredrich Engels. Hegel was a subjective idealist whose philosophical writings considerably influenced German Sociology, specially that of Karl Marx which in spite of its apparent emphasis on "dialectical materialism" stands in vital relationship to Hegelian dialectics. However, Marxist theory of culture takes a different approach which Martindale calls "conflict ideologies"[1] interpreting change through class conflict and cultural alienation. Marxist theory of culture, in a way, comes closer to sociology of culture than of others mentioned above because it explains nature of culture (ideologies and forms of social consciousness) in terms of economic and technological institutions in relation to class structure. This opens up the possibility of not only sociology of knowledge[2] which has been widely recognised, but also through it of a sociology of culture. Nevertheless, even Marx's and Engels', contributions remain speculative and ethical as those of the above writers.

In all these theories, major concern had been with the problem of change as a generalised historical process. The problem of integration, compatibility and syncretic adjustment within culture in response to a host of emerging factors from within and without did not constitute the major frame of reference of analysis. Such a situation is perhaps understandable in view of the neat theoretical propositions and postulates within the frame-work of which culture was analysed. Its concern was philosophy of change rather than sociology of change, emphasis being on destiny of history and its determined path rather than multiple probabilities within the structural functional nexus of events. The seat of controversy thus mostly remained confined to historicism and philosophical evolutionism along with controversy of the primacy between individual and society.

The growth of field work tradition, ethnographic enquiries and comparative study of cultures of the homogenous and complex societies

1. Martindale, Don : *op. cit.*, pp. 150—161.
2. *Specially relevant* in this connection are (1) Marx and Engels. *The German Ideology*, New York International Publishers 1947; (2) Marx and Engels. *A Contribution to Critique of Political Economy*, translated by Stone, New York, 1904; (3) Marx and Engels, *The Communist Manifesto*, International Publishers, New York, 1930.

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led to a radical change in the theoretical understanding of culture. Integration became the major focus of study, rather than change *per se*. To some extent, an exaggerated emphasis on culture integration and its mechanisms turned out to be a weakness of the new trend just as philosophical speculations were for the earlier theories. However, the lead in the direction was given by late 19th century and early 20th century social anthropologists whose empirical studies of primitive culture presented a marked contrast to the philosophico-speculative theories of philosophers and historians. These studies also revealed the importance of culture change through contact and diffusion. Although the controversy between 'organic' and 'super-organic', between 'pattern' and 'functional adjustment' persisted, the centre of attention shifted to the living cultures in the actual setting of life rather than to a remote logical postulate; a significant change in the theory of culture. Culture began to be treated as a relativistic phenomenon rather than a pre-determined form yielding to successive predestined phases.

This stage in the growth of the theory of culture has also coincided with advancement in the body of theories of psychology, emergence of dynamic concept of personality, reformulation of the classical theory of psycho-analysis and growth of scientific tradition of study of history and historiography. The studies in culture, thus began to interact fruitfully with equivalent and consistent trends in other social sciences, adapting to them and synthesising their relevant categories.

The developments which contribute to the growth of the sociology of culture can be primarily referred to the cultural studies of this phase. A common ground was provided by the British social anthropoligists, French and American sociologists and cultural anthropologists. Steps towards greater interaction and cross fertilisation of sociology, cultural anthropology and psychology were speeded up and some sound theoretical backlog towards this end was provided by American social anthropologists, sociologists and psychologists who contributed to an inter-disciplinary field of enquiry. The contribution of Clyde Kluckhohn, Florence Kluckhohn, Murray, Allport, T. Parsons, Edward Shils, etc. and other members of the Harvard Human Relations Department epitomised this theoretical development. As for the Continent the tradition of microscopic analysis and synthesis among the social sciences, on a comprehensive and deeper epistemological basis had already existed which still continues. The explanation of this phenomenon lies in the tradition of the social scientist in Europe not to concentrate only on the specialised core of the source materials and

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concepts of a discipline but to approach also the fundamentals of knowledge thus exploring its frontiers, even no man's lands.

The theoretical possibility of a sociology of culture could only emerge under such intellectual and disciplinary developments. A closed, finalistic and metaphysical mode of enquiry and conceptualisation did not favour the development of a frame of reference for the analysis of culture in which the role of existential linkages, factors and forces in relation to culture-integration growth and change could be discovered in depth and coverage; sociology of culture could further develop only when relative clarity about the meaning of sociological enquiry had been achieved. This precision and clarity sociology has been gaining rapidly since the beginning of the 20th century. This had been also supplemented by the works of social anthropologists who contributed valuable conceptual and methodological categories to the study of culture and social structure. Their approcah soon came to be known as 'functional analysis' which now is taken to be so common enough and agreed method of sociological study that some times a plea is made to drop the term 'functional' altogether and substitute it by 'sociological'[1]. However, the agreement on the sociological method of enquiry is still not clear or strong enough since the functional theory in spite of its claim to dynamic analysis still suffers from a one-sided and narrow use of exogenous factors in interpretation and analysis of change. The role of endogenous factors in change has till now not been successfully integrated in functional analysis of change. Moreover, the proponents of historical tradition in sociological theory who maintain their affiliation with the school of historico-philosophical interpretation of socio-cultural phenomena, as not merely emerging and self-sustaining but pre-existing subject to self-transformation and change, still persist. In a way, the argument is partly a revival of 'historical' versus 'natural' dichotomy about the nature of sociological phenomena.

Sociology has for the last two decades been seriously grappling with the dilemmas mentioned above and gradually a synthesis of the two apparently divergent sociological approaches has emerged. It is possible now with relatively greater certainty to talk of a sociological frame of reference. With this development the possibility of a sociology of culture has been as much thrown open as of many othere enquiries

1. Davis, Kingsley : "The Myth of Functional Analysis", *American Sociological Review*, September, 1956

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of socio-cultural phenomena such as art, religion, knowledge and science, with the help of a set of categories, concepts and methods sqecific to sociology. Thus, sociology of religion, knowledge, law, science and culture would only refer to a study of these several phenomena with a common set of procedures and perspectives that are of sociology. What this set of procedures and perspectives actually means has been formulated among modern sociologists by Merton, Talcott Parsons and Karl Mannheim. To all these writers sociology as a discipline defines regularities and its formal expressions through the action of individual actors. Thus individual is recognised as the basic category of all social sciences whose varying modes of interaction would yield abstractions like culture and society and with reference to its own neuropsychic and motivational structure in culture and society, to the concept of personality. Their epistemological foundation is commonly rooted in nominalism and behaviourism. As a logical *corollary* of these, relativism in culture and social structure on one hand and individual and society on the other, is clearly *implicit* in the writings of these sociologists. Thus, in the growth of sociology of culture two complementary and contributory developments have been seen; firstly, growing awareness about the contingent nature of social problems and possibility of inter-disciplinary communication and secondly, precision and sophistication in the methodological and conceptual foundation and meaning of culture and society and its inter-relationship.

Sociology of culture would thus focus upon the relationships between the components of culture, culture-themes and structure, its process of intégration and change in relation to types of social structure, social form, its level of adjustment and change. The concept of social structure is, however, an axiomatic category without which social 'relationships', 'roles' or 'actions' of individual members would not be sociologically meaningful. Culture is yet another abstraction of the social phenomena which is implicit in each interacting nucleus of social structure from a different frame of reference. Linton distinguishes between the two : '*organised group of individuals*' that is society and '*organised group of ideas, habits and conditioned emotional responses shared by the members of a society*' that is culture.[1] Mannheim takes a similar approach when he says : "The structure of action or *social structure* is derived from a group's involvement, from

1. Linton, Ralph : *Culture and Mental Disorder*, Edited by George Devreux. Thomas Publishers, U.S.A., 1956, pp. 5—6.

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the ways in which the performance of one depends on the performance of others. Now to reconstruct the order in which roles interdepend *i.e. their structural functional relationship*, we need not take account of the images, which form one of the aspects of cultural category and which participants form or follow as they play their respective roles. But as soon as we seek to interpret these 'images' or cultural realities in the context in which roles are assumed, our frame of reference shifts to sociology of culture. We are now dealing with roles not directly, but only in their derivative form, as they incarnate themselves in accomplished works. We recognise that a formed imagery conveys elements of the situation in which it is conceived. Moreover, such creations not only reflect their incipient milieu but also reveal the concerted volition, the action consensus of some who belong to that milieu."[1]

Karl Mannheim[2] treats sociology of culture as equivalent to sociology of mind which as Ernest Mannheim has remarked constitutes a part of the sociology of knowledge. He writes "The Sociology of Culture is an extension of the sociology of knowledge, to encompass not only the discursive thought but the whole gamut of symbolic expression, including art and religion."[3] The sociological frame of reference which Karl Mannheim has applied to the development of sociology of culture proposes to bring about synthesis between the 'nominal' and universal polarization of the social reality and seeks to resolve the false distinction between the historical versus functional and the material versus ideal conceptions of sociology and culture. The relevant issues raised by him are (1) the growth of democratic attitude in epistemology; (2) democratisation in elite and cultural patronage and (3) distantiation in elite mass relationship vis-a-vis culture and political structure. In the treatment of sociology of culture, Mannheim indicates significant methodological compromise with functional sociology than he used to permit in his early writings.[4]

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1. Karl Mannheim : *Essays in Sociology of Culture*, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1956, pp. 81—82.
2. Karl Mannheim : p. 81.
3. Ernest Mannheim : Introduction in *Essays in Sociology of Culture*, by Karl Mannheim, p. 11.
4. Specially in *Ideology and Utopia* and *Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction*, Mannheim's emphasis on historical method is less compromising and the definition of intelligentia in relation to folk or mass is also strictly

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The synthesis of the nominalistic and historical approaches in sociological analysis as well as sociology of culture and civilisation has been recently re-emphasised by Bart Landheer. Professor Landheer takes a clearly nominalistic standpoint when he says, "The individual has historical and logical priority in regard to the group; or quite simply a group develops out of individuals because no group can exist otherwise while the individual can, at least theoretically."[1] Yet he treats individual as a 'heuristic means' and process of abstraction 'through which social patterns emerge and can be analysed in terms of increasing rationality and differentiation of social behaviour and evolving 'basic reaction patterns'. Not in terms of organic determinism but evolving bio-psychic potentialities of man in changing group structures and its differentiations he postulates successive stages of 'thought-patterns' and cultural specialisation. He writes, "Each social group, in time as well as in terms of its positions in the social structure, has its own mental pattern. . .or perhaps even the term 'mental' is misleading in this respect unless it is considered to include emotional and spiritual factors."[2] Karl Mannheim refers to Landheer's work 'Mind and Society' in support of his nominalistic position. However, the contribution of Landheer seems to go one step further in offering systematic categories through which not only a bridge is established between organic aspect (natural science) and social structure and culture but the essential overtone of the analysis remains focussed on change. This result Landheer has achieved by his synthesis of Max Scheler's philosophical anthropology, philosophico-historical theories of cultural evolution and structural functional theory of personality, culture and society. It is interesting to note that the three "basic

compartmentalised. In his *Essyays on Sociology of Culture*, Mannheim accepts the *possibility* of culture creation by folk and *lower* echelons of membership of society. *Ibid*, page 111-112. Eliot has criticised Dr. Mannheim on the same ground that he confines the *possibility* of culture creation to the elites alone in his *Man and Society* which is not borne out by facts and involves a very narrow concept of culture. See T. S. Elliot, *Notes Towards Definition of Culture* Faber, 1948, pp. 37, 42.

1. Landheer, Bart: *Mind and Society*: *Epistemological Essays on Sociology*, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1952, pp. 38—53 and pp. 70 to 88. Landheer B. *Pause for Transition*: *An Analysis of Man, Mind and Society*, Martinus Nijhoff. The Hague, 1957. Part I—Development of the Basic Approach, pp. 3 to 78.

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2. Landheer.B.: *Pause for Transition* p.14.

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reaction-patterns"[1] which Landheer propounds have grown in man through successive stages of evolution, e.g. *natural* and short reaction, *rational societal* or longterm reaction and *spiritual imaginative* reaction, correspond to a great extent in a static cross section with Parsons motivational-orientation abstractions, e.g. cathectic, cognitive and expressive. However, this apparent similarity has basic differences too. Parsons model is relatively static proceeding in terms of continua of relations and patterns whereas Landheer's approach is dynamic structural and nearer to history. The latter offers a new approach in the study of sociology of knowledge and culture.

A valuable contribution to the theory of sociology of culture has come from Talcott Parsons, Kluckholn and Shils who in their 'general theory of action' have applied a single (action) frame of reference for the analysis of the systems of personality, society and culture. As mentioned earlier, the approach is by and large functional and culture is treated as a dimension of expressive symbolism in the foci of action system of individuals and collectivities. Evaluating Mannheim's contribution to sociology of culture and knowledge[2] Parsons states that the epistemological 'relativism' and 'historical relativism' of Mannheim is the last ditch defence of German philosophico-idealistic tradition. In the radical epistemological sense, it has no"compatability" with the foundation of science in the field of human action as it is still bogged into the problem of fundamental dichotomies. However, taking into consideration the stages of growth in Mannheim's theoretical position this criticism of Parsons can have only qualified validity.[3]

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1. Landheer.B.: *Mind and Society, op. cit.* p.44.
2. Parsons defines Sociology of knowledge as "discussion of the problems of the inter-relations of culture and social system in sociology." Introduction, *Theories of Society* edited by Parsons and Shils, Naegele & Pitts, Volume II, Free Press, 1961, p.988.
3. In regard to this criticism of Mannheim by Parsons it may be pointed out as earlier that the arguments are right only when reference is among English publications to *Ideology and Utopia,* and *Man and Society.* In his *Essays in Sociology of Culture,* Mannheim has explicitly stated the need for synthesis between false polarities. Of course, he is unjustifiably critical of Weber by alluding to him the limitations of other German philosophers and social scientists like Hegel and Marx. The oversight by Mannheim of the theoretical contributions of Marx, particularly Weber with reference to its deeper implications to a sociology of culture is no doubt understandable from the standpoint he takes. *Ibid.* p. 989.

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Parsons thinks that growth of sociology of knowledge and culture has been a consequence of two major types of developments; firstly, "the recognition of the analytical character of the categories at issue and the concomitant untenability of retifying them as concrete entities excluding the involvement in the same concrete empirical system of other factors" and secondly, the agreement on the issue that "further progress requires differentiation in the conceptual schemes employed."[1] The schematic-paradigmatic presentation and analysis of the categories of action frame of reference by Parsons conforms to both of these requirements. It also makes analytical distinction between systems of culture and society without which sociology of culture would have been a logical impossibility. It reveals the 'inter-penetrating' aspects of the two systems.

Sociology of culture is based on the fact that 'cultural categories' and problems cannot be explained entirely from a cultural point of view. They requires reference to social system besides the internal structural mechanism of culture in operation. Sociology of culture according to him, should specially be oriented to the study of the systems of scientific, technical and creative knowledge, growth of ideologies and its changes, emergence and dynamics of new values including problem of 'value-relevance' and 'value institutionalisation', systems of religion and its relation to social structure, broadly speaking all levels of interaction between culture and social systems.

In a slightly different theoretical frame the issue of the sociology of culture has been analysed by Alfred Weber,[2] who distinguishes between the civilizational process and cultural process or movements, the former being continuous, universally uniform and essentially parallel in all great cultures. "It is pre-existent, it is not to be created

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Mannheim defines sociology of mind in the following words : "Sociology of Mind is not an enquiry into the social causation of *intellectual* process, *but* a study of social character of those expressions whose currency does not reveal or *adequately* disclose their *action context*. The sociology of mind seeks to uncover and articulate those acts of society which are inherent in, but not revealed by—the *communication* of ideas. Actually ideas *taken* on new meaning when their social function changes and it is this relationship of meaning and function which sociology of the mind elaborates. (*Essays on the Sociology of culture*: Chapter I, p. 44.).

1. *Ibid.* Parsons, Shils, Naegele and Pitts, p. 989.
2. Alfred Weber: *Fundamentals of Culture Sociology*, Translated G.H. Weltber & C. F. Hirshman (New York : Columbia University, Department of Social Science, 1939) Extracts in *Theories of Society*, p. 1238.

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but discovered." The latter "produces no cosmos of universally valid and necessary things", everything born is bound to its historical limits and each step of differentiation is creation of 'independent symbolic worlds'. The civilizational process is causal, phenomenologically distinct entity, is objective and has universal validity; cultural developments are unique cultural worlds, unique in essence and historical in nature. The social process according to him is the third category besides the above two and sociology of culture should aim at the establishment of comparative typologies of the civilisational and cultural variations through constant interaction with social process. He writes, "And for the sociological examination of the worlds and movements of culture, it can therefore, only be a matter of elaborating types, i.e. the comparative presentation of recurring phenomenology of the surface appearance and an attempt to discover some intelligible connection between this phenomenology with its unique content, and the general processes of civilization and society in the various historical organisms. Roughly, this is the task of culture-sociology."[1]

It is quite evident from this that as compared to Mannheim and Parsons the theoretical structure of Alfred Weber's sociology of culture is more historicistic, yet it is another attempt to evolve a synthesis between historical evolutionism (civilisational processes) and philosophical historicisms (culture-problems) in the comprehensive and common matrix of social processes. Logically, Alfred Weber's thesis of universal and pre-existent course of civilisation-growth which includes body of scientific knowledge, fundamentals of mathematical and technological principles, concepts and notions of truth, in short, the inmost cognition-fields, contradicts the legitimacy of 'a sociology of mind' which is Karl Mannheim's equivalent to sociology of culture; rather sociology of culture would be confined to only that part of the culture and its correspondence to social systems which is relative and typical in various socio-ecological and historical situations.

If we try to recapitulate the salient developments in the study of culture as discussed above it would appear that major change in the concept as well as techniques of the study of culture have taken place. The speculative and philosophical analysis of culture has gradually been replaced by an approach to culture which tends to emphasise actual observation of existing cultures within the frame-

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1. *Ibid* p. 1238.

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work of social structure and thereafter classify cultural attributes in terms of this interaction for a large number of societies and civilizations. It is true that actual work on this model has not so far materialised on a larger scale, but systematic thinking in this direction has progressively increased. The impetus to this trend in studies of culture has no doubt come from social anthropology but it has recently influenced most of the modern thinking in sociology phrased as functional analysis. Although, the theoretical status of functional approach is still a matter of controversy among social scientists, its reference to inter-dependence, mutual compatability and self-maintenance and self-correction among the elements of society and culture opens up valuable possibilities for sociological analysis of culture.

Systematic presentation of this theoretical structure and point of view has appeared in spurts during the last few decades. Besides the writers discussed above Merton and Bernard Barber, have recently demonstrated the relationship between the thought categories, concepts, scientific and technical knowledge, and social structure. Bernard Barber discusses the interaction of science with society as a dual process, firstly, its deflections and adaptations within the maximal and minimal possibilities of growth or change and secondly, science as an institution of independent analytical as well as empirical significance for the society as a whole.[1]

Merton has codified some of the relevant concepts and areas to which attention should be focussed for systematic empirical studies of sociology of knowledge, religion and science. The theoretical structure of these codifications offer the possibility of "middle range theories" a compromise between architechtonic theories of philosophical speculative nature of earlier thinkers and extremely specialised microcosmic studies of isolated social phenomena as characteristic in 'sociometric' and "small group" studies.[2]

Sociology of culture is nevertheless not without a sociological basis of its own. This perhaps may be discovered if we understand that any growth in the field of knowledge has a pervasive and critical significance in the formation of the world-view of a whole period. There is some truth in the Comtean formulation of the three stages, not as steps of evolution of mind but as stages of intellectual world-view conditioned by social milieu. Sociology of culture in the present

1. Bernard Barber: *Science and the Social Order*, Free Press, 1952, U.S.A.
2. Merton : *Social Theory and Social Structure*, Free Press, 1957, pp. 3—16

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form is a child of twentieth century which is dominated by scientific-relativistic worldview.

Sociology of culture would seek to analyse all those problems and processes of culture change, i.e. changes in patterns of thought, themes of art and literature and its style, value orientations and norms of its evaluation, ideologies and utopias which show concomitant variation with changes in social structure and cultural role systems of the components of the social structure. It is in this connection that study of elites, folk-ethnic divisions and sects comprise the focus of sociology of culture wherever it could be established that the nature of their organisation in continuity, strain or change bear out results which have consequences of stability and change in culture. Thus, sociology of culture in its scope would include the changes in culture corresponding to those in social structure and changes in social structure initiated, regulated, influenced by changes in structure of culture. In this attempt the student of the sociology of culture would have to work out adequate analytical categories so that all possible strands of cultures and sub-cultures as well as those of structures and sub-structures in various phases of growth and differentiation within the society under study may be delineated for scientific classification and analysis. In such a venture, besides the precision in conceptual categories the utility of historical knowledge and historiography can hardly be over-emphasised.

Systematic studies in the sociology of Indian culture have not been undertaken so far. In fact the whole field of sociology of culture in modern scientific sense is so nebulous and unexplored that even in the West a comprehensive treatise on sociology of culture of a complex civilisation is not available, although works in specific areas with limited coverage are substantial. Most of the works done in the field of sociology of culture are confined to analytical discussions of theoretical problems substantiating arguments here and there with facts drawn in a scattered manner from socio-cultural history of a nation-culture or civilisation. In India also, some studies of similar nature have been conducted although not always with deliberate awareness of contribution to sociology of culture as a systematic proposition. Among Indian sociologists, the pioneer in this field was late Professor D.P. Mukerji who tried to analyse the relationship between social structure and intellectual professional culture and its problems in his study of Indian Middle Classes and consequences of interaction between socio-cultural streams and art forms (specially schools and forms in music) in his study of Indian music. In many of his essays Professor Mukerji offered analytical concepts and histori-

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cal perspectives for the study of relationship of education, technology, and class-structure on changes in Indian culture and social structure. From a theoretical point of view, Professor Radhakamal Mukerjee has made a series of attempts to synthesise the relativistic concept of values, morals and culture forms within the matrix of traditional Indian theory of values and culture.

However, the empirical-scientific tradition of analysis of changes in Indian culture and its consequences to social structure is a very recent one. Most of such studies are confined to microscopic areas, e.g. caste system in a region or a single community, analysis of western impact on youth and intellectuals, changes in culture and society of single village communities. On the whole, in all these studies there is no uniform definition or usage of concepts and categories; there is no substantial reference to historical forces and pan Indian ramifications; local and regional results are generalised for the nation as a whole; and emphasis is too much on problem of integration than change. Studies of such problems as 'democratisation' of elite and culture norms; selection and composition of intellectuals, growth of professional bureaucratic cultures and sub-cultures, synthesis between alien and native value systems and its institutionalisation, precarious implications of changing balance of relationship between rural-urban culture and social structure; growth of ideologies and its social structure are some of the problems which have not been touched so far in the study of Indian sociologists.

The difficulty in the growth of such study of Indian culture has been perhaps because of the lack of a comprehensive and workable conceptual scheme through which the diverse strands and streams of Indian culture could be studied in togetherness and changes therein could be analysed in a historical perspective. In the absence of such a conceptual framework studies have generally remained micro-cosmic assuming a degree of isolation of one unit of social reality or cultural sub-structure with the rest of the society that could be easily erroneous. Most of the studies in Indian culture, excluding purely historical works have confined to tribes and village communities. Both of these early studies had been sponsored in India by British administrators whose interest in Indian society was not purely academic or scientifically broad-based. Unfortunately, the methodological trends that developed in Indian sociology and cultural anthropology for historical-expedient reasons became the heritage of successive generations of Indian sociologists and anthropologists. Another factor which further stabilised this trend in Indian sociology was greater impact of

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classical functionalism of Malinowski and Radcliffe Brown over most of the Indian sociologists of new generation who conducted field studies in tribal and rural culture and society. Of course a minority of senior generation of Indian sociologists could be included among those who have an acute awareness in their works of the integral nature of Indian society and its culture irrespective of the apparent sub-structures or culture streams. Professor D.P. Mukerji, Professor G.S. Ghurye and Professor Radhakamal Mukerjee belong to this category of sociologists. In the works of these sociologists also one does not find a conceptual framework to study structure and change in Indian society and culture. For the study of some aspects of change in Indian culture concepts of Sanskritization—Westernization and parochialisation and universalisation have been used by M.N. Srinivas and McKim Marriott. However, these concepts have limited validity and often fail to explain a number of cultural facts of complex Indian civilisation. For lack of comprehensive study what may at first glance appear to be parochial may be essentially pan Indian and vice versa. Moreover, without history even the dichotomy of universal and parochial may have no meaning.

II

The development of a comprehensive model for the study of Indian culture and its dynamics, is however confronted with many difficulties. The first difficulty is that any model for its study must take into consideration the history and its continuities and discontinuities in the growth of Indian cultural traditions and subcultures; but such history is not available.

It is well-known that ancient Indians did not attach much importance to history. They were more concerned with perennial themes which find expression in metaphysics and mythology. Whatever history developed from time to time, soon turned into mythology through a process of re-working. The specific and the individual do not seem to interest the Indian mind. This combined with certain other factors has resulted in the situation in which a student of Indian sociology and culture finds himself today. Much of written history that is available, is history only of kings, empires and battles;

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and this too is mostly a patch-work. It hardly does any justice to the growth of institutions and cultures. This is a serious handicap to any proper assessment of the development of Indian cultural tradition with its various regional, tributary streams that go to make it.

Another important difficulty facing any one who attempts to develop the theoretical framework for the study of Indian society and culture is the neglect of peasant societies by modern social scientists. It is well-known that the anthropologists have so far devoted their attention chiefly to the study of the primitive societies and single village communities and the sociologists have concerned themselves chiefly with the understanding of modern societies and their problems. In the process, peasant societies have been more or less neglected. This is a serious gap even from the point of view of the understanding of human culture in general and that of attempting to formulate some general laws about social institutions and relationships. The importance of the peasant society is obvious from the fact that the vast majority of humanity found today, in the middle of the 20th century, still belongs to the peasant society. Moreover, from the very dawn of civilized social life, peasant societies have formed the major sector of almost every civilization. This long life has given peasant institutions and values a stability and harmony, which is unknown to the industrial society of today. For this reason also, the study of peasant society is bound to enrich the social sciences in general. But when we come to the study of Indian society and culture, the absence of tools for the analysis of peasant society becomes a great handicap. Some attempts have been recently made, notably by George M. Foster[1] and Robert Redfield;[2] but these represent only the beginnings.

Attempts towards understanding of Indian society and culture have often suffered because of a lack of distinct demarcation of universe. It has often happened that while only a part of the civilization was in the focus of study, statements were made as if they apply to the whole. For instance, there are a number of books which promise

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1. George M. Foster: "What is Folk Culture", *American Anthropologist*, Vol. 55 (April-June 1953), pp. 159—173.

2. Robert Redfield: *Peasant Society and Culture,* Chicago University Press, 1956. This book is a major contribution. It marks a considerable advance in Redfield's views on peasant society which makes it possible to distinguish clearly between peasant society and tribal society. However, Redfield uses the terms "Peasant Culture" in almost the same sense in which Foster uses the term "Folk-Culture".

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to be the study of Indian culture but cover only the tribal culture.[1] Similarly, metaphysical expositions of the Hindu view of life belonging to the higher tradition are put forward in a way which implies that these views are fully shared by all, or at least most of the inhabitants of India. Therefore, the first task in developing a sociology of Indian culture, should be to identify the major cultural traditions which have been flowing side by side in India. In so far as, these streams show a stable patterning, we can refer to them as cultural sub-structures.

If we look upon the Indian culture in a broad perspective we discern three major sub-structures : (1) Elite; (2) Folk and (3) Tribal. Of course, the distinction here is mainly conceptual and all limitations which generally apply to such conceptualisations will apply to this distinction also. One should not expect to find any of these cultural structures represented in its pure form by a distinct section of society. It will often be that a group has some characteristics of the tribal culture and some others of the folk. The folk and the elite elements too, will very often be found existing close together. Indeed, as later analysis will show, the folk and the elite elements are complementary and the existence of the one is the pre-requisite of the existence of the other. Thus, the division of Indian culture into three major cultural sub-structures is not expected to result in three neatly cut off segments, clearly distinguishable from each other. Yet, it is felt that the trichotomy presented here is sufficiently relevant to the socio-cultural facts in existence to serve as a useful frame for the comprehensive analysis of Indian culture. The value of this trichotomy should lie in providing workable conceptual tools through which ideal-typical characteristics of more prominent and emerging patterns of Indian culture could be delineated and studied. The typologies would provide the conceptual tool for classification of the varieties of adaptations in culture at different levels of differentiation and distribution.

In the present exploratory essay, we shall try, first of all, to bring out briefly the characteristics of the three chief cultural types or sub-structures so as to make it possible to identify and recognise them. Next, we shall try to study the inter-relations between them. Lastly, we shall try to see how this trichotomy is helpful in the study of Indian culture—both in its static and dynamic aspects.

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1. *e.g. The Matrix of Indian Culture* or *Races and Cultures of India* by the late Professor D.N. Majumdar—one of the pioneers of *anthropology* in India.

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Our discussion of the characteristics of each of these sub-structures will refer only to the broader features. It is recognised that details may be important for the ampler understanding of each sub-structure; but any adequate treatment of these would require collection and analysis of data on a much wider scale than has been done so far. Such an appraisal will also have to take into account the innumerable variations found in different regions and historical epochs. The present endeavour has a limited objective. As pointed out, it attempts to explore the possibility of constructing a conceptual frame that would enable us to take into account the distinctions and inter-relationships between cultural phenomena at various levels. It may be relevant to point out the advantages of this method of classification of Indian culture for study of its dynamics and growth through social structural differentiation and change. It is expected that any conceptual scheme, which aims at study of Indian culture from the above point of view or attempts to build up a sociology of Indian culture must be broadbased enough to understand the culture not only at its various levels of ramification or patterning like tribal, folk and elite but also link their growth with historical processes. It may not be over-simplification to assume that various stages of cultural development and culture conflict in India held importance not only for the elite sub-structure of culture but used to keep the folk and tribal interests, at least at ideological level, in the forefront. The reflection of this trend in various reform movements in Indian culture can be easily demonstrated right from Buddha to Mahatma Gandhi. In the context of present culture change the trichotomy of elite, folk and tribe offers a fairly reliable conceptual tool for analysis of emerging phenomena like leadership, democratic values and their working and interaction of one sub-culture with another as a result of changes in Indian economic, constitutional and educational structure. With this aim in view, certain broad characteristics of each of the major cultural sub-structures are being briefly stated.

The Elite Sub-Structure

There has existed in India for more than 2500 years a great tradition which embraces within its fold, in a highly spohisticated and systematized form, the various disciplines of knowledge and arts found in ancient classical civilizations : religion and metaphysics, astronomy and astrology, mathematics, grammar, rhetoric and prosody, music, dramatics and aesthetics, *statecraft* and the arts of war and diplomacy, medicine, architecture, etc. This tradition has been various-

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ly referred to as the *Śāstric*, Brahamanic or Sanskritic. There have been changes in it, but on the whole the continuity of the tradition has been maintained. One important way in which this continuity has been maintained is to be found in the belief shared by all orthodox (*āstic*)[1] scholars and philosophers that the source of all knowledge are the *Vedas*—the most ancient sacred books which contain the voice of God Himself. This meant that whatever they said was not new, but was based ultimately on the common source—the Vedas. For instance, all the six major systems of Hindu metaphysics (*Māya, Sāmkhya, Yoga, Vaishesik, Pūrva Mimānsa* and *Uttar Mimānsa*) claimed that they derive their authority from the Vedas. How far such claims are justifiable is besides the point. Many intricate ideas in the realms of metaphysics, science and the various arts may have really originated much after the times in which the Vedas were composed; but the firm belief that all valid knowledge was contained in the Vedas and was to be derived ultimately from these, provided a strong thread that brought in a common line most of the varied elements in the elite culture of Hindus—the *Śāstric* or the Sanskritic culture.

Consistent with this belief, the *Śāstric* tradition gave no quarters to originality. "Original contributions" were not to be extolled; on the contrary, they were *ipso facto* suspects—for if they really said something new it must be wrong. This, however, did not stop creative thinking. What it meant in practice was only that expositions had to assume the form of interpretations. A scholar or a thinker did not claim that he was saying anything new; he only claimed to be interpreting the *Vedas* or some other works which themselves were supposed to be based on the *Vedas*. Thus, such a genius as Sankarâchârya expounded his philosophy through an interpretation (*bhāsya*) of the *Bhagwad Gitā*. To this day religious disputations are known as "*śāstrārtha*"—interpreting the meaning of the *śāstras*. This spirit must have gone a long way in preserving the continuity of the orthodox tradition.

To be sure, there were some movements, from times as far back as the 6th century B.C., which challenged the infallibility of the

1. In popular usages, the word *āstika* is taken to refer to a theist, one who believes in God. However, in its more specific, *traditional* meaning' it refers to one who believes in the infallibility of the Vedas. The antonym of *āstika* is *nāstika* which in the latter *sense-refers* to one who challanges the authority of the *Vedas*.

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Vedas. But they could hardly attain a lasting hold over the elite of India, comparable to the orthodox *Śrauta* tradition. Buddhism, the most well-known among these heterodox (*nāstika*) movements, could not survive in the land of its origin even though it spread far and wide outside India.



The elite sub-structure of Indian culture displays a rich growth of numerous forms and systems in different fields of knowledge and aesthetics. Some of these achieved an unmatched degree of excellence and refinement. Panini's grand system of grammar is one example.

The notable attribute in all aspects of the culture of the elite is the high degree of sophistication and systematisation. There is a marked consciousness of the attributes, a pressing urge to understand the principles and a persistant effort to systematise. This applies equally to language, metaphysical systems, and the various forms of art : poetry, music, painting, sculpture and architecture. In the analysis and practice of all these, the degree of sophistication and systematisation achieved in the traditional culture of the elite is very high indeed. The analytical study of language yielded a thorough-going system of grammar; and the language of the elite, Sanskrit, was consciously moulded, as its etimological meaning implies.[1] Saying a thing in as few words as possible was developed into an art. The ingenious formulae (*sūtras*) in various domains of learning are a tribute to the skill and perseverence of their authors. It is proverbial that if a scholar was able to reduce his writings even by a single letter "his joy equalled that of the birth of a son". Comparable efforts towards systematisation and refinement are found also in other aspects of the culture of the traditional elite. The metaphysician consistently developed an idea to its logical conclusion, without bothering about the consequences. The philosophers of arts erected magnificent and elaborate edifices of classical music, rhetoric and dramatics. Bharat's treatise on dramatics (*Nātyaśāstra*) furnishes a good example of what such endeavour could produce. This work shows how penetrating analysis and acute observation can lead to a systematic (and what appears to be strikingly modern) understanding of aesthetic experience and the technique of drama.

It is not difficult to see that proficiency in any aspect of the elite culture would require special training and practice over a long period. This would apply to the arts as well as to the various branches of knowledge. Thus, according to the elite tradition, to be a poet

ACC. No.
Class No.

1. The meaning of "Sanskrit" is cultured or sanctified.

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requires not only a training in rhetoric and prosodybut also a thorough knowledge of all the important *sastras* (disciplines). To be a musician or a dancer required a life time of single-minded pursuit and practice.

This being so, a member of the elite was not expected to put in any "bread-labour". Indeed the activities connected with the production of subsistence were considered inferior. In the ideal fourfold heirarchy the two highest *Varnas* are the Brahman and the Kshatriya. The Brahman is supposed to devote himself to the persuit of knowledge and priesthood. The Kshatriya is the warrior and the ruler. It is to these two classes that the elite generally belonged. The third Varna is that of the Vaisya—the trader. People belonging to this class were considered lower to the first two, but some of their more prosperous members could have acquired a place among the elite.

Members of the fourth and the lowest Varna, the Sudra were expected to serve the higher Varnas and work for the production of subsistence. It was hardly possible for a Sudra to be included among the elite. In some exceptional cases, however, a Sudra caste could possibly become the carrier of a part of the elite cultural tradition. Some castes which pursued classical music and dance may be cited as an example. It has to be pointed out, however, that even though the members of these groups might have been regarded as the best exponents of one particular strand of the elite tradition, they were not generally accepted as full members of the elite—they were rather considered to be serving the elites through those arts.

The above analysis shows that members of different classes had differential opportunities to become bearers of the elite tradition, and the members of the highest classes had the greatest opportunity in this respect. However, it would be wrong to conclude from this that all those who belonged to the upper classes in the traditional Indian society were active bearers of the elite tradition. A large part of the upper classes, *perhaps* the major part on the population basis, hardly had such a chance since several centuries before Christ; for, women who must have formed approximately one half of the population were for all practical purposes deprived of such opportunity in an adequate measure. Women, at least, since the classical age seem to have been, for the most part, carriers of the folk rather than the elite tradition. Indeed in classical Sanskrit dramas, including those of Kalidas, even the royal ladies do not speak Sanskrit (the language of the elite) but Prakrit (the language of the folk).

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The symbolic significance of this is telling enough. Moreover, in so far as language is the chief vehicle of culture the exclusion from the learning and use of the language of a tradition automatically excludes one from full participation in it. The exclusion of women from active participation in the elite sub-structure of culture is not incomprehensible in terms of the existing status of woman and the ideals about her role. Wifehood and motherhood were supposed to be pivotal roles for all normal women and it was recognised that these leave her neither time nor energy for the persuit of any specialised discipline of knowledge or art.[1] Only those women who were free from the obligations of wifehood and motherhood—such as the *ganikas* (courtesans)—could, therefore, actively function as bearers of the elite tradition. But such cases would naturally be only exceptional.

If all members of the upper classes cannot be regarded as active bearers of the elite tradition, all the urban people can be regarded so with even lesser justification. The upper classes must have formed only a small part of the total urban population—a large part must be constituted by various kinds of artisans, servants and common soldiers. These latter groups can hardly be expected to be active bearers of the elite tradition.

The elite sub-structure of the traditional Indian culture does show remarkable creativity in various directions. But this also includes an uncanny deftness in adapting and integrating within itself elements derived from the folk and the tribal traditions. This process was made easier because of a high degree of tolerance in intellectual matters which characterised the Hindu elite tradition. Though the tradition rigorously imposed some norms of conduct, it allowed a wide latitude in matters of belief. This allowed for example, the integration of widely divergent religious beliefs and rites, derived from cultures at widely different levels, into a harmonious whole. This accounts to a great extent for the continuity of tradition of elite culture in India, just as the caste system accounts largely[2] for the persistence of social structure.

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1. A. K. Coomaraswamy, "The Status of Indian Woman", *The Dance of Siva* Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1948, pp. 115—139; esp. p. 118.

2. The caste system enables the Hindu society to integrate diverse racial and culture groups—both tribal and otherwise, into a harmonious structure without requiring them to give up their identity. of. Hutton. *Caste in India*, Oxford University Press, 1961, p. 115.

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The Folk Sub-Structure

The vast majority of Indian population throughout the historical times has been the bearer of the folk tradition of culture. This cultural tradition is oral—it is carried on by word of mouth and does not depend, directly, on books. Yet, it is not to be confused with the tribal traditions. It differs from them in one fundamental repsect : cultural tradition of a tribe is a self-contained whole, whereas the folk tradition is essentially a part—a sub-structure in the true sense of the word. The folk tradition continually interacts with the elite tradition. The folk tradition would not be itself without this interaction. It cannot be adequately understood without reference to the elite tradition.

It would be wrong, however, to think that culture only filters down to the folk from the elite. The process is a circular one, just as the folk sub-structure borrows some elements from the elite culture and imbibes them through a process of reworking, so also the elite sub-structure borrows elements from the folk culture and integrates them in its own system after necessary refinement. The percolation of cultural elements, upwards and downwards, has been going on for a long time, and therefore, it is difficult to decide for many items whether they originated first among the folk or the elite. However, the movement of some elements from the folk to the elite is obvious enough. Thus, many folk melodies have been reworked and included among the classical ragas.[1] The same can be said of many elements from other fields of arts and knowledge.

The view, therefore, that the folk are completely uncreative is erroneous. This view has been explicitly put forward by some scholars[2] and uncritically accepted by others.[3] Evidence from the interaction between the folk and elite sub-structures of culture shows that if the folk have borrowed some elements from the elite they have also lent some other elements to the latter. Moreover, some existing elements in the culture of the folk—even though brilliant and exquisite in their own way, could hardly have originated among the elite. For instance, many obscene pieces of folk-literatures show an ample amount of imaginativeness and ingenuity, but these could hardly have been com-

1. D. P. Mukerjee, *Indian Music*, Poona, Kutub, Publishers pp. 9—12.
2. e. g. Lord Raglan, A. M. Hocart and T. F. Henderson.
3. Even Redfield says : "In a civilization there is a great tradition of the reflective few, and there is a little tradition of the largely unreflective many." *Peasant Society and Culture*, p.70.

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posed by the elite. If the folk could by themselves compose these, there appears to be no reason to take for granted that the folk are incapable of composing the other non-obscene ones.

Another aspect of the Indian folk tradition which needs emphasis is its spread. Many writers have assumed that folk culture is necessarily local or parochial. This does not seem to be correct, except with regard to some superficial features. It is true that there is a vast variation of dialects from place to place, among the folk. But if one goes a bit deeper beneath these superficial differences he is struck by the fundamental unity of ideas, values, institution, and cultural forms among the folk. Even though, the outer expressions appear to be very varied, the spirit and the basic patterning in most aspects of culture is fundamentally the same.

For instance, each village seems to have some gods which are its own, but if we study them comparatively it will be found that systems of belief and rites are basically the same among the folk almost throughout India, while these may be at variance with the elite religious systems in some respects. Apart from some common gods and goddesses which the folk have in common throughout India, the ones that appear to be tied to a village also are different from each other only in name. The underlying ideas about the nature of dieties, and man-diety relationships remain almost the same. Even the mythological accounts related with corresponding types of dieties in different villages have common motifs, though there may be variations in proper names. As examples of dieties worshipped by the folk throughout India may be mentioned the Serpent God[1] (*Nāg*) and the Goddess of Smallpox (*Śhitalā*). As an example of fundamental similarity between local gods of different villages, the guardian diety of the fields of each village, may be mentioned. This diety is known by different names in different parts of India, but basic characteristics of the diety and its cult are more or less common throughout. The same applies to other village gods of a corresponding type.

A comparative study of the folk literature of various parts of India also upholds the view that the folk tradition has a wide spread—it is almost pan-Indic like the elite tradition. Many folk songs, epic poems, tales, proverbs, riddles and mnemonic and magical formulae have very wide popularity cutting across many linguistic

1. For an *excellent* study of serpent cult in India, see J. Ph.Vogel, *Indian Serpent Lore*, London : Aurther Propethain. One is struck by the similarity of the cult throughout India.

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and how Westernisation promotes Sanskritization.[1] But none of them has been able to give satisfactory answer to these questions. More adequate answers could perhaps be found if these processes were considered in the historical perspective of a medieval society changing into a modern one. The process of Sanskritisation could then have become comparable with some of the religious movements which marked this era in other civilisations in a similar situation. In any case, an adequate analysis of such phenomena can be made only in a sufficiently broad historical perspective.[2]

It has to be noted that the folk culture is not confined to villages, even though the bulk of the villagers have been bearers of the folk tradition. As has been pointed out in the analysis regarding the elite sub-structure, in the towns also the lower classes are generally the bearers of the folk tradition. Even among the upper classes in towns, the women are not active bearers of the elite tradition; they generally are steeped in the folk sub-structure of culture. Thus the folk tradition has had a very wide coverage. It traditionally has hold over the bulk of the rural population, the lower class people in towns, and most of the womenfolk even of the upper classes.

It is obvious that the bearers of the folk and the elite cultures have been living very close to each other. Even in the same family some persons may be active bearers of the elite tradition and some others may have belonged largely to the folk. Indeed, many individuals must have been carriers of both the traditions partially.

How was it that these two traditions could flow side by side without causing much friction and without trying to swallow each other ? The answer to this lies in the fact that both of them shared a common world view. Both were based on the same fundamental values. The folk and the elite subscribed to common metaphysical justifications of the existent social order. The difference between the two culture sub-structures therefore, is not of viewpoint or of fundamental content but only that of the degree of sophistication, systematisation and specialisation. These characteristics marked off the elite culture from that of the folk.

In the folk tradition there was hardly any specialised training in religion, metaphysics, literature, music, etc. One learnt in the ordi-

1. Apart from Srinivas himself, Gould and others.
2. For instance, the analysis presented by Ramkrishana Mukerjee in the *Dynamics of a Rural Society* shows how the change in the rural class structure in Bengal is linked with the rise of industrial capital in Britain.

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nary course of life, through participation. In group singing, the differences between the poet and the musician, the composer and the performer, and even the artist and the audience vanished. There was little room for professionalism in the fields of knowledge and arts. It were these characteristics of the folk tradition, rather than those of any fundamental content, themes and symbols that distinguished the folk cultural sub-structure from the elite.

This does not mean, however, that folk ideas or artistic expressions are raw products of the instincts. Even a casual study would reveal that the folk forms, such as the songs, have traditional patterning of own which have been very stable indeed. The difference from the elite mainly is, that in the folk tradition the principles underlying the forms are not clearly perceived, abstracted and systematised.

The Tribal Traditions

We cannot speak of tribal culture as a sub-structure in the same sense in which we refer to the folk culture. The reason for this is that the folk culture is a part-culture. It can be understood adequately only in relation to the elite culture (which again is a cultural sub-structure). The folk and the elite traditions taken together form a whole—the one cannot be conceived without the other. This elite-folk cultural system is almost pan-Indian. Even if there are marked regional differences, the continuity nevertheless exists.

Tribal cultures on the other hand are essentially wholes. A tribal culture may have borrowed from other cultures but this borrowing need not be continuous and it is not essential for its existence. In so far as a tribal culture remains intact, it is a cultural system in itself. It is not a cultural sub-structure like the folk or the elite.

It may be that a tribal culture may come so close to the elite-folk cultural system that it becomes dependent on it. But when this happens, that culture hardly remains a tribal culture in the true sense. It becomes a part of the folk, or, under exceptional circumstances, of the elite tradition. Indeed, this has been happening all along; and thus many tribes have turned into castes. Some tribes may be midway in their path towards becoming castes.

But many tribal cultures in India have maintained their identity through relative isolation. To these, Redfields' four characteristics of the Little Community : small size, homogeneity, distinctiveness and all pervasive self-sufficiency, apply to a great extent. Here cultural characteristics and structural features go hand in hand. A group

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bearing a tribal cultural tradition can be easily distinguished from other groups. The same cannot be said of the folk and the elite traditions.

While talking about the tribal culture in India, we have always to bear in mind that there are many tribal cultures. We cannot talk of "the Indian tribal culture" in the same way as we talk of the Indian elite culture. Tribes are scattered all around the vast land of India and many of them do not have much cultural give and take with each other. Different tribes show great diversity in the economic technological, institutional and magico-religious patterns. Contacts through the ages with the Indian elite-folk civilization has certainly given many of them some common colour, but fundamentally they stand apart from each other and from the mainstream. In so far as the tribal cultures are self-contained wholes, they do not constantly draw upon the elite store of knowledge, values and arts. Indeed, they need not look upon the pan-Indic culture as higher to their own. The tribes may have their elites within themselves, but tribal cultures are relatively homogenous. There is no leisure class and room for specialised persuit of knowledge and arts. The elites, therefore, do not normally form distinct, stable groups or traditions.

Some of the salient cultural characteristics of these three may be summarised in the form of a chart given below :

Interaction between the Cultural Sub-Structures

The above discussion introduces us to three types of culture streams which have co-existed in India for more than 2500 years.

Only the outlines of the form of these have been brought-out—the analysis of concrete contents would require much further study of facts.

However, a general picture of the broad cultural pattern in pre-modern era is clear : the main stream consists of two sub-streams, which flow side by side, on the same rock bed, so to say, but on different levels; their waters intermingle at a number of points but neither of these streams shows an inclination to swallow the other. Apart from these there are a number of pools of tribal cultures, which are essentially independent of each other, and also of the two tier main streams. Occasionally, such a tribal pool may come so close to the main stream—usually to its lower (folk) tier—that it becomes a part of the latter. Then it loses its identity. Another possibility is that a pool takes some elements from another pool or a stream but then recedes to re-establish its identity (this would explain the existence of

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Cultural Sub-structures in India

Aspects of culture	Elite	Folk	Tribal Culture
Spreading of culture	Part-culture. Pan-India and Regional	Part-culture. Regional-Pan-India	Whole cultures Localised and Nomadic
Extension	Mainly urban and masculine	Rural and urban	Isolated localised.
Main structural Elements	Varna (*ideal*) caste stratification	Caste stratification	Clan organisation (varying degrees of stratification)
Social Codes	Elaborate Treatises on rules and ritual forms. Centralised authority	Customary rules Panchayats and local councils to enforce codes	Customary-indigenous and diverse
Dominant & Variant-Mental Patterns	Intellectual-Moral-Imaginative	Moral-Imaginative Intellectual	Imaginative-Moral-Intellectual
Forms of Knowledge Religion and Art	Articulate, self-conscious, systematic, specialised and professional. Constant interaction with folk	Traditional but less systematic and specialised. Constant interaction with elite	Multiplicity of traditions-Not articulate-systematic, specialised and professional. Relatively isolated from folk and elite
Communication of Tradition	Through written language, books and other formal media	Oral (related to elite forms)	Oral (isolated)

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some traits derived from the elite and the folk cultures in a tribe, which nevertheless remains structurally exclusive).

One important question is : Why did not one of the sub-streams show an inclination to swallow the other ? Especially why did not the elite tradition damage the folk-tradition by its constant interaction. The answer to this question lies in the complementary nature of the elite and the folk sub-structures :

(1) Both traditions were incomplete by themselves.

(2) No clash of fundamental interests (economic, political, ideological) was involved.

(3) There was a sharing of basic values and beliefs in the same criteria of hierarchy (both institutional and of values).

However, with the impact of modern social forces the relationship between the elite and the folk traditions has been vitally disturbed. The first to change perhaps are the seats of the elite tradition, the urban centres. In the urban centres a new middle class has been growing and assuming the role of the bearer of the elite tradition. But this middle class has a world view that is radically different from that of the folk (and also of the earlier elite). Modern elite would also not let alone the folk and be satisfied with a part of their produce as the earlier elite were. This new elite feels impelled to change the folk also by selling factory made products to them; by employing them as workers in modern factories or offices, and trying to make them efficient; by giving them franchise and drawing them into a new kind of political arena; by giving them modern education and trying *to get them rid of superstitions.* This has thrown the traditional elite-folk-tribe relationship into a melting pot. What the future pattern will be, we need not try to predict here. We must note, however, that it is this change in the elite-folk-tribe relationship that is instrumental in bringing about fundamental social changes in the life of the masses. including the village folk.

Before the modern times, there have been cases when the processes of interaction between the elite and the folk currents have been accelerated. This has happened in periods of crisis—e.g., the rise of the *sant* movements after the Muslim impact. But then the balance was restored on the old lines. Now it will be reset on basically different lines—even the cultural streams of whose balance we have been talking will get changed radically.

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Of all the three substructures in India, perhaps the elite has been the most dynamic and active cultural tradition. Right from the Vedic times to the modern there have taken place significant changes in the structure, principle of selection, and socio-cultural role of elites. Some characteristics, however, have remained still intact. The social structural affiliation of the elite in traditional Indian culture had been with princes, Brahmin priests and scholars and guild masters, most of these statuses being ascribed and closed. Rise of Buddhism and its fall, and establishment of the Muslim rule brought some changes in the social structure of elite by rearrangements within the elite hierarchy but the principle of elite selection and its economic and cultural characteristics remained unchanged.

The growth of British rule for the first time started a chain reaction of jural, ethical, administrative and cultural reforms and reformulations which vitally shook the sociocultural and economic foundation of earlier elites. However, though British rule in India created some completely new elite sub-structures like the bureaucracy (military and administrative), judiciary, professional hierarchy of lawyers and university and college teachers, doctors and engineers and industrialists, it for diplomatic reasons allowed the landed aristocracy and princes of the past to occupy important elite position. Thus, double standards were ushered in the social structure and principle of selection of elites. But its "democratization" as Karl Mannheim calls it had still not taken place. This, however, happened after the freedom of the nation when speedy steps were taken to abolish the princedoms, Zamindari system and intermediary right, and adult franchize was introduced as political right of every adult individual. Full scope was thus created for the democratization of elite structure, and principle of ascription was replaced by achievement or competition. In one form, however, aacription was maintained—the special status given to scheduled cases, dspressed castes, communities and tribes, in the Constitution for vearious socio-economic opportunities. In a society which for more than two thousand years had been hierarchical, non-equalitaan, dominated by the feudal-handicraft-agrarian complex of economy the modern challenge of equalitarian industrial democracy at all levels of socio-cultural framework is a great leap in the unknown. The modern-elite is not only selected on a different principle but the internal hierarchy of the same has been modified; whereas traditionally, the princes or top-bureaucrats who had training in elite culture since birth occupied the position of highest power, the modern democratic structure gives this position to political leaders who generally belong

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to lower middle class culture—lower classes being still alien to elite social sub-structure, and who have to work with bureaucrats in a position of subordinate. This situation may not only create unforeseen problems in bureaucratic structure but may have consequences to the determination of prestige hierarchy in terms of position, status and office. This itself would have not an insignificant cultural repercussion or chain reaction.

In fact the processes of changed in the modern Indian elite structure offer a very fruitful area of research in the Indian sociology of culture to which many observations of this essay may have merely hypothetical value, as an accurate picture can emerge only after systematic enquiry. The studies that have been conducted in this field by historians and economists suffer from narrowness of perspective and approach.

Another characteristic of the new elite lies in its changed mode of interaction with the folk and tribe. Throughout history in India perhaps folk and tribes have relatively remained unaffected by historical vicissitudes', folk always adapting to changing elite structure which never tried to change the folk, and tribes remaining isolated. The modern elite wants to change both the folk and the tribe and its democratic principle of selection makes them active partners in the rank structure of the elite. Thus, for the first time a new mode of interaction between the three sub-cultures has emerged.

Concluding Remarks

Some problems of Indian sociology of culture that have been raised here with reference to three major socio-cultural streams present a comprehensive panorama of change and growth. Studies in the folk (peasant) and tribal culture integration and change have been conducted, but the elite forms of the same and its interaction on the gestalt of Indian culture has been neglected. Moreover, no attempts have so far been made to see the interlocking and inter-communication among the three. The sociology of Indian culture, should on the one hand constitute a systematic analysis of these aspects of culture, and on the other be oriented towards derivative issues of consequence, raised by Mannheim, Parsons and Weber, etc. A theoretical problem which has practical significance also is the relationship between tribe folk and the elite. This problem has intrigued sociologists of India for a long time and extreme views about it have been expressed—from tribe being '*Aadivasi*' to a 'segmental' feature of Indian social structure. Elites in this scheme of classification would refer not to isolated

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community or group but differentiated complex of roles which may be common to folk as well as to tribe.

The trichotomy does not propound segmental theory of cultures but provides analytical categories for comprehension and understanding of the synchronic and diachronic aspects of Indian culture vis-a-vis social structure.

Within this framework, there are many aspects of socio-cultural changes in India which have not been directly raised here but which are implicitly involved. Some of these include : (1) emerging nature and structure of elite, its democratisation ; its dependence upon folk and tribe and its consequences in Indian politico-cultural field; (2) the structure of professional bureaucrats and scientists, their changing role in modern India; (3) growth of political ideologies and its sustenance with relation to folk and tribal streams; (4) emerging values of democracy, secularism, individual rights and freedom and its consequences on culture and social structure. These problems are such that a casual reference to them by way of analysis may be presumptuous at this place. What is needed is a systematic study of these problems with reference to three sub-structures of culture mentioned above.

In presenting the above analysis the hope is that this trichotomy of cultural types will help us to take a comprehensive view of culture in India. We shall be able to locate the part about which we are talking, with the help of this frame. Moreover, this frame should facilitate comparative sociological studies of different aspects of culture such as knowledge, religion, art, literature, music—between various traditions in Indian culture and with corresponding traditions in the cultures of other countries.

It is hoped that the frame outlined above provides a useful tool for the analysis of the internal dynamics of culture in India. It also provides a strategy for the study of the modern impact. For instance, many contemporary changes in the villages will remain unexplained if studied at the folk level alone; by focussing our attention to the changing folk-elite relationship, many of the deeper aspects of this change may be revealed.

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Part II

Sociology of Culture and Civilization

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CHAPTER I

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The place of the theory of civilization in the sociology of culture

—Don Martindale

The term "civilization" referring to an advanced state of society characterized by developed arts, science, and religion did not come into currency until recent times. In 1772 Doctor Johnson still declined to include it in his dictionary. However, with the increased interaction between Europeans and peoples with less complex social orders, the term came widely into use in the nineteenth century. Moreover, when information was assembled on so-called "barbaric" and "primitive" peoples, some ethnographers began to insist that many peoples without cities were nevertheless highly "civilized". Alongside the older meaning of "civilization" as an advanced state of society appeared another : the unique type of culture of a people—as in the case of Polynesian or Maori civilization.

As the term "culture" also came into general use, the need was felt to distinguish between the two terms. Some German writers began to employ the term "civilization" for the technical apparatus of human society (for science, technology, and material equipment) and the term "culture" for the non-material apparatus of human society (his art, religion, philosophy), but this never became universal. Also, at times, the term "culture" has been restricted to the society and social forms of preliterate peoples, and the term "civilization" has been retained for the society and social forms of literate peoples.

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This usage still appears, as in the writings of Spengler and Toynbee.

In addition to these special usages is the practice of a large number of students employing the term "culture" in a generic sense for the sum total of man's social heritage, whether material or non-material. The term "civilization" is then taken to refer to a specific organised system of culture of a comprehensive and enduring sort. This usage will be followed here.

Only in the nineteenth century did the sum of man's social heritage, his culture, fall under the purview of science. As the science of culture began to assume its present form, two events of major importance marked its progress : (1) the establishment of the existence of comprehensive systems of culture—of civilizations; and (2) the investigation of the principles of civilization formation. The first of these events occurred in the course of the transition from eighteenth century rationalism to nineteenth century romanticism. The second has only recently got under way.

In the following pages the rise of the contemporary theory of civilization will be traced and a provisional attempt will be made to locate it, together with closely related disciplines, in the general science of culture.

Rationalism, Romanticism, and the Concept of Civilization

The eighteenth century has special importance for all students of the western world, for it sustained a series of revolutions which ushered in the contemporary national state. Prior to these revolutions under the absolute monarchies which proved to be transitional between the feudal and modern worlds, an advanced section of the intellectual spokesmen of the times was inspired by deep confidence in the possibilities of human progress. In the name of human rationality and progress, these opinion leaders sought to clear away the debris of the Middle Ages. In the words of Cassirer, "reason" had become "the unifying and central point of this century, expressing all that it longs and strives for, and all that it achieves."[1]

The enlightenment thinkers were firmly convinced that the essence of man was his rationality. The world, moreover, had a natural order which, while independent of his mind, was discoverable by reason.

1. Ernst Cassirer, *The Philosophy of the Enlightenment*, translated by Fritz C.A. Koelin and James P. Pettegrove (Boston : Beacon Press, 1951), p. 5. realpatidar.com

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> One should not seek order, law, and 'reason' as a rule that may be grasped and expressed prior to the phenomena, as their *a priori*; one should rather discover such regularity in the phenomena themselves, as the form of their imminent connection[1].

In one of the major products of eighteenth century psychology, Condillac's *Treatise on Sensation*, the spheres of material and mental phenomena were reduced to common elements subject to the same laws.

> The third sphere of reality is that which we find in the structure of the state and of society...Society must submit to being treated like a physical reality under investigation.... The general will of the state is treated as if it were composed of the wills of individuals and had come into being as a result of the union of these wills.[2]

These suppositions laid the foundation for a modern science of culture by naturalizing man and his works, making them a fit subject of scientific study.

It follows from the presuppositions of rationalism—the rationality of man and the lawfulness of nature and society—that human culture is not only natural but universal. However, the universality of human culture must be squared with the fact that it manifests itself in different ways from place to place. Montesquieu analyzed these variations as different expressions of the general spirit of mankind.

> Mankind are influenced by various causes : by the climate, by religion, by the laws, by the maxims of government, by precedents, morals, and customs; whence is formed a general spirit of nations...In proportion as, in every country, any one of these cause acts with more force, the others in the same degree are weakened. Nature and the climate rule almost alone over the savages; customs govern the Chinese; the laws tyrannize in Japan; morals had formerly all their influence at Sparta; maxims of government, and the ancient simplicity of manners, once prevailed at Rome.[3]

As a result of the differential operation of such facts, the character of peoples is a composition of good and bad qualities. The Spanish, Montesquieu believed, join honesty with indolence; the Chinese combine prodigious industry with greed. Other societies have other compositions.

1. *Ibid.*, p. 9.
2. *Ibid.*, pp. 18—19.
3. Baron de Montesquieu, *The Spirit of the Laws,* translated by Thomas Nugent (New York: Hafner, 1949). pp. 293-294.

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Within the framework of universal culture, Montesquieu began to isolate local drifts and eddies produced by special circumstances. He and other rationalists nevertheless held out the possibility that by the manipulation of local training and circumstance cultural contrast could be modified or eliminated, for in the background was a common, rational, human nature which responded in the same manner to similar conditions. The isolation of systems of culture (civilization) was always subordinated to the universality of man.

While the presuppositions of rationalism dominated an advanced section of European opinion, from around the middle of the seventeenth century a rival point of view—eventually to be described as "romantic" —began to gain currency.[1]

The romantic point of view was first evident in literature. When it first gained currency in aesthetic criticism, the term "romanticism" referred to the "imaginative", "extraordinary", and "visionary" elements which in some literary circles were beginning to be appreciated more highly than form, classical balance, and logical clarity— the prized literary qualities of the enlightenment.[2] During the course of the eighteenth century the term "romantic"ceased to be merely aesthetic, coming to designate a group of experiences, emotions, and sentiments which lay outside the rationalistic conception of rational human nature : fantasy, unrepressed passion, and deep feeling.

As the romantic conception of man, nature, and society gained coherent form, basic contrasts to rationalism became apparent. In place of the concept that the essence of man was his reason, the romantics found man's most significant characteristics in inspiration and demonic frenzy; in place of the rationalistic evaluation of order, the romantic doctrines of the infinite and progress were posed; in place of the rationalistic preference for the methods of reason, there appeared the romantic evaluation of irrational, superrational, mystical, occultist, magical, and intuitive procedures; in religion in place of the Deism of the rationalists, there arose new cults of emotionalism and enthusiasm (English Methodism, German Pietism, the mystic fervor of Johann Hamann and Swedenborg); in place of the rationalistic conception of the superiority of civilization to primitive society there appeared the romantic doctrine of the natural poetic genius

1. G. A. Borgese, "Romanticism." in the *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences* (New York: The Macmillan Co, 1948), Vol. XIII, p. 426.
2. Arthur O. Lhvejhy, *Essay on the History of Ideas* Baltimore : The John Hopkins Press, 1948), pp. 183 ff..

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of primitive peoples; in place of the rationalistic conception of the rational equality of men there appeared the romantic cult of genius; and finally, in place of the primacy of the individual to the group there appeared the romantic conception of society as a super-individual organism and the glorification of the state. These changes of supposition had important consequences for the theory of civilization.

The romantic conception of civilization (that is, of total systems or culture) came to fruition in Hegel's *Philosophy of History*. The starting point for his formulation seems to bear superficial similarities to those of the rationalists, in as much as like them he places the problem of reason in central focus in his analysis of social life.

> The only Thought which Philosophy brings with it to the contemplation of History, is the simple conception of *Reason*; that Reason is the Sovereign of the World; that the history of the world, therefore, presents us with a rational process.[1]

However, Hegel's Reason bears little resemblance to the Reason of the Rationalists. Reason for the rationalists was the universally distributed faculty for logical and rational thinking of individual men. This did not necessarily imply that human history followed a rational course. Hegel's Reason, by contrast, is not a property of the individual mind, but of collective experience. It is the "World-Spirit" that is rational; its "nature is always one and the same, but which unfolds its one nature in the phenomena of the World's existence."[2] The *individuals* in whom Hegel's Reason is manifest are not single persons, but peoples.

> In the history of the World, the *Individuals* we have to do with are *Peoples*; Totalities that are states.[3]

While the rationalists were convinced that reason (individual good sense) is approximately equally distributed in all individual persons, making one man as important as any other, Hegel was convinced that only a restricted category of men manifest the Reason of the World-Spirit, making them historically important. "Historical men—World-Historical Individuals—are those in whose aims...a general principle lies."[4]

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1. G. W. F. Hegel *The Philosophy of History*, translated by J, Sibree (New York: Villey, 1944), p. 9.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 10.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 14.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 29.

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Such historical men are driven by private purposes which involve the great issues of the World-Spirit.

> They may be called Heroes, in as much as they have derived their purposes and their vocation, not from the calm, regular course of things, sanctioned by the existing order, but from a concealed fount... from that inner Spirit, still hidden beneath the surface.... Such individuals had no consciousness of the general Idea they were unfolding, while prosecuting those aims of theirs; on the contrary, they were practical, political men. But at the same time they were thinking men, who had an insight into the requirements of the time—*what was ripe for development*.[1]

When the mission of such heroes of history is accomplished, they "fall off like empty hulls from the kernel. 'They die early, like Alexander; they are murdered, like Caesar; transported to St. Helena, like Napoleon."[2]

Individual persons are merely the subjective aspects of the world-spirit which is objectively manifest in the State. Morality and Truth are properties of the collective and not of the individual person.

> The State is the actually existing realized moral life. For it is the Unity of the Universal, essential Will, with that of the Individual; and this is 'Morality.'
>
> Truth is the Unity of the universal and subjective Will; the Universal is to be found in the State, in its laws, its universal and rational arrangements. The State is the Divine Idea as it exists on Earth.[3]

Only that individual person is free who conforms to the order of the state.

> Freedom of a low and limited order is mere caprice, which finds its exercise in the sphere of particular and limited desires....When the State or our country constitutes a community of existence; when the subjective will of man submits to its laws—the contradiction between Liberty and Necessity vanishes.[4]

In short, individual freedom is conformance to collective necessity.

1. *Ibid.*, p. 31.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 31.
3. *Ibid.*, pp. 38—39.
4. *Ibid.*, pp. 38—39.

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If we take the term "civilization" to refer to a comprehensive system of culture, it is evident that both the rationalists (as evidenced by Montesquieu) and the romantics (as evidenced by Hegel) have recognized the existence of civilizations and have assigned importance to them for the understanding of social and historical life. However, the rationalists and the romantics offer quite different estimates of the nature and importance of civilization. To the rationalists, any particular civilization (Montesquieu would describe it as a special spirit of a nation) is a local eddy in universal human culture. To the romantics, any particular civilization (Hegel would describe it as the integrated spirit of a people or a State) is a special embodiment of the objective Reason or the World-Spirit. For the rationalists, a civilization is a by-product of individual activitiy; for the romantics, a civilization is the primary cause of individual activity. For the rationalists, causal priority lies with the individual: for the romantics, causal priority is assigned to the collective.

In the course of the development of western thought from the eighteenth to the nineteenth century, the modern concept of civilization was born. The enlightenment thinkers recognized civilizations as local eddies in the general drift of universal human culture. Such local eddies were secondary rather than primary social phenomena. The romantics of the nineteenth century seized upon these phenomena that their predecessors had described as "the spirit of particular nations," and transformed them into the primary manifestations of the World-Spirit in human history. More was involved in this new analysis than a mere change of emphasis. To the rationalist the individual is primary, the collective (and the spirit of the collective) is secondary; to the romantic the collective is primary, and the individual is only the local and subjective aspect of the collective mind.

The mutual exchange of criticism by adherents of these two approaches to the problem of civilization led to the increasing disrepute of their key terms. One rarely finds in scholarly discourse the individualistic concept of the "spirit of the particular nation" or the collectivistic concept of *Volksgeist* any longer employed. However, the positions have persisted under new euphemisms. The term, "climate of opinion," is widely employed by contemporary adherents of the individualistic approach to civilization. The term "*milieu*," on the other hand, is widely used by adherents of the collectivistic approach to civilization. The concept of civilization (designating general systems of culture) has thus been fixed as part of the intellectual heritage of

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western man, and through various euphemisms individualistic and collectivistic theories of civilization have been pursued.

Three Twentieth Century Analyses of Civilization

In the twentieth century collectivistic analyses of civilization have generally been pursued more systematically and vigorously than individualistic analysis. The three most dramatic of these are the studies of Spengler, Toynbee, and Sorokin.

Oswald Spengler carried out his analysis of civilization from the standpoint of the same basic contrast of spirit and nature as Hegel. "The *world-as-history*, conceived, viewed, and given form, from out of its opposite, the *world-as-nature*—here is a new aspect of human existence on this earth."[1] In Spengler's view, different methods of thought are required for understanding each of these spheres. History is understood on the basis of Analogy; nature on the basis of Mathematical Law.

> There is, besides, a necessity of cause and effect—which I may call the *logic of space*—another necessity, an organic-necessity in life, that of Destiny—the *logic of time*.[2]

Organic necessity (Destiny) characterizes religion, art, in fact the whole of history. What diaries and autobiographies are to individuals, histories are to the developments of people as a whole. History studies the soul of a culture.[3]

Based upon these contrasts, Spengler lined up his concepts in a number of peculiar ways. A culture was taken to be an organic system of collective life born in the soul of a peasant folk bound to the soil and sustaining a peculiar conception of man and nature. The evolution of this culture begins when a people attempts to realize itself in objective form. Every culture gives rise to its own peculiar civilization. A peculiar civilization thus is the destiny of a culture.

> Civilizations are the most external and artificial states of which a species of developed humanity is capable. They are a conclusion, the thing-become succeeding the thing-becoming, death following life, rigidity following expansion, intellectual age and the stone-

1. Oswald Spengler, *The Decline of the West* (New York : Alfred A Knopf, 1929), Vol. I, p. 6. The opening pages of Hegel's *Philosophy of History* contain similar formulations.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 7.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 9.

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> built, petrifying world-city following mother-earth and the spiritual childhood of Doric and Gothic. They are an end, irrevocable yet by inward necessity reached again and again.[1]

Pure civilization consists in the objectification of forms that by this very process have become inorganic and dead. In place of a folk born of the soil, there appears a restless, nomadic civic mass. In place of the epic (the literature of the soil), there appears the drama and the novel (the literature of the city). In place of the genuine folk song, there is civic lyricism. In place of peasant art, there appear urban painting and architecture.[2]

> The stone Colossus 'Cosmopolis' stands at the end of the life's course of every great Culture. The Culture-man whom the land has spiritually formed is seized and possessed by his own creation, the city, and is made into its creature, its executive organ, and finally, its victim. This stony mass is the absolute city. Its image, as it appears with all its grandiose beauty..contains the whole noble death-symbolism of the definitive thing-become.

Spengler published his *Decline of the West* in 1918. The problem of civilization central to it was taken up once again by Toynbee in his *Study of History*, the first volume of which appeared in 1934. Like Spengler, Toynbee proposed that the basic unit of historical study is neither mankind as a whole nor the nation-state, but the society, (the civilization). The central characteristic of any given society Toynbee believes, is the direction taken by *mimesis* or imitation. Societies of the past and present were divided into two species: primitive societies characterized by a mimesis directed toward the past, ancestors, and tradition, giving the society a static structure; civilizations are societies in which mimesis is directed toward creative personalities. We can, Toynbee maintains, identify twenty specimens of civilizations and around 650 primitive societies.

In a manner suggestive of Spengler, Toynbee sees civilization as an evolution out of primitive society.

> Primitive societies...may be likened to a people lying torpid upon a ledge on a mountainside, with a precipice below and a

1. *Ibid.*, p. 31
2. *Ibid.*, Vol. II, p. 193.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 99.
4. Arnold Toynbee, *A Study of History* (London : Oxford University Press, 1934), Vol. I, p. 148.

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precipice above: civilizations may be likened to companions of these 'Sleepers of Ephesus' who have just risen to their feet and have started to climb up the face of the cliff.[1]

Toynbee argues that though we may rely on the ordinary methods of science and search the various external factors (such as race and environment) for the origins of civilizations, we are disappointed. The genesis of civilizations is not the result of biological or geographical factors acting singly or jointly. If we are to discover the true genesis of civilizations, we will find it necessary to "shut our eyes, for the moment, to the formulae of Science in order to open our ears to the language of Mythology."[2] In a methodological parallel to Spengler, Toynbee suggests that methods appropriate to the study of physical things are inappropriate to the study of human-social affairs.

> We have the choice of conceiving this relation either as an interaction between two inhuman forces...or as an encounter between two super-human personalities.... Let us yield our minds to the second of these two conceptions. Perhaps it will lead us toward the light.
>
> An encounter between two super-human personalities is the plot of some of the greatest satires and dramas that the human imagination has conceived. An encounter between Yahweh and the Serpent is the plot of the story of the Fall of Man in the Book of Genesis; a second encounter between the same antagonists... is the plot of the New Testament which tells the story of Redemption ; an encounter between the Lord and Satan is the plot of the Book of Job; an encounter between the Lord and Mephistopheles is the plot of Goethe's *Faust*; an encounter between Gods and Demons is the plot of the Scandinavian *Voluspa*; an encounter between Artemis and Aphrodite is the plot of Euripides Hippolytus.[3]

These and a host of similar examples suggest to Toynbee that the essential event in the birth of civilization out of primitive society, mythologically mirrored in the story of the temptation of man by the devil, is a challenge and a response. The most immediate result of this temptation is the casting of man from the Garden of Eden.

> The first stage... in the human protagonist's ordeal is a transition from Yin to Yang through a dynamic act—performed by God's

1. *Ibid.*, pp. 192-193. The "precipice above" is, perhaps, a hole in the sky.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 271.
3. *Ibid.*, pp. 271-272.

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> creature under temptation from the adversary....The second stage in the human protagonist's ordeal is the crisis. He realizes that his dynamic act, which had re-liberated the creative power of his Master and Maker, has set his own feet on a course whic is leading him to suffering and death.[1]

Toynbee appears determined to restore the Biblical story of Genesis at the core of contemporary social science. The birth of "civilization" is found in "a challenge from the human environment." This challenge "begins with a differentiation and culminates in a succession"[2].

There are major similarities between the analyses of civilization. by Toynbee and Spengler. Even Spengler's notion that a unique type of method is necessary for the analysis of history finds a parallel in Toynbee's recourse to the "language of mythology." In both cases, the spiritual act which gives birth to new development externalizes itself as a civilization which turns, in the end, into an empty shell

A few years after the appearance of the first volume of Toynbee's *Study of History*, the third major twentieth century study of civilization Sorokin's *Social and Cultural Dynamics*, appeared.

Sorokin accepted the concept of culture in the general sense understood by social scientists since Tylor as "the sum total of everything which is created or modified by the conscious or unconscious activity of two or more individuals."[3]

Man's culture can, he argues, be organized in four basic ways : (1) spatially or mechanically, (2) by association with an external factor, (3) causally or functionally, and (4) internally or logico-meaningfully. The spatial or mechanical relation of the elements of culture is illustrated by any collection of cultural items, even the debris of a dump. The association of a number of cultural items through a common external factor (but without functional or logical connection) is illustrated by the collection of items brought together in a ski lodge (winter clothes, liquor, skis, and other equipment, fireplaces, etc.). The common factor of a winter climate is critical for bringing them together Causal or functional integration of cultural elements may be illustrated by the various parts of an internal combustion engine assembled into a working combination.

1. *Ibid.*, p. 293.
2. *Ibid.*, p.336.
3. Pitirim A. Sorokin, *Social and Cultural Dynamics* (New York : American Book Co., 1937), Vol. I, p. 3.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 10.

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> Any cultural synthesis is to be regarded as functional when, on the one hand, the elimination of one of its important elements perceptibly influences the rest of the synthesis in its functions (and usually in its structure).[1]

The logico-meaningful integration is illustrated by the unity of elements of a poem, or of the arguments of a book of philosophy (such as Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*) or the passages of a musical score (such as Beethoven's *Third Symphony*).

> If we know the proper patterns of meaning and value, we can put these passages or parts together into a significant unity in which each page or fragment takes its proper place, acquires a meaning, and in which all together give the supremely integrated effect that was intended....Their unification is far closer than that of mere functional association.[2]

It is quite possible, Sorokin argues, to discover the same kind of intimate logico-meaningful integration as is present in a poem or piece of music between a large number of the details of an entire culture. In terms of whether ultimate reality is conceived to be supersensory or sensory, two profoundly different cultural super-systems may be isolated.

First Culture	*Second Culture*
Dominance of	Dominance of
Rationalism, Mysticism	Empiricism
Idealism	Materialism
Indeterminism	Temporalism
Realism	Determinism
Sociological Universalism	Nominalism
The conception of corporation or juridical personality as a primary reality	Sociological Singularism
	The concepts of corporation or juridical personality as an expedient fiction.
Ethics of Absolute Principles	Ethics of Happiness (Hedonism, Utilitarianism, Eudaemonism)
Few discoveries in the natural sciences and few inventions	Many discoveries and inventions
Static character of social life with a slow rate of change	Dynamic character of social life with a rapid rate of change

1. *Ibid.*, p. 15.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 19.

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Ideational style of painting	Visual style of painting
"Scripture" as the main form of literature	Secular with a realism and naturalism in literature, with sensualism and even sexualism
Pure or diluted theocracy	Pure or diluted secular power
"Expiation" as the basic principle of punishment and of criminal law	"Adjustment," re-education mixed with extermination of the "unadjusted" and "socially dangerous" persons.[1]

The two great cultural super-systems (civilizations) arising on the basis of these contrasting forms of logico-meaningful integration are described by Sorokin as Ideational and Sensate.

> Each has its own mentality; its own system of truth and knowledge; its own philosophy and *Weltanschauung*; its own type of religion and standards of 'holiness'; its own system of right and wrong; its own forms of art and literature; its own mores, laws, code of conduct; its own predominant forms of social relationships; its own economic and political organization; and, finally, its own type of *human personality*, with a peculiar mentality and conduct. The values which correspond to one another throughout these cultures are irreconcilably at variance in their nature; but within each culture all the values fit closely together, belong to one another logically, often functionally.
>
> Of these two systems one may be termed *Ideational* culture, the other *Sensate.* And as these names characterize the culture as a whole, so do they indicate the nature of each of the component parts.[2]

Between Ideational and Sensate civilizations appears only one stable compromise form of civilization, the Idealistic.

The major premises of these great super-systems concern the nature of reality, the nature of the needs and ends to be satisfied, the extent to which they are to be satisfied, and the methods of their satisfaction. Ideational culture conceives reality to be spiritual, its needs and ends are spiritual, highest priority is given to the satisfaction of spiritual needs which are fulfilled by the self-imposed minimization or elimination of physical needs. Sensate culture assumes reality to be sensual, it gives hedonistic needs priority, and attempts to satisfy them physically by modifying the external world. Idealistic culture

1. *Ibid.*, p. 33.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 67.

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represented a balanced unification of the Ideational and Sensate types with a predominance of Ideational elements. For if reality to the members of a civilization is both spiritual and material, its needs and ends are also both spiritual and material (predominantly spiritual), and it seeks to satisfy them by modification both of the self and the external world.

Sorokin's types of reality retain the medieval distinctions between the three faculties of man—the senses, faith, and reason, and their corresponding objects. Corresponding to these realities are three types of men and three types of society. The faculties through which these three types of reality are known are said to yield three types of truth: truths of the senses, truths of reason (logical truth), and truths of faith (intuition). However, in the end Sorokin postulates the existence of a synthetic type of *integral truth* which is said to be the highest of all, in as much as it fuses the truths of sense, reason, and intuition.[1]

To Spengler and Toynbee civilizations represented the consequences of spiritual impulses arising in primitive or peasant societies which externalized themselves at last in vast structures of steel and stone from whic all life had vanished. Civilizations were great individualized systems of culture in the overall draft of history. At least in Toynbee's case each of these civilizations ran the kind of course described in the biblical Genesis. Man was tempted out of his original state of primitive bliss (his Garden of Eden) by some challenge (the temptation of his Satan) to face dreadful ordeals in the course of which his civilization evolved as he struggled his way along a dark path which terminated in suffering and death. Spengler and Toynbee, thus, had largely taken over St. Augustine's theory of history, merely generalizing it to apply to all the great civilization rather than to Western civilization alone.

Sorokin, on the other hand, not only turned his face against both the doctrines of evolution and progress (which Spengler and Toynbee also contested) but also the doctrine of decline (which they sponsored). The types of civilization have been reduced to three, and human history was conceived as an eternal cycle of these forms.

While Spengler's and Toynbee's conception of history represents rather direct extensions of the Christian theory of history as found in St. Augustine, Sorokin's theories superficially seem distinct.

1. For a critique of Sorokin's ideas, see Hans Speier, *Social Order and Risks of War* (New York: George Stewart, 1952 . pp. 202 ff.

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> In the fourteenth book of Augustine's *Civitas Dei* we read : 'Epicurean philosophers lived after the flesh because they placed man's highest good in *bodily pleasure*; and... those others do so who have been of opinion that in some form or other bodily good is man's supreme good.' According to Augustine, the next higher level of life is represented by the Stoics, 'who place the supreme good of man in the soul.' Since 'both the soul and the flesh, the component parts of man, can be used to signify the whole man,' both Epicureans and Stoics (and Platonists) live 'according to man.' Or one may say that they live according to *reason*, if reason can be divorced from faith. Only the Christian, in his *faith*, lives according to God.[1]

However, Speier indicates that Sorokin's basic distinctions between sensate, idealistic, and ideational are modeled after the early Christian notions of sense, reason, and faith. The major differences between Sorokin's ideas and these early Christian notions is the blurring of the hierarchization of values central to Christian thought and the substitution of a kind of relativism for the absolute standards implied in Christian thinking.

> Throughout his work some kind of hierarchy of the three values is implied, as is particularly evident from the expressions of contempt, disgust, and revulsion in which Sorokin indulges whenever he describes the 'sensate sewers' of our time. However, it is not the truth of faith which ranks highest, as one might expect from familiarity with the tradition which Sorokin follows in distinguishing the three values. Rather, he 'prefers' idealism to ideationalism. Again, ideationalism is constructed as a compromise between sensation and idealism, which blurs the distinctions further. Finally, the methods used in *Social and Cultural Dynamics* are those of 'sensate science', which has induced a malicious critic to remark that the work may be a satire on modern social science.[2]

These considerations led Speier to describe Sorokin's position as "modern vulgarization of early Christian thinking."[3]

Concepts similar to those of Spengler, Toynbee, and Sorokin have continued to attract contemporary students despite the ex-

1. Speier, *op. cit.*, p. 211.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 212.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 211.

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tensive ciriticism leveled against all three of these thinkers. For example, in his *Evolution of Civilizations* Carrol Quigley employs a distinction between collections, groups, and societies which is reminiscent of Sorokin's distinction between the kinds of cultural integration. Societies which are defined as aggregates which have more relations with insiders than outsiders are, in turn, divided into simple tribes or bands and civilizations in a manner some what similar to Toynbee.[1]

Aggregates of Persons

A. Collections
B. Groups
C. Societies
   1. Parasitic societies
   2. Producing societies
      a. Simple tribes or bands
      b. Civilizations[2]

Moreover, every civilization was argued to pass through seven stages.

1. Mixture
2. Gestation
3. Expansion
4. Age of conflict
5. Universal empire
6. Decay
7. Invasion[3]

Quigley's stages of civilizational development are a compact summary of those earlier presented by Toynbee.

The great and continuing interest in analysis of civilization such as those of Spengler, Toynbee, and Sorokin is striking testimony of the importance of the concept for contemporary social science. However, the many criticisms to which these works have been subject testifies to the ambiguity with which the principles of civilization have been established. If, in the face of the criticisms, one abandons the task of analyzing civilization, it is still necessary to take account of the fact that various euphemisms for civilization such as *milieu* and *climate of opinion* continue to be employed in social science analysis, even where the concept of "civilization" is studiously avoided.

1. Carroll Quigley, *The Evolution of Civilizations* (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1961), p. 31.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 32.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 79.

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One of the major problems of contemporary social science is to establish a more adequate theory of civilization than appears in the works of Spengler, Toynbee, and Sorokin, and to isolate the principles of civilization on a sounder foundation than has been achieved hitherto.

Community and Civilization

Scientifically the major twentieth century analyses of civilization suffer from a number of defects : they make inadequate use of the concepts developed by social science; they employ methods lacking scientific standing; and they are riddled with value judgments. Non-scientific methods (Sorokin's truth of faith and integral truth, Toynbee's method of mythology, and Spengler's logic of Destiny) and ethical evaluation have no place in a scientific theory of civilization. Moreover, the study of systems of culture can be enriched by the employment of concepts more precise than mimesis (Toynbee), logico-meaningful integration (Sorokin), or organic succession (Spengler). A first step in increasing the precision of the theory of civilization is to introduce clear distinctions between civilization and society (or community). Moreover, once this distinction is carried through, the contrast can be drawn between the principles of community formation and civilization formation.

Community and civilization are distinct but related products of social life for the understanding of which tow major characteristics of human social life are critical : (1) man's lack of instincts and (2) his possession of language. Because of his lack of instincts (biologically pre-fixed solutions to the basic problems of life) man is compelled to learn or invent the solutions to his life problems. Language arms man with an instrument of unusual power for such invention and learning. When the individual solves his problems, language makes it possible to bring to bear all the experience of his associates upon them. By means of language the experience of men remote in time and space can be introduced into the sphere of the present. By means of language individuals can influence each other in ways of unusual precision.

Behavior that is linguistically re-structured acquires a polarity not possible to instinct-based, language-free behavior. A creature responding to his problems instinctively "does what comes naturally". When it has solved its problems in the instinctively prescribed manner, it is "satisfied". No sharp division appears between behavior performed for instrumental reasons and behavior for sheer enjoyment.

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All of this is quite changed for a creature without instincts and armed with language. Language introduces into present behavior a field of possibilities. Instinctive behavior arises in response to what is at hand; language-mediated behavior is always oriented in some measure to things not at hand. Among other things, a division appears between behavior which is instrumental (designed for survival) and behavior which is pursued for its own sake (intrinsically).

Not only does human social behavior, thus, differ from non-human social behavior in the appearance within it of the contrast between instrumental and intrinsically pursued activities, but complex systems of instrumental and intrinsic activities become possible. This distinction is basic for the contrast between community (or society) and civilization.

Communities as Systems of Instrumental Activities

The fact that man is without instinctive solutions to his problems and that he possesses language does not mean that he can permit his problems to go unsolved. Man must learn or invent his solutions. The learned or invented solutions to human problems are *institutions*. Institutions play the role among men performed by instincts in non-human beings. They do not have the certainty of instincts, but they have a plasticity which is absent in instincts.

The creature dependent on instincts must have a set sufficiently comprehensive to keep it alive and perpetuate its kind. The institutions which men invent to replace their lost instincts must perform the same functions. At least three major categories of institution are necessary for any plurality of people if they are to survive in nature and get along with one another : (1) they must solve the problems of their material existence (*mastery of nature*); (2) they must transform individuals and situations which are not *per se* social into social realities (*socialization*); and (3) they must secure sufficient discipline to carry out collective tasks (*social control*).

Strong forces are at work to bring the institutions of pluralities of people into working relation with one another. The manner in which a plurality of persons makes a living (its mastery of nature) has direct and indirect influences upon its institutions of socialization (family, religion, education, etc.). The realization of a plurality's economic and socialization objectives, moreover, is bound up with its institutions of social control. Three principles may be discerned operating on and between a people's institutions to bring them into stable inter-

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lation with one another : *stabilization* (the fixing of solutions to inter-human problems), *consistency* (the adaptation of the solutions to the problems in one area of life to those in another), and *closure* (the fusion of the series into an inter related set).

A community (or a society) is a total way of life consisting of a set of institutions (drawn from all of the major spheres of institutions) formed into a system sufficient to bring the plurality of individuals through the cycles of a normal year and an average life. A community (or society) thus is a behavioral system.[1]

Civilizations as Products of Intrinsically Valued Activities

Every human community is an instrumental-behavioral system of activities designed to secure the survival of its component groups of individuals. By its nature such a system of behavior can only explore a few of the many possible alternative groups which could by designed to secure similar and related ends. Since the men who establish these communities are language-using, thinking creatures, they are quite capable of envisioning alternatives to their groups and their communities. A field of possibilities surrounds every system of societal life.

When frustrations arise in the behavioral-instrumental system, men automatically turn to the symbolic system. When they are bored or weary, they may find temporary relief from the pressure of every day anxieties in the world of fantasy or in the world of play. If their frustrations are more deep, they may draw from the world of fantasy new suggestions for the arrangement of the every-day. In any case, alongside the behavioral-instrumental system of human activities there arises a symbolic-intrinsic system of potential activities. If they look to the behavioral system for survival, men look to the symbolic system for enrichment. While men shape their behavioral-instrumental activities into communities, they shape their symbolic-intrinsic activities into civilizations.

In contrast to all theories which draw no distinction between society (or community) and civilization, these two types of systems of human activity are here taken to be of intrinsically different types.

1. These concepts are discussed at length for various special purposes in a number of contexts. See Don Martindale, *American Social Structure* (New York: Appleton-Century-Crafts. 1960), *American Society* (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand, 1960), and *Social Life and Cultural Change* (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand, 1962).

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All of this is quite changed for a creature without instincts and armed with language. Language introduces into present behavior a field of possibilities. Instinctive behavior arises in response to what is at hand; language-mediated behavior is always oriented in some measure to things not at hand. Among other things, a division appears between behavior which is instrumental (designed for survival) and behavior which is pursued for its own sake (intrinsically).

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When some students argue that civilizations pass through stages such as mixture, gestation, expansion, an age of conflict, universal empire, etc., the lines between society (community) and civilization become hopelessly blurred. As an intrinsic-symbolic system a civilization cannot have a universal empire—a category applicable to society or community, to a behavioral complex, but not to a symbolic one. The arbitrariness this confusion of categories causes is illustrated by the argument that the Mogul domination represented the Universal Empire of Hinduism. However, the Mogul Empire was never a part of Hindu civilization at all; it was, rather, a behavioral event. To be sure, Hindu civilization underwent some changes when the Mogul domination was clamped down on Hindu communities after the tenth century, but that is something quite different from the retification of Hindu civilization and the assignment of a foreign domination to it as one of its components.

Primary Subdivisions of the Sociology of Culture

The sociology of culture is the study of the social implications of the intrinsic-symbolic forms of inter-human activity. The most comprehensive branch of the sociology of culture is the study of the formation of civilizations. However, there are a number of sub-branches of lesser scope : the sociology of play, the sociology of art, and the sociology of knowledge. There is some advantage in approaching the sociology of civilization by way of them.

The Sociology of Play

Without multiplying the definitions of play, it may be observed that most students recognize it to be a form of activity in which the center of interest lies in the activity itself. Play has in short, an intrinsic-symbolic character. Huizinga sums up the characteristics of play as :

> A free activity standing quite consciously outside 'ordinary' life as being 'not spurious,' but at the same time absorbing the player intensely and utterly. It is an activity connected with no material interest, and no profit can be gained by it. It proceeds within its own proper boundaries of time and space according to fixed rules and in an orderly manner. It promotes the formation of social groupings which tend to surround themselves with secrecy and to stress their difference from the common world by disguise or other means.[1]

1. J. Huizinga, *Homo Ludens: A Study of the Play-Element in Culture* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1950 , p. 13.

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Mitchell and Mason characterize play in similar terms :

> *Play* is effort in which the satisfactions are in and a part of the activity itself. The goals are immediate, and they are accomplishable. It is activity scaled down to the capacity of the performer, so as to provide a balance of success and failure possibilities, with the result that there is always hope of achievement. Play is its own reward and no other inducement is needed. *Play is self-expression for its own sake.*[1]

A number of theories of play were advanced in the nineteenth century. It was argued, for example, that play in the higher animals is a device for ridding the organism of surplus energy, not required for survival.[2] It has been theorized that play serves the purpose of recreation[3] or relaxation from the instrumental activities of life.[4] It has been argued that play is an activity performing a role in the practice of the instincts,[5] and that play represents the survival of pass behaviour which the individual recapitulaltes in the course of his individual development.[6] However, Huizinga's comment disposes of all such approaches to play:

> All these hypotheses have one thing in common : they all start from the assumption that play must serve something which is not play, that it must have some kind of biological purpose.[7]

This (that is, the biological reduction of play to the instincts) eclipses the very properties that give play its distinctive character, its intrinsic-symbolic character.

All theories which reduce play to an instinct or which subordinate it to instrumental activities distort its basic character.[8] In all the higher animals play increases in importance as the sphere of instincts

1. Elmer D. Mitchell and Bernard S. Mason, *The Theory of Play* (New York: A.S. Barnes, 1948), p. 116.
2. Argued by Fredrich Schiller, *Essays, Aesthetical and Philosophical* (London: Bell & Sons, 1875), among others.
3. Moritz Lazarus, *Ueber die Reize des Spiels* (Berlin: F. Dummer, 1883).
4. G.T.W. Patrick, *The Psychology of Relaxation* (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1916).
5. K. Gross, *The Play of Animals* (New York: D. Appleton, 1904.
6. G. Stanley Hall, *Youth* (New York: D. Appleton. 1906.)
7. Huizinga, *op. cit.*, p. 2.
8. See the discussion in Martindale, *Social Life and Cultural Change* (Princeton D. Van Nostrand, 1962), pp. 49—50.

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narrows. It occurs most frequently in man, who is most lacking in instincts. Playfulness is best viewed as a non-reducible property of the behavior of all higher creatures. When the range of instincts is narrowed while the energy for action still remains, there is placed at the disposal of the creature a sphere of activity within which free experimentalism becomes the rule.

The nature of play may also be approached by way of the distinction between instrumental and intrinsic activity. As indicated above, there is no reason to presume that creatures acting on the basis of instinct do not experience a state of well being when the activity is successful, and a state of frustration when it is unsuccessful. However, the distinction between activities which are instrumental (but not particularly enjoyable) and activities which are enjoyed for their own sake or intrinsically (but which serve no exterior purpose outside themselves) can hardly arise. However, the bifurcation between instrumental and intrinsically enjoyable activities does become possible in all creatures in whom instincts weaken and disappear. In such creatures spontaneous intrinsically enjoyed activities among them *play* occurs.

Huizinga who has made one of the comparatively few general attempts to explore the significance of play for civilization, maintains that "genuine, pure play is one of the main bases of civilization."[1] He was of the opinion that the basic elements of play which he lists as "contests, performances, exhibitions, challenges, preenings, struttings, and showings-off" are already present in the animal world.[2] There is no reason to reduce the basic elements of play to this list. Play is any activity raised to a new power. The question is why Huizinga chooses this particular list. There is a Hobbesian element in Huizinga's thought: the assumption that in his original state man tended toward a war of each against all. From this point of view civilization arises when man's spirit of hostility is fused with a spirit of friendliness, permitting him to operate in the framework of agreed upon rules.[3] Civilization is born in the instant when conflict is harnessed in the interest of collective life. Far from being an incidental by-product of human activity, play is taken to be the form of activity which makes culture possible.

1. Huizinga, *op. cit.*, p. 5.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 47.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 58.

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> The view we take in the following pages that culture arises in the form of play, that it is played from the very beginning.[1]

Once established, however, culture acquires an autonomy of its own, and the play element recedes into the background, being absorbed by the sacred sphere. In general :

> The function of play in the higher forms...can largely be derived from the two basic aspects under which we meet it : as a contest *for* something or as a representation *of* something. These two functions can unite in such a way that the game 'represents' a contest, or else becomes a contest for the best representation of something.[2]

In Huizinga's opinion civilization cannot exist in the absence of a play element.[3] Hence he was plunged into gloom by what he saw as the decline of play in Western civilization.

> More and more the sad conclusion forces itself upon us that the play element in culture has been on the wane ever since the eighteenth century, when it was in full flower. Civilization to-day is no longer played, and even where it seems to play it is false play.[4]

There is little doubt that in play Huizinga isolated one of the most fundamental of all civilization-forming processes. However, like many discoverers, Huizinga sharpens his distinctions (between play and non-play) into stereotypes. In on-going social life the lines between an activity valued instrumentally and intrinsically are not always sharply drawn. Work sometimes has many of the properties of play. Moreover, one need not assume a kind of pre-social war of each against all or assign minor significance to individual play forms as against the social play of the contest, as does Huizinga. One may, nevertheless, assign to play indispensable civilizational significance.

In both individual and collective forms, the play activities of mankind continually move out into the world of the possible. Play submits this world of possibilities to a set of rules of its own, in terms of which it explores their properties. As a by-product play continually casts up new cultural forms. A surprising number of man's basic tools first made their appearance as the toys of earlier periods.

1. *Ibid.*, p. 46.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 13.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 211.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 206.

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As a continuous joyous exploration of the world of the possible, play pioneers the routes of civilization.

The Sociology of Art

As in the case of play, a variety of theories has been developed which would reduce art to biological and instrumental status. According to Weitz, instrumental explanations dominate the recent approaches to art.

> The functions of art have been much discussed in aesthetic theory... If there is a dominant one today it is... some kind of instrument a lism. The Marxists, humanists, Thomists, and pragmatists, perhaps quite inadvertently, have joined forces in the condemnation of any doctrine of art for art's sake.[1]

However, the formalist theory of art introduced by Kant and Herbert, developed by Zimmermann, and voiced in musical criticism by Hanslick, and promoted by such art critics as Clive Bell and Roger Fry, locates art as a category of cultural activities concerned with intrinsic values.[2]

In the attempt to establish art as an autonomous activity which in Kant's phrases was characterized by "disinterested interest," the formalists have even rejected representation in the arts. The representational elements of art are most immediately subject to instrumental (propagandistic or sentimental) interpretation. On the other hand, if one withdraws all representational elements from the arts, many of them are impoverished. The literary arts suffer especially from the withdrawal of representational elements, for they are transformed into semi-musical gibberish.

To avoid impoverished types of formalism (which results when representation is banished from the arts) without abandoning the character of art as a form of activity pursued for its own sake (for the intrinsic values it contains), Weitz develops what he describes as an "organic theory" of the arts. This theory rejects the distinction between form and content which was basic to the repudiation of means, subjects, and representations in arts. "It refuses to rule out the non-plastic spiritual values for the very simple reason that these can contribute as much to art as line and color."[3]

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1. Morris Weitz, *Philosophy of the Arts* (Cambridge. Harvard University Press, 1950), pp. 202—203.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 1.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 62.

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Weitz construed his "organic" approach as an "expanded formalist theory." "In art... *how something is expressed is what is expressed.* Both the how and the what, like the form and the content, refer to the totality of the work, not to any set of separate constituents."[1]

This seems to bring the theory of art into correspondence with the actual practice of most times and places.

The characterization of the doctrine of art for art's sake as effete, and reactionary and evaluation of it as sick and decadent, arises from a restricted moralistic view of life which cannot tolerate the concept of a sphere of activity pursued for the love of it without need.

> The advocate of the doctrine of art for art's sake.... like the theoretical physicist in relation to the construction of his mathematical formulations, or the religious mystic in relation to his God, wishes only to call attention to the initially and primarily intrinsic character of his experience with art. He wishes to distinguish sharply between art as an end and art as a means; and he wishes to affirm that whatever experiences there are that are intrinsic, the aesthetic is among them. It is in this sense that he wishes to say that art either exists for its own sake or not at all, for without the recognition and acceptance of this intrinsic dimension of art, it becomes a handmaiden of something else and in that way is destroyed as an independent activity.[2]

The core of the aesthetic is located in man's capacity for the discernment of form and pattern in experience and his capacity for specialized response to this pattern.[3] Just as play activities may exist in varying degrees of separation from instrumental activities, so too may aesthetic activities.

The aesthetic experience first makes its appearance as a special kind of emphasis within the context of every day activity. At all times, the decorative arts seem to precede the rise of the pure arts. The border of a pot or basket is seized upon to be outlined in black or decorated with a rhythmic pattern. A stone surface is finished in a rhythmic pattern, or polished until it shines, though this in no way increases the efficiency of the tool. An open space on the side of an object is decorated with a design or picture. Although this in no way increases the functional utility of the object. In all these cases,

1. *Ibid.*, p. 63.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 204.
3. Mara indale, *Social Life and Cultural Change, op. cit.*, p. 51

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various properties of the form, color, and texture of tools and objects of ordinary use are isolated, emphasized, or modified in such manner that, be it ever so slightly, interest has been withdrawn for a few moments from the sheer practical purposes of the tool or object, and riveted on form or pattern for its own sake.

A further stage in the emergence of the aesthetic in isolation from the instrumental appears in peasant art. Here an object of every day use (a dish, tool, or even an item of food such as an egg or a cake) is frequently subjected to so much decorative treatment as to make it unusable. The tribal metalsmith decorates a dish to a point where it is hung on the wall and contemplated rather than used as a food container. The Ukranian Easter egg is so glorified with decoration as to become inedible. A Polynesian war club is carved into an object of delicate beauty, making it quite unusable for purposes of war. In all such cases aesthetic concerns which have arisen in the heart of the practical have reversed the direction of interest, and the practical utility of the object has been thrust aside.

Every development of technique, technology, and knowledge of materials potentially increases man's capacity for aesthetic discernment and for artistic execution. Moreover, since both abstract formal and contentual (representational-symbolic) elements may be present, two great style-forming possibilities are given for artistic development from the beginning. Artistic stylization may move primarily in terms of abstract formal or symbolic elements, or may seek some kind of balanced integration of each. There is no *a priori* reason for assuming that either abstract or symbolic styles are more primitive than the other, though both theses have been argued.

The abstract-formal and representational-symbolic dimensions of art arise originally in activities in which the distinction between instrumental and intrinsic requirements is not sharply drawn. Hence, art originally emerges as the decoration of a practical object, as embellishment of practical activity or as the symbolic supercharge objects or activities. However, once the distinction is drawn, art is free to go its own way. There is no more reason why artistic activities should have one-to-one correspondence with the non-aesthetic activities than that play should have a one-to-one correspondence with work. This is important for evaluating instrumentalist theories of art.

Plekhanov, who presented one of the original Marxian (instrumentalist) theories of the relation between art and social life, formulated two propositions concerning this relation :

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> The tendency of artists, and of those who have a lively interest in art, towards art for art's sake, arises when they are in hopeless disaccord with the social environment in which they live.
>
> The so-called utilitarian view of art...the inclination to attribute to works of art the significance of judgment on the phenomena of life, and its constant accompaniment of glad readiness to participate in social struggles, arises and becomes stronger wherever a mutual sympathy exists between the individuals more or less actively interested in artistic creation and some considerable part of society.[1]

Both of these formulations, the first of which would reduce art to the status of a retrograde utopia and the second of which would reduce it to propaganda, radically distort the character of art and over-simplify its relation of the aesthetic to the ordinary life. These are formulations of a man who can only live for a moral purpose, never for its own sake. One need not be in disaccord with his society to enjoy art or even try to transform life into a work of art.

The aesthetic, even when embedded in the actual, is an adventure into the world of the possible. It is the development of man's capacity for discernment and discriminating response for the intensified sense of life this entails without the necessity of shackling this sense to practical or moralistic requirements. In various ways the world of art may embellish, complement, or even call to critical account the world of the every day. And those certainly are great periods when a heightened sense of style may flow from the arts to everyday life and back again. However, wherever they develop, the arts are always a school of uniquely human capacities for discernment and discriminating response.

Some of the ways in which an art may develop a system of forms adapted to the requirements of the social stratum which primarily bears it and change when this stratum changes or when the art moves to the sphere of a new stratum have been indicated by Mukerji in his studies of the sociology of Indian music.[2]

He advanced the thesis that both European and Indian music arose out of folk and religious music, developing their classical specialization

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1. G.V. Plekhanov, *Art and Social Life* (London; Lawrence & Wishart, 1953), p. 177.
2. Dhurjati Prasad Mukerji, *Indian Music* (Poona: Kutub, 1945).

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in the interests of the upper classes and renewing themselves by contact with the music of people in times of class crisis.

> In both regions religious and folk music had been the inevitable context of classical music; in both, classical music at moments of crisis had drawn from people's music for fresh life, elaborated it at leisure, and imposed sophisticated forms upon it in return. Music was equally intimate with the functions of collective living and equally susceptible to the genuine influences that worked upon the culture-pattern. So long as the princely courts, the priestly dignitaries, and the strongly entrenched guilds fixed the rules of living, Indian and European music alike betrayed the rudiments of melody and harmony. Since then, the tempo of change has been slower in India than in Europe, accounting partly, at least, for the so-called 'spirituality' of her music.[1]

Hindustani classical music, Mukerji maintains, is about four hundred years old. It arose as a cultural synthesis during the period when the Muslims were in power. It incorporated folk, regional, and non-Indian types of music into its system, and refined them to the taste requirements of courtly and priestly strata.

> Our classical music has always served two masters, religion and the court. *Dhrupad* is defined in the texts as songs of praise of the gods and kings. Gradually, the kings prevailed, and the gods were sung in the *deshi* fashion. By the eighteenth century, when it became a courtly affair, music gained in sweetness and subtlety, but it lost its pristine simple vigour. Eventually, it became vocal gymnastics, until the romantics in the provincial *durbars* started protesting.[2]

Until the 1880's, according to Mukerji, Hindustani music led a sheltered existence in the courts of princes and the circles of musicians' guilds. However, when the princes were replaced by the *Zamindars* and merchant-princes, a change occurred. The *Zamindars* left their estates and settled in the cities, where the merchants had always been located. Left without a rural stratum to support them, the musicians poured into the cities from the decaying *durbars*.

> There was hardly a musician of note who in that period did not come to the then Imperial City of Calcutta to try his fortune. Bengal got a taste of classical Hindustani music from that date.[3]

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1. *Ibid.*, p. 18.
2. D. P. Mukerji, *Modern Indian Culture* (Bombay, Hind Kitabs, 1948), p. 150.
3. *Ibid.* p. 153.

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Hindustani music, which had once been primarily an art of priests was first turned into an art of princes and finally was transformed into an art of the middle classes. This final transition was completed by the 1930's, by which time the old musical traditions had begun to decay.

By the thirties of this century, when the middle class suddenly awoke to culture, they had to import musicians from Maharashtra to teach music to their sons and daughters. Today, the Marris College, re-named the Bhatkhande University, has become the premier institution in Northern India with about 800 boys and girls, nearly all belonging to respectable middle class families.[1] In the hands of the middle class, the decay of the classical music tradition has continued.

> Bengali music, while it is good enough for the new *bourgeoisie* in other provinces, is insufferable for its cloying sweetness, its protoplasmic invertebrateness. Art can no more be raised above its context than you can lift yourself by the ears.[2]

Both the revivalist and creative tendencies of classical Indian music are gone. "The revolutionary potencies of both seem to have lost themselves in the sands which separate the middle class from the rest of the people."[3]

The changing relation between an art and the social order is illustrated in Mukerji's review of the development of Hindustani music. The developmental course of the art was shaped by a combination of instrumental and intrinsic (expressive) needs which differed from class to class. Hindustani music was born in the circles of priests; it was transmitted on to courtly circles of nobles and princes; it migrated to the halls of the *Zamindars* and merchant princes in the cities; it is pursued today in circles of the middle classes. The instrumental requirements imposed on classical music varied : the priests subordinated it to ritualistic and religious requirements; the princes employed it as an occasion for sumptuous display; the *Zamindars* and merchants exploited it for bizarre and exotic properties; and in the middle classes which currently cultivated it, such music is both a mark of prestige, and a source of emotional sentimental experiences.

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1. *Ibid.*, p. 155.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 173.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 175.

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Class Anchorage of Hindustani Classical Music and Instrumental-intrinsic Porperties

Class	Instrumental Requirements	Intrinsic-Expressive Forms
Priests	As a ritualistic and religious aid	Limited, closed forms, like magical formulas
Princes and Musical Guilds	As an item in the opulent display of courts	Open forms, dramatically developed but under control
Zamindars and Merchant Princes	An item in status competition of the *Nouveau Riche*	Theatrical and Melodramatic elements emphasized with loss of formal control
Middle Classes	A prestige item of the newly cultured	Exploitation of emotional and sentimental elements

If one takes the high point in the Hindustani classical music tradition to be the period of the princes and musicians' guilds and the low point to be the present musical culture of the middle classes, and if we admit that from an aesthetic standpoint recent forms are inferior to those of the great period, it still does not follow that art has vitality only when it is borne by a class with a social purpose with the possible implication that the contemporary Indian middle classes are without social purpose.

It would most certainly be a curious definition of social purpose which would identify the objectives of the princes—who exploited their societies for their own requirements—as constituting a true social purpose, while the objectives of the contemporary middle classes who struggle for the best possible life for themselves and their children are not. Moreover, since classical Indian music reached its highest point under the princes rather than under the priests, one would have to demonstrate why the social purpose of the princes was higher than that of the priests.

It is true, on the other hand, that the conditions necessary for the development of high art were maximized under the princes : Indian music at the time was in the hands of professional musicians able to consolidate and amplify every new gain in technique and

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every new insight into aesthetic form; these musical guilds had no worry about their support, since they were patronized by the princely courts; in the society of the court such musicians had stable, cultivated audiences with leisure to devote to cultural pursuits—ironically, for all instrumentalist theories the princely court was precisely in the position to pursue art for art's sake. Under such propitious circumstances it was quite possible for Indian music to undergo constructive cycles of aesthetic development in which the skills of the artists and their new experiments in musical form could win immediate understanding and appreciation in courtly circles whose musical tastes were being refined by this very process.

By contrast, when Indian music was practised for religious purposes by priestly musicians, conditions were favorable for the development of only limited musical traditions. So long as musical expression was subordinated to religious ritual, musical forms were limited to magically interpreted formulas. While religious music was dominated by instrumental requirements, the court freed it for expressive experimentalism always, however, under the control of skilled professionals on the one hand, and audiences with trained musical tastes on the other.

When the social situation of the princes and their courts was destroyed, so, too, was the foundation for this kind of musical practice. The *Zamindars* did not support the musical guilds as the princes had done. Nor did they form a homogeneous status group whose musical tastes could be continually refined. Finally, the social situation of the classical musician deteriorated still further, when he was cast on the open market to compete for the tastes of newly cultured strata. While the *Zamindars* looked to classical music for bizarre and exotic musical effects, the new middle classes looked to it for emotional and sentimental experience. It takes time for the situation of the musician to stabilize and for audiences to be trained, until the foundation has been established for the emergence of a high art. Neither the *Zamindars* nor the middle classes in India have had this time.

There is, finally, another imponderable in the development of a high art. Art, like play, lays down the ground rules for performance (forms and styles) in the world of possibilities. However, unlike play, where interest primarily resides in the individual performance—making it possible for the same basic games to be played by men for endless generations—in an art interest attaches to the perfection of form realization. Art is, so to speak, a special kind of cultural game.

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The emergence of an artistic style follows the upward curve of exploration and perfection of a limited series of forms. Any single work of art is unique. It is executed once and for all time. One may do other things like it, but *it* is never re-done. Hence the form possibilities of any given art are gradually exhausted. It becomes increasingly difficult to produce more perfect works in the same style.

When one asks of the Indian middle classes that they create more perfect examples of classical Indian music, one is asking the impossible. It is like asking a modern dramatist to write plays in the style of the Greek Tragedy, but more perfect than those of the Greeks.

A striking property of a work of art—defying instrumental interpretations in yet another way—is that once created, it may be enjoyed by societies which had nothing to do with its creation. There is nothing necessarily retrogressive in the contemporary Indian middle classes enjoying the forms of classical Indian music. The examples of the greatest of the arts become part of the cultural richness, not simply of the circle in which such arts originated, but potentially of all mankind.

However all this may be, the proposition stands beyond all doubt that the sociology of art is one of the fundamental areas of the sociology of culture and a high road to the theory of civilization.

The Sociology of Knowledge

The third major sub-area of the sociology of culture, the sociology of knowledge, deals with the relation between idea and belief systems and behavioral systems. The rise of knowledge systems in every community is an unavoidable aspect of human social life. Having lost their instincts, men must learn or invent their social forms. By the development of language, men acquired an instrument of unusual power for inventing numerous possible solutions to their problems.

Language (a shared system of symbols and rules for their use) by its very nature introduces a series of possibilities into the field of the actual. At any moment language may introduce into the context of present reference to things quite remote or even things that never existed at all. Thus language shatters the usual limitations of time and space which fix most animal behaviors to an immediate present focus. Through language men may discuss the thoughts and experiences of men thousands of years remote in time or thousands of miles distant in space. By way of language, possibilities may be considered in the solution of present problems which are not part of the actual existent scene.

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All men employ language in the establishment of their communities. Their communities represent the selection and fixing of a particular series of solutions which are embodied in a working system. The body of ideas essential to the behavioral system may be described as the *standard operating notions* of the society in question. However, the given community imposes on its participants only a limited number of the possible solutions to the problems of collective life. Alternatives to the *standard operating notions* (the body of social instrumental knowledge) of the community do not automatically disappear—they live on in the knowledge systems of the community as dreams, as ideals, as traditions, and as criticisms of the standard operating notions.

The fact that men continually tend to explore in their ideas alternatives to their standard operating notions is of great potential importance to their societies. When conditions change or unexpected problems develop, new solutions to collective problems may be available, needing only to be put into practice. The fanciful notion of the present may become part of the standard operating knowledge of the future. One of the most significant of all forms of play is that occurring in the world of ideas—the play of imagination. Problems may be lifted out of the context of every day complications, clarified, and resolved in the world of thought.

The manner in which the literary productions a people may explore, problems underlying the every day, is brilliantly illustrated by Leo Lowenthal's study of the changing image of man in the literature of the Western world from the sixteenth to the twentieth century. Lowenthal traces the image of man through such writers as Cervantes and Shakespeare, the French classical dramatists (Corneille, Racine, and Moliere), through Goethe, to Henrik Ibsen and Knut Hamsun.

The classical Spanish writers (particularly Cervantes) present the picture of a highly mobile and competitive society in a world losing its Religious orientation and acquiring a secular one. Shakespeare's *The Tempest* presents a paradigm of the condition of man at the beginning of the modern era characterized by an adventurous mercantile economy. "He provides the most complete picture of the Renaissance individual who interprets the world almost exclusively in the light of his own needs and to whom outward events appear as tests of an inward adequacy and dynamism."[1]

1. Leo Lowenthal, *Literature and the Image of Man* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1957), p. vi.

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The French writers present the individual at a later stage of social development in which the monarchy is firmly established and the middle classes have begun to consolidate. The stages in the consolidation of the middle classes are reflected in their ethos. "The *bourgeois* ethos is more apparent in Racine than in Corneille, and in Moliere it is virtually all-pervasive."[1] Goethe's writings present further stages in the growth of the middle class. His own development progresses from his Storm and Stress· period to an acceptance of middle-class responsibility in *Wilhelm Meister's Travels.*

This curve of development in the situation of Western man, which began with the ideal of free individuality, emerged in the late Renaissance, and was first thought to be boundless, ends with Ibsen and Hamsun. Ibsen is the critic of middle class society. "In every sphere of life he found the results of competition and specialization to be pernicious. In all of their personal and social encounters, his characters emerge as losers." And while Ibsen presents the dilemma of liberalism, Knut Hamsun presents "its authoritarian resolution. There is, in all his novels, an anticipation of the Nazi ideology."[2] He rejects urban industrial society and submits to forces beyond human control, such as the Nazi "blood, race and soil".

One relation that the world of ideas may have for social practice, as Lowenthal's study shows, is to clarify strategic issues. On the other hand, the world of social practice may cast up themes which are explored in the world of thought. Alternative hypotheses as to the specific character of social influences on knowledge and *vice versa* have been presented by sociology of knowledge theorists.

The major positions in the sociology of knowledge were advanced by nineteenth century thinkers. The Marxists treated knowledge systems as reflections of man's material existence.

> Consciousness can never be anything else than conscious existence, and the existence of men is their life process...In all ideology men and their circumstances appear upside down as in a *camera obscura*... The phantoms formed in the human brain are... sublimates of their material life-process....morality, religion, metaphysics, all the rest of ideology...no longer retain the semblance of independence... Life is not determined by consciousness, but consciousness by life.[3]

1. *Ibid.*, p. vi.
2. *Ibid.*, p. vii.
3. Karl Marx and Frederich Engels, *The German Ideology* (New York: International Publishers, 1947), pp. 14-15.

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A modified form of the Marxian sociology of knowledge was developed in the twentieth century by Karl Mannheim.[1] A second major nineteenth century position treated idea and belief systems as rationalizations of biological and psychological forces. This was formulated clearly by Nietzsche.

> The falseness of an opinion is not for us any objection to it...The question is, how far an opinion is life furthering, life preserving, species preserving, perhaps species rearing...That which causes philosophers to be regarded half-distrustfully and half-mockingly, is...that there is not enough honest dealing with them...They all pose as though their real opinions had been discovered and attained through the self-evolving of a cold, pure, divinely indifferent dialectic...They are all advocates who do not wish to be regarded as such, generally astute defenders, also, of their prejudices...The spectacle of the Tartuffery of old Kant, equally stiff and decent, with which he entices us into the dialectic by-ways that lead (more correctly mislead) to his 'categorical imperative'—makes us fastidious ones smile. We find no small amusement in spying out the subtle tracks of old moralists and ethical preachers. Or, still more so, the hocus-pocus in mathematical form, by means of which Spinoza had, as it were, clad his philosophy in mail and mask...how much of personal timidity and vulnerability does this masquerade of a sickly recluse betray! [2]

The determination of knowledge by biological and psychological forces has been held in the twentieth century by sociologists such as Pareto and a host of psychologists such as Freud.

These two positions on the sociology of knowledge in the nineteenth century stood in contrast to the view that man's material life was determined by his ideas—a position held by idealistic philosophers such as Hegel and sociologists such as Comte and Durkheim. However, as the nineteenth century wore on, some thinkers attempted to establish a compromise between those positions which attempted to derive knowledge from man's material or psychological-biological life and those which attempted to derive man's material existence from his ideas. In philosophy such a compromise was advanced by Neo-Kantians such as Wilhelm Windelband and Heinrich Rickert. In

1. Karl Mannheim, *Ideology and Utopia* (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1949).
2. Friedrich Nietzsche. *The Philosophy of Nietzsche* (New York: Random House, 1954), pp. 384-385.

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sociology a compromise position of this sort was advocated by Max Weber. As Weber saw the matter, social and psychological influences react back on men's ideas and belief systems, but men's ideas also have causal significance for their material and social life. Avoiding one way causal attributions Weber describes the relation between knowledge systems and social systems as a kind of *selective affinity* rather than to assign exclusive causal significance to either one. In the twentieth century the most original extension of the position found in the works of Rickert and Weber appears in the studies of Werner Stark.

Stark maintains that every society establishes a value system which operates at the foundation of the judgments of its members, including their judgments of intellectual matters. He describes this value system as a social *a priori* or axiological system.

> This social *a priori* or axiological system is the value-system of the society in which the historian, the seeker after human knowledge, lives. The pre-judgments or prior evaluations with which he works and which enable him to do his work, are not prejudices or value-judgments in the current sense of the word. The latter unfortunately creep in from time to time, but they are as illegitimate as they are avoidable. His pre-judgments, however, are the value-facts at the basis of the contemporary social set-up which encloses him and has shaped his mind.[1]

This position advanced by Stark has to least the advantage of considerable flexibility over reduction of knowledge to the rationalization of biological and psychological impulses or to instruments of class warfare.

There are, Stark belives, three major aspects to the analysis of knowledge from the standpoint of his social *a priori* : (1) The values basic to any given world view are objective, given by the structure of the given society; (2) though the axiological system determines what is selected as important from the facts, it does not determine how it is selected (values determine what questions are formulated, but do not require that we falsify the facts in answering them); finally, Stark maintains that (3) self-conscious use of the social *a priori*, "can lead to an objectivity in the treatment of social and historical reality... deeper than any... attainable by those who deny the existence and the influence of a basic axiological layer in the human mind."[2]

1. W. Stark, *The Sociology of Knowledge* (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1958), p. 106.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 121.

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Marx and Mannheim felt that class interests formed the basic sub-structure of knowledge systems; Pareto and Nietzsche located the sub-structure of systems of knowledge in biological impulses; Stark locates the sub-structure in a basic axiological layer in the human mind supplied by the particular society. By testing hypothesis as to the relations between this sub-structure and the superstructure of knowledge systems, Stark believes that it is possible to develop a general typology of societies with associated types of thought and feeling. Such a typology will permit new analyses of concrete historical societies and the realm of facts considered important by each. On such a foundation Stark wishes to erect a metasociology, a "supra-historical doctrine of man" which would deal "with the results of man's search for knowledge as well as the different directions which it has taken. It would have to coordinate these results."[1]

Such a coordination of the elements of fact and truth contained in discordant world views is said to require a new method.[2] It is unnecessary to assume that any specific world view is false. Each has access to a part of the truth, though "the truth in its entirety escaped them all because they had each limited themselves to a specific line of vision."[3] However, the strategy of systematic discrimination and coordination of world views could easily "degenerate into an empty scholasticism" unless implemented "by the discrimination and coordination of research methods" in order to "escape the impasse of cultural relativity."[4] And the ultimate escape from cultural relativity is approximated, *though it cannot be finally reached.* "*The true Archi*medan point would lie beyond the end of history, beyond the last day. It cannot be reached by us, however much we stretch and strain."[5]

Stark presents a modified Kantian conception of mind and a Newtonian conception of the objective world. His paradiagm of the elements involved in cognition and in the location of the sociology of knowledge is as shown in the table on the following page.

In accord with the special character of the axiological layer of the mind unique to them, the individuals of any given society have a special

1. *Ibid.*, pp. 206-207.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 207.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 208.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 209.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 210.

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The subject and his approach	The categorical layer of the mind The physical apparatus of perception The axiological layer of the mind	The concern of the sociology of knowledge
The objective world	The objects of knowledge The materials of knowledge[1]	

world view based on a selection of the materials of knowledge. Each of these is a partial truth. The total truth, possible only from the standpoint of all possible perspectives, is evidently available only to the mind of God.

While Stark's "axiological layer of the mind" may appear similar to the *standard operating notions* of a given society, they should not be confused. The total stock of ideas of a society cannot be assigned to all members. To attribute to them a single shared system of values is a rather questionable practice. In every known society there is an unequal distribution of ideas and a variety of value perspectives. The intimate relation presupposed by Stark between the knowledge systems of a society and the axiological layer in the mind of its members implies a unity in the idea systems of a society which they do not in fact show. The Platonic dialogues were continuously occupied with the controversies of the Greek world. The ancient Chinese, Indians, and Jews similarly report duels of their intellectuals. Our own times are rent by controversies. Moreover, not only are alternative evaluations present in a society projected into the knowledge schemes of a people, but divisions appear between those who attack and those who defend the social order, between those who would complement or extend some aspects of the social order and those who would controvert them. At times the intellectuals develop alternatives to current social practice which have so little immediate bearing on social issues as to be ignored, only to be discovered later as harbingers of a social order yet unborn. The world of ideas finally is explored as a realm of intrinsic-symbolic activity in considerable measure for its own sake.

The Theory of Civilization as the Culmination of the Sociology of Culture

It is unfortunate that the study of civilization has so often been conducted directly rather than by way of a preliminary study of the

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1. *Ibid.*, p. 108.

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findings of the less comprehensive branches of the sociology of culture. The sociology of play, of art, and of knowledge as major sub-branches of the intrinsic-symbolic activities of men are the logical avenues to a general theory of civilization. In science it is always sound strategy to establish a beachhead on a limited front, consolidating one's position and working out from there rather than dissipating one's activities by a simultaneous attack on all positions at once. As things stand the more ambitious theories of civilization have too often collapsed because of the failure to observe the findings of specialists in sub-areas of culture.

The theory of civilization is the logical culmination of the sociology of culture, for it is concerned with the more comprehensive integrations of culture that men have achieved. The theory of civilization occupies a place in the sociology of culture comparable to the theory of community to the sociology of behaviour. The theory of the sub-areas of culture is the counterpart of the theory of special institutional areas (such as industrial, political, family or religious sociology) of social behavior. Moreover, like any given community, a civilization is not a seamless web, but is made up of component parts.

Comparisons between the Sociology of Behavior and the Sociology of Culture

Discipline	Sociology of Behavior	Sociology of Culture
Activity Studied	Behavioral-Instrumental	Symbolic-Intrinsic
Smallest unit studied	Social action	Cultural form or trait
Intermediate units studied	Groups	Styles
Most comprehensive units studied	Communities or societies	Civilizations

Just as communities do not spring into being fully constituted but arise out of the operation of basic principles, so civilizations arise on the basis of processes operative throughout social life. In the case of communities, acts are stabilized into inter-individual or group forms, and the group solutions to the problems of collective life are modified to accommodate one another. This has led to the Isolation of the primary principles of community formation as : *stabilization* (the fixing of the collective solutions to problems), *consistency* (the modification of the solutions to one set of problems to facilitate the solutions of others), and *completeness* (the establishment of a set sufficient to carry the plurality through its basic life cycles).

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In a comparable manner, the principles of civilization must account for the formation of cultural forms or traits, the working out of style-integrations of cultural forms and traits, and the formation of comprehensive style integrations which key basic cultural styles to behavioral problems. The three primary principles of civilization formation are *playfulness* (the enjoyment of the intrinsic-instrumental-activities for their own sake and the invention of cultural forms or traits which extend and complement the forms of every day life), *aesthetic receptivity* (the human capacity for and delight in the integration of cultural forms into comprehensive systems or styles), and *sublimation* (the tendency to cast unsolved problems and tensions of the behavioral system into the cultural sphere, where they are sublimated and transformed into nuclear points around which cultural styles may be comprehensively integrated).[1] In summary form :

Comparative Principles of Community and Civilization Formation

Basic Process	Community formation	Civilization Formation
Forming of basic units	Stabilization	Playfulness, invention of forms
Interadjustment of units	Consistency	Aesthetic receptivity development of styles
Formation of comprehensive systems	Completeness and behavioral closure	Sublimation and symbolic closure

In every sphere of cultural activity the three principles of civilization-formation are operative. However, the special value of the subdivisions of the sociology of culture is that they deal with areas of experience where one or other of the principles is predominant. Hence, though the play activities of a people reveal the operation of playfulness, aesthetic receptivity, and sublimation, the invention and exploration form possibilities is the dominant feature of play. On the other hand, while an invention of forms everywhere plays a role in the arts, they always strike one as achieving their proper sphere in the development of styles. Artistic practice in which the sheer invention of forms is dominant strikes one as falling short of high art—such a practice strikes one as merely "playful" rather than as serious art. Just as the sphere of play presents itself as an ideal situation for the study

1. Martindale, *Social Life and Cultural Change*, pp. 50-54.

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of the invention of forms, the arts present themselves as ideal situations for the study of stylization.

The productions of literary culture also show the operation of all three principles. However, in contrast to play and art, literary activities (including both literature and philosophy) are characterized by the predominance of the principle of sublimation. The literary products of a people by their very nature deal directly with the stock of expressed ideas, opinions, and sentiments of a people. To these literary products people turn for orientation, for interpretation and guidance from the tensions and contradictions that their social life casts up. Theorists of art as a catharsis from the days of Aristotle to Hirn[1] have usually looked to the dramatic and literary arts for their examples of the function of cultural products as purgations of the emotions and that attainment of serenity. The emotional explosions from which people seek relief in art are often created by contradictions or shortcomings of the society itself. Literary culture, in short, is perhaps somewhat more dominated by the process of sublimation than the sphere of play or of the non-literary arts, even though the other civilization-processes are also at work in it.

These reflections seem to lead to the following tentative conclusions : The sociology of culture is the study of the intrinsic-symbolic activities of man, in contrast to the sociology of behavior which deals with his instrumental-behavioral activities. The sociology of culture need not have recourse to astrological predictions of the doom of mankind or to non-scientific methods. It has a number of recognized branches (the sociology of play, the sociology of art, and the soiology of knowledge) for the study of which the accepted methods of investigation of the sciences and humanities appear to be quite adequate. The culminating discipline of the sociology of culture is the study of the formation of civilizations (of cultural systems which accompany social systems). Civilizations are analyzable in terms of their component cultural traits and forms and their integrating styles. The basic civilization forming principles of playfulness, aesthetic receptivity, and sublimation account for the invention of cultural traits or forms, the synthesis of these into styles, and the keying of cultural styles to their system of social behavior. The sub-disciplines of the sociology of culture present spheres in which the detailed study is possible of these civilization-forming principles.

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1. Yrjo Hirn, *The Origins of Art* (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1931).

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CHAPTER III

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The Factor of Creativity in Human History

—Pitirim A. Sorokin

If I have to indicate the main factor of all the constructive changes in human history—so far as any main factor can be singled out from a multitude of forces taking part in such changes—my choice goes in favor of the factor of human creativity. By this creativity I mean only those activities of an individual or a group which bring into being and tangibly enrich language, science, technology, philosophy, religion, ethics, law, fine arts, economics, politics, and practical ways of human life. In behavioral terms, a constructive creativity represents: (a) an adequate response of a person or a group to a *new* challenge or situation; (b) a *more adequate* reaction to the *old* challenge; (c) origination of a *new situation* as well as of an *adequate response* to it. All the activities which do not meet these conditions are either uncreative or destructive, when they undermine, impoverish, distort and destroy all the enumerated fields of culture and human life.

The first reason for my choice is that human creativity is the most important mark that distinguishes man from all the other species. However different are anatomical, physiological, and psychological characteristics of *homo sapiens* from those of other species, if these characteristics had not produced man's marvellous creativity, they would hardly be given a greater significance than the characteristics differentiating one of the non-human species from the others; nor would they be able to put *homo sapiens* into that unique position among all the other species which the old sage observed in his pregnant question: "What is man, that thou shouldst magnify him?"

Human creativity basically differs from that of all the other organisms. However wonderful are the creative activities of a spider

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weaving its web or of a bird building its nest or of ants constructing their astounding megalopolis, all of these achievements represent the same inherited stereotyped response not only to the specific situtions for which it has been made adequate by a long evolutionary process but to all sorts of different situations for which it is often quite useless. Still less can the non-human organisms invent a *new adequate response to the new challenge* or a basically *better response* to the *old situation.* Within very narrow limits they can and do modify their inherited responses to slightly different situations but these modifications are merely slight variations of the inherited reflexological response. The creativity of the other species is confined within their fixed instinctive patterns. It is controlled by rigid reflexological mechanisms, is hereditarily predetermined and "frozen" in a very specific and narrow form. It is automatically reproduced from generation to generation of a given species. In this sense it is little changeable and hardly capable of deviating much from and transgressing the rigid course prescribed by its automatic mechanism. In this sense it is not a "free" but an "imprisoned" creativity chained to its inherited patterns if not forever then, at least, for the life-span of a given species itself.

In so far as instinctive-reflexological actions are usually discharged automatically, without the guidance or even presence of a rational and conscious thought, they are *unconscious or pre-conscious or subconscious* actions in the exact sense of these terms. For this reason the instinctive creativity of other species is largely *unconscious* creativity. In comparison with this "imprisoned," narrow, hereditarily predetermined, rigid, and largely unconscious creativity of other species, man's creativity is essentially free from instinctive predetermination of its forms and manifestations. It is incomparably more manysided, versatile and dynamic. Potentially there are no limits for its diversity of forms, contents, and the material which it shapes, transforms discovers, and invents. It untiringly produces new adequate responses to the new situations, as well as better responses to the old challenges. And what is most important, its infinitely diverse achievements are little indebted to instincts and reflexes. These achievements are due mainly to man's genius: to his mastery of sense-observation, to his rational (logico-mathematical) thought, and to man's suprasensory and suprarational intuition (highest form of genius).[1] All these creative functions represent the conscious and supraconscious forms of psyche,

1. Cf. for evidence of this in P. Sorokin, *The Ways and Power of Love,* chaps: 5,6,7, Boston, 1954; *Social and Cultural Dynamics,* Vol. IV, ch. 18, New York 1962.

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different from and superior to the unconscious or subconscious in stincts and unconditioned and conditioned reflexes.

These properties of human creativity largely explaint he fact that despite the comparatively short period of man's creative history on this planet, the total result of his creativity has been truly astounding and immeasurably greater than the stereotyped creativity of other species. In the cosmos known to us, man has created a basically new realm of empirical reality. Besides the two basic classes of reality—inorganic and organic phenomena—which existed on this planet before the emergence of man, *he has built a third basic class of phenomena: the superorganic or cultural, quite different from the inorganic and the organic.* In contradistinction to inorganic phenomena that have only one physicochemical component, and to organic phenomena that have two components—physical and vital (life)—the man-made superorganic or cultural phenomena have three components: the physical, the vital, and an "immaterial" component of *meaning* (as idea, as value, as artistic pattern or moral norm of conduct), super-imposed upon the physical and/or vital components. This component of meaning radically changes the nature of the inorganic or organic phenomena upon which it is super-imposed. Without its meaning, a book, say, Plato's *Republic* or a paper upon which is printed score of Bach's *Mass* in *B Minor* is but a mere physical object of certain geometric form and physicochemical properties. With its meaning, it turns into a super organic system of the greatest ideas or musical values in which its physical qualities (paper) become quite irrelevant, because this system of ideas or musical values can be "objectified" and "materialized" in different physical media: recorded on a disk, written on a metal plate, spoken or sung (through the medium of air-waves) and so on. Deprived of its meaning, Venus of Milo turns into a mere piece of marble; a national flag into a piece of cloth attached to a stick; "king," "bishop," "hero," "saint," "genius" become a mere variety of organisms often biologically weaker than the organisms of "criminals," "slaves," or "morons."[1]

These examples show the specific nature of the cultural phenomena and the astounding role of meaning in the transformation of biophysical phenomena into something different from their biological and physical nature. At the present time this cultural, superorganic realm of:

1. See on this P. Sorokin, *Society, Culture and Personality*, chaps. 3, 4, 17-20, 35; *Social and Cultural Dynamics*, Vol. I, ch. I, Vol. IV Chapters 1-4.

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(a) The totality of infinitely rich ideological meanings unified into systems of language, science, technology, religion, philosophy, law, ethics, literature, painting, sculpture, music, architecture, drama, economic, political and social theories, and so on;

(b) the totality of so-called "*material culture*" representing objectification and materialization of all these meanings in biophysical media, beginning with the simplest tool and ending with the most complex machinery, books, pictures, sculptures, buildings, highways, airways, cultivated fields and gardens, villages and cities, and so on;

(c) the totality of *individuals, not merely as biological organisms, but as sociocultural persons and groups:* "kings," "popes," "farmers," "criminals," "saints," "husbands," "wives," "prostitutes," "professors," "businessmen," "slaves," "masters," "carpenters," "generals," "Americans," "Catholics," "Communists," and so on—none of these "sociocultural" classes of persons existing in biological taxonomy of *homo sapiens,* and each class having remote relationship to biological types of human organisms;

(d) the totality of *the overt actions, ceremonies, procedures, rituals and forms of meaningful conduct and relationships* superimposed upon the biophysical actions and radically changing their meanings and character; physically the same action of shooting a man with the same gun now becomes "murder," now "self-defence," now "an heroic act of shooting the enemy"; physically the same act in which A hands a $1000 bill to B, now becomes "payment of debt," now "generous Christmas present," now "bribery," now "ransom," and so on.

The total superorganic universe made of the above *ideological, material, personal, and meaningfully-behavioral cultural phenomena* has basically changed even the biophysical surface of the earth, and has become the most powerful environment that immediately envelops, conditions, determines, and molds every individual and group in its own image. This superorganic realm of reality surrounds us everywhere, and none of us can escape its incessant and perennial influence upon our body, our mind, and our soul. Like God, it is omnipresent and ever-active in shaping our ideas, emotions and volitions, our deeds and behavior, our whole life and fortune, and after death, our reputation and historical immortality or oblivion.

This man-made cultural universe has already grown to such an extent in its dynamic and creative power that it has harnessed, to a notable extent, inorganic and organic forces and subjected them to its own control; it has greatly changed the surface and deep strata of the

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earth, and is progressively extending its control beyond the earth-limits into an ever extending outer space. And there seems to be no fixed limit to the growth of this superorganic reality and to its creative power and control. Since this new class of reality has been created by man, man can proudly call himself a master-creater of the super-organic cosmos, and can justifiably view himself as one of the creative centres in the infinite world of the total reality. The religious thought quite correctly describes him as created in the image of the Supreme Creator God.

Functions of Physical and Biological Factors in Historical Change

The immeasurably great achievements of human creativity and its unlimited potential make it indeed the main factor of all constructive changes in human history. It has an unquestionable priority for this claim, in comparison with the contentions of either geographic, or biological, or demographic, or economic, or scientific, or religious, or political, or aesthetic, ethical, or practically any other factor expounded by prevalent theories of the main factors of sociocultural change, evolution, and progress.

It has this priority for several obvious reasons. First, purely physical factors such as geographic conditions of climate, sun-spots, soil, mountains, plains, steppers, deserts, sea-shores, rivers, flora and fauna can either favor or hinder, accelerate or retard the development of human creativity[1] but by themselves they cannot create it: a multitude of other species living in the same geographic conditions in which *homo sapiens* lives have never developed any thing even remotely approaching human creativity. As mentioned before, their creativity has remained essentially fixed, instinctive-reflexological, supplemented, at best, by a mere rudimental manifestation of the rational and the supra-rational creativity. As a result of this, for millennia the life-history of almost all the non-human species has remained essentially "historyless" and unchangeable—each generation of each species monotonously repeating the same course of biologically fixed actions-reactions and the cycle of their metamorphoses. In this sense, for millennia the life of these species has stayed uncreative, and, with very few exceptions, devoid of any new and radical transformations, despite wide variety and notable changes in their physical environments.

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1. Cf. on this P. Sorokin, *Contemporary Sociolgical Theories*, ch. 3, New York, 1928.

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Second, most careful investigation of the movements, fluctuations, and transformations of practically all substantial sociocultural processes, whether in the history of mankind or in that of any nation or society, cannot account for the greater part of these movements and changes by any single physical factor or even by their totality. Whether we take the movement of scientific discoveries and technological inventions in the whole history of mankind or in the history of Greece, Rome, of Arabic, Asiatic, and European people;[1] or the basic changes in the systems of truth, philosophy, and "the first principles;"[2] or movements and changes of the styles and contents of the fine arts,[3] or of ethical systems and law-codes,[4] or of wars and revolutions,[5] of economic conditions,[6] or fluctuation of governmental regimes,[7] or the periods of blossoming and decline of the State, science, literature, sculpture, architecture, music, painting, philosophy, religion, and economics in the history of Egypt, India, China, Japan, Greece, Rome, the Arabic-Islamic world, Germany, France, Great Britain, Italy, Russia;[8] or shifts of cultural creativity from country to country, from center to center;[9] or any other historical process—none of these movements in their overwhelmingly greater part can be explained by any or all physical factors. Practically all the theories of such factors as the main factors of historical changes are supported only by a few, onesidedly selected cases. At best, they account only for a few minor movements and trasformations of these and other important sociocultural processes, and by no means explain the overwhelmingly greater part of such changes.

Third, with the development of human creativity and of the super organic world of man, man's freedom from, and control of, physical forces and environment have been growing. At the present time this

1. See the long-time statistical series of scientific discoveries and and invention in P.Sorokin, *Social and Cultural Dynamics*, Vol. II, ch. 3; Vol. IV, ch.7
2. See the actual date on these movements, *Ibid.*, Vol. II, chaps. 2, 4-12; Vol. IV ch. 7.
3. See the long-time statistical and other data, *Ibid.*, Vol. I, chaps. 9-12; Vol. IV. ch. 7.
4. See the long-time statistical series and other data, *Ibid.*, Vol. II, chaps. 13-15.
5. See the long-time series of wars and revolutions, *Ibid.*, Vol. I, III, chaps. 9-14.
6. See the long-time fluctuations of economic conditions, *Ibid.*, Vol. III, ch 8.
7. *Ibid.*, Vol III, ch. 7.
8. See the actual data in P. Sorokin, *Society, Culture and Personality*, pp. 548-551; A. K. Kroeber, *Configurations of Culture Growth*, University of California Press, 1944, passim.
9. See the data in the *Dynamics*, Vol, chaps. 5 and 7; Kroeder, *Ibid.*, passim.

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freedom and control are already so great that man is a master rather than a slave of these physical factors.

Likewise, with the present biological constitution of man evolved, as the organic basis of his superorganic creativity, this creativity and the superorganic world build by it are already largely insulated and have a wide margin of autonomy from the pressures of various biological factors. These forces, like heredity, selection, struggle for existence, births, deaths, marriages, morbidity, size and density of population, etc., are already notably controlled by man's rational and suprarational creativity and by the forces of the human superorganic universe. In the present conditions, the biological factors can hinder or facilitate, accelerate or retard, in exceptional conditions can even destroy some streams of human creativity and a part of the superorganic world; but by themselves, without direct cooperation of the superorganic forces, they cannot account for the greater part of *constructive historical changes or for the fantastic variety of manifestations* of greatly developed human creativity.[1]

They cannot do that, first of all, because, as mentioned, it is already known that in the historical past they were tangibly controlled by the superorganic forces of man (regardless of how and why these superorganic forces evolved—a problem still largely unexplained and unaccounted for). With the development of human history this control of the superorganic forces has been, with some interruption and reverses, fairly steadily increasing. At the present time it is quite considerable. Man has already achieved a large margin of freedom from biological factors. Here again man has already become a master rather than a slave of these forces. And if by man's own misuse of his superorganic creativity he does not commit his own destruction, there is hardly any doubt in a rapid increase of his mastery over practically all biological forces.

Second, the tempo of most historical events and socio-cultural changes has been much faster than those of most of the changes of man's biological constitution. Quite a large portion of important changes in the life-history of various human societies has occurred without notable changes in their biological constitutions and environment. For these reasons an overwhelming bulk of sociocultural transformations cannot be accounted for by biological factors.

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1. See a detailed analysis of main biological factors in P. Sorokin, *Contemporary Sociological Theories*, chaps. 4,5,6,7,

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Third, if a most careful scholar should try to account for all the movements, fluctuations, and qualitative changes of the sociocultural process mentioned above (scientific discoveries, inventions, philosophies, religions, fine arts, forms of government, wars, revolutions and so on) by any or all biological factors, he would certainly be found to fail in his objective. At the best, a few minor modifications of these incessantly changing processes may, perhaps, be accounted for by biological factors, but an overwhelmingly greater part of their transformoations cannot be explained by this sort of "variable."

For these reasons the totality of biological factors, and especially each single one of these forces, cannot be considered as the main factor of human history and of socio-cultural changes, at least during the last—more or less known—ten thousand years of man's history.

Total Human Creativity as the Main Factor of Constructive Sociocultural Change

Having disposed of the inorganic and the organic factors, now we can turn to various sociocultural factors which have been extolled by diverse sociological theories as the predominant factor of historical (sociocultural) transformations. In sociological terms, science and technological inventions, religion and philosophy (including folkways and mores), ethics and law, economics, politics, and fine arts—each and all of these superorganic, creative forces—have been claimed by prevalent theories to be the pre-eminent determiner of all sociocultural changes in the human universe. In psychological terms, now "the unconscious," now "the rational conscious thought," now the will or emotions, residues or "the supraconscious" have been elevated to the role of the main factor.[1]

Side by side with their specific defects and virtues, all of these theories have important shortcomings in common. So far as each of these theories singles out one specific form of creativity, e.g., scientific or religious or economic, or one psychological element, e.g., rational thought or residue or emotion, it ignores all the other forms of creativity, and all the other elements of the total psychological experience of man. Ignoring all the other forms of creativity and other psychological elements, each of these theories does not and cannot account for all these other forms and elements; for a mere ignoring of any real fact does not make it either non-existent or accounted for. Neglecting

1. Cf on theories in P. Sorokin, *Contemporary Sociological Theories, passim.*

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all the other forms of creativity or the total psychological experience of man, they utterly distort the manifold reality of human creativeness or of human psychology. Doing this, they commit the old logical error of the *pars pro toto*, the error of replacement of the whole by one of its parts or of identification of the whole with one of its parts.

Some of these theories try to overcome these errors by contentions that all the other forms of creativity or psychological experience are mere derivatives of their pet factor, or mere "dependent variables" of their pet "independent variable." Despite these contentions they have never succeeded in proving their point either logically or emperically. Logically they never successfully solved the dilemma. If all the other forms of creativity or of psychological experience are *basically different from their pet main form of creativity* or pet dominant psychological factor, then these other forms cannot be viewed as *identical* to it—as its mere variations or derivatives. If they are regarded as identical with, as mere variations or derivatives of their pet main factor, then this factor becomes *meaningless*, completely undistinguishable from all the other forms of creativity or psychological elements. Concretely, if it is assumed that scientific creativity is *basically different* from moral or philosophical or aesthetic or religious, or economic, creativity, then these cannot be considered as mere variation or derivatives of scientific creativity. If they are considered so, then "scientific" creativity covers and contains religious, aesthetic, economic, and all the other forms of creativity; in that case its *specific meaning*——"scientific"—*as different from all the other forms* evaporates and becomes undistinguishable from all the other forms. In that case the term "scientific" becomes completely indeterminate and meaningless.

If the attempt is made to solve this dilemma by considerations of the sort that "scientific creativity potentially contains in itself all the other forms of creativity," such a proposition does not remove the above contradiction, nor does such a statement become sufficiently clear and precise in its meaning. With equal logic, this indeterminate proposition can be replaced by the proposition that "religious (or philosophical or economic) creativity potentially contains in itself all the other forms of creativity, including the scientific." Logically, these statements are as valid or invalid, clear or vague as the theory that "scientific creativity potentially contains in itself all the other forms of creativity."

Being indeterminate, all these statements are neither provable nor disprovable; they are neither true nor false, because they are largely

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Constructive Versus Destructive Changes

This thesis is correct only in regard to *the constructive historical socio-cultural changes.* Destructive or uncreative changes have been and can be caused by many physical forces like earthquake, floods, volcanic eruptions, hurricanes, etc.; by several biological agencies like epidemics, wrong heredity, negative selection, regressive mutations, and so on; by a multitude of superorganic processes like devastating wars, civil strife, crimes, stupid private and public tyranny, ignorance, insanity, and through misuse and abuse of human creativity for destructive purposes. From time to time in the history of various societies these destructive and uncreative forces have played mtanopantirrole by causing tremendous havoc in the social life of respective groups, by suppressing, hindering and slowing their constructive creativity, and once in a while by terminating their individuality and historical existence.

However momentous, these destructive changes have contributed little to the constructive solution of pressing human needs, to the enrichment of science, technology, philosophy, religion, fine arts, ethics and other compartment of human culture, to the world of great values and to the meaningfulness and happiness of human life. At the best, for a short time a small fraction of selfish and predatory humans may have profited from them at the cost of the suffering majority; once in a while these catastrophic forces may have stimulated human creativity in inventing new ways and means of protection from-their devastating results.[1]

But without human creativity they could not have produced even these modestly constructive consequences. And in comparison with their deadly effects their positive results have anyhow been comparatively insignificant.

Throughout man's long history he has survived and has largely overcome the incessant attacks of these forces of death and desolation exactly through the powerful grace of his constructive creativity. It is through this grace that he has built a superorganic stratum of reality different from the inorganic and organic realities. It is only through this constructive creativity that he has successfully solved his urgent needs and momentous problems. Finally, through continuous

1. See on the effects of wars, revolutions, famines, epidemics, upon psychology and behavior of individuals and groups, upon social organization and institutions, science, religion, ethics, law, fine arts in P. Sorokin, *Man and Society in Calamity*, chaps. 2-15.

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meaningless. In fact, the indeterminacy and meaninglessness of all such theories has made possible the "production, coexistence, circulation, and interminable mutual dispute" of this sort of mutually contradictory theories on the market of sociology and other psychosocial sciences. Due to their vagueness and indeterminacy none of these theories has been able to prove its own validity and the invalidity of all the rival theories. The mutual dispute has been endlessly going on without a decisive victory or defeat for any of these conspicuously vague and self-contradictory hypotheses.

Marxian theory of determination of all "ideological superstructure," including religious creativity, by the economic factor (creativity), and the opposite theories of F. de Coulanges or M. Weber of predominant determination of economic and other forms of creativity by the religious and its *Wirtschaftsethik* factor can serve as examples of this sort of theory. Neither one of these essentially opposite theoreis has been able to demonstrate convincingly its own validity as well as the invalidity of its opponent. The same can be said of most of the other theories that single out of many forms of human creativity one of its forms as the main factor.

To sum up: logically all of these theories are very defective and none of them has successfully solved its "antinomies and dilemmas."

Still less successfully have they proved their contentions empirically. As a matter of fact their empirical evidence is poor, conspicuously inadequate, and in most of the cases represents but a few onesidedly selected illustrative cases allegedly confirming a pet theory. When these cases are confronted with an incomparably longer and fuller series or samples of the relevant facts, or especially by the total known universe of such facts, they invariably appear "unrepresentative," onesided, fragmentary, and inadequate.[1]

For these—logical and empirical—reasons my hypothesis of *the total human creativity in all its known forms as the main factor of constructive sociocultural change* appears to be more valid and adequate than any of the theories that take *one form of this creativity for such a factor.*

1. The unrepresentative, onesided and incorrect character of the "empirical corroborations" of the theories criticized can clearly be seen by confrontation of these fragmentary samples with much fuller, more systematic, and much longer time-series of respective facts given in my *Dynamics, Man and Society in Calamity*, and other works.

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Constructive Versus Destructive Changes

This thesis is correct only in regard to *the constructive historical socio-cultural changes*. Destructive or uncreative changes have been and can be caused by many physical forces like earthquake, floods, volcanic eruptions, hurricanes, etc.; by several biological agencies like epidemics, wrong heredity, negative selection, regressive mutations, and so on; by a multitude of superorganic processes like devastating wars, civil strife, crimes, stupid private and public tyranny, ignorance, insanity, and through misuse and abuse of human creativity for destructive purposes. From time to time in the history of various societies these destructive and uncreative forces have played mtanopantirrole by causing tremendous havoc in the social life of respective groups, by suppressing, hindering and slowing their constructive creativity, and once in a while by terminating their individuality and historical existence.

However momentous, these destructive changes have contributed little to the constructive solution of pressing human needs, to the enrichment of science, technology, philosophy, religion, fine arts, ethics and other compartment of human culture, to the world of great values and to the meaningfulness and happiness of human life. At the best, for a short time a small fraction of selfish and predatory humans may have profited from them at the cost of the suffering majority; once in a while these catastrophic forces may have stimulated human creativity in inventing new ways and means of protection from-their devastating results.[1]

But without human creativity they could not have produced even these modestly constructive consequences. And in comparison with their deadly effects their positive results have anyhow been comparatively insignificant.

Throughout man's long history he has survived and has largely overcome the incessant attacks of these forces of death and desolation exactly through the powerful grace of his constructive creativity. It is through this grace that he has built a superorganic stratum of reality different from the inorganic and organic realities. It is only through this constructive creativity that he has successfully solved his urgent needs and momentous problems. Finally, through continuous

1. See on the effects of wars, revolutions, famines, epidemics, upon psychology and behavior of individuals and groups, upon social organization and institutions, science, religion, ethics, law, fine arts in P. Sorokin, *Man and Society in Calamity*, chaps. 2-15.

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Religious values can only expand with economic security and are nourished by, and elicit, a sense of social justice and equality. No Beauty can develop in a field of moral chaos and confusion. Wealth, Morality and Beauty can be subserved best by the advancement of Knowledge. In general social and moral progress moves towards the creation and diffusion of more inclusive and more enduring values that the idividual identifies with the maximum fulfilment of his potentialities, with his real Being. Within the unity of Being all polar antinomies, of values are resolved. The psychological concept of the conjuction of values is linked with the ontological concept of the unity and transcendence of the absolute Being. In Being, transcendent and yet immanent, inaccessible and yet everpresent, all values converge and are reinforced, and obtain their absoluteness and universality, The beckning voice of the absolute is always there wherever civilization falters and tread on an uncertain moral path. It is the vision of an absolute transhuman demand that is the only safeguard against the corruption and degradation of man and civilization as it is the perennial source of intensity of their adventure and aspiration.

Derogation of the Absolutes and Universals in Occident

Such is, however, the travesty of modern civilization that following the Occidental thought-pattern that has now invaded the various continents, men in their self-deception and pride do not accept any human absolutes and universals, but view all norms and standards as relative, contingent and dependent on the social and historical context. The notion of ethical relativity, so strongly emphasized in particular by cultural anthropology in the nineteenth century, was no doubt in keeping with the sense of racial superiority, national chauvinism and the colonial exploitation and violence of the epoch. Anthropologists and sociologists of the twentieth century now realise that the divergence of moral standards from culture to culture was grossly exaggerated, and that there are certain universal goals, values or norms of behaviour accepted by all peoples of the world. The greater awareness of, and sensitiveness to human wickedness, suffering and degradation in the mid-twentieth century have stimulated a search for sources of universal values and norms in cultures. A world conscience is evident for the first time in human history and expresses itself in certain absolute demands of goodness, justice and equally related to the fundamental liberty and dignity of the human person. The Declaration of Human Rights under the aegis of the U.N.O. is a landmark in the survey of the area of what is always good and just and of what is always wrong

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and unjust for mankind. An over-all view of societies and civilizations of the world reveals that today, as always in the past, man and society cherish and strive after universal values and norms rooted in human nature and evolution themselves.

The crucial issues of truth and error, justice and injustice, love and selfishness, goodness and wickedness, harmony and conflict in contemporary society can be judged only the absolutely and universally true or false, good or evil, just or unjust that knowledge, religion, art and morality confirm and enshrine in the spirit of man and the durabilities of civilization. These alone can prevent civilization from relapsing into sterile hedonic enjoyment of the individual, aggrandizement of power of the nation and collective megalomania. The twentieth century is already the sickest, most wicked, and bloodiest in human annals. But it possesses at the same time the highest potentials for a complete transformation and fulfilment of men and civilization. The time is, indeed, ripe for a momentous historic change of mankind, paradoxically enough for the peak of good or of evil. In contemporary life the instruments and techniques of human degradation, mutilation and savagery thrive side by side with the possibilities of the whole and universal man, cosmic community and transhuman values.

The Reconciliation of Transcendence and Immanence

The integration of knowledge, art, religion and morality, grounded in cosmic intuition, feeling and passion, can and does enable man to "live not only in place but in space, not only at a time but in History." Only through his creative spiritual dialectic of intuitions and feelings can he, working at a high level, achieve a balanced, living harmony of the antinomic experiences of concreteness and universality, immediacy and eternity, creatureliness and infinitude, immanence and transcendence. Such experiences are those of the true mystic everywhere, who finds the Absolute Being in the finite, as the Friend, Companion or the Beloved in some casual human encounter. He meets Being as he plies his boat in the long river-journey at each ferry and each bend of the river :

O Friend, End of all endless movement,
How many bends of the river are still before me ?
And with what call wilt thou reveal
Thyself to me ?

Each human personality matures and develops into the cosmic personality creating and revealing Truth, Beauty, Goodness and Love fused in the wholeness and transcendence of the essential Being or

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Supreme Reality, indweller in all fellow-men and sentient creatures of the earth. Similarly each civilization matures and develops into the community of mankind-and-cosmos through its unity of understanding of the cosmos and its process, and of the human totality, its sense of reverence for man and for life and its suprarational faith and vision. Such outlook is basic for the appreciation of the divergent values of individual cultures, their mutual relationships and the fundamental historic process of the unification of civilization accelerated in this epoch by the technological and economic unification of the globe. Knowledge, art, morality and religion coalesce in envisioning for mankind a metaphysical, metacultural cosmic pattern of harmony, beauty and wholeness based on an ontological order encompassing man which alone can build up the unity and integrity of One World, One Civilization, One Noetic System. This is the subject-matter of Meta-civilization that fuses the theory of human evolution and civilization into the acknowledgement and realization of absolute, ultimate and transcendent values which every civilization creates and nurtures, and which underlie the intensity of its zest, commitment and adventure. Only this can offer the highest fulfilment to human nature, values and potentialities, and achieve a harmonious concord between man and society, between society and civilization and between mankind and cosmos-total.

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CHAPTER V

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Prolegomena to a Sociology of Art

— Egon E. Bergel

1. Sociology of art is still in a condition of chaos. There is no dearth of literature; but the writers cover only selected aspects; there is hardly any coordination of their efforts, and their approaches to the problem differ widely. For instance, Professor Mukherjee's great pioneer study *The Social Function of Art* (New York, 1954) and the admirable essay by Ralph Ross "Art and its Social Functions"(Chapter 26 of Ernest Van den Hagg and Ralph Ross, *The Fabric of Society,* New York, 1957) have practically nothing in common but the title.

Moreover, we have not succeeded (perhaps we have not even tried) to assign to art its proper place in the social system as a whole and to coordinate it with, and relate it to, the other parts of the system.

Indeed, many writers fail to include art in their texts on sociology.

2. Certain exceptions may be noted. Social environmentalists derived art from social conditions, as, for instance, stated by Taine : "L'oeuvre d'art est determinée par un ensemble qui est létal general de l'ésprit et des moeurs environmantes" (*Philosophie de* l' *art,* Paris 1865, p. 17). But apart from the unscientific concept of a mysterious "spirit" Taine's treatment remained on a philosophical level; at the time when he represented his"milieu"theory, sociology as an empirical science was still in its embryonic stage. His statement was not a theory but a challenge to prove a vague hypothesis. The extreme vagueness of the milieu proposition proved to be a hindrance for the

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development of a generally accepted environmental theory of art. Quite to the contrary Marx and Engels are unmistakably specific: art like all other social phenomena is determined by economic conditions. Art is one of various "superstructures," a dependent variable of an independently changing economic structure. But they did practically nothing to elaborate, let alone to prove, this proposition. Neither for a long time, did, their followers. But after Communism had come to power the situation changed and numerous "Marxian" essays on art made their appearance. Apart from its objectionable monistic approach, the hypothesis of economic determinism is one of the weakest parts of Marxian system and fails to account for many of the most important artistic phenomena. Yet we owe to this school of thought some extremely interesting studies, notably by G. Lukacs. However, none of the essays offer a satisfactory sociological theory; the general decline of orthodox Marxism let us expect that future attempts will be less numerous but equally unsuccessful. Many writers classified art correctly as part of the non-material culture of a given society, forming with all other parts a unit of which all parts are conceived as mutually interdependent. But beyond such classifications the writers mostly failed to go.

The most notable exception is Sorokin's cycle theory of culture of which art, to be sure, is an integral part. There is no lack of cycle theories; in his contemporary *Sociological Theories* Sorokin himself lists many authors, to whom at least Toynbee must be added(his *Study of History* began to appear 6 years after Sorokin's book). But Sorokin's predecessors were either not interested in art, as for instance Pareto who concentrated on the circulation of a political (and, to some degree, economic elite); or they wrote philosophical essays rather than sociological studies (this also applies, notwithstanding his extensive use of historical data, to Toynbee). It is not the purpose of the present paper, to evaluate Sorokin's theory and discuss it in detail. There is little doubt that he overstated his case and that his work can be criticized in many respects. One of his greatest admirers N. Timasheff (*Sociological Theory*, New York, 1957, pp. 283f) lists three major objections.

But it remains a fact that Sorokin was the first to offer an elaborate theory connecting art as an interdependent variable with all other parts of a culture and presenting a theory of immanent and therefore unavoidable change. This theory is strictly sociological, derives its supporting data from objectively verifiable facts and is thus exclusively

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a scientific proposition and not a philosophical interpretation. The correct procedure would have been to apply positive and constructive criticism in order to arrive at an improved theory. Instead, the proposition—apart from being mentioned in text books—has been mostly ignored and a comprehensive sociology of art is still to be written.

3. There are several reasons why sociologists fail to deal with art. Many scientists as private individuals have little use for art and consequently lack motivation to concern themselves with art as sociologists.

Perhaps more important is the fact that apparently quantitative methods are not applicable if art as a social phenomenon has to be investigated. At present many sociologists still regard statistics and other quantitative procedures as the only legitimate methods in sociology. "*Quod non est in actis non est in mundo.*" as the Roman lawyers said; what cannot be measured does not belong to the field of sociology. However, it is erroneous to assume that quantitative methods cannot be used for research into art sociology. Sorokin, for instance, used quantitative methods in his cultural studies; while these measurements are admittedly primitive, they could be refined. There are many other possibilities. We can (and sometimes do) list the number of registered borrowers from the public library in a city, compare them with the total population which permits us to draw certain conclusions as to the "echo" of art, namely the response which the writer gets. Audience responses have been repeatedly measured and have been used not only for practical purpose in the radio and television industry but also for theoretical research. In a similar way we can determine the quantitative response of the audience by counting the performances of a play, the sales of phonograph records or the visitors of an art gallery. By comparing figures for several plays, records, paintings we will find differences which can be typified and analyzed. For instance (although the figures have never been determined) we can be reasonably sure that the Mona Lisa has been seen by more visitors than any other painting in the Louvre. We also know that "My Fair Lady" has been performed without interruption for several years because the response permitted repetition. But there is general agreement (although no "experiment" was made) that an attempt to perform "The Marriage of Figaro" or "Midsummernights Dream" for merely three consecutive months would not only end in a financial catastrophe but—which is germane to our own quest—would have to be played before empty seats. One is almost

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tempted to derive a "law" from these quantitative data: the number of audience responses is inversely proportional to the quality of an art work. The joke reveals an important fact—the lack of correlation between artistic qualities and their effects on society.

This fact has to be explained and the explanation cannot be found only by quantitative research. Certain limits of the statistical approach become apparent. This does not imply that empirical methods other than statistics cannot be used. Basically, the situation is similar to that in many other fields; sociology of religion, for instance, also permits only limited use of statistics. Generally speaking, the empirical methods used for research into a sociology of art are practically the same methods which cultural anthropologists use for their investigations of cultures (of which art is a part). The results thus obtained should permit us to develop a theory of sociology of arr which need not be "philosophical", that is: based on speculation rather than objectively verifiable facts. No one has called Malinowski, Linton, Kroeber or Kluckhohm "speculative" because they used quantitative methods but sparingly or not at all.

4. Every theory is developed within a frame of reference. In sociology we use now almost universally either social action (or interaction) or social relationships or a combination of both to build up a general theory. The same frame of reference can be applied to a sociology of art. But we must be aware that certain amendments and changes are necessary to keep the frame a useful instrument.

The process of interaction in art does not conform—at least in many instances—to the usual pattern. The social action of the artist which, as should be noted, is not the creation of a work but its presentation to the public and the "reaction" of the audience are usually separated by a considerable interval of time and by distance in space. (Main exceptions: Presentations on stage or in a concert hall). In most cases the public never meets the artist face to face, their relationships are rarely primary group relationships. In many instances the artist has been dead for hundreds of years but through various media he is still able to communicate with a public, convey a "message" and create emotions which in turn motivate social actions. Time interval and spatial separation are by no means solely a characteristic of social action in arts; in politics dead leaders still continue to "act" through intermediaries. Gandhi is still a powerful force in India and the same applies, though to a lesser degree, to the United States (Washington, Lincoln and others) and other countries (Mazzini, Bolivar, Lenin). But these cases are infrequent while the great artists—

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great as measured by lasting social prestige, by audience rating—are nearly always dead artists.

5. Another urgent task is a re-definition of art in the sociological sense of the term. Obviously we can no longer make beauty an indispensable criterion, as contemporary artists show a decided preference for presenting the ugly in its numerous variations. But even in the past the criterion of beauty never applied to all works of art. No one can call Flaubert's description of the slow, painful death of Madame Bovary or the terrifying etchings "Desastros de la Guerra" by Goya works of beauty but they are great works of art. The same is true of the representations of the crucifixion. A generally accepted satisfactory definition does not exist. Two criteria may help to characterize art as a specific phenomenon *sui generis*. One: art is the willful creation of an unreal world, pretending to be real. This applies to all types of art, to masterworks as well as to the clumsiest attempts by a child. Two: the decisive difference between art and all other manifestations of the human mind lies in the fact that in art the form outweighs the contents. Not *what* the artist writes, paints, composes matters, but *how* it is done makes a work a piece of art. The "idea" as stated in the sentence: "If men were not afraid of what will happen after death they would commit suicide" is not a work of art, nor is the sentence a psychologically correct statement. But the same incorrect statement becomes a work of great art if it takes on the form of Hamlet's soliloquy. Not great ideas, but the mastery of form separate the great artist from the bungling dilettante.

6. To repeat as stated above the relationship between artist and audience is characterized by distance in time and space. Even if artist and audience are actually together as in the performing arts, a spatial distance is artificially created by a sharp separation of the "*scena*" from the "*auditorium*." The actors, singers, dancers, musicians behave as if there were no audience. The "immortality", granted to great artists is based on the separation in time which enables the artist to communicate with an audience long after his death. All this constitutes a very peculiar type of social relationships which has not been sufficiently analyzed. The same applies to one of the results of this type of relationship—namely, due to separation in space and time, the delayed effect of the artist's communication; the desired response of the audience may come long after the death of the artist, who when still alive found no recognition which means that he was unable successfully to communicate with his contemporaries.

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7. While the way of presentation, the form, is more important than the contents (as discussed above) so the originality of the artist depends again on form rather than content. Plots and characters in literature, themes in music, the human body, animals and flowers, landscapes, all are limited in number and the artists are forced to use the same topics which have been used through all the centuries. What is original is the treatment not the theme.

Real originality, however, is always very rare and the majority of the artists notwithstanding their own modifications and deviations have to follow the example of the great masters. Here again we have a nearly unexplored sociological phenomenon the ability of artists to form "schools", to find followers who imitate and the willingness of these followers to be disciples rather than masters. This, too, represents a very peculiar form of social relationships; the phenomenon is by no means restricted to the field of arts; philosophers, scientists and in a certain sense, political leaders to form schools. Obviously Tarde's concept of imitation has to be used but it only can serve as a starting point for a real analysis in depth.

8. But the artist—master or disciple—creates not only in a specific form, characteristic of his personality, his manner, but also in the specific form of his time and his society, in the *style* of his period. The phenomenon of style, obvious as it is, is one of the few aspects of art which have been extensively discussed although rarely by sociologists. Two points have become quite clear. Style is never the creation of a single person; many contribute to its emergence and the artist, although he is not forced to do so, adopts the style of his age and group. Style is thus an eminently social phenomenon. Moreover although style is above all form (and has little or nothing to do with contents) it is more than form. Style in some way expresses the philosophy, the feeling and the values of a generation. This, too, is a social phenomenon and in great need of socientific analysis and explanation. We do have a great deal of literature treating that aspect but too much of it is either philosophical speculations (Spengler!) or the most amateurish enterprise of sometimes gifted but always scientifically undisciplined writers.

What has still to be done is to investigate the *social* meaning of style, the *social* forces which are instrumental in creating and changing a style and the reasons for its decay and final disappearance. Sorokin's cyclical types, as stated before, are certainly helpful particularly because they are correlated to metaphysical and moral values prevalent in a given period of a specific society but the correlations are

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much more complicated and complex than Sorokin's types indicate.

9. The enormous difficulties may be exemplified by some considerations about modern Western Art.

It is quite obvious that modern Western Art in all its major branches—literature, paintings, sculpture, music-represents a radical break with the past, the emergence of a completely new style (or styles) and not merely a gradual change from previous periods. It is equally obvious that this radical change in the arts is paralleled by similar radical changes in all fields of culture: Sciences and technology, political configurations and socio-economic conditions.

Perhaps no other period has seen so radical, so revolutionary, so universal changes in all fields. The infinite cosmos became finite, the "straight" universe curved, Newtonian gravity was replaced by Einstein's relativity. The belief in strict determinism was shattered—at least for the micro-cosmic, atomic world—by Heisenberg. The indivisible atom not only became fissionable but a cosmos in itself. The elements, once immutable, can be transformed in short, the most important axioms have been replaced by their very opposites. The old views of the world and with them all the philosophies based on now discredited theories were totally destroyed. The scientists were able to build up a new theoretical system of the universe, grandiose but strange and to a large extent even for highly educated men not understandable. Of the special theory of relativity it has been said that only a dozen physicists are able to understand it.

In the social sciences the situation is perhaps worse. As Parsons in his *Structure of Social Action* convincingly demonstrated the theories of Durkheim, Pareto, Weber (and Freud) successfully demolished then the prevalent ideas that man's acts are motivated preponderantly by rational considerations. Gone is the positivism and utilitarianism of the nineteenth century and with them the belief in unlimited progress in a world and in a society which through an uninterrupted evolutionary process supposedly becomes more and more rational, more and more intelligible. Man has ceased to understand the universe, to understand his society and, finally, to understand himself.

It is apparent that modern art, too, even to educated and enthusiastic lovers of art, defies understanding. A work like "Finnegan's Wake" is about as accessible to most human minds as the special theory of relativity. This is at least one point on which most observers will agree and it has attracted the attention of the scientists (see for instance,

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would have been subject to criminal prosecution and confiscations. However, nearly all these descriptions are found in literature written for entertainment. If they appear in what we may call serious literature they are usually written in a way to disparage sexual desire not to arouse it. Never before have the writers so consistently represented sex in its most repulsive aspects, in its pathological and destructive forms; these works are not sensual; they do not depict sex as a source of pleasure but as an evil force leading to inescapable catastrophe. The other branches of art are even more radical in their rejection of sex. No paintings and sculptures have ever been less sensate than abstract art, no music less sensuous than twelve-tone music and even the less artistic endeavors of surrealism in film and photography avoid sexual themes. Thus Sorokin's scheme does not apply to our own time. The fact, that in no other period sex has been so devaluated or entirely disregarded in the most puzzling sociological phenomenon of modern art.

11. But at least one feature is quite clear: contemporary art represents a most radical break with the past. Here the artistic developments are much more in line with the cultural developments in general. There can be no doubt that the period which the historians have called "Modern Times" has passed and that we witness the dawn of an entirely new still unnamed period of civilization. As all other parts of this civilization differ from the past, so does its art. If the artists refuse to continue in the manner of yesterday they obviously do so because the artistic tools of the past are inadequate to express the mood of the new time and that the traditional styles have exhausted all possibilities. Hence the abandonment of the rhyme in poetry and the replacement of strict meters by "verse libre"; hence abstract painting and twelve-tone music. They all signify more than the already mentioned break with the past, namely the emergence of a new historical era. The new styles cannot be dismissed as mere fads; not only have they lasted too long but no substitute is in sight. The strength of the new movement is demonstrated by the fact that it has spread into communist-controlled countries which not only disapprove but try to obstruct the production of modern art and even penalize the artists. Obviously we are on safe ground as long as we emphasize only the negative aspects of the new styles, namely the inadequacy of the traditional types of artistic presentation in a largely different world. But if we have to explain why modern artists create just their specific methods which are not only new but extremely strange, then we have to confess our inability to offer even a reasonable hypothesis. This is one of the foremost unsolved problems of sociology of art: the establishment of some

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Edward F. Rothschild, *The Meaning of Unintelligibility in Modern Art*, Chicago, 1934).

This may indicate that the two phenomena are correlated and that the unintelligibility of the arts is simply a corollary of the unintelligibility of the world. But analysis shows that no such correlation exists. Advanced research in physics and chemistry have shown conditions of such complexity that the human mind—or the majority of men—are unable to understand them. Not the world *per se* but the imperfection of the human brain accounts for the unintelligibility of nature. Unless we succeed in breeding better brains that situation will prevail. But the unintelligibility of modern art does not come from extra-human conditions but is of man's own making. It is the modern artist—not modern art—who by his own choosing expresses himself in an unintelligible way. Why he does so remains to be explained. Since he writes, paints and composes not as an isolated individual but in a style common to so many contemporary artists, we have here a social phenomenon for which the sociologists have to find an explanation. Apparently we are far from reaching even a tentative explanation but some problems within the larger problem can be cleared up.

10. In a certain sense we can regard art as the—friendly or hostile—reaction, as a kind of echo to the general conditions of the period in which the artist lives. Modern art is not so much the reaction against the unintelligibility of the physical world as against the senselessness of the social world in which the artist finds himself. He has tried all the substitutes for religion, so copiously offered during the last hundred years; he enthusiastically supported liberalism, socialism, communism, facism in all their many shades and variations and after some time he has found every one of them wanting. With all possibilities exhausted no new panacea is being offered and the artist who perhaps more than anybody else needs a system of ultimate orientation (that is a religion or a pseudo-religion) lives in a world which he condemns, cannot change and fails to understand. Yet he is a part of this world. The result is utter despair in all its moods ranging from nihilism to cynicism.

Applying Sorokin's scheme we should expect that a world which has lost all faith, in which man does not even believe in himself, shows the signs and symptoms of an extremely "sensate" civilization, especially a stress on sex and sensual gratifications. Indeed, we find in real life much laxer sex standards than in the preceding Puritan and Victorian periods and in literature descriptions which in these periods

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correlation between modern art and the other essential parts of contemporary civilization. That a phenomenon like the change of style which took place before our eyes, which can be investigated by formal analysis, by comparison with former periods, by interrogating artists as well as audience, still defies a scientific explanation is a tantalizing challenge for sociology.

12. It is a favorite idea of *literati* and others engaged in baseless speculations that art is "representing" an age. If by that somewhat vague statement we mean that every age has its own specific art no objection can be raised. But this would only be another formulation of the uncontested fact that every period has its own style. But behind the idea of artistic "representation" is quite often the notion that the artist represents in artistic form what people feel or think, so that conversely artistic works permits us to draw conclusions as to the prevailing "mood" of a given period. Vague as the notion is it represents either the idea that the artists function as the 'mouthpiece" of his time, saying or expressing in artistic form what his contemporaries feel; or the artist is conceived as a kind of leader, an innovator who shows the people new ways in a new period. In either formulation intellectual and spiritual identity of the artist and its potential audience is assumed. Even a brief analysis proves this assumption as untenable Only under the most primitive conditions—with small, illiterate groups, with no or only rudimentary technical training in music and fine arts—can we observe a unity of the creative and receptive minds of a group. Not that we can exclude a priori "deviant" artistic creations in a primitive world but since they fail to please the people they have no chance to survive. In a complex and literate society the situation is totally different. In the first place there is no longer a uniform society but several groups with different tastes, different artistic demands attitudes toward the world and its problems. The artist may—and perhaps more often than not does please a single group and antagonizes all others. Secondly, artists can withstand disapproval and continue to create and persevere their works for a more appreciative future generation. Van Gogh is an example.

It is possible to conceive the strict and stilted alexandrine verse of the classic French tragedy as the artistic expression of an extremely formal, highly stylized society and the blank verse of the Elizabethan drama as representing a less regulated British society, permitting much more freedom. But even if we grant the premises Corneille and Racine did not represent the France of their time with her impoverished peasantry, far from being formal and stylish; at best they

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represented the French high nobility, a group to which the poets did not belong themselves. Yet even such comparisons are not always feasible. No one can seriously maintain, for instance that the Romanseque round arch "represents" early Feudalism and the Gothic ogive Feudalism at its peak. In fact we have here a change in artistic style much more radical and revolutionary than the accompanying very gradual change within Feudalism.

That the artist does not always represent his society but may even build a wall between himself and his contemporary audience is clearly demonstrated by modern art. Since modern art without special training and instruction cannot be understood even by an intelligent and educated public the artist does not express what his society *feels* and, since in all probability the majority rejects his art he creates not even what his society wants. Instead of representing his contemporaries the modern artist alienates and antagonizes them. Doubtless this is an extreme case but in other periods artists also antagonized their public frequently, (but not always) because they were ahead of their time. As a rule, the audience is more conservative than the artist who creates new styles as well as new works. History provides copious examples of times when artist were the leaders of their society; it also shows that at other times the artists bitterly opposed their own society and, quite naturally, *vice versa*. Nor do the contents especially of literary works necessarily depict the state of mind of a given society at a given time. They sometimes do if the artist undertook to describe or to criticise or to ridicule his society (e.g. Ibsen's "Pillars of Society", Sinclair Lewis' "Babbit", Galsworthy's "Forsythe Saga", Zola's "Rougon-Maryuard" Series). But that is the exception rather than the rule. Oedipus and Antigone, Hamlet and Macbeth, Faust and all the other German classic plays do not represent the social conditions of the contemporary audience.

Sometimes the artists do not care what the audience wants. The present writer, in his article "Slavic Influence on German Literature" (*Slavonic Encyclopedia*, ed. J. Roucek, New York, 1949) has shown that the German writers not only consistently disregarded the century-old antagonism between Prussians and Poles and between Austrians and Czechs but glorified the revolutionary struggle of the Slaves for their liberation. If we had only the German writings as our sole source we would never guess how bitter the enmity between Germans and Slavs had been during the nineteenth and the earlier parts of the twentieth century.

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Conclusion

The foregoing discussion tried to show how unsafe and treacherous the ground is on which sociology of arts still rests. Without a commonly accepted frame of reference, with imperfect tools, with little enthusiasm for further research we have gained not much insight in the essence and the dynamics of an extremely important phenomenon. The lack of interest is in itself a significant sociological fact, indicating perhaps that the limiting of research to phenomenon which can be measured deprives us without necessity of an all-inclusive sociology which covers the entire field of social actions and their effects. So far a systematic sociology of art is still a postulate rather than reality.

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Part III

Culture Change and Elite in India

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CHAPTER VI

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The Faith of a Modern Intellectual

—*A. K. Saran*

Prologue

"In the life of Vivekanand there is an almost continual conflict between his powerful, proud nature and the presence of Ramakrishna —that spiritualized psychic force which the master had transmitted to him and which acutalized itself for a last time in Vivekanand during the hours before his death. This final grace the master owed to him— the master who had chosen this anguished and haughty substance and had besprinkled it with the dew of his beatitude only to set it adrift afterwards in the whirlpool of two worlds that are batering and penetrating one another." (Frithjof Schuon : *Spiritual Perspective and Human Facts* p. 121).

And this poignant conflict in the life of Vivekanand symbolised the sickness in the soul of India—the malaise that has continued to appear in the intellectual life of modern India in forms differing according to the mode of intellectuality. And this is the deeper theme of Prof. D.P. Mukerji's latest collection of essays, significantly—I was going to say ironically—entitled *Diversities.*

These essays—the publisher's note notwithstanding—are neither an exercise in versatility nor a series of studies in synthesis; nor yet analyses of acculturation in India. They form a study in disintegration from diverse points of view. Prof. Mukerji would, of course, disagree; and many readers too, would protest. But that is part of the phenomenon, signifying certain deeper level of our socio-cultural

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disintegration. More immediately, it is the specificity of Prof. Mukerji's way of thinking—He acknowledges disintegration, but does not accept it. He chooses to call it a state of tension. He is aware of the anomie, the corrosion this continued tension involves, but emphasises its creative role—tension is desirable "if it leads up to a higher stage". Too intelligent to be unaware of the acute logical difficulties in the concept of the "next higher stage" (the socialist order), he is, however, too well-born, intellectually too suave, to exhibit his uneasiness.

Technology and the Socialist Order

I could reproduce a diversity of passages to show that it is not merely change but disintegration which is Prof. Mukerji's real though unacknowledged concern. I shall, however, quote only from his inaugural address to the University of Aligarh :

"Modern definition of economics is closed, deliberately closed, because it avoids norms and values, all in the name of logical analysis. If equilibrium could be just equilibrium, then there should have been no search for equilibrium. Like art for art's sake, this type of pure thinking is really a mark of decadence, though it looks like being prompted by the desire for the establishment of the autonomous science of economics. Prof. Robbins' definition is only a symptom of spiritual shrinkage that comes to all men whenever they equate logic with reason and reason with reality". (p. 87) (cf. Schuon : "Existentialism always reduces cause to effect, principle to manifestation and reality to fact".)

"I have an idea that Indian culture is not yet so disintegrated that one aspect of life is completely severed from another, as it is reported to have happened in other cultures".(91)

"I have just hinted at certain advantages which an Indian student of economics enjoys, or shall I say, should enjoy by virtue of his being an Indian living in a certain pattern of values that has not yet been torn to shreds. For him, his institutions are still real. I know how they are being shaken. It is also true that judged by other standards, these institutions, values and attitudes are feudal, if not primitive. But backwardness may be a privilege, but if and only if, there is a pervasive sense of historical urgency".

We shall see in due course what this "pervasive sense of historical urgency" means; for the present it should be clear I think that the "not yet" and "not so much" clauses hardly—if at all—mitigate the seriousness of the situation, that, in other words, whatever terminology Prof. Mukerji may officially choose to diagnose the present human situation,

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the fact remains that it is in terms of disintegration and decadence that he really understands it. Let us now attempt a brief review of Prof. Mukerji's analyses of the contemporary situation in some of the most important spheres of man's thought.

Let us begin with technology, for technology is the key to the understanding of modern man and his civilization—it represents not only his most valunted achievement, but also his highest aspirations for a better social order. This Kingdom-to-come may be based on neotechnic, biotechnic or cybernetic principles—modern thinkers are not clear about this. But if there is one idea on which there is complete accord in this age of deep discords and violent disagreements, it is that technology—under which psychosocialtechniques of controlling human behaviour are also included—and technology alone can save man. An infinitely developing technology is, as Prof. Mukerji aptly puts it, an absolute given of the modern outlook.

Prof. Mukerji's views on this are contained in a number of essays in the present collection, but "Mahatma Gandhi's views on Machines and Technology" and "Man and Plan in India" are especially useful in this connection. From Prof. Mukerji's extraordinarily able survey, which is a rare combination of historical precision and penetrating analysis—it is clear that there are two aspects of Mahatma Gandhi's opposition to a technological civilization. In the first place, he was convinced that the increasing and large-scale use of machinery was an engine of exploitation. And, in the second place, he was opposed to technology because it represented the negation of normal social order, which in Gandhiji's view, was one based on the principle of wantlessness, nonpossessiveness. It should not be difficult to see that Gandhiji's argument from exploitation is really an aspect of his theory of Aparigraha Nonetheless a whole school of thought denies this. Marxists are utterly opposed to exploitation; their most fundamental objection against the capitalist system is that it is based on nearly the worst form of exploitation; and their main argument for revolution is the promise that the communist social order will abolish forever all exploitation. But the Marxist rejects that spiritual norm of nonpossessiveness which is based on wantlessness. Nor would he accept the Gandhian code of social conduct founded on self-control and prayer.

Prof. Mukerji is quite clear that Gandhiji's basic objection to technology is not the possibility of its misuse, but its incompatibility with a social system worthy of human beings. Whatever place Gandhiji allowed to machines was nothing more than a concession to the reali-

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ties of the situation and the imperfections of human nature—in the last analysis a deviation from the norm. As Prof. Mukerji puts it, ".. despite many concessions to the proper use of machines, his values were definitely opposed to those that make for technological civilization and are made by it".

It is clear from this that logically Gandhiji's views on technology ultimately lead to a total rejection of Western civilization. It is true that Mahatma Gandhi could not be as uncompromising and absolute in his attitude to technology as logic would demand. That modern India, too, has rejected Mahatma Gandhi's views is true, but not much relevant. What is important is the belief that a non-exploitative social order and a high degree of technological progress can be and ought to be combined.

The crucial question, therefore, is: What is the basic connection between the development of technology and 'the exploitation of man by man' ? Within the common assumption about the compatibility of increasing technological power and universal human welfare, two schools of thought may be distinguished. The Marxists, as is well-known, have been greatly preoccupied with exploitation in its various historical forms. Their fundamental thought is that man's increasing technological power can cease to be an instrument of exploitation and become the means to unprecedented human happiness if, but only if, there is at the same time a communist social order. They are quite clear that it is by no means technological power that leads to exploitation but a socio-economic system based on free enterprise, individualistic freedom, private ownership of the means of production and private profit. The other school which may be called non-Marxist, does not believe that a communist socio-economic system is the *sine quo non* of human welfare in a technological age. They put their faith in, (i-a) a further development of technological power such that it will enable man to eliminate or control the evils of technology; (i-b) corresponding development of the psycho-social sciences; (ii) education for love and altruism; (iii) a growing fear of the conse quences of nuclear warfare.

These points, except perhaps the second one, are accepted by the Marxists too; the real point of divergence lies in the Marxists' insistence on communist social order which alone can guarantee welfare of the people. The non-Marxist modern thinkers deny this and hold that the above three factors are sufficient for controlling the abuse of man's increasing technological power as also for ensuring the welfare of the people.

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I shall not directly discuss this difference between the two schools of thought: its significance will become clear in the course of our examination of the above two schools.

Let me begin with a working definition of technology and technological power. Technology is a system of second and higher order means to any given end or set of ends. Technological power may be described as ability to produce at will certain asymmetries in the system (or a part of it) of human or man-nature relationships which the use of a technological system (or a part of it) specifically makes possible for man.

It would *not be incorrect* to define technology more simply as the system of means for accomplishing a given end. But then the concept of technology will be co-extensive with human action itself and hence a narrower definition and a stronger requirement may be more useful for analytical purposes. According to our definition, then, a house is not a part of technology so long as it is used as a means of direct satisfaction or utility to man. The material and the know-how of house building will be part of the existing technological system, for these are means to a means; negatively, since they are not useful directly. It is clear of course that the concept of technology is relative to the set of ends taken as ultimate and to a given set of first-order means. This definition does not oblige us to distinguish between technology and product of technology; our point is not that a fountain pen is not technology while the materials and the machines or tools which go to make are our point is that so long as writing is taken as an ultimate end, the writing instrument itself is not technology in the narrower sense which we are preferring here. When we invent a special tool or mechanism to make a pen, that becomes part of technology; or when writing it considered a means to an end, say communication of ideas, a pen becomes part of technology, while writing in that case will not be.

This is not the occasion to offer a full length justification for the proposed definition of technology; it will not affect our argument if we define it alternatively, as any system of means to a set of human ends, such that it replaces human action in the accomplishment of those ends. (Perhaps the two definitions are not different in principle; but we can do without demonstrating this).

Exploitation is more difficult to define. In the Marxian tradition, exploitation is the concrete social-historical expression of alienation, the economic basis of which, in the present age, is the appropriation of surplus value by a set of persons, other than those who create it. In the context of the programme to end exploitation in all its forms and

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for ever, it is clearly connected with the end of the reign of necessity and the coming of the reign of human freedom. Thus exploitation is loss of self-determination on the part of man. This remains true however pre-eminent the role of any given economic system may be in bringing it about.

In less abstract language, we may say that exploitation of man by man means the use of one group(A) of men by another (B) such that it benefits neither the former (A) nor the whole of which both are part, but only the latter group (B) either wholly or largely.

We are now ready to examine the relation between technology and the exploitation of man by man. The first point is this: Technology cannot be its own end: for it is essentially an order of means. (I suppose this is accepted on all hands). The accepted purpose of technology in modern thought is to provide increasing leisure (surplus time and energy) for an ever-increasing number of people in a society. Prof. Mukerji accepts this. Now it is clear that leisure is not its own end. It must be devoted to the pursuit of ends other than those to which the leisure-producing technology has been a means. They will obviously be on a higher level. Hence, in the context of a society which admits no suprahuman *telos*, leisure will be either synonymous with mortal boredom or it will be used for war or persecution. In other words, the social order will become exploitative: for leisure, in this context, is simply the other side of technological power. And technological power has a double face. It is a power over natural forces; at the same time and by the same token, it is power over men. And because technology (material or social) means a replacement of human action, and technological power a mastery of impersonal (general, suprahindividual) processes and forces, the moment of its consummation is also the moment of the loss of man's human status. Consider electricity: it represents man's mastery over natural processes; at the same time in so far as everybody does not generate his own electricity from a to z, electricity gives to one group of men a type of power over the rest of us which nobody could exercise half so effectively before the use of electricity. And thirdly, in so far as man cannot alter physical laws, he is subordinating himself to the physical order to the extent he makes electricity part of his life and in so doing surrenders his victory over nature.

Let us ignore this last aspect for the present, and return to our main problem: what could guarantee the right use of this technological power? Or, which is the same, what could guarantee that the in-

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creasing leisure provided by the development of technology will not be used for war and/or persecution.

As we have already said, the only guarantee againt the exploitative use of technological power or leisure is the acceptance of a suprahuman nomos, a hierarchy. The over-all direction of technological advance clearly indicates its tendency to concentrate power in a few hands—as a matter of fact, this is unmistakably clear in the advances and the aspiration of the human sciences which seek to be able to control man's conduct and his historical destiny as fully as the natural scientists control those of natural phenomena. The "secrecy" about nuclear knowledge is another symptom of the same tendency.

It may be objected that we have assumed a certain human nature in fact, the "capitalist" one—and disregarded the Marxist theory that with the coming of the communist society human nature will undergo a radical transformation. In fact, our argument is strictly on a sociological plane and makes no specific assumptions about human nature, except that it will remain human, or in other words, that it will not be the usual mode of thought and action of an omniscient, omnipotent, supernatural being.

Our argument depends simply on the assumption that the infinitely expanding technological power of man has to be used: it is this rather than any weakness of human nature that, combined with lack of a suprahuman, spiritual dimension, necessarily leads to exploitation and its higher transformation, persecution; and eventually to the explosion of man by "man", (cf. C. S. Lewis: *The Abolition of Man*).

Against this it can be urged that the distinction between an explotiative and non-exploitative social system is based ultimately on the concept of a transcendental common good, on the distinction between might and right. With the elimination of these ideas in the higher stages of technocracy, exploitation becomes meaningless. As Alfred Weber puts it, "there are now only *de facto* relationships which are becoming pure power-relationships". (Quoted by Josef Pieper in *The End of Time*, p. 131).

It is a valid argument. I need not try to meet it, for it only goes to prove that a "humanistic" technological order is essentially a non-human one.

If, however, all this does not seem as obvious as it is simple, the reason perhaps is that very often our thinking is conditioned by the present situation in many subtle ways. Today an adequate standard of necessaries and comforts for all seems a distant goal. And hence we think that technological advances which ensure greater comforts

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and new luxuries would be an unmixed good, once the present rather obsolete economic system is replaced by one more suitably oriented to the changing technology. At another level, lack of clear thinking on this problem is connected with the failure to appreciate that power, need, exploitation and freedom form a family of concepts. The satisfaction of a need implies the acquisition of a corresponding power. And in so far as needs have to be satisfied externally, the means to satisfy them must be in the hands of a few poeple. (Prof. Mukerji is well aware of this: concentration of power, he says, is among the essentials of any technology. p.63) In the absence of a theory of hierarchical representation and spiritual sovereignty, the fact of public or private ownership of these means cannot make any fundamental difference in the position of those who depend on others who control these means.

Exploitation is not the only argument against a technology-oriented social system. Prof. Mukerji has given (p. 226) an excellent analysis of the chain-effects of technology. Unintended evil effects of technological advance are a well-known story. If the technological society is to last, these must be controlled. The second big assumption of modern thought is this: in course of time science (natural and social) will be sufficiently advanced to control or counteract these effects. This belief too derives its plausibility from a piecemeal view of things. In the last analysis, the question is not one of being able to counteract this or that consequence, or by product of a particular technological device. A new principle and a new power are involved here: The principle of an action which requires no factor external to the will of the agent: the power to have one's pound of flesh without shedding a single drop of blood. Consider the invention of the typewriter. We wanted the typewriter, but not the noise it necessarily produced, hence the invention of the noiseless typewriter. Does it involve any paradox? None it seems. But consider the principle involved. The noise is an unintended consequence of the operation of the technical device designed to typewrite. This unintended result is eliminated by an other technical device, which in turn, will necessarily produce certain other unintended (which is not synonymous with unanticipated) consequences. These may be negligible or harmless. But the technical device by which noise is controlled does not, by itself, ensure that it will have no undesirable consequences. We are lucky if, in the given set-up, none of its consequences is undesirable. A change in the social set up may, however, convert a harmless into a "harmful", a desirable into an "undesirable" effect. And hence

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from a principial point of view we can speak of eliminating the evil or undesirable effects of a device only if an action produces no consequences other than the intended ones. And this is exactly what we meant when we talked about having our pound of flesh without shedding a single drop of blood.

In order to obviate certain objections, particularly from Neo-Wittgensteinian circles, it seems necessary to clarify the nature of our argument, even at the cost of some repetition. A sound case for unlimited technological advance requires something more than merely a large number of cases in which a later technological device has been able to eliminate or modify some of the undesirable effects of an earlier one. It is necessary to assume that by the self-correcting capacity of technology man will be able to eliminate any unintended effects that he may wish to. The whole plausibility of the case derives from the implicit belief in the complete eliminability of the unintended effects of technological advance. Accordingly, our argument focusses attention on this implied assumption and seeks to show that from the number of cases in which certain unintended effects have been removed or corrected, one cannot infer that, in course of time, the unintended effects of technology are all eliminable by technological measures themselves. It further shows that eliminability, as distinguished from elimination in a given case, involves an entirely different principle.

That it is not essentially a question of benevolent or malevolent effects of technology can be seen from another point of view also. Measured in terms of energy, input and output will be equal in the operation of a technological device. Now in so far as there are unintended consequences, they would represent a waste from the socio-economic point of view. The "socially necessary labour time" will, therefore, always include potential waste so long as unintended consequences are not eliminated; in order, therefore, to speak of technology as man's *mastery* over nature, we should be able to exercise our technological power free from unintended consequences. This, obviously, involves a new principle. A fresh advance in technology cannot solve the problem of unintended consequences, it can only take it a stage further.

Hitherto it has been assumed that the unintended consequences can be anticipated, even if they cannot always be controlled. It is by no means a realistic assumption. And here again a question of principle is involved: to be able to anticipate correctly the entire chain of consequences of a given action is to get outside it: Tiresias must necessarily be blind. But even if we do not take this line of

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argument, it is clear that to be able to anticipate the full range of the consequences of nuclear technology is to be able to recreate the universe. And to be able not only to anticipate the consequences, but also to mould them according to human purposes is to achieve a radically new mastery and freedom—quite unintelligible to this generation. It is not the freedom that comes from the recognition of necessity; it is the freedom that comes from the elimination of all necessity.

To sum up : the connection between technology and exploitation can be seen from the following: in terms of satisfaction of needs it leads to subhuman laziness: in terms of power it leads to supergods, to autoapotheosis in fact.

Man and plan in India

Our analysis has shown how utterly mistaken is the contemporary belief in the compatibility of the twin ideals: infinite advance of technology and a non-exploitative (just, equitable) society. If correct, our analysis also makes it clear that the evils of technology cannot be counteracted by a further development of technology itself. Prof. Mukerji is certainly aware of this as well as other basic contradictions of our age. He is too sophisticated to believe in the power of love and altruism except when they are built into the social system. He would immediately see that further development of the social sciences along present naturalistic lines would be really an aspect of technology-oriented thinking and would merely add another dimension to the problems of technological society. But he is convinced that it will not do to reject one's own age. I cannot think of any other reason for the fact that he seems to be satisfied with solutions which, as our analysis shows, do not at all go to the root of the matter and are, in the last analysis, no better than a form of *ignoratio elenchi.* In his brilliant essay on "Man and Plan in India", these problems come up again, this time in a more direct context. Here Prof. Mukerji clearly suggests that the socialist order will realize the impossible ideal of a society technologically oriented, yet completely non-exploitative: in such a society the upsetting social consequences of a fast-advancing and changing technology would be planned away. (This assumes, of course, that the consequences will all be calculable, indeed calculated). It is true Prof. Mukerji does not say this in so many words—but what else would be the implication of the following: "And tension, if it leads up to a higher stage, is also desirable. That higher stage is where personality is integrated through a planned,

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a socially directed, collective endeavour for historically understood ends, which means, as the author understands it, a socialist order". (p. 76).

And yet nowhere in this pioneer study of *Man and Plan in India* does he grapple with the problem of resolving the contradictions inherent in this conception of a socialist order. Referring to technology and technocracy Prof. Mukerji makes a distinction between the technology of power and the technology of goods; and it appears that the distinction is implicitly designed to mediate the tension between technology and socialism (non-exploitative social order). But, as has already been shown, every expansion of the supply system involves a corresponding expansion of the power system, and hence the two technologies cannot be insulated against one another. Prof. Mukerji himself admits this when he says that all technology implies a concentration of power, inclusive of organisation. In fact, he is clear about the next phase of Indian society in which the trend towards technocracy is unmistakable. "In any case, a spiritual restlessness seems to be the only immediate guarantee against warped personality types which the next natural technological, urbanized, bureaucratized social order is going to throw up." (p. 71).

Is this "spiritual restlessness" compatible with Prof. Mukerji's modified version of Marxism? We may not raise this question immediately. But, notwithstanding the quiet, almost casual, manner in which he introduces it, the idea of "spiritual restlessness" seems to me to be the essence, the central "theme" of the new Weltanschauung which is Prof. Mukerji's hope against the on-going disintegration; it represents, if I may so put it, the dialectical faith through which he would overcome the insidious despair of our times. It is, therefore, important to examine the idea of a planned social order to see how far any spiritual restlessness could be its redeeming force.

* * *

The historic roots of the idea of a planned social order go back to the break-up of the World-view founded, among others, on the idea of the Great Chain of Being. The immediate positive reaction to the traditional world-view was to substitute the transcendental intuition of order by an immanentist conception of the social system. This was the logico-philosophical basis of the competitive, individualistic society which supplanted the traditional order in the West. (It makes little immediate difference to our position if the relation is reversed and the non-transcendental immanentist-world-view is called the "ideology" of the emergent

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competitive socio-economic system). In Adam Smith's system, the conception of national economy as a self-adjusting mechanism with automatic co-ordination of demand and supply retained a "subtheological" (the term is taken from Prof. Stark) reference to the hand of the Providence. But social thinking was definitely moving away from its roots in tradition and the self-adjusting socio-economic system came to be understood in terms of a homoeostatic model. The actual working of the economy, however, showed frequent and important deviations from this model: and it was not at all difficult to see that state activity was essential to keep the self-adjusting mechanism in porper gear. Formally, however, the state did not enter the economic system at all. It could not, therefore, be very long before the need was felt for open state activity in the socio-economic field. This was the point whence the idea of planning originated. With open state action in non-political fields, another far-reaching shift in thinking took place. Instead of giving up the self-adjusting model, an effort was made to reconcile it with the role of the state. The implicit auto-apotheosis (of Man) which characterises modern thought on planned socio-economic systems is the result of this effort. With the addition of the idea of a collective secular Providence to the competitive world-view, there arises an inner tension between the notion of self-adjustment and the notion of planning—though the cybernetic model may be supposed to represent planning at its highest, the principles of human planning and those of cybernetics pull in opposite directions.

It is curious to note that Marx, who launched historically the most powerful attack on capitalism and the competitive society and advocated the idea of a planned social order, himself retained the logico-philosophical basis of the capitalist order, viz., the idea of a self-adjusting system; true, he insisted that in the capitalist competitive society this self-adjusting mechanism seems to break down, in the sense that it works towards the dissolution of the capitalist society—but Marx was equally clear that the inauguration of the Communist society will restore its normal functioning towards self-maintenance leading to self-development towards ever higher forms. Here is the germ of an inner tension between Man and Plan. Though independent of each other, the transcendental-Providential and the homoeostatic theories of social order and history could, however, be combined; Scheler's *fatalite modifiable* is an effort in that direction, however feeble. (The idea comes from Comte). But man's auto-apotheosis cannot be combined with the idea of a dynamic self-adjusting social order. At the same time, it could not be avoided either, for the transition from the

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traditional theory of social order to the theory of the planned social order—to the theory of the *human* birth of a new man—does not represent a *line of development* in the history of ideas. It is, in fact, an encounter between two opposed ideas. The basic problem of planning is no other than the problem of social order and one need not be either a metaphysician or a neoliberal to see that it is essentially the problem of human freedom. The theological problem of sin and evil in the world is rooted in the concept of human freedom. But human freedom, whose phenomenological reality cannot be denied, besides giving rise to sin, evil—and theodicy—also gives rise to another, rather strange phenomenon. Let Engles enunciate it: "In the history of society, the actors are all men endowed with consciousness, acting with deliberation or passion and working for definite aims; nothing happens without conscious intention without a desired end. But . . . what is desired only rarely comes to pass . . . The ends of the action are willed, but the results, which in fact, spring from the actions, are not willed, or, in so far as they do seem to correspond to the desired ends, have ultimately consequences which are entirely different from those that were desired". (For a Hindu there is an irresistible temptation to recall: *Karmaryevādhikārarastu, mā phaleshu kadāchana.*

This is what Wundt called the heterogony of purposes or values. In other words, human freedom creates a gap between the part and the whole, the past-present on the one hand, and the future on the other. But a social system, cannot tolerate this gap. How is it closed? That is one of the key-questions of social science. The Marxist answer, which is also that of the modern thinker, is: by Man's Plan. Prof. Mukerji cannot accept this answer, if he wishes to retain his belief in spiritual restlessness even as a defence mechanism; for this answer does not solve the problem of the heterogony of ends. It runs counter to it. Indeed, the attempt to solve this problem through human planning implies an absolutization of non-transcendental human freedom; and that can only mean—if it can be meaningful at all—either omnipotence of every man ?) or near-absolute power for some, and sub-human servility for the rest. Either way, there can be no place for restlessness, spiritual or otherwise.

There is every reason to believe that Prof. Mukerji is aware of this result; he prefers, however, to halt his analysis and criticism just at the point where they begin to plumb the perilous depths. In a delicately ironical style which combines English understatement with the wounding subtlety of Sanskrit Vyanjana, Prof. Mukerji

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has subjected the first two Five Year plans of India to a devastating criticism. His basic objection, though somewhat obscured by a too consummate artistry, is this: Indian planners equate planning with rational budgeting, with the public sector and welfare bureaucracy. The reason for this narrow equation is that our planners still lack historical understanding and social vision: they do not think in terms of a new man and a new social order. (This is the main burden of *Man and Plan in India*).

Prof. Mukerji is perfectly correct. But what does this criticism involve? It involves, for instance, that our planners have not been able to emancipate themselves from the "folklore" of planning: that they still talk about "felt" needs of the people when they should be clear that the state plans neither for "felt" nor for "anticipated" needs; beyond a bare minimum, it plans quite simply, for *imputed* needs. The concepts of "new man", "social vision" and "historical understanding" belong to the esotericism of planning which like all esotericisms, is the genuine theory of planning. Having been a pupil of Prof. Mukerji, I do not believe that he is one of those theoreticians who cannot deduce the ultimate consequences of their own positions. How then does he avoid the dangerous thinking which he asks others to cultivate? By a diversity of devices. In these two articles, his technique is to severely localise his problems. He shows an acute awareness of the deeper and dangerous implications of his criticisms of Indian Planning: towards the end, however, he leads the reader to think that the problem is simply one of cultural assimilation and synthesis. And yet in the very passage in which he talks of acculturation and cultural synthesis, he makes it clear that the real solution is something different, viz., the inauguration of the socialist order: "Thus it is that two systems of data are to be worked out. One is the Plan with its basic western values in experimentalism, rationalism, social accounting and in further Western values centering in, or emerging out of bureaucratization, industrialization, technology and increasing urbanisation. The other is not so much the Indian traditions as India's forces of conservation and powers of assimilation. At present, they are not sharply opposed. If anything, the first datum is gradually becoming ascendant. This is a bare historical fact. To transmute that fact into a value, the first requisite is to have active faith in the historicity of that fact; just as it is necessary to actively know that individual life has an end in order to convert the personal facts of living into social and higher values. The second requisite is social action to push on with the Plan and to push it, consciously, deliberately,

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collectively, into the next historical phase. The value of Indian tradition lies in the ability of their conserving forces to put a brake on hasty passage. Adjustment is the end product of the dialectical connection between the two. Meanwhile is tension. And tension is not merely interesting as a subject of research, if it leads up to a higher stage, it is also desirable. That higher statge is where personality is integrated through a planned, and a socially directed, collective endeavour for historically understood ends, which means, as the author understands it, a socialist order. Tensions will not cease there. It is not the peace of the grave. Only alienation from nature, man and work will stop in the arduous course of such high and strenuous endeavours". (p. 76).

It is a fundamental passage, written in excellent modernese, highly characteristic of Prof. Mukerji's thought; and I think it will be worth our while to spend some time over it. In Prof. Mukerji's view there is conflict in India between Eastern and Western values; but it is in no way really acute, for the West is now almost supreme. Conflict and tension cannot, however, be resolved thereby: only a socialist system can really redeem the Western civilization. Now in the light of our analysis of a technology-centred, dynamic, planned society it is clear that a socialist order has certain fundamental contradictions. Prof. Mukerji suggests no solution to them: his extraordinary powers of analysis are never trained on the concept of a socialist order. Prof. Mukerji enjoins us to have active faith in the historicity of the current dominance of Western values centering in technology and planning. What does it mean? I for one cannot understand how it can mean anything else than accepting, with the enthusiasm or despair born of a sense of inevitability, the secular mystery of the state (instead of transcendental truths, reasons of state) and the self-canonization of politicians, experts and technicians.

Prof. Mukerji talks of social and higher values which he believes "the next historical development (Socialism)" will realize. But he does not pause to enunciate them and to consider if they can logically have a place in the socialist system. Is it because he knows that these higher values are no higher than the values of idolatry, (the cult of Stalin or Gandhi, or that of Khrushchev or Nehru) and the sociality is no better than the abstract, self-combustive levelling-down process, in a word, the crowd; or, as the modern social scientists prefer to call it, "mass society"—a phrase which the pre-Wittgensteinian logicians would have called a contradiction in terms ?

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There is no doubt that a collective life based on self-canonization of party bosses guarantees unremitting peace and happiness to the masses; in fact there should be no difficulty in believing that in the "new" society, each individual will be perfectly happy and peaceful. The only question is whether in this society our distinction between the peace of the living and the peace of the grave would be meaningful at all. It is unlikely that Prof. Mukerji is unaware of this result. And yet he insists that even in the new social order (the socialist order) "Tensions will not cease there. It is not the peace of the grave. Only alienation from nature, work and man will stop in the arduous course of such high and strenuous endeavours".

Of course, Prof. Mukerji is making a distinction between the Communist and the bourgeois tension the latter being one that arises from "alienation from nature, work and man." But tension, whatever its source, implies inwardness and bilateral pulls. And such inconsistent pulls are precisely what a successful socialist order plans away. There can be differences in the quality and degree of alienation. But alienation, as such, cannot stop, howsoever strenuous or high the endeavour; for alienation is an essential aspect of externalization and effort.

The philosophy of Indian History

Prof. Mukerji's essay on the Philosophy of Indian History is more directly relevant to these problems. The central problem posed in this essay is: Can there be a philosophy of history at all? With brilliant erudition Prof. Mukerji shows that all historiography implies a philosophy, though, of course, it may not always be systematically or explicitly formulated. His charge against current historiography is that it has generally failed to tell you and me to make history. In other words, a true philosophy of history must be pragmatically oriented. Unfortunately, however, Prof. Mukerji does not choose to consider the difficulties of this position, one of which is specially acute in the context of his view—expressed earlier in this essay—that philosophy is a historical discipline. This immediately raises the problem of clarifying the relation between the pragmatic philosophy of history and the historical theory of philosophical truth. Prof. Mukerji's remarks on this would have been extremely useful, but he prefers to pass on immediately to Indian historiography. He argues that histories of India are usually superficial: one would look in vain for the spirit of India, the specificities of Indian culture. Indian histori-

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have been obsessed with political history which, under British rule, became an intense preoccupation with the Indian national struggle. The result has been that Indian historians have tended to neglect the genuine bonds of Indian social life, caste, family life, the village community, a particular type of religious dynamics and that "real basis of Indian unity"—the sense of obligation derived from the theory of Karma.

Why has our historiography been so barren? Prof. Mukerji attributes this to the influence of the West. The influence and the prestige of Western thought and politics generated this nucleus of guilt and fostered it in the name of science. The result was a complete neglect of the bonds of the people, *Dharma*, religion. No history of the people, which in India is the same thing as the history of culture, could be written, because the only sign of revolt, resistance and life here against religious and rituals could thus be written. Let me repeat: our numerous religious sects were so many rebellions." (P. 142).

The implication of Prof. Mukerji's penetrating critique is simply this that India's history is essentially the story of her culture and that in turn is inseparable from the history of her religious quest. Now if one emphasises this; if, further, one rejects the "natural""scientific" attitude for the understanding of history—one cannot possibly view Indian history in terms of class-struggle. And yet we find Prof. Mukerji anxious to find a place for class-conflict. Referring to the 'pure' and "scientific" theory of history, he remarks: "The doctrine, to put it bluntly, was the reflection of a desire not to recognise class-conflict". (p. 144).

It is no incidental inconsistency. For Prof. Mukerji goes on to charge the Indian historians with betraying their people inasmuch as they have failed to tell them how to give a push to history. Now quite apart from the internal inconsistency or otherwise of Prof. Mukerji's views, the pragmatic (or, should I call it Marxist) philosophy of history—which in turn is the basis of his charge of betrayal against the Indian historians—is by no means an easy philosophy for those who are not already committed to it as part of a certain system of thought. To mention only two difficulties. First, to demand that the historian must enable us to learn the art of making history, the know-how of speeding it up to its next higher stage, is to presuppose that the historian knows not only what the future social order is likely to be, but also that it is internally coherent and absolutely desirable. If the historian does not know what the next phase of history is, or if he does not believe that it is the only possible and the best phase,

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It may not be possible for him to give a forward push to history as Prof. Mukerji demands of him; in fact, he may give it even a backward pull. (The crux of the difficulty is that a philosophy of history cannot properly be scientifically inducted from the study of history itself. It must, in a sense, be *a priori*. To admit this is, however, not quite consistent with pragmatism).

The second difficulty is this: Confronted with different belief systems. what is the historian to do ? If he cannot understand them in terms of the tradition which sustains them or of which they form part, he would either misunderstand them or explain them away—neither of which would do. It becomes specially acute when a belief-system includes (implicity or explicity) a philosophy of history different from or opposed to that of the historian. Hence arises the fundamental question: can there be a non-transcendental philosophy of history which can encompass diverse collective consciousnesses; some of which have a necessary supraconscious dimension (or belief-systems some of which include postulates about supraconscious and transcendental levels of reality)? Prof. Mukerji recognizes that this is the crucial question. I shall quote in full the passage in which I think he answers it: "There were a number of crises in our history which they called *manvantara*. These had to be accounted for. Besides after the crises the streams again looked placid. Great men had intervened, the *avatars* who appeared at every crisis but on the whole, there was a sort of social entropy a dispersion of energy a loss in quality in time. Such a state of affairs could be met by the concepts of *Kalpas* and *Yugas*, *Manvantaras*, *Avataras* and the doctrine of Karma: a doctirne be it noted which is different from that of *Kriya Shakti*. In short the people's philosophy of time was a variation of the theme of pre-destination and recurrence. For the Indian people, the curve of history was cyclical. Sociologically speaking, it was unilinear and, therefore, quantitative. Its equality was related to the individual but for the people it offered no quality other than patience, which is another name for taking it as a static , objective unity, that is, time as it is. This will not do for the Indian of today. So the second requisite for the new philosophy will be such a concept of time that it will not be along one direction, that it will not be cyclical; it will be neither the Greenwich time nor the twinkle of Brahma's eye but that it will be open, responsive to deliberate changes of collective efforts and living, very human, dialectical and materialist in the first instance. Through this change from transcendental to human time, philosophy will become one with history: or if that appears to be a bold statement, philosophy will be worthy

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of history in the making. And that is the least of what we want today from our historians". (p. 150).

It is expedient to begin with certain minor difficulties to which this important passage gives rise. According to Hinucosmic time reckoning, a *Kalpa* is sub-divided into fourteen *Manvantaras*, each comprising senventy-one and a fraction *Mahayuga* and terminating with a deluge. A *Manvantara*, then, is quite simply a larger unit of reckoning than the *Yuga* and the *Mahayuga*. It is, therefore, difficult to understand why Prof. Mukerji should choose to call it a crisis. Similarly, it is not clear why he should like to begin the next *Manvantara* with an *avatara* ('Great men had intervened, the *avatars* who appeared at every crisis'.) when he knows that the next *manvantara* always begins with the Manu who is saved from the deluge that follows the end of a *Manvantara*. Again the way in which he puts it, suggests a Euhemerist theory of myth, but I know he accepts no such theory. Prof. Mukerji is, no doubt aware of the transcendental and cosmological nature of what may be called the Hindu philosophy of history; and yet he seems to be suggesting an interpretation of it in terms of social entropy, even though there is nothing in the second law of thermodynamics itself to warrant the conception of ever-recurring cycles of human history. Further, Prof. Mukerji says: "Such a state of affairs could be met by the concepts of *Kalpas* and *Yugas*, *Manvantaras*, *avatara* and the doctrine of *Karma*". If he does not believe in the myth of eternal return, this way of putting the matter commits him to the view that these concepts were just collective make-believe. But I doubt if he would maintain any such theory. In any case, one fails to understand Prof. Mukerji's reason for interpreting the traditional theory of time in terms of "social entropy". If this has anything to do with a synthesis of modernism and traditionalism, the entropic interpretation happens to be rather ill-advised; for at least one important modern philosopher of dialectical materialism is hostile to the second law of thermodynamics. Referring to Eddington's formulation, Vislobokov says: "The class character of this 'theory' is manifest: if, after a certain period the universe is going to be 'dead' what is the point, then, of struggling for better life on earth? The theory of the 'heat-death' of the universe defends the interests of the imperialists, disarms the workers in the capitalist countries and diverts them from the class-struggle." (Quoted in Wetter, *Dialectical Materialism*—p. 303).

The objections that have just been raised are admittedly minor, and I should not have mentioned them had they not seemed to me to be

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intimately connected with a fundamental question. Can we have a philosophy of India's history, which implies a rejection or perversion of the traditional Indian metaphysics and intellectuality? For example, according to the traditional Indian point of view, the "non-spacial and the non-temporal intuition is the condition of the interpretation of the space-time world itself", "all states of being, seen in principle, are simultaneous in the eternal now; he who cannot escape from the standpoint of temporal succession so as to see all things in their simultaneity is incapable of the least conception of the metaphysical order." (Coomaraswamy; *Time and Eternity*, p. 139). Now can a thinker reject this viewpoint and yet claim to enunciate *the* philosophy of *Indian* history? Prof. Mukerji avoids a straight commitment on this issue; it is, however, fairly clear that he does not stand for a total rejection of the tradition—which must include the traditional theory of time and history. At the same time, he is convinced that this will not do for the Indian of today. If it does not mean that the metaphysical view of history is dated, it can only mean that what we need today is a reactivation, a revivification of the traditional ideas. But the new concept of time which he proposes, "very human, open, dialectical, materialist", et cetera, has little to do with the traditional theory according to which time is the backshining of Eternity. Is it then a refined version of the Marxist theory of time? I do not know. A dialectic of time which excludes Eternity, or at any rate, a "higher unity" of time and everlastingness is not easy to understand. As to the next stipulation that the new concept of time should be "materialist", Engels' formulation is negative in force. "The basic forms of all being are space and time and existence out of time is just as gross an absurdity as existence out of space." (*Anti-Duhring*. p. 62). According to positive formulations achieved in later Soviet philosophy, Matter exists in space and time as their modes of existence: "In the first place, space and time as such are the basic, objectively real forms of existence of self-moving matter; secondly, as forms their properties are conditioned by their content, self-moving matter, thirdly, as forms, they possess a specific character of their own, distinct from that of their content, self-moving matter". (V. I. Svidersky, Quoted in Wetter *op. cit.* p. 307).

Now, however satisfactory this "material" concept of time may be to a Soviet philosopher, the keen intellect of Prof. Mukerji cannot fail to see its implicitly transcendental nature. For, the phrase 'specific character of their own, distinct from that of their content, self-moving matter.....' precludes any interpretation in terms of immanence. Prof.

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Mukerji has, therefore, to pause a little and consider if a strictly materialist concept of time is at all possible. It appears that the new concept of time proposed by him is a little too eclectic, not to say elastic. In any case it has certain quite awkward features. We are told that "the new concept of time will be such that time will be neither undirectional nor cyclic". If this involves a rejection of the irreversibility of the temporal flow—and socio-cultural time is often thought to be reversible—it is difficult to understand how a non-irreversible time could also be noncyclic—unless, of course, one were thinking in purely spatial terms.

The Unity of Theory and Practice

It seems to me that the theory of an evolving cultural synthesis from which will emerge a new man and a new society has not been particularly successful even in Prof. Mukerji's expert hands. In his view, however, a major obstacle in the emergence of the new society is that our thinking is not adequately alive to the demands of the historical situation, which, in its turn, is not sufficiently informed by vital theory. In other words, our age lacks unity of theory and practice. This is one of the key ideas in Prof. Mukerji's thinking. As is, however, usual with key ideas, the concept of unity of theory and practice is nowhere rigorously explicated or examined at length; in fact, it is usually presented as a solution, seldom, if ever, posed as a problem.

Now unity of theory and practice may mean complete sincerity; concord of word, thought and deed: a constant endeavour to have right understanding and to act completely in accordance with it. In other words, Kierkegaard's theory of reduplicated thinking minus his doctrine of truth as subjectivity. This presupposes, of course, a coherent social order based on a system of norms accepted unquestioningly. Since Prof. Mukerji thinks in terms of a changing world, and is most anxious that everyone, particularly the intellectuals should contribute to the "business of making history", his idea of the unity of theory and practice has to be a different one. In a traditional society the unity of theory and practice is really hierarchical and assumes: (i) the superiority (and uniqueness) of gnosis over all other forms of knowledge and thinking. (Gnosis is not the same as "gnosticism". It bears here "its original meaning of wisdom made up of knowledge and sanctity." It is also necessary to distinguish between "knowledge acquired by the ordinary discursive mind and the higher knowledge, which comes of intuition by the intellect"). (ii) complete

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acceptance of the traditional hierarchy of values and conformity with the received norms of conduct; (iii) the equation of non-conformity with abnormalcy; and (iv) a line of men who are the bearers of tradition.

In a dynamic-open society, unity of theory and practice, in so far as it is interpreted in terms of sincerity, unavoidably takes on a Kierkegaardian meaning. Since such a society does not accept any common, suprahuman tradition, conformity to norms cannot be wholly objective or social. Truth thus becomes subjectivity, involving infinite risk; or else, sheer conventionality which is usually a mask for timorousness. In such a situation there is only one way of achieveing unity of theory and practice: by reducing theory to subliminal advertisement and practice to crowd-behaviour. (Perhaps also by martyrdom. But it is doubtful if martyrdom can be posited as a norm of social action). In other words, if one does not accept transsocial archetypes of thought and action, it is arbitrary to hope, as Riesman does, that the modern "other-directed person" canr egain his autonomy and get out of the desperate loneliness of living in a crowd of peers by the simple device of attending to his own feelings and aspirations. There is, in fact, no halfway-house between the "tradition-directed" and the "other-directed" societies: for, in reality, the other is the counterfeit of the Tradition.

Now neither the existentialist nor the salesman interpretation is relevant to a society engaged in 'recreating itself'. A different meaning of the unity of theory and practice is obviously called for; it is one we find in Marx. Though Professor Mukerji makes no definite commitment, it is pretty clear that he is supporting what is substantially the Marxian view of the unity of theory and practice.

It is one of the earlier themes in Marx's thinking. "It is a psychological law", he writes, "that once the theoretical spirit has has been liberated it turns to practical energy emerging, as will from Amenthes' Kingdom of Shades and rounding upon the independently existing world of reality". (From the Doctoral Dissertation. Quoted by Wetter, *op. cit.*, p. 257). In a later passage he assigns, more explicitly, a maieutic function to theory. Criticism, he thought, can bring out the truth from reality "by making the world aware of its own consciousness...."

In his famous theses on Feuerbach, Marx takes up this theme once again: "The question whether objective truth belongs to human thinking is not a question of theory but a practical question. The truth, that is, the reality and power of thought, must be demonstrated

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in practice"...."Philosophers have only interpreted the world in different ways. The problem is to change it".

A new element has now entered Marx's thinking on the subject. The role of theory is no longer maieutic; it is now instrumental and creative at the same time. It would appear that it is from this strain that the later Soviet theory was developed. In Lenin's thought the instrumental role of theory comes to the fore: "Theory is the experience of the working class movement in all countries taken in its general aspects....Theory can become a tremendous force in the working class movement if it is built up in indissoluble connection with revolutionary practice; for theory and theory alone can give the movement confidence, the power of orientation and an understanding of the inner relation of surrounding events; for it, and it alone, can help practice to realize not only how and in which direction classes are moving at the present time but also how and in which direction they will move in the near future". (*Foundations of Leninism*—p. 26).

Any one can see that the role of guiding practice assigned to theory in this passage is scarcely compatible with the definition of theory offered in the same paragraph. Generalization of the experience of working class movement is achieved on its own level. But a new level is required for guiding revolutionary practice. Perhaps it is this difficulty which Lenin tries to meet by his idea that the revolutionary consciousness must be brought from the outside: "We have said *that there could not yet be* social democratic consciousness among the workers. This consciousness could only be brought to them from without. The history of all countries shows that the working-class, exclusively by its own effort, is able to develop only trade unions, i.e., it may itself realize the necessity for combining in unions, for fighting against the employers and for striking to compel the government to pass necessary labour legislation, etc. The theory of socialism, however, grew out of the philosophic, historical and economic theories that were elaborated by the educated representatives of the propertied classes, the intellectuals". (Quoted by Wetter *op.cit.*, p. 260).

It should be noted that the word intellectuals is used here in a very special sense. In point of fact, the external bringer of socialist consciousness is no other than the Communist Party: "Throughout its glorious history of more than half-a-century the Communist party of the Soviet Union has regarded it as of first rate importance to develop the Socialist ideology and to bring this into the workers' movement and into the consciousness of the working class". (M.T. Iovchuk. Quoted by Wetter, *op. cit.*, p. 260).

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Theory thus becomes subservient to practice and practice is equated to carrying out the party programme. In other words, the essential function of theory is to help and maintain the Communist Party into power. Thus, "unity" actually means the subservience of theory to practice—whatever may be said theoretically about the dialectical relationship between the two. Stalin is quite clear about this: "Good resolutions and declarations in favour of the general line of the party are only a beginning; they merely express the desire to achieve victory, but not the victory itself....After the correct political line has been laid down, organizational work decides everything including the fate of the political line itself, its success or failure". (J.V. Stalin, *Works* XIII, p. 373).

The position becomes still clearer in another closely connected doctrine of Marxism—the partisan character of philosophy: "The Communist Party and its central committee are not only the collective organizers, but also the collective centre for the development of Marxist collective thought". (See Wetter, *op. cit.*, p. 273).

"The history of the CPSU represent an organic unification of revolutionary theory and revolutionary practice, the visible incarnation of the ideas of Marxist-Leninism" (Quoted from *Kommunist*, 1954, 14, p. 6 by Wetter p. 274).

An analysis of these views will show that the problem (or programme) of the unity of theory and practice involves questions of the meaning and truth of theory; from this point of view, the word unity is unfortunate. The relation between the two can be considered from the following points of view: (i) Socio-historical determination of theory (with respect to both genesis and truth-value of ideas) (ii) Pragmatism, (ii-b) Pragmaticism, (iii) Operationalism and (iv) Existentialism (a) Humanistic (b) Transcendental-Religious (Hindu).

Now it is true that the Marxist approach does not quite fit into the above typology. In fact, it is a confusion of the two sub-types of the fourth (Existential). It is an approach that logically leaves no room for any criticism. Only self-criticism is permitted, which, given the facts of the case, can only mean the criticism of one stratum of the party by another: to be precise, the higher strata enjoy the right to criticise the lower ones.

The rationale of Marx's doctrine of the "Unity" of theory and practice may be formulated perhaps as follows: Contemporary thought is ideological because it presents an inverted picture of reality. But the fault lies with reality itself: in the present stage of society human relationships have been inverted. Normal relationship would be restored

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with the coming of the communist society. Hence, for thought to be truthful, social reality must be changed. Thus in the contemporary world, theory has to be an instrument of socialchange without which it would remain distorted and empty.

When Professor Mukerji talks about the unity of theory and practice and charges the Indian intellectuals with the task of making history, he does so, I think, more in the spirit of Marx and Engels than in that of James and Dewey. In that case a few questions ought to have been answered: (i) Will the Communist social system be coherent ? (ii) How can reality itself be inverted unless a higher reality be posited? (iii) How do we determine the correct line of social change? (iv) How could thought be expected to correct the inversion of reality when it is held to be invariably only a reflection of reality? (v) Why, Professor Mukerji calls India's plans the new social framework which has to be accepted—going so far as to add that the Plan will work us if we do not work it—does he endorse thereby the analogical corres pondence of the Planning as Authority and the Central Committee of the Communist Party?

Prof. Mukerji does not raise any of these points. It may be that he would reject altogether the above analysis; though it does not seem more likely that he would accept the later Soviet interpretation of the unity of theory and practice. There is, however, one other passage which may help us in understanding his views on this question. The hard core of the Marxist position, Prof. Mukerji says, is pragmatism: "Thought originates in action, it is organised by action from the point of view of outcome; it must needs end in some action which is result". (p. 278). He goes on to add, "Philosophers have pointed out the defects of this position. Pragmatism is a subspecies of Idealism and full of fallacies. Instrumentalism stems out of it and refines its crudities".

How does Professor Mukerji propose to meet these objections? In the first place, he seems to rely on a skilful use of a psychological device by which a forceful anticipation of possible objections to a theory shocks the reader into the belief that the author must be in a position to meet those objections. In the second place, he tells us that the Marx's position is different from both pragmatism and instrumentalism in the following way: "Instead of priority of action over thought the Marxist counts on their dialectical interplay. For him the world is an objective reality independent of ideas and thoughts. He further grounds both thought and action on human behaviour, which by its nature is historical, and, therefore, relative in every way

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but in spiralled search of the absolute....No criticism of agronomical theory can be so effective as that of farming practices". (p. 278).

If we accept this as the formulation of the authentic Marxist position on the question—though the 'spiralled search of the absolute' does not look quite Marxist—the redeeming feature of Marx's pragmatism would seem to be the dialectical view he takes of the relation between theory and practice. The trouble, however, is that Marxist philosophers do not adhere to this position; on the contrary, as has been shown above, they emphatically take a position that makes the supremacy of practice over theory nearly absolute.

And unfortunately Prof. Mukerji himself lends support to this non-dialectical approach when he makes practice the most effective criticism and the supreme test of theory. Such a status for practice takes away, in effect, the whole point of a dialectical relation.

If the communists do not bother to reconcile these opposed views on the relation between theory and practice, they do so, I think, with good reason. It may not be unfair to put it like this: The top level of the Communist Party represents the still centre (or, shall I say the Godhead?) from which all dialectic emanates and to which it ultimately returns. (Of course, no Marxist or Soviet theoretician is likely to admit it in these words; however, even the brief account I have given above of the Soviet views on the unity of theory and practice and the partisan character of philosophy should make this implication clear). I am quite certain Professor Mukerji would reject any solution along this line, even though he may believe in the "spiralled research of the absolute". It is a great pity that he does not go more deeply into the vexed problem of the relation between theory and practice. There can be no doubt about Professor Mukerji's catholicity and deep humanism: it must, however, be said that his views on the unity of theory and practice do open the door to the scarcely disguised despotic stand of the Soviet thinkers. Explaining his views on the unity of thought and action, he writes, "Admitting all that the meaning of unity of thought and action is still not clear. Thinking as distinct from thought and thought as distinct from theory increase the distance between thought and action. Thinking no doubt is mental action in so far as it is dependent on (a) knowledge of the contradictions of the past or passing system of thought and (b) language, that is concepts and symbols, it is a form a social action. But either is past social action although thinking is being done at present. From this angle all thinking is historical.

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But the historicity of the Marxist is another type. It is forward gazing; its action is essentially futurist.

"Futurist action involves the transformation of present contribution into past one, and also the construction in accordance with some vision of the next step reached by understanding. So there must always be a lag between social action in terms of language and knowledge of past contradiction, and social action in terms of the potentialities of that historical knowledge which is the charter of freedom from necessity; otherwise one will have to posit some sort of 'eternal content' running throughout all the motive forces of change and or all the social orders hitherto existent. Such tie-ups with eternity the Marxist resists. His sociology is that of liberation, a sort of social *moksha*: hence its trace of millenialism. This is also one of its capacities to enthuse. As such, the levels of social action and thought are as different as those of *prartti* and *mukti*. The case of Janak is an ideal compromise, and not of genuine unity of thought and action. He had a family.

"Unity, therefore, can only mean a constant endeavour for the progress of thought to come closer to the march of action. Needless to say that vital thought and vital action are meant. We need not redefine vitality; the Marxist explanation is sufficient unto the day. But the closeness must be measured. So far as is known, no serious theoretical discussion of such approximation as could bring about change is forthcoming in Marxist literature. What is found is a post hoc explanation. The function of leadership is brought in for rescue, but in the ultimate analysis that peculiar match-making between knowledge of the historical process and the willed action remains the artist's secret". (p. 279-80).

This important passage, in spite of its unpoetic elusiveness, shows Prof. Mukerji clinging to the Marxist system, even though acutely aware of its inconsistencies and dilemmas, none of which he has been able to reconcile or resolve. In a revealing interpretation of Marxist sociology he says, "His sociology is that of liberation, a sort of social *moksha;* hence its trace of millenialism". Is he thinking of a fully-realized communist world-society? Will such a society be any different from a society of *Jeewan Muktas*? But in that case, will Prof. Mukerji, admit its incomprehensible, paradoxical nature?

Prof. Mukerji says, "The function of leadership is brought in for rescue, but in the ultimate analysis that peculiar match-making between knowledge of the historical process and the willed action remains the artist's secret." Given the Marxist's stubborn resistance

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to all "tie-ups with eternity", to which Professor Mukerji has referred earlier, the above sentence has a natural sequel: The supreme artist, holding the dread secret, is born and reborn in the person of the Prime Minister of the USSR and the First Secretary of the Communist Party. That Professor Mukerji meant nothing of the sort by his phrase "artist's secret" is certain. Indeed to make it bear the above construction may seem to indicate lack of literary sensibility. But a figure of speech, however elegant, is too feeble a device to close the perilous chasm between the "understanding of historical process" and "willed action", between man's limited intellectual powers and the infinitely complex course of history. A brilliant phrase may suppress the implications of a thought, it does not eliminate them.

The conceptual framework which we have been analysing here underlies two other important essays. '*Social Problems in Fiction*' and '*The Sociology of Indian Literature*'. In applying it to the special field of creative expression, Professor Mukerji makes some highly important points. They deserve full-length examination which I reserve for a future occasion. A brief reference may, however, be made to the essay on *Standards in Education*, from which our last quotation on theory and practice was taken.

Professor Mukerji begins by rejecting all the usual explanations of the fast deteriorating educational standards. He wishes to go to the root of the matter. According to his analysis the Indian Independence movement was indifferent to academic values, was more emotional than intellectual in nature: in fact its top leadership, particularly Gandhiji, had a dread of the intellectuals and this was one of the reasons why Indian intellectuals as such did not take any important part in shaping its course. Further, in terms of his theory of the unity of theory and practice, Prof. Mukerji holds that the Indian national movement was not revolutionary. Hence, he concludes that standards "have fallen very low: because there has been a counter-revolution instead....Therefore, and this is important, a revolution is necessary to raise them. Such a revolution would build up its adequate theories, which in their turn would create the necessary outlook and enthusiasm among the students".

I shall not comment on this diagnosis, for I do not fully understand it. One or two questions may, however, be raised. What type of revolution has Professor Mukerji in mind? Does he mean the kind of revolution which he says is taking place in India through the Five Year Plan? Or does he mean the one that is expected to bring Social *Moksha* (Liberation) to our country? If it is the latter, one can

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easily understand how it will improve educational (as also other) standards. But if it is the former, a clarification regarding its role in improving educational standards would have been most welcome.

Our second difficulty is this: Prof. Mukerji says that a revolution will build up its own adequate theory. How should we understand the concept of "adequacy"? Is a theory adequate when it fully justifies the revolution? Or is there some other criterion of adequacy? A clarification on this issue was all the more necessary in view of Professor Mukerji's immediately following remark that "Intellectual life has an order of its own". Apparently this contradicts his view that theory arises out of and is validated by practice. It is, however, too obvious a contradiction, and what Prof Mukerji is suggesting is perhaps something different: it may be called the principle of relative autonomy of thought under the suzerainty of practice. I am not sure if such a principle is logically tenable. Since, however, the supremacy of practice is postulated in advance, any critique of the principle would be void *ab initio*.

There can be scarcely any doubt that the problem of the proper relationship between theory and practice is a most crucial one. On the integration of theory and practice, thought and action, depends not only the integrity of the intellectual, but the unity and life of the socio-cultural system itself. When the unity of theory and practice is broken the whole system goes to pieces. Very rightly does Marx make the severance of theory and practice the gravamen of his charge against non-Marxian thinkers; with equal insight he emphasises the crucial role of the proper relationship of theory and practice in bringing about social revolution and in sustaining the 'new order'. Since there are various levels (and modes) of both theory and practice and hence also of their correspondence, the problem of their proper relation is one of unusual complexity. While every solution to such a crucial and complex problem has its own special danger, the most dreadful is perhaps the one that leads to idiolatry—the worship of man by man. Can we avoid it? Is there a way to genuine de-Stalinization, to a truly aniconic level of thought? It is a serious problem and one that can arise in a traditional society as well. "Doctrine is one thing", remarks Schuon, going straight to the heart of the matter, "and sanctity another. To subordinate, from the doctrinal point of view, doctrine to sanctity, or in other words, to the personal realization of the doctrine, is to preclude oneself from making use of the doctrine, since no one can canonize himself; it is also to ruin the doctrine which thus ceases to be

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something absolute in its own order. The "objective" doctrine is something other than knowledge actualised in a particular "subject".

"It is illogical to reject a doctrine in the name of sanctity or a sanctity in the name of doctrine". (*Spiritual Perspectives and Human Facts*—p. 74).

Of course the solution implicitly suggested here will not quite fit in with Prof. Mukerji's general outlook—his "spiralled search of the absolute" belongs in an opposed line of thought. In fact—and this is the crucial point—traditionalism itself can be no more than an anachronism today; for there does not appear to be any genuine method of reactivating the traditional ideas by human effort. The intellectual today faces an utterly perplexing situation. Professor Mukerji's essays are certainly no guide to the perplexed. Nor were they designed to serve that purpose. And yet Professor Mukerji does not stop at analysis and criticism alone. He shares and propagates the contemporary notion that one *must have* "faith". Accordingly, we find in his thought the faith in the emergence of "new man" and "the new society", that is, the socialist order.

Which is better: a 'faith', founded on the denial of necessary knowledge and the glorification of probable opinion—a 'faith' that is supposed to be the necessary equipment of the modern intellectual; or, a frank despair to which he is driven by the 'darkness of this time'? Despair can be a pose and a sham; or worse, it can be a cover for gainful inaction. Could it not be the prelude to a state in which man, while living and suffereing in his own historical time, preserves a consciousness of the unreality of time and is open to the Myth of the Eternal Return?

Epilogue

"The only hope, or else despair
Lies in the choice of pyre or pyre—
To be redeemed from fire by fire".

(T.S. Eliot, *Little Gidding*, iv)

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CHAPTER VII

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The New Elite

—I. P. Desai

Nearly a hundred and fifty years ago the British rulers of India introduced a new system of education. It was a system of public education, and, therefore, everyone could take advantage of it, irrespective of caste, creed or sex. The knowledge content and organisation of the new system of education were different from those of the old or traditional system of education prevailing in India in the early nineteenth century. Among other things, the system also created a class of new intellectuals. In terms of their knowledge, they were different from the traditional intellectuals.

This new knowledge had two aspects, formal and substantive. We might say that the way of looking at the world or the scientific attitude was the formal aspect. The substantive aspect was made up of beliefs, values, views and ideas on technology, economic system, system of government and organisation of society. In brief, we can say that Western society, its history and culture were the main items of the knowledge content of the new educational system, and the difference between the new intellectuals and traditional intellectuals could be understood in terms of their respective orientations. The former were Western-oriented while the latter were oriented in Indian tradition. It is generally presumed that all those who took to the new education also approved of Western society and culture, and that consequently as a class the new intellectuals were the most potent and active agents

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of Western society and culture in India or of Westernisation in India. As a corollary to this, there is another belief. It is felt that as the class of these intellectuals grows in number and influence, the traditional society and culture recede more and more and Western society and culture proceed further in extent and intensity.

Yet another belief about the new intellectuals is that they are progressive and, therefore, the right policy makers—albeit on other grounds too.

Now these beliefs about them are both true and false.

While it cannot be denied that there are significant differences between the traditional intellectual and the new intellectual, there is on the other hand, as Edward Shils has recently pointed out, a close inner affinity between them. Writing about the new intellectuals in the underdeveloped but newly emergent countries in Asia, he says:

"At present the traditional intellectuals, e.g., the Pandits in India, are looked upon with condescending pity or outright contempt by the modern intelligentsia of these countries. What the traditional intelligentsia regards as sacred, their modern counterparts regard as superstition or triviality. There is little contact between these two sections of the intellectual classes. Their modes of life, their intellectual satisfactions and curiosities seem to be poles apart. Nonetheless, a deeper affinity exists between them, and this affinity has important implication for economic development."

"The affinity is evident in the theoretical and literary tendencies of the modern intelligentsia in the underdeveloped countries. How few study engineering or natural sciences, especially the experimental sciences. How vast is the disproportion between those who have taken degrees in the arts, in law and commerce, and those studying science and engineering, wherever in the economically underdeveloped parts of the world there is an ongoing university system, it is flooded with candidates for arts degrees for whom there will be very few opportunities for employment.

"The origins of the relative indifference towards the intellectual and practical mastery of Nature can thus be seen to be rooted in the older traditions of each country and in the recent traditions established by the method of domination employed by the foreign ruler. Because of these traditions, the educated classes of the underdeveloped countries, however much they believe in the saving graces of science and technology, have a largely literary or ideological relationship to

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them. In practice, being an engineer or an applied scientist does not count for as much in the eyes of the educated as having a good humanistic education."[1]

In view of the increasing number of institutions teaching science and technology and the growing demand for them in India, one may feel disinclined to agree with the last sentence of the quotation given above. But it is not known as to how many of those taking to science and technology do so in order to earn their bread or find enough money to maintain their traditional status, and how many feel that they would rather take to humanistic education if they could achieve these two aims by it. It is also significant that Nehru and Radhakrishnan, to mention two eminent intellectuals among politicians, rarely miss an opportunity to emphasise spiritual or humanistic values or that which is valuable in the Indian heritage after justifying, eulogising and supporting science and technology. They might be only paying lip service to spritual values, but that they are compelled to do so in public is indeed an indication of the climate in the country.

Thus the common belief that the new Western education completely destroyed the old intellectual tradition or its influence does not seem to be true. This influence persists and manifests itself as required by the new situation and environment though differently from the past or from its original situations and environment.

It may not merely be that the past tradition is latent. What appears to be the new tradition—believed to be Western-oriented—may be only a sort of perversion of the Western tradition. As Shils points out, Westernisation may not be a tradition. It may only be what he characterises as "xenophilia'. He says,

"Although there has been a revival of appreciation for the inherent qualities of traditional art, music, sculpture and religious philosophy, there is even more prestige attributed to a thorough familiarity with the culture of the West. It is not only the man who has studied at Oxford, Cambridge, Heidelberg or Paris who is deferred to, but the person who, whether he has studied abroad or not, is intimate with the contents of the *New Statesman* and *Economist*, who knows about Bertrand Russell, T. S. Eliot, Sartre, Graham Greene, Camus, Auden and Faulkner, who is at home with the conflicts within the British Labour Party

1 Edward Shils: 'The Intellectuals, Public Opinion and Economic Development', *Economic Development and Cultural Change, Vol vi, Number 1, October 1957.*

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and the plays of Christopher Fry. Even among scientists in these countries work seems to be done for an invisible jury of scientists in England, the United States and Germany while other scientists, working in the same field within their own country, are less frequently thought of or referred to.

"This location of the intellectual centre of gravity in a foreign country, and indeed in a Western country, may be attributed to a more realistic or refined appreciation of the quality of scientific, literary and philosophical work in the West. If this were only so, it would not injure the cause of national improvement and economic development. It is because fundamentally it arises from xenophilia that it harms the culture, science, and economy of the underdeveloped countries".[1]

Thus what appears to be Westernisation is not Westernisation, and therefore the claim to progressiveness of the so-called Westernised section is also questionable. The fake Westernisation or xenophilia is not merely not beneficial but harmful.

To quote again from Shils, "The real disadvantage of xenophilia is that it arises from, and fosters, a lack of intimacy with the material environment and is a form of social blindness to the capacities and incapacities of one's fellow countrymen and their problems. It is a product of a hierarchical society in which higher castes and classes had little feeling for those beneath them, and of the religious tradition of non-attachment. Its result is the esxitence of an educated class with little deeper understanding of the real state of mind and the real problems of the country."

Shils is quoted at length not because he is the first person, the only person or the most recent and western intellectual to say this, but because he has personally visited some of the countries in question including India, and he himself and his colleague acquired systematically the relevant information from the intellectuals themselves.[2] The usefulness of Shil's observation to our purpose is that the differences of kind and degree in the orientation of the new intellectuals may also be according to the subjects studied and the history of the study of these subjects in India.

1. Ibid.
2. There is a personal reason too. I would not be able to express myself in English as effectively as Shils. What is worse, I am not trained to write in my own tongue.

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How far it is true then to say that Western education in India created a really Western-oriented intellectual class and not xenophiles. We are not attempting that question here. For our purpose, the lesson is that in terms of orientation the class of the new intellectuals is not homogeneous. All those who took the new education, were not uniformly affected in their intellectual tradition or ideology. There may be several tiers among them according to the type, and degree of the effect, of the new education on their ideology.

The two extremes that we have are the traditional and Westernised. But from what we have said above, there are numerous variations of both; and probably in the ideological continuum, a point may be reached where it may be difficult to distinguish one from another. What we may have is a Western-influenced Indian-oriented ideology and the large mass of the new intellectuals probably belongs to this category. Ideologically, we do not have genuine Westernisation. It is a fake Westernisation which, of course, has a social function to perfrom. Our point here is that this fake Westernisation is the attribute of a section of the new intellectuals which is small numerically but big in power and influence. It also follows that the new intellectuals cannot be called progressive on the ground of their being Westernised.

Our position then is that the effect of the new ideology on the traditional ideology is not uniform on all those who take to the new education. The only thing common to the class of new intellectuals is that they have been to the university and might or might not have taken a degree. There is nothing common to them all in their ideology.

The efficacy of the new intellectuals as agents of Westernisation cannot also be taken for granted. The role of the new intellectuals as powerful and active agents of Westernisation can be understood if it is thought of and observed not in terms of the whole, but structure-wise. The relation of a particular ideology to the social stratification, and the position of the intellectuals in the hierarchical order and their distance from economic and political power would determine the effect of that ideology on the whole of society. The ideology of that section which has a higher position in the social hierarchy and is close to economic and political power will generally dominate the social policy. This does not mean that the policy is right or that it will succeed. Today, the section of intellectuals that is close to economic and political power is the section that is afflicted by xenophilia. They are themselves the policy makers or are near the policy makers in the Government,

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in the universities, in business and in industry. They form the new elite. Their Westernisation being a fake one, what they do can only be an imitation of the West in such things as the style of living, personal habits, personal appearance, manner and mannerism, the use of English in conversation, the quality of English and so on and so forth. They claim superiority over others on the ground of their cosmopolitanism, which to them and to others means Westernisation. But since their Westernisation is not genuine their cosmopolitanism is also not genuine.

This section is politically more dangerous than the revivalist section of our intellectuals because it is nearer the seat of political power. Because of the very character of their intellectualism their policy will be devoid of the understanding of the problems and state of mind of their people; and they are blind to the capacities and incapacities of their people. The only way open to them to make their policies succeed is to get the people to submit to them. The form of the force will be 'democractic'. The bureaucracy in a parliamentary democracy eminently suits their feudal heritage and feudal social origin. Their idea of democracy is as fake as their Westernisation and cosmopolitanism. They have democratic slogans but their actions are undemocratic. Democracy as a way of life is foreign to their social nature and nurture.

The easiest defence—and an effective one too—of this section would be that the xenophiles do not simply exist and that the people near the seat of political and social power are not xenophiles. That sets a task to the social scientist—the task of proving the existence of the xenophiles and showing their location in the Indian social structure.

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CHAPTER VIII

Religion, Social Forces & Historical Periods in India—An Analysis of Social and Cultural Dynamics

—K. C. Panchanadikar

Writing on Historical Periods is not a quest for fixing the chronological sequence[1] of ancient history or literature of India. The term Historical Period is used here in the sociological sense as expounded initially by Karl Mannheim and currently by the Historical Perspectivist[2] school of Gerth and Mills. The term historical period is also indicated by other words like era, epoch or weltanschauung. It implies a socio-cultural context that is indicative of dynamics of social forces during a time period. Social and cultural change in a system within a temporal and territorial context is generated by an impact of new configurations of cultural traits and complexes emerging either from within the system, or impinging from a culture outside of it.

Contemporary Indian society is a resultant of social forces that shaped it through certain historical periods. Stages[3] of development of the Indian social system as has come down to our time in the decolonial period after 1947, could be designated as follows:—

1. Evolution in the ancient period up to the synthesis in Geetā the Smritis and Arthashāstra, w.r.t. Brahmanical i.e. Sanātan (Shruti, Smriti, Purānokta) as well as other a-Sanātan trends viz. Buddhist and Jain systems.

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2. Constructive re-interpretation of the Sanātan systematic position, through Bhāshyas (expositions) on Geetā and Niban dhas (commentaries) on Smritis during cultural expansion and integration. This period also saw the end of the long drawn competition between the Sanātan system, and Buddhist and Jain sects during the 8th and 12th century respectively resulting in the convergence of orthodox and heterodox values.

3. Trends of mobility under the impact of Islam, i.e. Turko-Afghan cum-Persian military and administrative conquest, and cultural penetratian resulting in the decline of Kshatriya-Brahmin socio-occupational dominance and the consequent new socio-occupational mobility. Bhakti schools and liberal trends in religion and custom arose as rallying nucleus for cultural survival and continuity of the Indian tradition vis-a-vis the external cultural stresses.

4.(A) Trends of Reformation and revival both aiming at the reconstruction of Indian society, but with different response patterns towards impact of colonial market-cum-factory era with its ethic of liberal democracy.

(B) Twofold climax of these trends of reformation and revival respectively, in the decolonial period after Indian independence in 1947.

(i) Constitution oriented to liberalism, democracy and planned reconstruction towards a welfare state and society. This trend is symbolised by the Head role of Mr. Nehru, and his Congress party.

(ii) Gandhian enunciated Sarvodaya concept growing into a social movement to reconstruct Indian society on a revolutionary reinterpretation of Geetā ethic and the traditional Varna-Ashram Dharma Sansthā. This trend is symbolised by the Head role of the saint Vinoba Bhave and his Dān movement.

Amongst these four historical periods in the development of the Indian social system, the first two are entirely confined to stresses of instituting cultural creations and their configurations arising from within the Indian society, and competing to be instituted. Whereas the last two stages indicate cultural impacts impinging from outside sources namely, Turko-Afghan-cum-Persian initiated Islam and the British colonial liberal capitalism respectively.

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In each of these four stages, problems arose that affected the organization of society. In turn they generated new patterns of values, norms and institutions and thus reorganized the Indian social system at a new level of integration. This holds good even for the contemporary colonial-decolonial period. British colonial system started its impact firstly on polity and economy and replaced the agro-handicraft economy and feudal polity respectively, by an (i) economy of incorporated[4] (joint stock) business (including factory or the manufacturing firm), (ii) and a polity, centralized, stable and liberalised. It also secularized law (penal code) and the educational spheres. Thereby employment avenues in administration and military spheres were thrown open to all eligible persons, without reference to caste. The state was welfare[5] oriented too, in as much as it gave reservations to caste groups that were too backward to compete. Thus the principles of opportunity, competition, mobility, individualism and welfare were initiated. These changes were stabilized in the urban sectors located in the midst of rural settlements in each of the linguistic regional variants of Indian society, though with differential[6] rate of intensity. Rural society was also subjected to certain changes. Rural economy of agriculture-cattle complex was capitalized or commercialized and was linked to the colonial market and demand. There was a steady percolation of governmental white collar groups down into rural life. There was a flow of urban migration, drawing away the excess of rural population for urban white collar and working class occupations. There was also an urban migration for studies and subsequent absorption.

But certain spheres of institutional living remained intact under the external impact. These were spheres of religion, of personal law governing family, kinship, property and succession. Linguistic communication and creative activity in all forms was enlivened by the impact of the European culture but retained the indigenous character and genius in growth. In the area of personal law[7] thanks to Warren Hastings and Lord Bentinck, the Mitāksharā, Dāyabhāg, Nambudiri Marumakkatāyam and Aliya Santānam laws were codified and reconstrued by judicial decisions of courts, that in a way acted as the latest Nibandhkāras of Yājnavalkya Smriti. Personal law was refined and extended, though slowly and haltingly, by executive and legislative decrees. In this field the British political acumen[8] always waited for a strong enough popular agitation and demand, except in case of practice of Sati which was curbed with a firm executive action.

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We have already discussed elsewhere[9] that in this economic and political transformation the Indian business castes, regionally clustered in Calcutta, Madras and Bombay, had a stake in aiding the British colonial interests which were fully in conformity with their own, on transforming the traditional economy and polity of pre-colonial India. The challenge and brunt of reflecting and responding to the impact of European culture, on behalf of Indian tradition was undertaken by the white collar professional groups especially after the backbone of Indian feudalism was completely broken both politically and militarily in the war of 1857-59.

There was a great deal of heart searching in the area ofIndian religious beliefs and practices, which led to two forms[10] of new religious efforts (1) formation of religious sects oriented to religious reformations and social reform; (2) religious revival with fresh formulation and interpretations. The nineteenth century in India witnessed the birth of religious movements like the Brahmo Samaj in Bengal and Prathana Samaj in Bombay both of which could be described as reformationist. There were other religious movements, revivalist in nature that breathed a sterner pride for cultural traditions of Indian society subjugated and humiliated militarily and politcally by colonial conquest. These were the sects like Arya Samaj, Ramkrishna Mission, Arvindo Mysticism and Theosophy. There was a still larger general revivalist trend of Karamyoga initiated by Lokmanya Tilak who formed the extremist flank of the Indian National Congress. Tilak wrote his great religious treatise the Geeta-Rahasya, or the Karma-Yoga-Shāstra, creating a religious base for his way of thinking. Even the Indian terrorists[11] had their aggressive religico-national thinking.

Lastly came the Gandhian enunciation that has grown into fulfledged revivalist movement of Sarvodaya under the saint leader Vinoba Bhave. This movement has a complete and comprehensive philosophy of religion and secular living, based on a far-reaching re-interpretation of Geeta. This new Bhāshya on Geetā by the Gandhian saint philosopher Vinoba, is the climax of the century and a half of religious and social reflection both reformationist and revivalist. It is the climax of effective response by Indian tradition to the colonial impact of liberal democracy. We have juxtaposed[12] in detail in an earlier article the Sarvodaya movement vis-a-vis Indian liberal democracy in the decolonial period of planned reconstruction of Indian society. Thus traditional religion and ethic of India has shown its vitality to rejuvenate under a new motto[13] enunciated by Vinoba Bhave namely science and spirituality in place of politics

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and religion. This is a mature message of Indian tradition and culture for the mid-twentieth century world civilization.

The eleven principles or undertakings (Vratās)[14] of Sarvodaya define the essence of the value-system of Indian society and culture, which Indians consider as eternal (Sanātan Dharma). Sarvodaya as expounded by Vinoba aims at re-establishing the Varna and the Āshrama scheme of organization of society with revolutionary redefinition based on the concept of Dān or Sharing (Dānam Sama Vibhāgah), Trusteeship and equal remuneration (Samān Vetan) for all occupational strata, thus holding them in equal status. This Dharma (instituted value system) according to Vinoba, is applicable for all the Varnas i.e. occupational-cum-status strata of society, (Dharmo ayam Sārva Vārnikah). Equal social status is explained on the basis of the equality of spiritual dignity of human beings in the divine cosmos, as propounded by Geetā. In this sense, Sarvodaya is attempting to institute the Sanātan Dharma of Geetā which had so long remained at the level of mere enunciation. This is an ambitious programme of social reconstruction by instituting the entire ethic of Geetā. There is a fulfledged programme of decentralizing power structure in a polity based on Grāmrājya (village local authorities) and a rule by total consent, rather than by majority. This essentially implies rule by compromise rather than political cleavage under party banners. A Sarvodaya village is also a grāmdān village with a common pooling of productive capital of land-cattle complex. The same principle is sought to be extended to the urban settlements under Nagar Panchāyat rule (city local govt.) Sarvodaya speaks with a voice totally different from the two alternate social systems—liberalism and communism—of the greater European culture. In the light of the traditional Indian ethic (SanātanDharma of Geetā), it tries to institute in a social system (called Sarvodaya Samāj) the basic fundamentals of human behaviour, Kāma (desire, motivation), Karma (action or institutional interaction) and Jnan (maturity or ego-autonomy of personality). This integration starts with the internalization of the ethic (Dharma) of Brahma-orientation which is secularly achieved by attaining humanist maturity (Samatva-bhāv), by feeling one and at peace with the world of other fellow human beings. This implies a normative control of Kama (desire) which differentiates ego from the world of alters, in a series of ingroup attachments clustering around the central figure of ego. It should be noted that this attainment of maturity (Jnān) is to be achieved in this very human world, in the context of social) interaction. Karma (social action) is not to

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be given up even after achieving maturity (Jnān), lest it would confuse the alters of lesser maturity. This is Lok-Sangraha. This ethic is called Nish-Kām-Karma-Yoga (ethic of continuing social action even after motivation is normatively controlled, into a stage of ego maturity). It is an equivalent of Moksha, Mukti, liberation or attainment of Brahma,where Ātman (individual Soul) feels one with Paramātman (the Universal Soul). Ego's narrow ingroup feelings and loyalties are merged with the largest macro-groups, society and humanity, which are the worldly symbols of divine cosmic principle, Brahman. This principle may be visualised and attained by following any religious faith or path. All religions are essentially equal for goal attainment (Sarva Dharma Samānatwa). In this Indian ethic there is no other metaphysical world but this very one, where a human soul goes into a chain of rebirths (Punar-janma), so long as Karma (action) is not Nish-Kām (free of ego's attachment to narrow ingroup feeling and desires).

In early life, a social being, ego, is initiated into this Dharma (ethic), whose basis is Nish-Kām (Brahma) orientation, to be realized and achieved through life-experiences by the self. This could be done either by taking to the status (Āshram) of Grihastha (householder living a family life after marriage) or Sanyāsi (ascetic order). The latter is not renouncing society. It is only renouncing membership of the primary in-group of family. But before a person is ordained by a spiritual guide into one of the orders of Sanyās, it is strictly essential that the individual has obtained permission of the spouse, or mother in case there is no spouse. A Sanyasi has to go around from his āshram or hermitage amongst people, to render services. A Sanyāsi has to renounce bonds of property and power. In the Sarvodaya movement, this institution has been revived in the concept of Lok Sevak (social worker), who is to be resident in an Āshrama i.e. hermitage, and going around in the service of surrounding rural or urban settlements. These full time members of the Sarvodaya movement constituting the neo-ascetic order, have to sign a pledge of offering their everything in life (Sarvaswa-Dān) and keeping free of all forms of political power and wealth. The order is to run Nishkānchan i.e. without formally raising funds. They have to subsist on the proceeds of Sarvodaya-Pātra. It is a pot maintained by a householder member, whose child puts a handful of grain into it daily and the collection is periodically made over for the maintenance of the Lok Sevak serving that area. This is called Sammati-Dān (sharing goal-acceptance). Sarvodaya has also tried to resusticate the Vānaprastha Āshrama by enlisting retired

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folks to take up social service and guidance work, e.g. in the city of Indore.

According to Sarvodaya ethic, a human being can maintain his goal orientation, through devotional meditation (Bhakti) and Karunā (a feeling of empathy to all human beings) and live a life of normative achievement of Kāma, through Artha and Moksha, in a Dharma oriented life, either as a householder (Grihastha) or as an ascetic (Sanyāsi). This in short is the Sarvodaya mode of integrally combining Karma (institutional interaction), Bhakti (devotional feeling and meditation) and Jnān (humanist maturity), in an instituted social interaction process. Sarvodaya aims to institute all that the Geetā had merely stated as social ethic. After a lapse of centuries the traditional Indian ethic enunciated in Geetā is sought to be instituted in social living. In this sense the Gandhian Sarvodaya is the next ambitious step, coming long after the initial formulation of Geetā philosophy and ethic. It is in this sense, that it has a revolutionary role to play in trying out the Indian experiment in social and human organization. In this context Sarvodaya movement seeking to institute Geetā-ethic is a social and cultural system, alternative to liberalism on the one hand and communism on the other, as a way of human living, i.e. culture. It is too early to pass judgement on this great humanist experiment and hence it is best to analyze the historical periods that gave rise to the formulation of this traditional Indian ethic (Sanātan Dharma), which is now being restated and is sought to be instituted by the Gandhian Sarvodaya movement.

It is needless to restate that traditional Indian ethic is not a mere historical curiosity but a living, contemporary social fact, having empiric validity in social cognition. Indian cultural tradition has come down through the historical periods stated above, into the contemporary functioning rural society in our village settlements An Indian village system is an integral community organization of Jatis (castes) that constitute a configuration of social living around the focal collectivity of major agricultural castes in an ensemble of entrepreneur, tenant and labourer roles. There are other dependant minor castes playing subsidiary roles of servicing and artisanship through ritual as well as non-ritual occupations. The nature of the colonial urban community is much different than what it was in pre-colonial periods. It is based on multi-occupational economy organised as joint stock (corporate) business, including manufacturing firms or factories. It is a European-pattern modern industrial society and it is being grafted on the Indian rural society, through a process of capi-

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talization of agriculture. Its value system includes individualism, opportunity and mobility, competition and contract, and democracy welfare and efficiency. Sarvodaya and its efficacy would be tested in providing an institutional order that could incorporate this factory industrial material culture, as well as the essence of its value system or ethic, in a synthesis with the traditional Indian pattern.

Intergration and synthesis is a process of seeking areas of compatibility with instituted symbols of interaction. To the extent these are discovered and initiated by the charismatic Head roles, areas of tension for a participant ego, are resolved. But the path of social changes is a path strewn with schisms and conflict around cultural symbols, seeking and competing to be instituted. Even the shaping of Geetā ethic and the personal law of the Dharma Shāstras (Smritis), that have come down to the colonial time, was an attempt to resolves chisms impeding the process of instituting cultural symbols, in other words social forces. As much as the interaction process is dynamic, so has the frame of cultural symbols, its own dynamics. Historical periods could be abstracted for analytical purposes and treated as a dynamic process leading towards logical closure of cumulative and integrating cultural symbols. The logic in this process is guided and affected by the cognition and charisma of leadership roles acting within the frame of dynamics of social forces, or in other words social movements. At each stage in the cultural dynamics a choice is exercised in favour of a specific cultural symbol, from among an 'ensemble of available and potential alternatives of cultural creations. Culture is a configurating process between symbols in the different institutional areas that together constitute social living. It is like an advance of a total front without leaving any gaps between different units constituting the total front. There is a continuous attempt to re-establish logical compatibility between cultural symbols that newly take their place in one or the other institutional areas. All instances of logical non-compatibility ultimately lead to trends of non-integration and thus pattern maintenance is weakened. Adaptation and reintegration of cultural symbols into new configurations continues the process of pattern maintenance.

In India today, there is a lot of pre-occupation around the problems of emotional integration, and a common bond for interregional cultural communication. A nation is not made merely by binding the units politically through measures for administration and defence. National society is founded on a deeper community of cultural sharing, which alone unites people in emotional integration. Problems em-

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broiling the Indian Union of the decolonial era is an instance in this context. A political unification and a statal apparatus on the model of European capitalist liberalism, has come to be acquired in the colonial context. A European model of corporate factory economy too is being grafted on the original rural economy by a mode o fcapitalizing process. A system of education and media of communication has also been acquired and is being grafted on the traditional social structure. But the core of a people's ethic and institutional interaction lies in its language, religion and personal law governing family and kinship, which is the basis of socialization process. Individual's "Generalized Other" is formed from within the intimate areas of family, kinship, marriage, property and succession. In the Indian rural community the problems of occupation, class power and status were integrally resolved through the institution of caste as a component of community configuration. An individual belonged either to the major agricultural castes (playing entrepreneur, tenant and labour roles), or to the minor artisan and servicing castes. Agricultural land being limited in its scope for productive expansion, the Jati (caste) ensemble, organizing occupation, class, power and status, is a given. The tenancy legislation has not changed this "given", of status equilibration through Jāti organization of rural community living. It should be noted here that rural community living in which individual family interests are deeply entrenched, is a stronger element vis-a-vis kinship, governed by caste endogamy. It should also be noted that various modes of exogamy lead to generational weakening of kinship bonds vis-a-vis locally entrenched family interests, which are essentially entwined with the interests of families of other castes, that together create all the requirements of a rural community living. In the Indian rural communities in each of the linguistic-regional variants of Indian society, we find the institutions of religion and caste entwined with all other institutions by bonds of reciprocity as well as irradiation.

Thus the real social problem in India today is to search for areas of compatibility between the new institutions that have been imported from the European liberal capitalist model, and the indigenous traditional institutions which are not at all likely to be replaced by any process of import. These are language, religion and personal law governed by caste status in the Jati community configurati on, in a rural settlement. Naive ideas of imposing foreign language, terminology and/or script, are comparable to the naive ideas of totally imposing foreign personal law and religion, by sovereigns professing alien culture in the past, Portuguese, Turko-Afghan and Mughal

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religious persecutions have failed. So have failed the attempts to impose alien personal law viz., by Dalhousie, with disastrous results. Nor had Jazia tax any better success in imposing a price for retaining freedom to apply one's own personal law. These attempts have disastrously failed; as also has failed the effort of six centuries to impose the alien Persian language on the community living and communication in this country. On the background of the grafting process of liberalism and secularism and factory economy in this country, it is useful to remember that a whole people have never and nowhere lived their community living, with agnosticism for their religious behaviour. The common people cannot live in the insecurity of agnostic thinking. At best, it is a personal luxury of a few gifted individuals. So, secularism as a state policy does not imply a community living without its religious aspects. This confused thinking on the implications of the term "Secular" have also lead to a naive thinking on the concept of nation. Every single nation consists of a majority community and a few legally recognized minorities. The legal recognition provides for certain legally protected features of cultural specificity vis-a-vis the major community that constitutes the nation. It is in this clear logical sense that we use the term "Indian" w.r.t. the social system of this soverign republic of the Indian Union. Nation making process during the decolonial era after 1947, cannot be confined to reconstruction activity in the institutional areas ofeconomy, polity and education, alone. There is a greater task to search out and create compatibility between these imported institutions and those areas of institutional living that continue to be in the Indian tradition, modified and re-interpreted. It is in this context that the motto of science and spirituality to replace religion and politics, as enunciated in common by the Gandhian Sarvodaya (of Vinoba) and the welfare oriented Indian liberalism (of Nehru), becomes significant.

This process of integration by logical compatibility is evident even in the earliest phase of the historical process that culminated in the philosophy of Geetā and established the primacy[15] of Prasthān Trayee,—of Geetā, Upanishads and the Vedānt Sutras—which became a frame of reference for future Bhāshya re-interpretations of Geetā, to initiate trends of change. In the area of personal law, the Yājnavalkya Smriti has come down to our contemporary period through various commentaries or Nibandhas especially in the form of Mitāksharā law of Vijnāneswar and the Dāyabhāga law of Jimutavāhana with specific application in Bengal. In this context it should be made clear that the word Hinduism[16] or Hindu religion is a misnomer. There are religions of the Hindus or the Indian peoples. Again, the English

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word religion does not fully connote the Indian word Dharma. Dharma is twofold[17]—Pāramārthik Dharma (spiritual) and Vyāvahārik Dharma or Dharma Sanskār (secular). The former is connoted by metaphysical beliefs and theological practices and thus is the equivalent of the English word religion. The latter which covers all normative behaviour, could be translated by the word, "Ethic" or values and normative pattern. In the Indian tradition that has come down, the former area is covered by the Geetā and the latter by the Smritis. We do not intend to refer to Arthashāstra,[18] which includes treatment of polity and political economy (Danda Neeti and Varta), in our discussion here; because the political institutions of the Indian tradition broke down during the military and political impact of Islamic Turko-Afghans and Persians, during the period from 13th to the 17th Century. In the 18th Century, Hindu princes in various parts of India were on the offensive over the Turko-Afghan polity, whose eilte mode[19] of warfare and administration they had copied. But neither their systems of polity and warfare, nor their language of communication, Persian, continued further than 1857, in the colonial-decolonial period. Yet the Kshatriya-Brahmin monopoly in administrative and military occupations was gone for good. Many other castes thereafter found an opening into these exclusive occupational categories. Only the agrarian system[20] that supported this military and political structure, and which was almost similar to the previous Hindu pattern, continued through the colonial period and after. Hindu Personal Law too, was permitted conditionally[21] and thus came down in tact, into the later colonial period.

The only legacy of this alien culture on the Indian peoples was a national alienation of portions of four Indian societies viz. Pashtuns, Punjabis, Sindhis and Bengalis, who carved out for themselves a separate sovereign state of Pakistan in 1947. This political division of the same linguistic regional peoples brings home the point that a logical compatibility between different institutional areas of living, is a must, for a nationally integrated society.

So we delimit our analysis to the social forces and the cultural synthesis that went in the making of Geetā as the Pāramārthik Dharma (metaphysical and theological systematic position) and Smritis or Dharmashāstras as Āchar or Vyāvahārik Dharma (ethic and personal law), at the climax of a process of evolution. This whole process constitutes our first historical period. A sociologist should clearly note that these metaphysical and theological systems and personal law, have come down to our own colonial—decolonial era, through the next two intervening historical periods, viz.,

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(a) Bhāshya and Nibandh period resulting in the final elimination of Buddhism and Jainism, as regionally spread out, non-Sanatan religious systems. This was the result of preachings of Shankar, Ramanuj and the Veer-Shaiv Basav and their respective schools.

(b) Rise of Bhakti schools with their use of regional languages for devotional poetry and religious communication, under the impact of Islam which broke the Kshtriya-Brahmin occupational monopoly in political and military spheres.

Discussing the earliest historical period, Dr. S.V. Ketkar[22] traces all later religious and normative differentiations to two historical trends of Vedic and pre-Vedic traditions. He designates these trends as the Māntra tradition, of worshippers of Indra through Vedic sacrificial offerings; and Déshya tradition of the indigenous sanskritic speaking peoples. Déshya tradition was already established prior to the introduction of Vedic sacrificial worship by the conquerors. Māntra implies the worship pattern of sacrificial offerings to gods at Yājna ritual, based on the Māntra prayers of Rgveda, sung to the Sāma tunes and the elaborate sacrificial ritual detailed out in the Yajurveda. This was the Rgvedic tradition of the victors of Dāsha Rājna war, between the Bharat king Sudas and his allies, and twenty or more tribal principalities of earlier Sanskrit speaking settlers in the north-west of river Saraswati. The Déshya tradition was that of the Purāna writings preserved by the Sūtas. This was the tradition of the earlier settlers like Yadu-Turvash and other peoples who had fought Sudas and his allies in the Dāshā Rājna war of Rgveda. They too were a Sanskrit speaking people, but practised for their religion a mode of household fire-worship in the tradition of Atharvan and Angirasa. Atharvan was white magic and Angirasa was black magic. This tradition was also prevalent amongst the farther eastern people in India, who have been described by the Vedic people, as Magandas i.e. followers of the Maga priests who practised a cult of household fire-worship, very much unlike the sacrificial Indra worship. The earlier name of Magadh of the Magandas was Keekata. Magas have also been mentioned as the priests of the Shākya tribe in Buddhist literature. Thus the Brahmanical Yajna system was not the universal practice of all the sanskritic speaking peoples. It was the system of the conquering Bharat tribe of Sudas and his allies, who had the Vasistas for their priests. But the Atharvan tradition of the earlier indigenous people was a practical magical ritual, useful in varied situations of social living and was inexpensive compared to the elaborate Yajna sacrifices. These pre-Māntra people

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had Atharvans for their priests, who are different from the Brahmins of the "Trayee" or the three classical Vedas—Rg., Yajur and Sāma.

These two competing systems of fire-worship were later amalgamated and Atharv-Angiras was accepted as the fourth Veda, along with the original three Vedas, known as "Trayee" or the original three. In the Söma sacrifice the Atharvan priest, "Brahma", was given the honorific presiding position over all the officiating Rtwijas or sacrificial priests; even though the Yajurvedic Adhwaryu is the real responsible priest in the whole ritual. The Atharvavedic black and white magical techniques were recognised, in as much as they were allotted specific days, in the ten day cycle of the "Pariplavākhyāna" narrations, in the Ashwamedha sacrifices. This series also included Itihās and Purān and the Vidyās of Sarpa, Asura, Pishācha and Rākshasa. Each was allotted a separate day for its specific discourse. Similarly, Prajāpati of the Sūta tradition was adopted in the Yajurvedic Yajna ritual in preference to Indra the great god of Rgveda. A still further concession is evident in the Vishnu Yāga of Smriti tradition, introduced alongside of the sacrifices to gods of the Shruti tradition. Thus the Māntra tradition of the Shrutis or the Vedas, tended to incorporate the Puranic or Sūta religious tradition by compatibility.

In the Maitrāyani Sainhitā of Yajurveda, there is mention of gods like Mahādeva, Skanda, Ganapati, Gouri, Sūrya and Vishnu. These are gods of the Puranic origin who later came to be united in the famous complex of Five Deities, "Panchadeva".[23] But there were other religious and ethical systems of Kshatriya origination, that claimed a pre-Māntra tradition. One of these, was the cult of Vāsudeva of the Sātwat Kshatriya clan. It is also known as Bhāgawata Sāmprādāya or Vaishnavism in later times. This sect emphasized Bhakti as the mode of spiritual attainment, instead of the Yajna sacrifices. Even so, this Bhāgawata tradition founded in the western regions of India, kept in conformity[24] with the main trends in the vedic religious tradition. Whereas Buddhist and Jain sects also of the Kshatriya origin founded in the eastern regions of India emphasized ethical behaviour and sensory control for attaining the spiritual end. They did not consider the concept of Godhood as necessary for their systems. In this respect they differed substantively with the theistic Vedic religious tradition. Rise of the theistic Vasudeva Bhakti sect and the agnostic materialist Buddhistic and Jain sects, came in the wake of religious upheaval created by the abstract scepticism and bold reflections of the Upanishads, in the realm of spirituality. Upanishads neutralised the importance of Vedic sacrificial worship (termed as Karma-kānd or

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Karma-vāda in Indian religious tradition) and advanced the path of abstract realization known as Jnān Kānd or Jnān Mārga.

Buddhist and Jain systems represented the extreme positions in this Shraut-Sūta controversy and continued the Schism till they were finally delimited by the resurgent Sanātan faiths both Shaiv and Vasihnav, between the eighth and twelfth centuries A.D., Shankara, Ramanuja and Kumarila defeated[25] the Buddhist theologians to contain Buddhism. Basava the founder of the Veer-Shaiv sect in the Deccan was responsible for the diminution of Jainism in those areas of India. Jainism is still practised in West Central India by a minor though important commercial group. Buddhism finally yielded to the iconoclast impact of Islam in the North Western and Eastern portions of India, that constitute to-day the Islamic territories of Pakistan.

Buddhism and Jainism were ardently kshatriya in orientation and origin, being of Shākya and Jnātrik clans respectively. They challenged the entire Vedic tradition that was Brahmanically oriented. They pleaded the primacy[26] of Kshatriya division and regarded Brahmins as coming next in order of precedence. It is interesting though to note, that they continued[27] to employ the services of Brahmins for purposes of Sanskār (sacrament), which has always been distinguished in India from Sampradāya or religious sect. Jains employ Brahmins for this purpose even to this day.

Thus within the Vedic system itself, there existed a schism[28] between the sacrificial Karmavāda of the Vedic Samhitas and Brahmanas, and the Jnān Mārga of the Upanishads. The Vāsudeva Bhakti cult and the Buddhist and Jain paths of spiritual attainment through ethical behaviour, entered into this religious competition. Agnostic materialism of Buddhism and Jainism grew in total non-conformity with the main stream and thus remained exclusive. For the rest of the systems, finally, Jnān came to be accepted as the ultimate spiritual goal; and before Jnān was attained, Bhakti was taken to be a necessary adjunct of spiritual pursuit. Vedic ritual (Karma-mārga) came to be restricted to the realm of Sanskāras.

This major synthesis by compatibility was achieved by the philosophical system of Geetā. It resolved a number of schisms that had started through Upanishads, the Darshanas and the Vāsudeva cult, vis-a-vis the Yajna worship of the Shruti or Vedic ritual and legitimized their co-existence. Upanishadic thought had expressed itself against[29] the whole system of Yajna, its multiple gods, animal slaughter and sacrificial goals of secular wealth, and luxury in heaven. Even in that

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Shruti sacrifices this trend against animal slaughter, especially against cow slaughter is visible; and animals were replaced in certain sacrifices by their forms made of flour. Atharvavedic tradition had rated, hospitality as equivalent to Yajna. Ashwalāyan Sutra extended the concept of Yajna to include study of Vedas and hospitality. Geetā retained the word Yajna (sacrifice) but sublimated its meaning to institute the concept of "Pancha-mahaYajnā" i.e. five great sacrifices to Brahma, manes, gods, animals and men. These include respectively learning and teaching, oblations to the manes, household offerings to the gods, offering food and water to the animals, and offering hospitality to guests. This is only one of the instances of adaptation and integration of an institution by re-interpretation.

Upanishads expounded the concepts of oneness of Ātman (individual soul) and Paramātman (universal soul) and their eternity; the concepts of Karma (social action), Karmaphal (reward of actions in another life) and Punarjanma (rebirth cycle); and the concept of Mithyavād (unreality of all wordly objects), which was a beginning of an attitude of secular pessimism, that resulted into an orientation to instituted asceticism, in preference to normal family life and social living of a householder. These metaphysical concepts seem to have served to justify social differentiations, due to ascription by birth in a specific Varna or Jāti.

Geetā legitimised the given social differentiations[30] by the concept of Swadharma or Varna Dharma (i.e. occupations by virtue of one's birth in a Varna to be faithfully followed). On the other hand, Geetā liberated every one irrespective of low or high birth from the near hopeless psychic strain, of climbing towards spiritual liberation (Mukti) through a chain of hierarchical births. Liberation could be experienced even whilst you live, provided you have reached a stage of mental maturity (Samatva) on the plane of humanistic loyalties. Geetā refuted worldly pessimism by declaring that Karma (institutional activity) cannot be avoided so long as one lives and it should be carried out with a diligence of maturity, or disinterested interest for its own sake (Nishkāma Karma). Even persons of higher abilities (Vidwān), should interact in life normally, lest the less gifted people may be misled to renounce their worldly duties (Lokasangrah). Geetā ordained this attitude for women also. Thus Geetā laid a definite premium on the life of an industrious householder (Grihastha) in preference to a life of renunciation that had degenerated into instituted unproductive beggary. Upanishads had lauded Jnān and Nivritti (spiritual maturity and renunciation) to the exclusion of Karma and Bhakti, a trend very much con-

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formed to even by Buddhism and Jainism. Geetā upheld Swadharma (activity determined by birth in a Varna), Karma (Action) and Bhakti (devotional surrender to God). Thus Geetā established spiritual equality of all men irrespective of their occupation and social status. It also extended recognition and acceptance of various spiritual approaches both formalised and personal. In this sense it confirmed the characteristic Indian trend of spiritual freedom. Women, Shudra and even Chāndāl (the untouchable) were all considered eligible for spiritual attainment.

Upanishads had laid a premium on the spiritual goal of self-realization (*uddharėt ātamanah ātmānam*) by renunciation of worldly pursuits in a social living. Sanyās was lauded at the cost of Grihasthāshram rooted in the institutions of family, kinship, occupation, property and stratification. Pursuit of Artha was exlcusive from Moksha, in the original Purushārtha scheme. New theoretical position put forth by Geetā removed these schisms and once again established a balance in the Purushārtha and Ashram Schemes in the Social Organization of Indian society. It is true that the implications of this theoretical frame for an integrated social system have not been explored; nor has there been an attempt to institute them in a normative order beyond the stage of goal orientation. It is this unfinished work that Sarvodaya movement has undertaken to institute in a more suitable context of social living, under the colonial-decolonial polity and economy.

The period that followed the enunication of Geetā's Pāramārthik Dharma and the Āchārdharma of the Dharmashāstras was a period of political and religious instability and conflict. Thanks to a firm theoretical position built by the Geetā and the Dharmashāstras, Sanatan Indian society was able to emerge victorious in its severe dingdong competition with Buddhism as a spiritual and secular system. Buddhism and Sanātan Hinduism alternately enjoyed political upperhand in north India and the Deccan through the reigns of Ashoka Maurya, Shungas, Kushānas Andhras, Guptas and the Vardhanas. It does not mean that there was political persecution of either religious systems. On the contrary, state extended protection and patronage to all religious denominations. In this sense Indian statal system has always been secular in its outlook. What was true of religion was also true of recruitment to administration, armed forces and the professional pursuits at these courts. Indian feudal states have been above linguistic and religious differentiations in these matters of internal policy, as well as in their external relations and political alliances. Castes were let alone with their internal auto-

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nomy of Panchāyat regulation. The only loyalty firmly dominant under feudal dynastic states, was the personal loyalty to one who gave the means of making a livelihood. Not cognizant of this important fact, many an analysis of these societies and their cultural contexts, commits the fallacy of diachronic comparisons.

Anyway the second historical period that followed Geetā and the Dharmashāstras through political and religious instability, finally ended in a definitive victory for the metaphysical system of Geetā over Buddhism. Shankarāchārya writing his Adwait Bhāshya on Geetā, in the 8th Century A.D. confronted the Buddhist theologians with a metaphysical dilemma. Either the atomistic dynamics or the Nirvān static position was true. Either way the basis of Buddhism would prove to be not firm. Following his theological conquest, Shankarāchārya established[31] four Maths (monastic centres) in four directions of India, Jyotish at Badri in the north, Shāradā at Dwārka in the west, Shringeri at Shringeri in the south, and Govardhan at Puri in the east. He also re-organized the ten ascetic orders and attached them to these centers. Both these instituted features have come down to our contemporary time. Rāmānuj who wrote his Vishistādvait Bhāshya also hastened[32] this process of elimination of Buddhism from Southern India in the 12th Century A.D. Veershaiv sect in Karnātak and the Shaiv sect in Tamilnad were responsible in containing[33] Buddhism and especially Jainism in South India in the 12th Century A.D. Notwithstanding this Orthodox resurgence an osmosis of the Heterodox system into the Orthodox system, and vice-versa was an irreversible patent fact.

End of Buddhism and Jainism brings to a close the second historical period in the social and cultural dynamics of Indian society. Momentum[34] of Bhāshya writings continued in the following period, and a number of Bhāshyas on Geetā were written and Vaishnav sects were founded on their basis. Dwait school of Mādhva, Shuddhādwait school of Vallabh and Dwaitādwait school of Nimbārk are some of the more known Bhāshyas on Geetā. These Vaishnav sects coupled Bhakti with their metaphysical systems. These Bhashyas or expositions were written in Sanskrit and the founders of the Bhashya sects of Vaishnavism were all Brahmins.

It was around this period that the Turko-Afghan Islamic impact, came into India, first engulfing northern India in the 13th Century, and invading and gaining a foothold in the Deccan north of Tungabhadra in the 14th century. The traditional ruling castes, with their, power, wealth and status, were licked in a straight contest of arms, diplomacy and organization. In this hour of national psychological

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demoralization, rallying came from an unusual quarter of the Indian social order. A general Bhakti movement[35] arose in each linguistic region of India during this period of 13th to 17th Century A.D., in which saintly personalities arose from the ranks of Sudras, untouchables and people of lower birth. There were even some gifted women in this great Reformation, as also some great men from higher castes. Names of Rāmānand, Kabir and Tulsidās; Nānak, Meerā, and Narsi; Chaitanya, Deena Krishna and Shankar Deo; Jnāneswar, Nāmdev, Tukārām, Rāmdās and Eknāth; the Alwars and Nayanmars of Tamilnad and the Haridāsas of Kannada country are well known to all Indians to this day through the institutions of Harikathā and Keertan, their religious centres and places of pilgrimage made sacred by the memory of these saints. Even to-date, the radio and screen and play and dance, widely depict their life and their devotional songs. It is a live tradition come down into the contemporary period of colonial-de-colonial era.

These saints were drawn from varied backgrounds and every walk of life. There were petty traders, artisans, farmers, domestic servants, untouchables, priests, officials—there was even a princess, Meerā amongst these Bhaktas. These saints wrote, sung and preached in the respective languages of the people of different linguistic regions of India. Modern Indian vernaculars owe their literary beginnings to this period and movement. The principle of spiritual equality of all, born high or low, man or woman, as expounded by Geetā was validated by the saints. In the words of Justice Ranade[36] who spoke of this movement in Maharashtra, "It raised the Shudra classes to a position, of spiritual power and social importance, almost equal to that of the Brahmins. It gave sanctity to the family relations and raised the status of woman. It made the nation more humane, at the same time more prone to hold together, by mutual toleration. It modified the strictness of the old spirit of caste exclusiveness. It subordinated the importance of rites and ceremonies, and of pilgrimages and fasts and of learning and contemplation, to the higher excellence of worship by means of love and faith. It tended in all these ways to raise the nation generally to a higher level of capacity both of thought and action, in a way...to take the lead in re-establishing a united native power in the place of foreign domination". These words of Ranade are almost an anticipation of a similar analysis of Protestant Ethic by Max Weber in another context, and could hardly be improved upon in their insightful delineation.

It should however be pointed out that the value system and socio-religious goals, sung so eloquently by the Bhaktas in their time, and

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continuing to be sung in religious congregations even to this day, did not irradiate to the rest of the social structure to institute social justice and equality of their vision. There was no social instrument to translate their humane ethic into a social reality. In the pre-Islamic periods, the State did not interfere[37] in the internal regulation of Jatis (castes), Shrenis (guide) or the Sampradāyas (religious denominations). The Maths (centres of religion and learning), institutions of secular learning termed Pāthshala, Vihār, Gurukul, Vidyāpeetha, Vidyā-Sthana, were left to manage their own affairs. Local as well as pilgrimage temples were also managed by autonomous bodies. Finances of these autonomous bodies were raised on private or state gifts in land and/or buildings and other implements, as well as by individual contributions by members, visitors or alummi. State did exercise supervision and extended patronage but did not actively initiate. Conditions were something akin to those prevalent in the European culture area till the end of the Feudal era ; where churches, monasteries, academies, guilds and corporations were self managed within a broad frame of statal supervision and patronage and court of appeal. Similar conditions in India led to a pattern of regulation in which these concerned autonomous bodies sought to accept the tradition of one or the other Dharma Shāstras or treatises on customary law. These were also known as Smriti, which meant customary tradition. As has been shown by Dr. K.M. Kapadia[38], in the specific area of Personal Law, these writers of Smriti treatises and commentators on them, have tried to accommodate change by evidence and expansion by re-interpretation. This procedure is well known and universal especially in matters of Church, Learning and Jurisprudence, which extend by re-formulation and incorporation w.r.t. a continuum of fresh case material. In India a usual procedure[39] for a new formulation of law, religion or learning, was to go to the centres of learning and challenge the earlier champions of a school of thinking for a discussion (Vād). A learned board of referees was appointed who would give verdict. One who was defeated had to accept the system of the winner. These tours of conquest were termed Digvijay (conquest in all directions) as in the case of military campaigns. This acclaimed contest was sometimes arranged in the royal courts in the presence of a king. Many a religious conversion in India has taken place by such peaceful conquest by argument and learning. Even in the field of learning and custom similar was the practice. This is one of the reasons why traditional Indian jurisprudence, consists of a series of Smriti writings and commentaries on them rather than statutory law. These new

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formulations had to pass the test of successful discussions in the presence of political or religious authority and then it would pass muster to be accepted for being studied at a centre of learning and being adopted by concerned autonomous bodies for application.

During the Moslem hegemony, the system continued under a policy of let alone and non-initiative. But it changed under the East India Company's colonial era, when personal law was codified[40] stage by stage and was brought under judicial, administrative and legislative control. To the extent that state took over this institutional function, the sphere of normative regulation by autonomous bodies of caste, religion and occupation was diminished. The colonial polity in India was a centralising state with initiative and welfare orientation.

There was also another feature of British colonial polity. It was oriented towards Individualism and Democracy which recognized the principle of individuals' rights and the principle of representation, in matters of concerned interests. After a century of gradual growth, this colonial liberal trend has been finally instituted in its fulness in the Indian Constitution of independent India, in 1950, initiating the decolonial era in this land. Dr. Ambedkar[41], the author of the Indian Constitution, is also the latest Nibandhakāra on Yājnavalkya system of Personal Laws (Smriti). Formulation of the Hindu Code is supposed to be a major step towards making uniform Civil Code for all the Indian people. This completes the process initiated by Macaulay, whom Panikkar[42] designates "India's new Manu". The same process of statal take-over has worked in the field of education[43] since the famous Minute by Macaulay in 1835, and Wood's Dispatch in 1854, were adopted for legal regulation of the educational sphere. Recently, in 1962, the Hindu Religious Endowments Commission[44] has submitted its report. Its terms of reference were to inquire into the nature of resources, management, utilization of funds and authority structure of the endowments; and to recommend criteria for treating them as public religious endowments. A total of 232 more important institutions including local and pilgrimage temples, Mathas and Sampradāya centres, are covered by this inquiry. This report too brings to climax a series of regional legislations to regulate the realm of religion, which is the last sector of the autonomous areas of Indian institutional living. Thus, only a few areas of religious[45] activity will have remained free of governmental control. One will be the area of sacraments (Sanskāra) ritual and worship of Kuldevata (lineage god goddess), by the Brahmin Purohit or Upādhyāya (family priest). A Brahmin priest is a resident component in the Jajamān-Parijan

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system of the Indian rural settlements of marginal size, i.e., a size that can retain a full complement of artisan and servicing cadre, both ritual and non-ritual. Similarly a Sampradāya Guru (spiritual guide of a sect) will continue to give his initiation (Deeksha) and accept gifts (Padharamani). An unattached hermit will retain initiative to set up his hermitage and preach and serve people. These are the religious institutions that are still functioning to serve rural settlements in the linguistic cultural variants of Indian society. The institution of temple and temple priest, which is also a functioning unit, seems likely to be brought under statal control, under the category of public trust. Instituted religion in rural India shows clear evidence of religious beliefs of Karma, Punarjanm Karma-phal, Punya and Pāp, Dan and Moksha. Panchamahā yajnas (five modes of making daily offerings) and Sanskaras around birth, marriage and death are prevalent, in ritual or customary form. It is this core of religion that has successfully withstood the three cultural impacts from, (i) Buddhism and Jainism (ii) Islam (iii) Colonial Liberalism. It is this core of religion that is being appealed to in the Gandhian Sarvodaya movement to institute spirituality, social justice and a sense of social service as expounded in the philosophy of Geetā,—but with revolutionary re-interpretation.

At the same time, it is a patent fact that the context of material culture in India, has totally changed with its growing urban sector of corporate and industrial, welfare oriented and liberal, social organization. Indian liberalism and the core of Indian religion, are both enduring and unavoidable empiric facts of Indian social living. If they remain unadapted and exclusive of each other, integration of Indian society will remain incomplete and defective. To that extent both these elements will be dysfunctional to each other. Indian individuals who will be functioning in both these sectors of institutional living simultaneously, will experience a disjuncting effect in the process of socialization and ego-autonomy. Thus the great task of emotional integration or in other words, building a modern Indian nation, entails discovering and instituting areas of compatibility between Indian religion and Indian liberalism. A new configuration of these two cultural elements, will constitute the basis of charisma or social forces, in the historical period of de-colonial reconstruction.

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CHAPTER IX

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Modern Elites in India

—T. B. Bottomore

The rise and fall of elites is one of the most important aspects of social change in the underdeveloped countries. This phenomenon, in the particular case of India, was of great concern to the late Professor D.P. Mukerji, and it will not be unfitting, in a volume dedicated to his memory, to consider briefly some characteristics of the new elites which have emerged in modern India.

The importance of elites lies in the direction and control which they can exercise over the complex and difficult transition from one form of social organization to another. Conditions of rapid social change impose upon large sections of the population the necessity of entering new occupations, acquiring new skills, moving into new environments, and establishing new social relationships; and in this complicated process little guidance is to be found in the traditional rules of social behaviour. Effective leadership—which may be provided by a charismatic individual and his group of disciples, or more usually, by a social stratum which has gained prestige because of its possession of modern knowledge or skills, or because of its relationship with an influential social class—makes it possible to limit the disturbing effects of social change, and to accelerate its pace, by formulating clearly and vigorously the aims which are to be pursued, and the rules of social behaviour which it is appropriate to follow in the emerging social order. The relationship beteen elites and social classes is always important for the success or failure of an attempted transformation of society, and in Marx's sociological theory it is the rise of the new,

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revolutionary classes which is put forward as the basic explanation of all major changes in the structure of societies; but there does occur also, and especially in present day societies, formation of elite groups which may not be associated in any direct or simple way with particular social classes, such as, for example, the nationalist elites in some developing countries.

The industrialization and modernization of the countries of Western Europe and North America in the 19th century was undertaken by a national *bourgeoisie*, which brought into existence the capitalist form of industrial society. In the present developing countries a number of different elite groups are seeking to create a modern industrial society, in a variety of other forms; and the relative importance of these different elites, as well as their degree of success, is influenced by the traditional social structure and culture of each particular country, and by the nature of the country's past and present relationships with the existing industrial societies.

The modernization of Indian society was begun under British rule largely by the activities of an elite of colonial administrators who established an effective administrative and judicial system over the whole country, introduced higher education, and promoted modern banking and commerce, as well as some modern industries. The importance of their rule was not so much that it led directly to the expansion of industry—for the economic interests of the ruling power, and the generally inhibiting effects of foreign rule, hindered rapid industrialization—as that it set the pattern for the growth of a modern middle class in India. As B.B. Misra has shown, the "new middle classes" which grew up during the later period of British rule were the products of the growth of secondary and higher education, rather than of the development of industry; and as he observes, "... the bulk of the Indian middle classes came to consist of the intelligentsia—public servants, other salaried employees, and members of the learned professions."[1]

The counterpart of this situation was that a *bourgeois* class, of the kind which dominated the industrial development of the Western countries, was not formed in India. The Indian merchants and industrialists were too few in number, and economically too weak, to aspire to the social and political leadership which the *bourgeoisie* in the West had exercised. They supported the nationalist movement, and helped to finance it, but they did not gain a clearly preponderant

1. B.B. Misra. *The Indian Middle Classes* (London, Oxford University Press, 1961), p.343.

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influence upon its organization or aims. Since independence the Indian middle classes have increased more rapidly in number, but it has been largely along the same lines as previously, that is, by the expansion of education and of clerical and professional occupations. The *bourgeoisie* has perhaps succeeded, along with other sections of the upper and middle classes, in appropriating a disproportionate share of the benefits of economic growth, but it has not yet claimed a dominant role in the shaping of social policy, nor has it enlarged appreciably its political influence. The first sign that it may do so in the future was given by the foundation, in 1959, of the Swatantra Party, which is committed to establishing a free-enterprise capitalist economy in India; but this has done no more up to the present than to produce a somewhat clearer differentiation between the left-wing and right-wing political elites in India's mixed form of economy and society. The rise of the *bourgeoisie*, both economically and politically, is still checked by the power of the nationalist political leaders, and of the administrators, who are committed to industrialization by economic planning and public enterprise, and indeed to the eventual creation of a "socialist pattern of society."

Two elite groups—the high officials and the nationalist political leaders—have at the present time a predominant influence, and are indeed responsible for the fortunes of India's effort to become a modern industrial nation. The role of the officials has not been at all closely studied from a sociological point of view,[1] but general observation of the working of the higher administration, and such accounts of its personnel as are available, suggest that high officials form an elite which is more consistently modern in outlook than any other group in Indian society. This circumstance may be accounted for by the antecedents of the present I.A.S., by the pattern of recruitment and training (since the service attracts many of the most able University graduates who are then given further training which includes study in the modern social sciences), and by the nature of the occupation, which imposes the highly rational behaviour of a bureaucratic system, and also brings some of its members into frequent and close contact with officials and other representatives of industrially advanced countries. Another elite group which resembles the high officials in being very receptive to modern ideas, because of the nature of its activities, which are bound up with the most modern technology,

1. Some data on the social background of recent entrants to the I.A.S. will be found in R. K. Trivedi and D. N. Rao, *Regular Recruits to the I. A. S. —A Study*.

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is that of the military officers, who have become, in a number of developing countries, the actual political rulers.[1] But in India the military leaders have not so far had any great political influence, for reasons which it would be interesting to examine, but which are not immediately relevant to the present study.

Since the high officials are associated on one side with the politica leaders, and on the other side with the academic and intellectual world, their influence upon public attitudes to India's social problems must be considerable, but it is limited by the general climate of social thought which the intellectuals create or perpetuate, and above all by the aims of the political leaders. Ultimately it is the politicians of the Congress Party who have a determining influence upon the direction and rate of change in Indian society. They constitute, at the present time, the "governing class" and so it is important to assess their role and to consider the challenges which they have met, or are likely to meet, from other political groups and elites. Two features of the Congress Party are of great sociological interest: first, that it came to power as a nationalist party which had assimilated diverse social interests and doctrines, and succeeded in keeping them in some kind of harmony, partly through the pressures of the struggle for independence itself, and partly through the personal influence of Gandhi, which imparted a religious and traditionalist character to the movement; and secondly, that it has continued to incorporate these diverse interests and doctrines, but in a less harmonious relationship. Consequently, the Congress Party was not, and is not now, a completely modern party which is committed in a single-minded way to the creation of a modern industrial society; and the effectiveness of its action upon society is reduced by the diversity of opinions within its ranks. It is not at all a unified governing class, possessing a clearly defined "political formula";[2] but rather a federation of diverse and to some extent conflicting groups whose distinctive social doctrines have been

1. See on this subject, Lucian W. Pye, "Armies in the Process of Political Modernization," *European Journal of Sociology II* (1) 1961; and S. E. Fine, *The Man on Horseback* (London, Pall Mall Press, 1962), especially Chapters 8 and 9

2. Gaetano Mosco *The Ruling Class* (English translation New York, McGraw-Hill, 1939) p. 70: ... ruling classes do not justify their power exclusively by possession of it, but by representing it as the logical and necessary consequence of doctrines and belief's that are generally recognised and accepted. ... This legal and moral basis or principle on which the power of the political class rests is what we have elsewhere called...the political formula.'"

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muffled, and not shaped into a coherent whole, by their association, and which is held together to an important extent by patronage. This is not to say that the Congress Party has no political formula at all; for there are the surviving ideas of the independence movement, and some directing principles of social policy, which have been stated in the Constitution and in the Five Year Plans. But these ideas and principles are of a very general nature, and their political applications can be interpreted in very diverse ways; in practice, therefore, they have not been adequate to unite and sustain the political elite, to arouse great popular enthusiasm, or to stimulate discussion of political and social ideas among the intellectuals. Again, this is not to say that the Congress Party has simply failed in its task. On the contrary, it has succeeded in creating and fostering a democratic system of government, in establishing basic industries, and in bringing about a modest but sustained rate of economic growth which has improved the general level of living. Yet in the conditions of strain and stress which industrialisation produces it does not seem likely that a governing elite can continue for long to be even moderately successful unless it is able to resolve in a more decisive way the conflict between tradition and modernity, to depict more precisely the main features of the society which it is trying to create, and to ensure the wholehearted support of those classes in the existing society which have a strong interest in bringing about radical changes.

One of the reasons why the Congress Party has been able to avoid a searching re-examination of its doctrines and policies is that its political dominance has not yet been seriously challenged. In the General Election of 1962 it obtained 43% of the total votes and 73% of the seats in the Lok Sabha. It does not have to face a single large opposition party; but only several much smaller parties, of which the most influential, at the national level, are the Communist Party, the Swatantra Party, Jan Sangh, and Praja Socialist Party. The Communist Party, which gained 9.5% of the votes and 6.5% of the seats in the 1962 election, and which has been a very strong contender for power in two of the states—Andhra and Kerala—provides at the present time the main opposition to the Congress Party. Unlike the latter it has, in Marxism, a coherent and vigorous political creed, which is also thoroughly modern, at least in the emphasis which it now places upon science, technology and industrialization, and in its rejection of traditional religious beliefs. However, the Communist Party in India has many weaknesses of its own. In the first place, its Marxist doctrine has little intellectual vitality or originality, and largely reflects the predominant views of the Russian or Chinese parties

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at any given time. Recently, its ideological effectiveness has been further reduced by the conflict between the Russian and Chinese conceptions of Marxist theory, which has produced fresh divisions within its own ranks. Secondly, the Indian Communist Party gained much of its political support in the first decade of independence by espousing the cause of greater autonomy for the states of South India; as a result it is relatively weak in the Hindi-speaking north, and it has acquired to some extent the character of a federation of regional parties concentrated in certain areas, rather than a national party. Its greatest weakness, however, is that in the absence of a large and organized industrial working class it must gain its principal support from the peasantry, and it has been less successful in this sphere than have the communist parties in some other developing countries. The reasons are various. One is undoubtedly the fragmentation of the peasantry through the caste system; and the Communist Party has had to rely, in some cases even more than other Indian parties, upon the support of particular caste groups, and has thus become associated with one of the strongest traditional elements in Indian society. Another reason is the influence which the Congress Party obtained among the peasantry during the independence struggle, and which it has largely retained because living conditions in the villages have on the whole improved steadily under its rule. Only if the economic situation deteriorated would there be any likelihood of the development of a radical or revolutionary peasant movement.

The other opposition parties represent even less of a challenge to the Congress Party than does the Communist Party. The Jan Sangh, and other Hindu parties, are likely to increase their support mainly where local circumstances produce tensions between Hindus and Muslims, and it is reasonable to expect that the appeal of Hindu traditionalism will in any case diminish as industrialization proceeds. The Swatantra Party, which advocates a free-enterprise economy, has made little headway in the face of the success of economic planning, and the clarity of its own alternative policies has lately been somewhat obscured by its approach towards alliances with the Hindu traditionalists. The Praja Socialist Party has suffered from the fact that it is in competition on the left with the Communist Party, and on the right with the socialists in the Congress Party. Thus, its own distinctively socialist doctrines have not appeared as a clear alternative, and they have lost a great deal of such vitality as they had through the inclination of the party's leaders to accept the views of the more right-wing sections of the European socialist parties, which are largely irrelevant to the Indian situation.

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An effective competition between national political elites in India, involving a clear separation between rival social doctrines, is only likely to emerge if the distinction between left-wing and right-wing politics, and between the social groups which support one or the other, becomes stronger. But this development is hindered by a number of important elements in the social structure: by the persistence of caste, which impedes, although in my view it cannot altogether prevent, the formation of larger social class groupings; by the separation between the different levels of Indian politics, which still confines major political activities to small elite groups; and by the strength of regional nationalism, which engenders a different type of political conflict, among the regions and between the regions and the centre.

These impediments to a clear confrontation between rival doctrines and policies are re-inforced in some degree by the role of Indian intellectuals. In India, the intellectuals, who in other developing countries have frequently constituted an important modernizing elite, have been much more attached to traditional ideas. It is true that a number of Indian intellectuals, influenced by Western ideas, played an important part in creating the modern nationalist movement at the end of the nineteenth century; but as it grew into a mass movement the influence of the modernizing intellectuals declined, and they were opposed at every stage by eminent teachers of traditional Hindu thought. This situation does not seem to have changed very greatly in recent years, in spite of the fact that the numbers engaged in modern intellectual occupations—in science, teaching, and administration—have increased rapidly, and that India's intellectual contacts with the rest of the world have multiplied. As D.P. Mukerji wrote: "Everywhere the old elite-groups have disappeared; here too they are going; and no new ones, barring the professional politician and the bureaucrat, are to be seen."[1] There has been no intellectual revolution in India: no sudden flowering of modern critical thought. On the contrary, there have been several signs of a revival of traditional thought. This affects even the social sciences, those essentially modern disciplines which grew out of an earlier intellectual revolution in Europe, but which are not infrequently represented in India as a harmonious continuation of traditional Hindu conceptions of society.

Only one modern system of thought, Marxism, has had any great impact upon the intellectuals. Even so, it is only a small minority of

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1. D. P. Mukerji, *Diversities* (Delhi, People's Publishing House 1958), p.73.

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the intellectuals who have been influenced, and they have been more concerned with Marxism as a political creed than as a body of philosophical and sociological thought. It is significant that the work of the most original Marxist thinker in India, M.N. Roy, has had little intellectual influence and is today quite unjustifiably neglected.

What are the reasons for this slow and halting formation of a modern intellectual class in India? Perhaps it is too early yet to assess the full impact of the growth of modern knowledge. Perhaps there will take place in India in the next few decades a new "battle of the books", a new Renaissance, or a conflict between science and religion similar to that of the nineteenth century in Europe. Nevertheless, it should be recognised that there are very strong resistances to any such intellectual movements. E. Shils, in his study of the Indian intellectuals,[1] has drawn attention to the unique position of the Brahmins as an intellectual elite, and to the continuity between this traditional elite and the modern intellectuals. The existence of a hereditary group which for long dominated intellectual life, and many of whose members have entered the new intellectual occupations, has conferred an unusual strength and tenacity upon traditional ways of thought. It is no doubt much more difficult than it was in societies which had less rigorous forms of social stratification, for the individual, so closely bound to his family and caste, to liberate himself from the traditional ideas of his social milieu; and at the same time it is more difficult for individuals from non-Brahmin castes to enter the intellectual world, or to have sufficient confidence in their ability to expound new ideas once they have entered.

There is another, more recent, factor which may have important consequences for the formation of a modern intellectual class. Selig S. Harrison has argued, like D.P. Mukerji, that the unifying cultural influence of the Brahmin elite, which is now in decline, has not been replaced by any similar influence; but in his view it is "the upsurge of the regional languages (which) radically distinguishes the India now emerging from the India of the past two thousand years."[2]

Although this may state a validcontrast tooforcefully, it can hardly be doubted that the success of present attempts to establish the regional languages as the principal media of higher education, and thus in large measure of creative work in scholarship and the arts, would

1. E. Shill, *The Intellectual Between Tradition and Modernity: The Indian situations* (The Hague, Mouton & Co., 1961)
2. Selig S. Harrision, *India: The Most Dangerous Decades* (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1960), p.55.

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standing he wished to place before the Conference was *not* the preamble to a specific brand of Indian sociology but a plea to persuade us to realize the necessity of studying "Indian tradition" while examining social change in India today.

The plea was timely. In D.P.'s words:

> "If this address were to be delivered a few years ago my emphasis on the need for the study of traditions would have been much less sharp. Meanwhile, I have seen how our progressive groups have failed in the field of intellect, and hence also in economics and political actions, chiefly on account of their ignorance of and unrootedness in India's social reality." (Mukerji 1958: 240).
>
> "In my view, the real reason why we have not done more than what we have done through planning—and we have done none too badly—is the yet unresolved conflict between the traditions which are the principle of *dhriti*, that is, *dharma*, that which holds, maintains and continues, and the new traditions which the urban middle class have been trying to build up in the last hundred years or so. Bureaucracy is not the villain of the piece." (*ibid* ; 234-235).

If, however, we have not yet paid sufficient attention to this plea, it is because of three principal reasons. The first of them refers to our spontaneous and negative reaction to the need and feasibility of studying "Indian tradition" scientifically for any purpose whatsoever. This, therefore, is the first hurdle to be crossed in order that D.P.'s plea may be appreciated. And, I feel, what would be required in that respect are: (1) a clear enunciation of the usefulness of studying "tradition" in order to understand social reality; (2) a precise definition or, at any rate, a practical demarcation of the field of "Indian tradition"; and (3) the formulation of an objective frame of reference thereto as a workable (not necessarily as a final) proposition.

Accordingly, in the following pages I shall discuss these points as my first task.

The second reason for our reticence to undertake studies of "Indian tradition" refer to our diffidence regarding the practicability and the priority of its examination in the specific context of "social change". It has thus two aspects. One is concerned with identification and selection of such features of "Indian tradition" as we should examine in reference to the working frame adopted and in relation to social change in India today. The other aspect, then, follows as to why these facets of "Indian tradition" should be examined vis-a-vis the course

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of change it is desired to usher in India through the developmental programmes under examination.

Evidently, the first of these two aspects follows from the discussion undertaken as the first task, and refers directly to the scope of D.P.'s address entitled "Indian Tradition and Social Change." The second aspect, thereafter, goes deeper into the content of D.P.'s address. Accordingly, I shall examine these two points in the above-mentioned chronological order as subsequent to the first task undertaken.

Lastly, there is the most crucial point to the present discussion. It refers to the obvious fact that we do not give due importance to the study of "tradition" in the context of India's present programme for planned development. The reason behind this attitude of ours thus becomes fundamental to our appreciation of D.P.'s plea. For he himself has underlined this point in his address (*vide*, his second extract above). Also, as further indicated by the title of his address as well as by its content, our appreciation of the *specific* and the *topical* need for studying "Indian tradition" in this context should enable us to define clearly the nature and the priority of our task as sociologists if we wish to be positively useful to society at this critical and pregnant stage of her development.

This point, therefore, I shall discuss at the end of this paper.

The procedure adopted, however, is bound to make the paper involved with more and more points to be taken into account as we proceed with the discussion. So there is the risk that the reader may eventually lose its thread. But the unfortunate complexity appears unavoidable in view of the inevitable ramifications of the central issue under reference. Therefore, in order to make the situation as clear as possible under the circumstances, I should note here that in this paper I wish to treat the following questions (in the order indicated) with specific reference to D.P.'s address on "Indian Tradition and Social Change". Namely :

(1) Why study "tradition", what is "Indian tradition", and what *may be* its *workable* frame of reference? (*vide*, Section II).

(2) What are the specific attributes of "Indian tradition" that we should examine in reference to the adopted working frame and in relation to social change in India today? (*vide*, Section III).

(3) Why should we study these facets of "Indian tradition" vis-a-vis India's present programme for planned development? (*vide*, Section IV)

(4) Why do we not give due importance to the study of "tradi-

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tion" in this context, and what shall we gain by doing so? (*vide*, Section V).

II

Our experience with most of the available studies on "Indian tradition" points to their speculative and conjectural nature; at the best, to esoteric evaluation of intangibles—however logically made. Also most of these studies are written, as D.P. has caustically remarked, to provide "an argument for traditionalism *via* the need for self-respect and national vanity" (*ibid* : 241). Purposefully, therefore, we endeavour to maintain our scientific objectivity by attending to *currently* ascertainable facts only, and drawing inferences on "Indian problems" solely on that basis. But that approach has not led us very far.

In reference to one of its aspects, I had the occasion to discuss this issue. Namely, how and why our appreciation of social changes in India today remains inconsequential or fallacious because of the way we frequently handle the currently ascertainable facts (Mukerjee 1962a) And this issue I attempted to clarify further in the light of three concrete situations discussed in three other papers (1963). What I would like to mention in the present context is that even after we are able to appreciate the current situation correctly and comprehensively, there would remain an allied and a bigger issue at stake. Namely, since reality is a concomitant understanding of the past and the present, how can we draw effective generalizations on social change without delving into the past?

Some of us may question the need for such generalizations on the ground that as the past cannot be portrayed objectively there is no point in making quixotic attempts. Rigorously, therefore, they keep themselves confined to spontaneous deductions and inferences from empirical findings. Regarding such efforts, D.P. remarked: "much of empirical research in anthropology and in psychology has been rendered futile because its fields have so far been kept covered" (Mukerji 1958: 229).

Then there are those to whom generalizations (or "throwing up bold hypotheses") on the basis of empirical findings appear as an essential demand of sociological research. They thus invite D.P.'s scathing comment on "the most jejune and vapid generalizations about Indian problems with which we are being familiarised today in the name of scientific research (*ibid* : 232).

The point remains, all the same, that unless a precise and objecive method is demonstrated (or, at the least, suggested) as how to look

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into the past, such comments and criticisms would be futile. On this count, therefore, we should seriously examine D.P.'s suggestion to study "Indian tradition". Because "tradition"is such a link between the past and the present that it can be examined on the *current footing*.

But there, again, a mere exposition of the need for studying "tradition" and a general statement on its methodology, in addition, may not persuade us to take up the study. Such as, to quote what D.P. himself has said in the latter respect:

> "Thus it is that it is not enough for the Indian sociologist to be a sociologist. He must be an Indian first, that is, he is to share in the folk-ways, mores, customs and traditions for the purpose of understanding his social system and what lies beneath it and beyond it. He should be steeped in the Indian lore, both high and low." (*ibid* : 232-233).

One may retort to the above that D.P.'s enunciation of how to study "tradition" is vague, diffused, and all-embracing of the life-process of the Indian people. So it would deserve the same judgement that he himself has delivered on empirical findings in anthropology and psychology, on the generalizations drawn therefrom by some social scientists, and on the abstract evaluation of "traditional values" as made by the traditionalists (quoted above).

The foremost point, therefore, is to characterize and select the media (in terms of their priority to the purpose of a study) through which a tradition is in operation in society. For to echo what D.P. found useful to quote in his address: "In fact it is generally when the tradition is no longer a description of an actual fact and when it has become somewhat evanescent as a rule of conduct that it most clearly justifies its name and performs its real functions" (*ibid* : 236). Hence, D.P's plea for our orientation may achieve its deserved force and his suggested methodology also may acquire a meaning, provided we are able to (a) ascertain the media through which tradition—"a forgotten fact", according to D.P.—is handed down to the people from generation to generations and (b) specify thereafter the characteristics of the media on which our attention should be focussed.

The attempt, however, is offset at the very beginning with the question: What is Indian tradition? Namely, what is it something tangible and concrete—as opposed to something visionary and abstract —which is being transmitted generationally to *all* people in India or, at any rate, to their overwhelming majority?

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For even a casual observer cannot fail to notice that diversity is evident in the life of the peoples of India; pointedly, in their material culture (ASI 1961). Linguistic and religious differences, distinctions in customs and institutional complexes are also obvious among the inhabitants of different parts of the sub-continent (cf. Panchanadikar 1961). Moreover, these differences are not noticed in modern times only. Take, for instance, Karna's and Salya's vitriolic attacks, in the Mahabharata, on the customs and manners of the people belonging to the other's kingdom (Sukthankar and Belvalkar 1954: Book VIII, Chapters 27-30); or the distinction drawn in the Ramayana between the life and living in the north and the south of the Vindhyas.

Yet the Ramayana and the Mahabharata are Indian epics; read, appreciated and idealized in even remote villages *all over* India. And, more significantly, the development of many languages in India synchronized with the translation of the Ramayana and the Mahabharata in local vernaculars. Also, while anti-Bengali riots may take place in Assam or DMK may flourish in South India, and the call may be broadcast to find ways and means to solve the problem of *national integration of India*, at the immediate onset of an emergency the "Indians" as constituting a category are found to stand up *en bloc*.

Briefly, India is not merely a geographical mass; it is a social entity. And so there is a *prima facie* case to search for a *common base* in respect of "Indian tradition".

This base has often been interpreted in terms of Hindu religion; with reference to the pilgrim centres strewn all over the sub-continent and thus providing the net work to bind India as a whole. But when we speak of "Indian tradition" we do not exclude the Muslims, the Christians, the Zoroastrians, etc. For our purpose, therefore, the unity expressed by the *overt practice* of one religion is not of direct importance.

In the same way, the unity expressed by political and administrative boundary of India would not be relevant to the present discussion. Or any such *overt* manifestation and organization of the peoples of India, as is only too evident from current events calling for the "national integration of India". Therefore, what we have to search for is the common base of "Indian tradition" in the intrinsic mechanism of the peoples' lives, in their intimate day to day living.

To be sure, there again a medium through which "Indian tradition" is in operation may not be India's copyright. It may have spilled over on to neighbouring countries or it may be found in a wider region

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or in countries which have undergone a similar course of social development as India. But basing upon such distinctive (not monopolistic) media for India, her tradition may have crystalized into peculiar characteristics; or, at any rate, it may exhibit nuances peculiar to herself. It is in this respect, therefore, that we have to conduct our search for the media of "Indian tradition".

The search, however, has hardly begun. Basing upon contemporary data, it has been hypothesized that there are three principal dimensions of integration in the life of our people. One, the place in which an Indian is born, brought up, and dies; two. the kingroup to which a person belongs; and three, the caste to which he is affiliated —referring equally to the caste-like appellations among the non-Hindus, as has been pointed out by many authorities (cf. Gait 1902. VI, 165ff; 1911. O'Malley 1913: 495ff; 1932. Risley 1891; etc.) A fourth dimension also could be mentioned, viz, the linguistic-regional integration of the people. But this is, firstly, an "*intra*-India" dimension, whereas the other three are common to all-India. Secondly, while enlarging the scope of this paper, it may not make any significant contribution to the course of discussion other than what has already been made (cf. Panchanadikar 1961). We need not, therefore, bring to account this dimension of integration in the lives of our people

The other three dimensions, on the other hand, would constitute a workable hypothesis. Firstly, because they refer to India as a whole; and, secondly, because such attributes of integration are common to virtually all "traditional" societies (cf. McClelland 1961: 178ff). And, in the present context therefore, its implication should be clear to us. For: can these forms of integration be persistent phenomena in society unless they were crystalized and maintained by tradition?

So, to begin with, we may look for the common base of "Indian tradition" in terms of these three dimensions of integration in the life and living of the Indian people.

III

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To consider, accordingly, the traditional attachment to the place where an Indian is born, passes his life-time and dies, it is known from empirical evidence to refer essentially to villages. To an appreciable extent, it refers also to small towns; and with reference to the autochthones of large towns and cities also it is not altogether absent. But, all in all, the attachment to places of habitation is not unique to the Indian people. The Parisiennes are proud of Paris; so are the Bretons of their *villages*. The Berliners have a nostalgia for Berlin, just as the Bauern have for their respective Dorfs. And so on. Therefore, the mere fact of this kind of traditional attachment need not draw our notice.

Instead, what we are after is to examine whether the traditional attachment of our people to places of habitation has given them a parochial outlook, sustained their attitude to see only the tree for the wood, and thus has made them forget the society at large for their tiny villages, little towns, or segments of cities. Because, moulded in this manner, their inertia to the place of birth, living and death may resist the course of social change planned to be introduced as a part and parcel of the programme for India's development.

It is on this characteristic of traditional attachment of the Indian people to places of habitation that we should, therefore, focus our attention instead of forming the vision of village as "a way of life" and occasionally going a step farther to denote that life as "idyllic".

Next to consider the integration of the people in terms of the kin-groups they form, this also is not a feature unique to the peoples of India. But in reference to the subject under discussion, the structures and functions of kingrouping traditionally evolved in society and the consequent ideology imposed upon the people would deserve examination.

For the most important structure in this respect is the "joint family", acclaimed *the* traditional family organization of the Indian people. The type of this joint family organization is usually patri-virilocal ; among a few, matri-utrolocal. Also there are some well-defined groups of Indian people who form, traditionally, the nuclear family organization. But, by and large, the patri-virilocally joint family type is considered the *norm* of Indian family organization; and empirical investigations have tended to support this viewpoint either in terms of forming locally-functioning co-resident and commensal kingroups or in the light of maintaining the "jointedness" through concerted action and/or mental orientation of the persons concerned (cf. Desai –in press; Kapadia 1959: 68-69; Karve 1953: 10-15; Mukherjee 1963c.

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etc.). So that it would be useful to examine those facets of privileges and obligations on the part of the members of a "joint family" as are commensurate with this institution but are not conducive to a progressive development of Indian society in present times.

Such as, in a "joint family" the earning member or members would have the obligation to feed the rest, and the consequent privilege may be utilized by some of the dependents to lead a parasitic existence. Hence, while the situation may be accepted and tolerated in the family in terms of its traditional organization and ideology, its effect on the country's supply of labour force may be significantly adverse.

Or, when the incomes of the earners in a "joint family" are from different sources and are also sharply different in magnitudes, their common or weighted appropriation by the family *en bloc* may work against the urge of the higher income-recipients to exert themselves more to earn bigger incomes. Concurrently, their traditional moorings to the institution may work against their breaking away from it. And the upshot would be that affecting in the same manner as very high rate of public taxation does in a country, this would then provide a counter-leverage to greater production or better services in the society at large.

Further, the "joint family" sentiment may restrict the mobility of its constituent members, while the country's economic, territorial or social planning may demand such mobility. Or, even when obliged to move out of one's own joint family, more often than not the person concerned may graft himself on to the nuclear or the joint family-unit of a relative. The latter situation would, then, create one or more of the problems already enumerated or further complicate the course of planning; as we find, for example, in reference to town and city planning vis-a-vis the worker's settlements in industrial areas or otherwise (Chattopadhyay and Bandyopadhyay 1962).

Also the ideology of the joint family system may promote the growth of population although population control may be the current requirement of society. Or it may inhibit the individual urge of the younger generation in the "modern" social setting; and so on.

Many such hypothetical instances may be cited in reference to this kind of traditional integration in the life and living of our people. Some of them are already borne out by empirical investigations. They thus support our *a priori* knowledge thereto, and tend to indicate

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the repercussions of these features of joint family organization and ideology on the planned programme of India's development.

Pointedly in their respects, therefore, we should examine the joint family system instead of : (a) merely condemning it in general terms as anachronistic to the current course of India's social change ; or (b) praising it sky-high, as a counterblast to such offensive remarks, by stressing its supposedly remarkable content of "social insurance" and "mutual aid" programme and the unselfish, harmonious way of life established and nurtured by it in order to sustain a large number of persons at the marginal cost and expenditure of energy.

To consider, likewise, the integration of the Indian people in terms of their caste and caste-like affiliations (as found among the functional and non-functional Muslim sects, etc.), the caste structure *as such* does not fall within our purview although it may appear as unique to the *ensemble* of Indian people. Because the hierarchical ordering of castes within the structure they form thereby varies from one region of India to another (cf. Panchanadikar 1961: 19-20); and as Emile Senart put it precisely : "La répartition hiérarchique de la population en classes est un fait presque universal ; le régime des castes est un phénoména unique" (Senart 1927: 176). This uniqueness, therefore, is to be noticed in the superbly regimented society organized and sustained by the *caste system* whereby even today hardly any one breaks through the magic circle. (O'Malley 1932:175-176; Mukherjee 1957: 102-127; 1963c; etc.).

Aspirations to move higher up the caste ladder may be detected in present times, as before (cf. Chattopadhyay and Bandyopahdyay 1963a). Also some caste principles, like sensitivity to pollution by touch or inter-dining between castes, may have lost their virulence in the current ecological setting. But the fact remains, all the same, that the changes reflect adjustments *within* the confines of the caste system and not attempts to break away from the "Indian social life... of bees and beavers, regimented, totalitarian, in fact, almost communistic" (Mukherji 1958; 235). And, D.P. further commented, "the beauty of it is that barring a stratum of people who repeat 'individual values', 'freedom', 'cultural freedom' like parrots, or who have become morbid by their very un-Indianness, the majority of us do *not* feel regimented" (*ibid*).

The point of contextual interest to us, therefore, is this aspect of caste-wise integration of the Indian people which forbids them to adopt such values as D.P. has zealously made mockery of. For it is

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hardly necessary to elaborate on the fact that as an anti-thesis to the expression of an individual's specific potentiality, "the Indian social life...of bees and beavers" is standing in the way of planned development of India. This is not merely a personal or familial attribute of the people to be dispensed with as of no consequence in the present or the future perspective.

IV

On all the above counts, however, it may be argued by a sociologist that a study of their traditional attachment would be purely academic; irrelevant in reference to social change. Because from our investigations into the immediate state of affairs alone we should be able to ascertain *what* exact forms these kinds of integration have taken today in the life of our people. And, thereafter, their association with particular aspects of the socio-economic-ideological structures of the society should tell us *how* are they functioning now. So, that should give us the clue to decide on how to bring forth the desired course of social change.

This approach would have worked, provided contingent associations between particular forms of integration and specific variants of the socio-economic-ideological structures of Indian society could have been brought about. But, by and large, that appears not to be the social reality. On the contrary, except for inconsequential instances or insignificant coverages, any such association is found to be distinctly lacking.

Such as, in the last fifteen years since India became independent, her economy has gathered considerable momentum. Industrial production is now taking a greater share of the total national income than before; and, correspondingly, agricultural production a lesser share (CSO 1963: Table 2, cols. 2 and 15). Pursuantly, urban expansion is proceeding at a rapid pace; drawing emigrant rural folks into the urban labour force in successively larger proportions (*vide*, Census figures for 1951 and 1961; *NSS Report 53*, 1962: Tables 1.1 and 3.2; etc.). Also appreciable migration within the rural horizon is recorded for persons in the labour force (*ibid.* 1962: Table 1.1). Even so, we cannot by-pass the fact that empirical studies point to the persistent parochial and intra-village factional features of the Indian villagers (cf. Majumdar 1958: 324-330; Mukherjee 1963c; Pakrasi 1962; Singh 1961; etc.).

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Thus we do not detect yet any contingent association between deparochialization of Indian life and the urban and industrial development of India or urbanization of the countryside in the demographic sense.

Similarly, we do not find yet a distinct trend in the familial organization and ideology of the Indian people as different from that ordained by the joint family system. No doubt, certain sources of livelihood of the people have gained importance in the recent decades whereby they are induced to live outside their traditional abode and so may not be able to maintain the joint family organization as residential units. Or, economic devitalization may have compelled a joint family to split into several nuclear ones. Alternatively, the material and cultural amenities available increasingly to the people (and especially in urban and urbanized areas) could be hypothesized to promote the break-up of joint families into nuclear. And the same could be said in reference to the rapidly spreading mass education in the countryside as well as in towns and cities. But either in the formation of coresident and commensal units of kins and affines beyond those specified for a nuclear family or in the mental construct of the members of nuclear residential units, the joint family system is seen to remain the dominant phenomenon in India irrespective of her rural-urban differentiation, the education and occupational profile of her people, etc. (Mukherjee 1958b, 1963c).

Indeed, the joint family system still maintains such a vital force in Indian society that some eminent sociologists are inclined to think that it has only realigned its structural configuration in the "new" situation and has not lost or reduced its function (cf. Nimkoff 1959: 34). Also it appears that while the joint family organization may be difficult to maintain in the urban ecological setting, its ideology is more heavily entrenched in that sector of society where the people are farther away from agriculture and craft production and are comparatively better-educated (Mukherjee 1963c).

Thus, in terms of its organization and/or its ideology, any contingent association is yet lacking between the preservation or destruction of the joint family system, on the one hand, and variants of the present-day Indian socio-economic-ideological structure, on the other.

Lastly, to consider the caste organization and the caste ideology of the people, it is claimed that they received severe battering in the last hundred years from the legislative, economic and material changes taking place in India since then. Facts tend to support that viewpoint; so the high-lights of them may be recapitulated.

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Namely, when in 1858 India became a Crown Colony, Queen Victoria proclaimed that Indians, "*of whatever race or creed*, be freely and impartially admitted to offices in our services..." (Emphasis added R.M.). Also, starting with the Caste Disabilities Removal Act XXI of 1850, there were several legislations during the British rule and afterwards which were to make serious onslaughts on the sanctions of the caste system. And, finally, "caste" was removed from the Indian census since 1950.

The economic and material factors in the same respect may not be so impressive as the legislative measures, but they could achieve a more positive effect. Such as, the mobility from caste-occupations as imposed on the society with the mounting crisis in her economy in the later phase of the British rule and as effected in a different context since 1950 with the implementation of the Five Year Plans, the Community Development Programme, etc. . Or, the introduction of railways and other means of public transport to carry passengers to pilgrim centres and else-where, whereby the concept of caste-pollution could not work effectively. Or, the dissemination of "democratic" cultural values and "modern" material amenities to the people irrespective of their caste and creed. And so on.

These and similar features of modern India should have had levelled out the distinctions among castes; at any rate, those associated "traditionally" with their economic organization and cultural make-up. But that we do not find to be the case (cf. Bandyopadhyay and Chattopadhyay 1963; Chattopadhyay and Bandhyopadhyay 1963a, 1963b; Mukherjee 1957, 1958b; Mukherjee and Bandyopadhyay 1963; etc.).

Contrariwise, the cardinal fact remains, over-riding those enumerated above and many others which could be enumerated, that the caste system went on maintaining its hold on the people barring an insignificant minority. Of course, it had to adjust itself to the "altered" conditions; and this it has done admirably with refurbished or original maxims and, where necessary, with a logical rendering of the situation peculiarly suited to its persistence. Such as, putting a new meaning to the phrase *vrhat kāsthe na doso syāt* in reference to the inevitable situation of persons of various castes and religion sitting on the same bench of a third class compartment in a railway train. Or a Brahmin working in the production wing of a shoe factory still preserving his caste as the setting is totally foreign to that of a traditional cobbler. And so on.

Furthermore, the few contingent associations detected between the caste and the economic structure of society do not indicate how the

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caste system would loose its hold on the people. Instead, they demonstrate how the caste system has obtained a fresh lease of life in "modern India" (cf. Bailey 1958; Mukherjee 1957, 1961; Srinivas 1962: 15-41; etc.).

Indeed, the role of caste organization and caste ideology remains so important and obvious in the Indian scene that in respect of rural or urban areas, industrial or agricultural settlements, *haves* or *have-nots*, and even in reference to the non-Hindus, the phenomenon is discussed today in meetings, seminars and conferences organized by universities, research institutions and public bodies.

Therefore, centering round all the above three aspects of integration in the lives of our people, the questions crop up: *Why* is that so? *How* is it that we do not observe a significant association between the physical, material or cultural changes in society and its social organization or the ideological make-up of her people?

The situation is so incomprehensible that one can draw an analogy from the Indian fairy tales. For the triad of village parochialism, joint family system and the caste system appears like a hydra-headed monster which has its soul hidden somewhere outside its immediate environment, just as the demons (*raksas*) had in the form of a wasp concealed within a crystal column built under the water of the lake round which they lived. And, therefore, as the demons could go on freely dominating the people—(king and his subjects, the rich and the poor, alike)—, so can this monster irrespective of the changes brought about in India.

Furthermore, it appears that as in the fairy tale the spilling of blood of the live repository of the demons' soul could create many more demons instead of destroying them, so is the outcome of the present-day changes in India with respect to this monster. Baljit Singh has hinted at that in respect of recent legislations on land ownership and the village life (Singh 1961). Srinivas noted the same more emphatically in 1957 in respect of "caste", bringing forth in the limelight what was cursorily observed by Risley more than six decades ago in relation to "the great expansion of railways" (Srinivas 1962: 15-41; Risley 1891: I, xxx). And on the joint family system, similarly pregnant remarks are being made by sociologists–both Indian and foreign.

Quite evidently, we have not yet found the clue to decide on how to bring forth the desired course of social change. If we had, D.P. would not have had to tell us seven years earlier that: "If the address were to be delivered a few years ago my emphasis on the need of the study of traditions would have been much less sharp"! And, following

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therefrom, his remarks made at that time have become more forceful today. Namely:

"Indian sociologists should take courage in both hands and openly say that the study of the Indian social system, in so far as it has been functioning till now, requires a different approach to sociology because of its special traditions, its special symbols and its special patterns of culture and social actions. The impact of economic and technological changes on Indian traditions, culture and symbol, follows thereafter. In my view, *the thing changing is more real and objective than change per se*." (Mukerji 1958: 241. Emphasis mine—R.M.).

V

To be sure, there is a substantial reason behind our attitude contrary to D.P.'s. Namely, our touching faith in the economic development of our country to resolve all its evils. Thereby, we merely play the second fiddle to the bulk of planners interested predominantly, if not entirely, in achieving the objective of an economically prosperous India.

Today, it is not infrequently noticed, therefore, that even a well-documented study of "social" characteristics of our people or a penetrating analysis thereto ends, ultimately, in laying all hopes on the economic betterment and education of the masses. But if it were all that we can say in conclusion of our researches, we may as well retire from the field in so far as the planned programme of India's development is concerned. Otherwise, according to the present schedule, we shall have to remain as chroniclers of circumscribed achievements and as handy assistants to the prime movers in the field in diagnosing local, minor and casual evils;—not the chronic and acute ones.

D.P., contrarily, asked us to assume a bigger responsibility when he referred to the limited success from "what we have done through planning" (quoted earlier). Throughout his address he exhorted us to undertake the task of detecting the lacunae in developing the *motivation of our people* to the desired course of change. And this he did without undermining the fundamentally important role of economic forces in this context. For, it appears, he implicitly accepted the view that the issues like the triad of village parochialism, joint family integration and the caste system rest *ultimately* on the economic edifice that India built in the past.

On this point, possibly there were over-emphasis either way; in stressing the economic or the non-economic factors in *producing*

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these kinds of integration in the lives of our people. But that the economic forces had a very powerful say in the matter, and that they played a vital role in *stabilizing* these kinds of integration in society, can hardly be doubted. So D.P.'s plea should be judged, eventually, against the standpoint of relative relevance of the economic and non-economic factors in the perspective of a planned development of India and with respect to the implementation of such a plan in the *current setting*.

If we, therefore, wish to appreciate the Indian scene from this standpoint, we should note at the outset that controversies are there on whether the village communities in pre-British India were "closed" societies; and that in certain respects, obviously, there had to be contact between villages as well as between villages and urban centres. Such as, salt had to be imported in villages, taxes had to be exported to capital towns and cities, and inter-village contacts had to be maintained for kinship relation, marriage, etc. But such contacts need not have offset the predominantly self-sufficient, subsistent and autonomous character of the village communities, as adduced by Indologists and historians and as laid down in Hindu law books (cf. Mukherjee 1957; 1958a: 140-174 for details). So that, the isolated and the vegetative existence of the villages, thus carried on for generations after generations, could lead to, stabilize, and preserve the life of their inhabitants in well-grooved traditional lines, centering round their place of origin, development and decay.

Indeed, evidence are there in India's history of such parochial, self-regulating, and virtually self-governing existence of village communities (*ibid.*). It may also be argued that this very characteristic of all-India social organization (excluding some small frontier territoties) gave rise to one of the few common bases of "Indian tradition" in the midst of a *complex mosaic* of diverse ethnic, social and cultural elements. So that, as Charles Metcalfe put it forcefully, India witnessed the striking fact over centuries that here : "Dynasty after dynasty tumbles down; revolution succeeds to revolution; Hindoo, Patan, Mogul, Mahratta, Sikh, English, are all masters in turn; but the Village Communities remain the same" (Metcalfe 1830: 331).

The parochial existence of Indian villagers has thus a history, a tradition. But this may not interest the planners on their immediate assignment; or they may not consider it as of any serious import. Because in the above formulation of the resistance to change the economic motivation to parochial existence of Indian villagers is strongly underlined. This was also stated explicitly by Marx as that the "structure of the economical elements of society remains untouched

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by the storm-clouds of the political sky" (Marx 1949: 352). And this appears to be supported by the effects produced on the "village system" by the measure undertaken since the time of Sher Shah and Akbar—(particularly during the rule of the East India Company)—in order to break-through its autonomy, self-sufficiency and subsistence economy (cf. Mukherjee 1958a: 174-212, 300-378; Dutt 1950; etc.). The planners may, therefore, argue that a developing economy of the country as a whole would solve the impasse.

Of course, we may recall that as late as in 1930 the Indian Statutory Commission made an observation the veracity of which cannot be doubted although we may contest the logic of the conclusion the Commission drew therefrom. Namely: "Any quickening of general political judgement, any widening of rural horizons beyond the traditional and engrossing interest of weather and water and crops and cattle, with the round of festivals and fairs and any such change from these immemorial preoccupations of the average Indian villager is bound to come very slowly indeed" (ISC 1930: I, 15). But this point, again, may be countered by the planners on the ground that such a situation existed even during the last phase of the British rule because the traditional economy had disintegrated by then but it was not replaced by a developing economy (cf. Nanavati and Anjaria 1944: 74-75).

And it would follow therefrom that the parochial nature of the small towns as well as of the autochthones of large towns and cities also would disappear with the economic development of society. Because; are they not analogous to rural parochialism at that stage of India's economy? Further: Do we not detect in this characteristic a situation similar to that in Europe in the pre-renaissance period when feudalism was about to collapse and a new society was in the offing ? (cf. Max Webber 1934; Tawney 1948).

In the same vein, the joint family organization and the consequent mental make-up of the people also may be of only casual (at the most, secondary) interest to the planners. They may argue that these societal features need not assume any direct importance to a planned programme for India's development because the hold of the joint family system on the life of our people would disappear along with the successive development of our economy. For: does not the system owe its stability to subsistence production in agriculture and handicraft at a low and virtually unchanging technical level?

It remains a fact, no doubt, that where the techniques of production are poorly developed the exploitation of land or crafts would

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depend essentially on human labour. The labour could then be obtained communally or by employing bands of slaves, etc., according as the society is organized. But where the family as a kingroup is the *unit* of production and its appropriation, the organization of labour has to be on the familial basis. And, in that case, the greater the number of workers in a family the bigger would be its production and appropriation, provided the scope for the employment of such labour is there in the form of abundance of culturable area, etc., which the family may bring (or have brought) under tillage and possess thereafter under usufructuary or absolute right of property. Hence, if the joint family organization is already in vogue or can emerge in contemporary congenial circumstances, it could best meet the demand and itself be estabilized in society through its economic function.

Situations of this and similar nature are noticed even today in some parts of the world; as for example, in Africa (cf. Mukherjee 1956.) For India, the historians and Indologists have asserted this to have been the case from about the fourth century of the Christian era (Kosambi 1955; Majumdar and Altekar 1954; Majumdar and Pusalker 1954, 1955; Nilakanta Sastri 1955; etc.). So that, one may logically argue that whatever may have been the origin of the joint family system, its persistence to date is merely due to the fact that it was nurtured by an economy which prevailed in the pre-British period of India's history and which has not yet undergone a total change.

Indeed, it could be pointed out that, with the deterioration set in the traditional economy, the joint family organization as forming locally functioning *residential units* began to disintegrate under the British rule, particularly in its last phase (cf. Chattopadhyay 1961; Mahalanobis *et al* 1946; Mukherjee 1958b; etc.). And it may be noted further that this phenomenon has become so palpably evident today that a discussion is now raging in India as how to define a "joint family" so that the *true significance* of the "jointedness" may be indicated. Namely, in terms of forming "joint" resi-defînal units, or exhibiting "jointedness" through the implied privileges and obligations of the joint family system, or the orientation towards "joint families" in the mental construct of the people, and so on.

A planner may suggest, therefore, that all that is needed is a dynamic transformation of the economic base of society which must do away with the life force of this institution. To be sure, in the ideological make-up of the people the joint family system may still linger for a while; but certainly it would be doomed to decay lacking sustenance. So that the vestigeal remains of the joint family organization and the

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consequent ideology (as befitting its traditional moorings), or the various forms its structure may adopt in the transitional stage-such as forming a kingroup not prescribed for all its constituent members according to the patri-virilocal norm of residence (Mukherjee 1962b)—should be regarded as of secondary, or of only incidental, importance to the planned programme for India's development.

Pursuing the same logic, it could be argued that whatever may be the origin of the caste system in India, it could consolidate its forces through the operation of the distinctive features of the village community system whereby each and every person, however high or low in the social scale, had a specific position in society with indisputable stability of existence and clock-work regularity of repetition of their respective types for generations after generations (Mukherjee 1958a: 157ff. for details). And thus stabilized, it could also react on the society and eventually govern it through its central principles of the doctrine of *karma* and the theory of reincarnation of souls.

On this point, we notice interestingly that Marx and Max Weber thought alike. Marx spoke of the transformation of "a self-developing social state into never changing natural destiny", and gave his opinion that: "wo die besondre Art der Arbeit—die Meisterschaft in derselben, und dementsprechend das Eigentum am Arbeitsinstrument —Eigentum an den Produktionsbedingungen—, so schliesst es zwar Sklaverei und Leibeigenschaft aus; *kann aber in der Form des Kastenwesens eine analoge negative Entwicklung erhalten*" (Marx 1853; 1953: 399-400. Emphasis mine—R.M.). Max Weber stressed the stabilizing influence of the doctrine of *karma* and the theory of reincarnation of souls in the same respect, whereby not enough force could generate in society to disturb its ordained harmony (Max Weber 1947: III, 248-249).

So the planners may argue that in a new economic set-up the caste system is bound to wither away eventually, just as it would be the case with village parochialism and the joint family organization and its ideology. And if the triad is still a palpable force in Indian society, it is only because (a) her economic transformation has not yet gathered the required momentum; and (b) the degree of urbanization, as conceived by Gibbs, has not yet reached the critical point (Gibbs 1961 : 392ff).

On all counts, therefore, the industrial and urban expansion of India, and the urbanization of the countryside, become the main props to the planned programme for India's development at the moment.

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But this policy orientation contains its own set-back. The soundness of stressing the fact of economic development of our country cannot be doubted. Concurrently, however, it cannot also be doubted that it is not all-inclusive of the factors seriously retarding the course of development. Because the factors like the triad of village parochialism, joint family integration and the caste system are not merely neutral to the envisaged programme for change. They are putting up formidable obstructions to the very process of economic development, as our *a priori* knowledge and whatever empirical studies we have made so far tend to indicate.

On one side, there is the apathy of the people nurtured by these attributes. It forms a quagmire round the wheel of progress and tends to resist its movement. For the spread of material and cultural values distinguishes the people from their previous condition but it does not prompt them *ipso facto* to see the wood for the trees. Additionally, "family ties" endeavour to curtail or inhibit their initiative to participate enthusiastically in developmental programmes. And above all, the "unworldly" outlook derived from the doctrine of *karma* and the theory of reincarnation of souls breeds callousness in the minds of the caste-ridden masses. The upshot is that fatalism, endemic in the circumscribed horizon of most of the Indians, ignore or distort the perspective of societal currents and even of the ups and downs in their lives.

Time and again the social reformers of the nineteenth century have underlined this state of affairs in India. Tagore in his novel *Gora* castigated this narrowness in Indian life which could be most appropriately described as "the frog in a well" in terms of the anecdote Swami Vivekananda related to his American audience in the World Congress of Religion (Tagore 1909; Vivekananda 1893). But how little has it changed since then in more than half a century? Perhaps only in developing a defence mechanism of the people in an "alien" world, as the Mesozoic animals did to check the movement of the wheel of history.

So we face today such curious facts that in an opinion survey of traditionalism in Indian and American families, "the American respondents seemed to hold more traditional attitudes than the Indian" (Hallen and Theodorson 1963: 109)! Is that opinion equated in practice? Is there any semblence of relation between the two?

Similarly, in the elections to the Parliament and the State Assemblies by universal suffrage, the polling is found to be spectacularly heavy.

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But when the "representatives" of the people pass laws against marriage dowry, pre-adolescence marriage, caste discriminations, etc., the people just do not take notice of them. In overwhelming majority they go on running their business in well-grooved "traditional" lines irrespective of what they are asked to do, what they *say* to others in the context of what would please their questioners, and what they do on such occasions as have no bearing upon their ordained existence.

We thus come across two worlds in India, of which I had the occasion to refer in an earlier communication (Mukherjee 1962a). One, of the people clinging to their traditional moorings as "a forgotten fact" and so professing or outwardly acting differently; and the other, of the planners who wish, in the end, to usher in what D.P. described as "the new traditions which the urban middle class have been trying to build up in the last hundred years or so" (quoted earlier).

That is one side of the picture. On the other side, these attributes tend to put the wheel of progress in the back gear. For they create, in conjunction, peculiar obstructions to the planned course of development in the name of village solidarity, familial obligations, caste/sect/religious fraternity, etc. Shorn off pious trimmings and eloquent verbiage to defend or apologize for their existence, they refer to such pernicious outcomes of village-kingroup-caste-wise "selections" as are obviously noticed today particularly in reference to the "modern" economic organization of society.

Moreover, this affects not only the top stratum of society where the management of "business houses", industrial concerns, etc., are located. It has permeated into the entire economic structure of "modern" society, whereby it refers as much to the recruitment of office personnel as, say, of the primary workers in manufacturing industries. To cite a few examples in this context would be invidious; especially when the phenomenon is known, and is also frequently referred, to have entered the political arena as well.

The planners could argue, of course, that this state of affairs may continue only so long as the technical demands of "know-how", etc., are low in society; and, therefore, factors other than the intrinsic qualifications and ability of persons may count in favour of their employment. They may also point out in this connection that even the most "traditional" business establishments (such as of the Marwaris in the Burra Bazar area of Calcutta) had to employ totally "unrelated" but educated persons to keep their accounts, to deal with the "foreign" concerns, etc. And so they may conclude that once the traditional

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coteric of "selection" automatically disappears along with the developing economic organization of society, its manifestation in the political sphere would be extremely short-lived. For, as Trevelyan has said: Does not the Social scene grow "out of economic conditions to much the same extent that political events in their turn grow out of social conditions"? (quoted, Mukherjee 1956: 229).

But the question follows: Does the state of affairs conform to such a simple equation? Interestingly, we first notice the paradox that this kind of selection of personnel does not operate in the entrepreneurial organization for agricultural or craft production. There the demand for "know-how", etc., as different from what the people learn traditionally from their ancestors, is virtually nil. Yet, as found for villages in Bengal, Bihar, etc., wage-labour is selected for the purpose according to the relative skill of the available hands to hire and not necessarily on other considerations (cf. Bhattacharjee *et al*, 1958; Mukherjee 1958b; etc.). Whereas, it is in the "non-traditional" economic set-up of society that the "selection" is effected on traditional lines of integration!

An easy and unilateral "economic" explanation of the situaton, therefore, does not appear to conform to social reality. Instead, the social scene requires looking into *in depth*, and beyond its economic contours.

Furthermore, we cannot fail to take note of the fact that even if the "economic" explanation contains more than a grain of truth (which it evidently does), in the present situation this explanation would merely defeat its own purpose. For, may be as the demand for "know-how", etc., rises in all spheres of our economic life, it would be the intrinsic ability of the persons in the labour force (whether they are in the management, in the office or the store, and in the yard or the field) which would be the deciding factor in their employment and not their "relation" with x, y, or z. But the very presence of this problem does not promote either the demand for or the supply of technically qualified persons. Because a vicious circle is formed by the "traditional" cliques, on the one hand, and the consequent frustration of the able individuals, on the other.

Like the above, many other examples could be cited to denote that if we wish to be useful to society in reference to the sociologists and social change in India today there are problems spceific to ourselves, and these problems are no less important and urgent than those which interest the planners *prima facie*. Indeed, they may, and do,

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demand greater priority. Because invisible dykes are being built to obstruct the flow of the stream of economic progress; and lacking proper dredging of the bed of society, the accumulated filth mounting under the glistening surface of modernization and "cultural" improvements slows down the course stream. Pursuantly, social change in India today becomes not an eventual but an imperative and topical necessity; and the task of the sociologists is defined accordingly.

In this perspective, D.P.'s directive to study "Indian tradition" assumes crucial importance; namely, "the study of the changes in tradition by internal and external pressures" (Mukerji 1958: 232). For:

> "The latter are mostly economic, and we know what they are. But the way in which the economic pressures work is not that of a mechanical force moving dead matter. Tradition have great powers of resistance and absorption. *Unless the economic force is extraordinarily strong—and it is that strong only when the modes of production are altered, traditions survive by adjustments.* The capacity for adjustment is the measure of the vitality of traditions. One can have a full measure of this vitality only by immediate experience. Thus it is that I give top priority to the understanding (in Dilthey's sense) of tradition even for the study of their changes. In other words, the study of Indian traditions, which, in my view, is the first and immediate duty of the Indian sociologist, should *precede the socialist interpretations of changes in the Indian traditions in terms of economic forces.*" (*ibid.* Emphasis mine—R.M.)

A virgin field thus awaits our attention.

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CHAPTER XI

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Some Social Implications of Multilingualism

—Aileen D. Ross

In the early history of mankind linguistic groups were geographically separated, and each commanded a territory which it could more or less call its own. In our modern society people of different mother tongues have become so intermixed that it is often difficult for a group to claim a particular area which is linguistically pure.

When different linguistic groups live together their respective languages inevitably compete for dominance and survival. If one of the languages dies in the struggle, the history and culture of that particular group gradually disappears.

The survival of a language depends primarily on its usefulness. Two of the crucial questions that can be asked in this context are : What has any particular language to offer? And, are there penalties for not learning it? These questions imply that a language survives in terms of the incentives to learn it, and these, in turn, are bound up with the whole way of life of the society to which it belongs. In the newly independent Asian and African countries, for example, knowledge of English or French may be a greater asset for an ambitious young man than one of his own local languages. National sentiment, however, may induce his country to make an indigenous language dominant, and so reject languages which are of more practical use. And so citizens may have to learn languages which will not assist them in a practical way in their chosen careers.

The desire to make Hindi the national language of India instead of English has meant the replacement of an internationally useful language with one which is not yet fully developed for modern business, social or political purposes. Moreover, Hindi is a language which is almost unknown and unused outside India. This has caused many Indians to plead for the retention of Engish as the medium of instruction in schools and colleges. Others wish to retain English only until Hindi has had time to catch up with modern content and phraseology. So, at present, one section of the Indian

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population is determined to retain English as the university, civil service, and national language, just as strong an effort is being made by others to replace English with Hindi, and a third group is trying to re-establish the pre-eminence of the regional languages.

This latter movement was encouraged when fourteen officials languages were established by the Indian government after Independence. Since then regional languages have become the medium of instruction in the primary and high schools and even, occasionally, have been elevated to the college level. In view of this cleavage in opinion in regard to language no one is certain which language will eventually attain a clearly dominant position, and this uncertainty is causing great confusion in the minds of the educational authorities, parents, and students as to which languages should be taught and learned.[1] The net result is a general feeling of insecurity.[2]

A second insecurity arises from the perplexing question of just how competent a student needs to be in any one language. Is it enough to be able to pass examinations in English, or must one be fluent enough in that language to share in the way of life it expresses?

In the present linguistic situation, therefore, many Indian students feel that they must learn three or more languages in order to be able to participate fully in the life of their country and carve out satisfactory careers within it. One language to enable them to carry

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1. "Current Comments," *Deccan Herald* (October 31, 1961), Comment made at a meeting in New Delhi at which the Vice Chancellors of the Indian universities recommended that English was the only appropriate medium of instruction in universities at the present time

"This will go a long way in dispelling the miasma of confusion and uncertainty which has been created by meddlesome instrusion of politicians into education. There has been enough dislocation and waste already, to say nothing of lowerd standards, through hasty experimentation . . . The replacement of English medium in universities is fraught with grave dangers . . . Retrace the steps if need be, scotch the tendency to regionalism and lingualism!"

Since then an Official Language Bill has been passed by both the Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha providing for the continuance of English beyond 1965 (*The Hindu Weekly Review*, May 13, 1963, p. 5).

2. The pressure to learn a number of languages so as not to miss the "right" one stems largely from the anxiety of parents in regard to their children's occupational careers. The number of educated unemployed in India is still so large that it acts as a perpetual threat to a student's future, particularly if he does not belong to a favoured community or caste, or has no influential relatives to help him get a good position after college.

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on their business or professional interests, another for the social contacts which may be an indispensable part of their careers, a third to enjoy the pleasures and relaxation of their intimate family lives.

An adequate understanding of the effect of living in a bilingual or multilingual country cannot be obtained unless the linguistic history of the people is known. A bilingual person in the United States, for example, may have very different experience from, say, an Indian growing up in India. For in the United States bilingualism has been a bi-product of immigration. One firmly established dominant language has held the center of the stage, and won the allegiance of the great majority of young immigrants in such a way that they have typically lost interest in their own mother tongues.

In India, on the other hand, multilingualism has developed historically by means of a series of conquests and amalgamations of a wide variety of linguistic groups, topped by the British conquest, and the imposition of English for those who wished to fill the important military, educational, business, and governmental positions. In the case of the United States, bilingualism is only thought of as part of a historical process through which a person gradually loses his own mother tongue and becomes "100 per cent" American. After English is fully mastered, learning other languages is merely thought of as a cultural asset, not as a necessary path to success. In the case of India, however, it is unusual to find anyone who is not bilingual or even multilingual. Thus, a person who speaks several languages is a "normal" person.[1] It is even possible that the more languages a person speaks in India, the greater is his or her prestige. Moreover, no one thinks it at all unusual that people should speak several languages, it is taken for granted.[2] There is, then, implicit if not explicit encouragement to acquire several

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1. Bossard, James H. S., *The Sociology of Child Development* (New York : Harper & Brothers, 1954), p. 206. Bossard speaks of the "vogue" of being bilingual in the French Acadian sections of Louisiana and the Spanish settlements in New Mexico.

2. Time and again when Indians are asked where they learned their languages they reply that they "just picked them up," as though it was no effort at all to learn them. This is also the case in many European countries where it is quite normal for a person to speak a number of the indigenous languages as well as several other European languages such as English, French, or German.

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languages.[1] And people will be so used to hearing their mother tongues spoken with different accents, and different degrees of proficiency, that speech will rarely be an occasion for scorn or ridicule.

The prestige of being bilingual or multilingual, and the relative strength of the incentives to learn extra languages thus differs from country to country. The problem of motivating people to learn languages is made more complex by the fact that there will almost certainly be a difference in prestige in the different languages of a bilingual or multilingual country. English gained in prestige in India when it became the goal of the "Westernized élite" and the road to important positions.[2] It lost out with the growth of the national movement which elevated an indigenous language to the top place. Thus, Hindi, low in prestige in terms of its modernity and ability to serve a modern technological society, gained in prestige as an important symbol of national independence. Even those who began to learn Hindi were looked up to in the pre-independence period.

The prestige of a language depends very largely on the status of the linguistic group. Children of immigrants in Canada may reject their mother tongues because of the scron attached to such epithets as "Dago" or "Bohunk."[3] A tribal language in India may be associated

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1. Hormann, Bernard L., "Hawaii's Linguistic Situation : A Sociologicol Interpretation in the New Key," *Social Process in Hawaii* (Vol. 24, 1960, Honolulu), p. 28. Hormann stresses the importance of feeling that *it is possible* (and not difficult) to be multilingual, and that an extra language is a social asset.

2. Pieris, Ralph, "Bilingualism and Cultural Marginality," *British Journal of Sociology* (Vol. 2, 1951), p. 331. In speaking of conditions in Ceylon (which were similar to those in India before Independence) Pieris tells of how the Westernized elite gradually came to look down on their own languages and literature. "Knowledge of the English language was regarded as a patent of western 'culture,' a stepping—stone to the adornment of European attire, and the acquisition of the coveted government job."

The Westernized elite in India also spoke English at work, in schools and in talking to their friends. Some even used it in place of their mother tongue at home. Pieris refers to the change in attitude to English after Independence as a "cycle of colonial experience in regard to language." It has occurred in most of the newly independent Asian and many of the new African countries.

3. Derogatory terms used by Candians for Italian and Hungarian Canadians. The rural or "habitant" French is ridiculed in Canada by those who have been educated to speak French with a "Parisian" accent. In India the more sophisticated may laugh at the "rural" Kanada of a student from a village.

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with backwardness and so receive scant respect from Indians whose mother tongues represent more advanced cultures. Even the association of a dialect like Cockney with the lower class may make its speakers objects of ridicule for those who speak "Oxford English." In this way a person's speech may immediately define the deference he is due from people of other languages, and so influence his relationships with other linguistic groups.

In his studies of bilingualism, Lambert has shown that a person's attitude to the other linguistic groups has an important bearing on his motivation to learn extra languages. His main thesis is :

> The learner's ethnocentric tendencies and his attitudes toward the other group are believed to determine his success in learning the new language. His motivation to learn is thought to be determined by his attitudes and by his orientation toward learning a second language. The orientation is 'instrumental' in form if the purposes of language study reflect the more utilitarian value of linguistic achievement, such as getting ahead in one's occupation, and is 'integrative' if the student is oriented to learn more about the other cultural community as if he desired to become a potential member of the group.[1]

The social problems that arise from bilingualism or multilingualism can be studied from two perspectives. On the one hand they can be observed in the light of the effect they have on the linguistic group as a whole. On the other hand, from the point of view of an individual who must span two or more linguistic worlds. If the group is the focus of interest some of the relevant problems would include : the position of the group in relation to other linguistic groups within the same community ; whether the group is large enough to support schools and functionaries to transmit their language to the next generation ; whether the neecessity of having to learn two or more languages places its members at a disadvantage in regard to the economic, social, recreational, or political opportunities ; whether the language is adequate to deal with changing times and new techni-

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1. Lambert, Wallace E., "Psychological Approaches to the Study of Language," Part II : "On Second-Language Learning and Bilingualism." *The Modern Language Journal* (Vol. XLVII, No. 3, March, 1963), pp. 114, 115.

Lambert goes on to say that the implication of this is that "... the learner must want to identify with members of the other linguistic-cultural group and be willing to take on very subtle aspects of their behaviour such as their language or even their style of speech."

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cal, scientific, and social knowledge ; whether the group receives a derogatory stereotype because of the backwardness or "quaintness" of its language, and if so, whether this leads to a sense of inferiority and frustration.

The main purpose of this paper, however, is to explore the language experiences of a number of individual Indian college students in order to point up some of the problems multilingualism.[1] It will emphasize the relative assistance the different students obtained from home, friends, and the mass media of communication in helping them cope with English as the medium of instruction at the college level. Surprisingly little attention has been paid as yet to the problems of bilingualism and multilingualism. A few anthropologists, psychologists and educators have been interested in the effect of bilingualism on the mental development of the child, its relation to speech difficulties, the motivation to learn a second language, and its effect on certain aspects of personality development, but few have given serious thought to its effect on a person's social relationships and/or his career.[2] The multilingual person has been even more neglected.[3] Even the problem of changing the language of large masses of immigrants in the process of their assimilation to the North America culture does not seem to have stirred the interest of North American social scientists sufficiently to have made them pay much attention to this field.[4]

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1. Both male and female students were interviewed. All were in their last year of the B. A. or B.Sc. degree, and were attending various colleges of the University of Mysore in Bangalore, South India.

It is unfortunate that, as the interviews with these students on language were only part of a larger study, not much qualitative data were collected to support the quantitative information.

2. Bossard, James H. S., *The Sociology of Child Development* (New York : Harper & Brothers, 1954), p. 202.

3. Hawaiian sociologists have probably studied these problems more extensively than have sociologists in other countries. See : *Social Processes in Hawii* (Vol. 24, 1960, Honolulu). Even before Hawii was made a State of the United States, there was strong pressure to learn English. The early American settlers set the economic goals and since then Hawaii has largely depended on English speech and American education. In India, on the other hand, the recent encouragement of literature, drama, and radio programs in the regional languages has emphasized regional identity. This has weakened the acceptance of a total "Indian" identity which had begun during the British regime—as in all other countries—in the form of the Indian version of the modern urbanite.

4. Brezeau, E. Jacques, "Language Differences and Occupational Experi-

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The social problems of a bilingual or multilingual person fall into five main areas, namely, family life, education, work, social life, and psychological adjustment. This paper will suggest some of the areas of the family, social life, and education that may be affected by multilingualism. Work and psychological adjnstment will be dealt with in another paper.

The problems that bilingualism may present for a family are amply illustrated in studies which have been made of the adjustment of immigrants to the North American continent. Many first generation immigrants have used their native tongues exclusiuely at home. This has enabled their children to retain some sense of identity with the mother culture, but it may have seriously handicapped them in their adjustment to their peer groups, schools, and later in their business and social lives. It has also been a potential point of conflict between the two generations. The more ambitious parents, and those who belong to the higher classes probably want their children to master the dominant language.[1] But, whatever their attitude, the fact that different family members have varied in their mastery of the dominant language has caused many family tensions.

Immigrant children typically learn English first, then the father, and finally the mother.[2] For, as she is usually more confined to the home, she has less need to know it. A mother who fails to learn the language which her children are acquiring at school, and through

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ence," *Candian J. of Econo nics and Polit. Science,* (V. XXIV, No. 4, 1958) p. 533. Brazeau points out that the general disinterest in bilingualism is shown in that many multilingual countries in Europe, such as Switzerland and Belgium, do not publish statistics on the mother tongue or ethnic origin of their occupational groups.

Bossard, James H. S., *op. cit.*, p. 200. Bossard says that in spite of the lack of studies on the subject, bilingualism in the United States is such a widespread phenomenon that it is worthy of study. He quotes the 1940 United States census which showed that in that year, 21,996,240 Americans (16.7% of the total population), grew up in families in which another language than English was used in the home.

1. Lambert, Wallace E., *op. cit.*, p. 116. Lambert stresses the importance of the attitude of parents to a language in supporting their children in learning it. He feels there is enough evidence from his research to say that bilingual children have much more favourable attitudes to the "other" language than monolingual children—and these favourable attitudes are also held by their parents.

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2. Bossard, James H. S., *op. cit.*, p. 207.

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their neighbourhood friends, may not be able to share many of their new experiences. Her lack of understanding of what they are going through may prevent her assisting their adjustment to the new country. Should the children marry English-speaking husbands or wives she may be further isolated from them, and later from her grandchildren. Even siblings may be separated from each other through not being equally fluent in the same languages.[1]

The same problem exists in India. There it is not only the problem of non-communication in terms of equally developed languages, but, if the mother tongue of a student is a language that is not fully developed in terms of modern society, then the parents will not be able to understand their children's new life, for there will be no possibility of translating the behaviour necessary for a highly technical society into the local regional languages.[2] Even the experiences of an urban environment cannot be fully explained in a language that is only suitable for rural life.

Table I shows that the great majority of the students of this sample had only spoken their mother tongues at home while growing up, and that there war not much change in this situation when they were older. For there were only four more homes in which English, as well as the mother tongue, was spoken when the students were in their last year of college, and only two others in which other languages were spoken. It could therefore be said that in most of the homes represented by this sample the mother tongue had been spoken continuously and exclusively while the children were at home. This shows that the students, as a whole, did not yet any support at home for the English medium of instruction with which they struggled at school and college.[3] Students who attached the Bangalore colleges from the villages may never have heard English spoken either in their homes or by other villages. And the only written

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1. A certain amount of rapport and understanding may continue through the use of common gestures, even though feelings and ideas cannot be expressed verbally.

2. Hormann- Bernard L., *op. cit.*, p. 20. Hormann quotes the experiences of a Chinese-Hawaiian girl at home :

"Though the family as a whole understands both languages (Chinense and English) well enough to get by, we do not know enough of what the other is more versatile to speak on complicated matters."

3. Hormann, Bernard L., *Ibid.*, p. 21. On this page Hormann quotes the difficulties of a Japanese student who had not had family support to learn

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TABLE I

Number of languages spoken at home when students were growing up and now

*Mother Tongue**	*Languages Spoken at Home*						*Total Number of Students*
	Mother Tongue Only		*Mother Tongue and English*		*Mother Tongue and other*		
Men Students	Growing up	Now	Growing up	Now	Growing up	Now	
Kannada	88	87	—	2	6	5	94
Tamil	24	18	3	6	1	4	28
Other	29	30	5	4	3	3	37
Total	141	135	8	12	10	12	159
Women Students							
Kannada	42	42	1	3	5	3	48
Tamil	25	21	1	2	1	4	27
Other	12	10	3	5	1	1	16
Total	79	73	5	10	7	8	91
TOTAL FOR MEN AND WOMEN STUDENTS	220	208	13	22	17	20	250

* The students were divided according to mother tongue because, as Kannada is the regional language, the Kannada-speaking students would be expected to have fewer language difficulties. The Tamil speaking students were the next largest group, as there are a large number of people of that mother tongue in Bangalore. They would not be expected to have as many language difficulties as some of the other linguistic groups as Tamil has the same Dravidian roots as Kannada.

The "other" mother tongues were: English, Konkan, Malayalam, Marathi, Sankethi and Telugu.

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language they may have seen around them may have been their mother tongue.

Shils has pointed out the change in the composition of the Indian college population in that, like other advanced countries, the students are now coming in increasing numbers from the lower classes and the rural areas. He says that this means that they are coming from "families with less of the traditional, indigenous, or Westernized respect for learning ... from families where English has been less spoken ... and less well spoken and understood." Further to this, "Neither modern learning nor English as the language of modern learning has frunished their minds before coming up from secondary school. [Moreover] their environment has been less sophisticated than their predecessors'. The new type of student is more of a stranger in the college and university enviornment. He feels less at ease there. His poorer linguistic equipment also places him in a very difficult situation."[1]

So an increasing number of Indian students are facing the great problem of having to study at college in a language which they are illequipped to handle. The burden that this imposes will be seen more clearly when we consider the effect of multilingualism on education.

It is not surprising to find that the majority of students spoke only their mother tongues at home. For, as the mother tongue is learned in the personal, intimate surroundings of family and neighbourhood, it is the language in which a person typically feels most at ease. When speaking it he does not have to be on guard, or anxious about phraseology, grammar or accent. It is also the language that expresses the deeply emotional relationship of husband and wife, parents and children, and friends. It is probably, then, a relief for people who must speak less well-known languages at work to return to their habitual tongue. On the other hand, it can be distressing and even frustrating for a multilingual person to find himself unable to communicate with family members whose experiences of life can only be expressed in the mother tongue.

(Contd. from page 219)

English at home : "Since Japanese was spoken at home. I wasn't able to speak English well when I entered kindergarten. I used to hate school and cried every morning before I left home because nobody spoke Japanese there."

1. Shils, Edward, "Indian Students," *Opinion* (Vol. 11, No. 19, September 19, 1961), p. 7.

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After studying a number of bilingual families, Bossard concludes that each of them had some sort of language problem :

> Under the most favourable circumstances, the bilingual situation appears to involve a nervous strain, a certain added effort to shift gears, as it were, from one linguistic level to another. It adds another dimension to family relationships.

He found that resentment or contempt for parents, or avoidance of them when they could not speak the dominant language properly, were some of the emotional reactions to the bilingual family situation.[1]

Quite a difference is seen in the languages that were used by the students when conversing with friends as compared to the ones they spoke at home. Only 41 students used their mother tongues exclusively with their peers. Forty-two students talked only in English, and 84 others combined English with their mother tongues. Twenty-six other students used English and other languages. Thus, 153 of the students, or nearly one-third of the students, used English as a means of communication with the friends. This would strengthen their knowledge of English at college.

The problem of making friends for those whose mother tongues are not the regional language is suggested in the comparison of the languages spoken by the Kannada-speaking students to their friends as compared to the Tamil and "other" groups. Whereas 44 Kannada-speaking students spoke only in that language with their friends, only 1 Tamil-speaking student spoke Tamil exclusively, and 6 of the "other" language group spoke in their mother tongues. These figures might be an indication of the comparative isolation of students from the general student body, presuming that the majority would speak Kannada. As Mysore State has a large number of Tamil-speaking residents, it is probably that students of the "other" mother tongues would have an even more difficult time in making friends. For they would only have a small number with whom they could converse in their mother tongues and so might have to learn a number of different languages should they be eager to become an integral part of the community.[2]

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1. Bossard, James H. S., *op. cit.*, p. 208.

2. Of the 11 Kannada-speaking students who spoke other languages than mother tongue or English with their friends, 2 spoke 1 other language, 4 spoke 2 languages, 2 spoke 3 languages, and 3 spoke 4 languages.

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(*Contd. on page 223*)

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TABLE II

Language Spoken with Friends

Mother Tongue	*Languages spoken with friends*				*No Answer*	*Total*
	Mother Tongue Only	*English Only*	*Mother Tongue and English*	*Mother Tongue and other*		
Men Students :						
Kannada	23	3	56	10	2	94
Tamil	1	8	7	12	—	28
Other	6	7	1	23	—	37
Total	30	18	64	45	2	159
Women Students :						
Kannada	21	6	20	1	—	48
Tamil	—	10	1	15	1	27
Other	—	8	—	8	—	16
Total	21	24	21	24	1	91
TOTAL FOR MEN AND WOMEN STUDENTS	51	42	85	69	3	250

The importance of adolescent peer groups in enticing and even forcing their members to speak certain languages, or corruptions of a language, is shown in one of the Hawaiian studies in which a Japanese student tells of the ridicule he suffered when he spoke differently from the group. In that case the student learned to modify his "correct" English into the pidgin spoken by his peers.[1]

(*Contd. from page 222*)

In comparison, 18 of the Tamil-speaking students spoke 1 extra language and 9 spoke 2. Of the 31 other language-speaking group, 11 spoke 1 other language than mother tongue or English with friends, 18 spoke 2 other languages, and 2 spoke in 3 other languages.

1. Kormann, Bernard L., *op. cit.*, p. 17 "When one of the boys tried to speak good English we all tried to make him conform to our local standards. This was done by laughing, ridiculing, teasing, and calling him 'yellow Haole'."

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This suggests that a very garbled version of English may emerge in India amongst groups of students who live in multi-lingual neighbourhoods, or whose friends come from many linguistic groups. And that this may affect the quality of the language with which they are equipped when they reach college. It also suggests that the attitude of peers to language may be equally or more important in motivating a child or adolescent to learn it than the attitudes of his family.

The way in which the inability to speak a language well restricted the student's social contacts was shown by several of the English-speaking students of this study, who claimed that, although they had no problem with the English medium at college, their inadequacy in Kannada cut them off socially from most of the Kannada-speaking students. Even when a student speaks another language moderately well he may hesitated to join a group of students of that language in fear of ridicule from his peers.[1] This is another factor that limits the number of friends of other languages that he makes.

When the child goes to school in India his language problem may become even more complicated. If his mother tongue is one of the regional languages he will probably not have much trouble in the early school years, as the regional language is usually medium of instruction. But this may make it more difficult for him when the medium of instruction changes to English in high school or at college.

The boy or girl whose mother tongue is other than the regional language, or English, may have a very complicated linguistic educational experience. This is particularly true of those who belong to a linguistic group which is not large enough to support its own schools.

The present generation of students seems, on the whole, to have had much less instruction in English at school than did the pre-Independent student who usually studied English for at least seven years,

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1. Lind, Andrew W., "Communication : A Problem of Island Youth.", *Social Process in Hawaii* (Vol. 24, 1960, Honolulu), p. 48. "Oriental youths are afraid to speak up. These youths lack social ease, in that they feel that they will be laughed at every time they open their mouths. They feel that people will not accept them, and that a mistake will show their intelligence. This sense of insecurity in social relations has stopped many youths from expressing themselves, although they may have . . . . pertinent points to bring up."

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or had it as medium of instruction from primary school on.[1] The regional languages now typically dominate the school years, and the students change to English at different stages on their way up the educational ladder, depending on the schools they attend. English is often introduced as a secondary language before the student has it as medium of instruction. But this is not always the case, and most students arrive at college without a sufficient knowledge of it to facilitate their college studies.[2]

Table III shows that in this sample 52 or 21 per cent of the students began English as medium of instruction at primary school, 26 or 10 per cent at middle school, 120 or 48 per cent at high school, and 52 or 21 per cent at college. A thorough knowledge of English may be hampered in that many of the students study or learn other languages on their way through school.[3]

Even when English is the medium at school it does not always seem to equip the student with a full enough vocabulary, or knowledge of language structure, to prepare him for his college work.

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1. Patel, M.S., "Modern Trends in the Teaching of English in India," *Journal of Education and Psychology* (Vol. XIV, No. 3, Oct. 1956, Baroda), pp. 173, 175. "The absence of a well defined policy and definite guidance from the Centre means that some State Governments have introduced a syllabus in which the pupils in schools have 6 or 7 years of English. Others teach English for about 3½ to 4 years in secondary schools. Certain important bodies such as the All-Indian Council for Secondary Education and the Conference of Professors of English have recommended that English should be taught for 6 years at the secondary stage, beginning at 11 or 12 years. In Bombay State they begin at 13 or 14."

2. *Report on a Survey of the Attitudes, Opinions and Personality Traits of a Sample of 1706 Students of the University of Bombay* (Sponsored by World Brotherhood, Bombay. Bombay : Orient Longmans Private Ltd., 1960), p. 3. The crucial problem of educational authorities in determining the medium of instruction used at school or college is to decide just how adequate a regional language is to act as a vehicle of expression and communication at any educational level. Informants thought that most of the official regional languages were advanced enough in terms of structure and vocabulary to express modern knowledge up to the secondary school level. But were not able to be used as a means of instruction beyond that stage. Some of the new Asian countries began English in the primary schools as they have no native language that is sophisticated enough to handle even the early years of modern education.

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3. See Table IV

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TABLE III

Educational Level at which English was Medium of Instruction

	Primary School		*Middle School*		*High School*		*College*		*Total Namber of Student*
	No.	*%*	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*	
Men Students	29	19	20	12	75	47	35	22	159
Women Students	23	25	6	7	45	49	17	19	91
	52	21	26	10	120	48	52	21	250

> For the SSLC the student is generally equipped with a vocabulary of about 2,500 words and about 250 sentence structures, whereas in the first year of the university he is faced with texts introducting a 5,000 to 7.000 word vocabulary and at least 4 times the number of structures learned in school. There is no continuity or bridge between school and university studies, and the unfortunate student is faced with a near impossible situation.[1]

This quotation emphasizes the problem of the students who do not even have English as medium of instruction at school, but only as a secondary language before arriving at college.[2] The result is seen in that students who may pass their SSLC examinations in the regional language with very high marks are said to "gape vacantly"

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when they attend college lectures given in English. This may aggrevate the problem by tempting the lecturer to lecture in the local vernacular, which in turn may encourage the students to answer in the same language. If the students also do as much of their reading as possible in the regional language rather than in English, they are hardly prepared to write their examinations in that language. Translating during the emotional strain of an examination is very difficult, particularly if the student is writing a paper which demands a fluent expression of thought. The English medium appears to be particularly difficult for students from the mofussil, for, as has already been noted, they may not have had any support at home or in the village for learning or speaking the language. The result of these difficulties may account to a large extent for the extremely high rate of failures in the first years of college.

Some of the students who said that they had had no difficulties with English at college said that their parents had helped them at home, as children, with accent and grammar. Some of the students who had had great difficulty in learning English were depressed at their inadequacy in the language. Others were keenly aware of their grammatical mistakes, and found it very difficult, even in their last year, to follow lectures because of their poor vocabulary, or to think and talk rapidly, particularly when debating. Some felt they could understand what they read very well, but found it very difficult to express their ideals in speech or writing.

A second problem that arises from the difficulty that the students have with the English medium of instruction is that they often find their lectures uninteresting and meaningless. Being unable to understand English properly, it follows that many of them cannot understand their lectures, and consequently find them boring.

> Students come to us in hundreds, their minds variously muddied o'er with ill-taught language both in English and the vernacular. . . . To follow the old technique of 'lecturing' is meaningless. Their vocabulary is too limited and our high flown phrases are lost on them . . . . It is a sobering thought that where there is no understanding words are but as sounding brass and a tinkling cymbal. . . . Teachers report to notes . . . . . The answers are garbled versions of the summery.[1]

1. Muliyil, G., "Thirty Years of English," pp. 1, 2. (Unpublished article, Bangalore, 1961).

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Several college lecturers told me that, as their students were quite incapable of understanding or handling English, it was almost impossible to teach them anything in their first years at college.

> *College lecturer* : English ! You should see the terrible essays I get. They have wrong words and tenses—I can't make anything out of them. We have a *dreadful* time with English. There is great resistance to it amongst the students.
>
> In my grandfather's day, and even my father's, it was much better. Everyone talked English. But now the young girls know *very* little. They don't speak it at home. I am even forced to write out the lesson portions on the blackboard instead of lecturing. It isn't enough just to spell out the words for them, they can't even understand them !

Still another result of the language problem at college is that it tends to accentuate student unrest. Shils says that in the colleges in which the students have a better command of English there is less revolt and rebellion than in those in which the "ascendancy" of Hindi has led to a "premature relaxation of standards of English teaching." He would perhaps agree that the ascendancy of a regional language would have the same effect. For, as has been said, the encouragement of a regional language means that the teaching of English is delayed until periously near the time for college.

My interviews supported Shils comments in that a good deal of the dissatisfaction of the students interviewed stemmed from having to cope with the deteriorating English of their lecturers. Shils speaks of the "anguishing experience" of students who must listen hour after hour to lecturers who stumble along in inadequate English, with poor grammar and a difficult accent.[1] A number of the students interviewed said that their lecturers spoke even worse English than they did, and some of the girls claimed that they cut classes because they were afraid that the "dreadful" accent of their lecturers would corrupt their own English. Other students have felt that the poor English they learned in secondary schools was largely responsible for their problems at college.[2]

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1. Shils, Edward, *op. cit.*, p. 8.

2. Sarkar, Chanchal, *The Unquiet Campus* (six articles reprinted from *The Statesman*, New Delhi, 1960), p. 18.

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Finally, studies that have been made in Hawaii suggest that a student who must suddenly use a language which he has not completely mastered may find it a traumatic experience.[1]

The English medium of instruction is, of course, a problem for the lecturer as well as the student. Many mentioned their difficulties in lecturing in such subjects as psychology and phisolohpy without having a proper command of English. And for those who had lectured for many years in English the deterioration of the student's standard caused many heartaches. It is particularly hard for those who have taught literature and poetry for many years, and now know that their students are quiet incapable of comprehending what they themselves have loved and admired.

With the lecturers bored by hours of dictating notes, and students bored by writing them down, hour after hour, often without understanding, all pleasure and intellectual curiosity disappears from the educational experience.

The English of most students, who remain, willy-nilly improves in their second and third years. By that time they can understand more of the lectures (one professor said that in the third year the students laugh at his jokes), but few can still express themselves adequately, particularly on paper.

Proficiency in the medium of instruction not only determines the academic success of a student, but may gravely affect his or her social relationships while at college. Sarkar claims that it was undoubtedly the college students who had had English as medium of instruction early in school who were the campus leaders.[2]

It is quite possible that a student may be hampered in attaining a competent knowledge of English by having to learn other languages. Table IV shows the number of languages the students learned at home and while attending school and college. It suggests that the main linguistic strain comes during the formal educational period. For, whereas 148 students did not learn any extra languages before going to school, only 50 students did not learn an extra language at school or college. And whereas only 25 students learned two extra languages at home, 92 did at school or college. Likewise, only 3 learned three languages at home, but 39 did at school. The really

1. Lind, Andrew W., *op. cit.*, p. 52.
2. Sarkar, Chanchal, *op. cit.*, p. 31.

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TABLE IV

Number of Language learned by Students while at home, at School and at College

	Number of Different Languages Learned											
	*While at Home**						*At School or College***					
	0	1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4	5	*Total Number of Students*
Men Students :												
Kannada	66	11	13	2	1	1	20	58	9	6	1	94
Tamil	17	6	4	—	1	—	7	7	8	5	1	28
Other	26	11	—	—	—	—	—	1	3	17	16	37
Total	109	28	17	2	2	1	27	66	20	28	18	159
Women Students :												
Kannada	25	20	3	—	—	—	13	16	9	7	2	48
Tamil	9	14	3	1	—	—	7	5	9	5	1	27
Other	5	8	2	—	1	—	3	5	1	6	1	16
Total	39	42	8	1	1	—	23	26	19	18	4	91
TOTAL NUMBER OF STUDENTS	148	70	25	3	3	1	50	92	39	46	22	250

* Mother tongue is not counted.

** Mother tongue is not counted ; English is counted. The table is complicated by the fact that, if English was first learned at home, it was not counted again at the school level when it became the medium of instruction.

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startling figures are for the 46 and 22 students who learned four and five languages respectively while at school and/or college. The total number of languages learned by these students is shown in Table 6.

The main extra language learned by the students at school, besides English, was Hindi. In most schools this is a compulsory subject, but some parents take no chances, and teach their children Hindi at home.[1] This was the case with 31 students. The next popular language was English, which 25 students had learned at home. Twenty-four more students, other than the Tamil-speaking group, learned Tamil at home, 23 other than the Kannada-speaking students learned Kannada, 25 learned Telugu. As Kannada, Tamil and Telugu would be the three languages children would be most likely to meet in their neighbourhood contacts with other children, these languages were probably learned through peer groups. Six other students learned Urdu at home, 4 Sanskrit, 3 Malayalam, 2 Konkani, 2 Marathi, 2 Tulu, and 1 each learned Coorgi, French and Portugese.

All the students presumably learned English at school and college if not at home. Besides this, 161 students learned Hindi, 41 Tamil, 26 Telugu, and 25 Sanskrit. As well as these main popular languages, 16 learned Urdu, 9 French, and 3 Malayalam. Two students learned Konkani, 2 Marathi, 2 Tulu, and 1 each learned Coorgi, German, Gujerati, and Latin. Thus, sixteen different languages were learned by this group of students either at school or college, or while attending these institutions.

The extent to which the students' mastery of the different languages was reinforced by reading and watching movies is shown in Table 5. Both of these media of communication may be encouraged by parents who make books and magazines available to their children at home ; or encourage them to use libraries. Here again the student from the mofussil, particularly if he is only able to attend college because of a scholarship or freeship, may be handicapped. For it is almost certain that there will be few libraries available in the rural areas, and his parents' income will probably not stretch to cover the purchase of books. It is unlikely, too, that the local movies will show either English-speaking or Hindi films, for there will not be enough people who understand these languages to support them.

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1. In the Anglo-Indian schools, the regional language, English, and Sanskrit are the three compulsory languages.

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Table 5 shows that the students tended to read in more languages than were spoken at home, and were by no means confined to literature written in their mother tongues.[1] It also shows that English is the language in which they read most in their leisure time. Reasons for this are not difficult to find. Bangalore has a number of good public libraries. Several of these, such as the ones at the Institute of World Culture and United States Information Service have a large supply of English and American newspapers, magazines and books. Many of the Indian newspapers printed in English are of a very high calibre, and probably more international in their outlook than the newspapers written in the regional language. There are also a number of attractive Indian magazines printed in English, and the English and American ones have a magic-like quality for many students who are eager to study "abroad." Their portrayal of the affluent society of gadgets and cars probably fascinates this age group. But they are two expensive for most students to buy.

Books written in Kannada seem to be the only serious competitors of the English ones. One-hundred and forty-seven of the students read them, as compared to 210 who read in English. Kannada writers have been greatly encouraged by the revival of their mother tongue which has caused an increasing demand for short stories, novels, and radio scripts in that language. The number of newspapers, magazines, and books read by the students in the "other" languages was negligible.

This picture changes when the students' choice of movies is considered. Movies are the main recreation of Indian students. The English-speaking movies head the list, 211 students having patronized them, but they are closely followed in popularity by the Hindi-speaking movies (198), and then by those written in the "other" languages (159). The latter movies are popular because the Tamil and Telugu-speaking students often preferred to go to movies in their own mother tongues. The fact that more men than women students had gone to movies in a larger number of languages shows that they had a wider language experience in this medium.

A summation of the information in this Table shows that, when the students have a choice, they prefer to read in English, and a large number patronize English movies. The Kannada medium of communication is fairly popular in all these areas, largely due to the

1. As the students were only asked their present reading habits there is no way of telling how long they had been reading in the different languages.

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TABLE V

Languages in which Students Read Newspapers, Magazines and Books, and Heard Movies*

Language	*Newspapers*	*Magazines*	*Books*	*Movies*
English	227	215	210	211
Kannada	132	111	147	122
Hindi	3	5	15	198
Other	9	24	23	159

* The stuaents read, or heard movis, in form one to five languages. Forty-one stndents went to movies in one language, 63 in two 62 in three, 25 in four, and 42 in five languages.

greater proportion of Kannada-speaking students in this sample. Hindi newspapers, magazines, and books are seldom read by the students, but the movies made in that language are very popular. Movies are, therefore, the only medium that reenforces the students' study of Hindi at school and college.

Students of the "other" language group tended to read and see movies in their respective mother tongues. However, 87 of those who watched the Tamil language movies were Kannada-speaking. One reason for this is that, as Kannada, Tamil, Telugu and Malayalam belong to the same Dravidian group of languages, it is fairly easy for the students to understand movies in these languages. They also tend to cost less than the Hindi and English movies.

The importance of the movie as a means of presenting the "cultural" nuances which a language expresses, pictorially, as well as a means of language instructions, cannot be overestimated. The movies made in the Hindi-speaking region are known to be the most modern and up-to-date in India. It is therefore not surprising that, although the students did not read in Hindi to any great extent for pleasure, they patronized the Hindi-speaking movies more than others. This may give them more of a feeling of identity with the Hindi-speaking world than they would obtain from books or magazines.

Television has not yet arrived in India, but the radio is a very important medium of communication through which the different languages can be "unwittingly" learned. Air India broadcasts a

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number of different language programs each day, and the number of radios has increased to such an extent that Hormann's comments in regard to the function of the mass media in Hawaii are probably equally valid for India.

> Through mass media local people are constantly exposed to standard speech patterns, as though they were listening to tapes in a foreign-language laboratory. Few local people escape these mass media of communication. . . . In the contemporary world the major mass media are in spoken rather than written language, thus reflecting colloquial speech and fads and fashions in language perhaps more than do the media depending on writing. In this renewed dominance of the spoken word there are no doubt important social implications which it is still diffcult to see . . .[1]

There are, then, an increasing number of ways in which the growing number of educated Indians can, wittingly or unwittingly, be assisted in learning languages. Television will help them even more, for it will bring pictorial support for learning the *meaning* of languages into many homes.[2]

An adequate knowledge of a language can be assessed in two ways. First, from the point of view of a language expert, who would take such matters as grammar, accent and sentence structure into account. Secondly, from the feelings of a person who wishes to use the language. It may be sufficient for a student, for example, to know enough Kannada to pass-the-time-of-day with acquaintances, or buy what he needs. That this is probably the level of competence of many of the students who said they had "learned" a language can be seen in Table 6 where the number of languages the students said they learned is compared with the number they said they spoke freely, read well, and wrote fluently. An understanding of the

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1. Hormann, Bernard L., *op. cit.*, pp. 24, 25.

2. Doctor, Powrie V., "Research Need in the Vocational Rehabilitation of the Deaf," *American Annals of the Deaf* Vol. 105, No. 4, Sep. 1960), p. 346. Doctor likes a person learning a foreign language to a deef person. For in each case the person may be able to speak a sentence clearly enough to be understood and yet not know the meaning of what they are saying. "The problem of language with the deaf individual thus may be thought of in terms of the acquisition of the meaning of symbols . . . *as they are used in the culture in which he functions.*" (Italics are those of the author).

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TABLE VI

Total number of Languages learned by Students compared with those they spoke freely, read well and wrote fluently*

Language	*No. of Languages*							*No Answer*	*Total Number of Students*
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7		
*Total Number learned***									
Men Students :	—	8	62	38	40	9	2	—	159
Women Students :	—	3	26	25	26	9	2	—	91
Total	—	11	88	63	66	18	4	—	250
Number Spoken Freely									
Men Students :	59	41	35	12	9	1	—	2	159
Women Students :	12	28	26	17	5	3	—	—	91
Total	71	69	61	29	14	4	—	2	250
Number Read Well									
Men Students :	56	64	25	6	3	—	—	5	159
Women Students :	5	39	32	11	2	—	—	2	91
Total	61	103	57	17	5	—	—	7	250
Number written Fluently									
Men Students :	70	60	19	4	1	—	—	5	159
Women Students :	6	44	29	8	2	—	—	2	91
Total	76	104	48	12	3	—	—	7	250

* Students' own assessment.

** Totals obtained from Table IV.

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students' "real" knowledge of these languages is hampered by the fact that some said they could speek freely in a language in which they could not read or write and several said they could read well in a language which they could not speak freely or write fiuently. However, the figures show that the students by no means felt that they liad a perfect mastery of all the languages they had learned. Nor could they, on the whole, read or write languages as well as they could speak them. To what extent partial knowledge of a number of languages affects "perfect" knowledge of a few is impossible to assess with the data at hand, but it is a relevant problem.

An infinite number of combinations could be worked out in terms of the number of languages the students of this sample said they spoke, read, or wrote, talked at home or with friends, had learned at home, school, or college, read newspapers, magazines, or books in, or in which they listened to movies. An analysis of all this detailed information in terms of how it affects a student's ability to communicate adequately with those about him, handle his college studies, and to his feelings of satisfaction in his personal relationships, is impossible to make without a great deal of more qualitative data. Nor can we learn from this quantitative information whether a multilingual student can synthesize the different cultural insights he receives from knowledge of a language into an adequate feeling of identity with any one linguistic group. Nor whether he has learned any one language well enough to feel master of his destiny.[1]

The conclusion of this exploratory study is that, in view of the great variety of complicated linguistic situations in the modern world, multilingualism presents a challenging field for the researcher who would understand some of the crucial problems of present day group relations and individual adjustment.

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1. Brazeaue, E. Jacques, *op. cit.*, p. 539. Brazeau suggests that in a bilingual country some people may not speak either language perfectly, and so may be "people without a language in which they feel adequate."

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CHAPTER XII

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Humanist Element in Modern Indian Culture : The Role of Rabindranath Tagore

—P.C. Mahalanobis

Rabindranath Tagore coined a new word, "Visva-manava", in his own Bengali language, to convey the idea of universal humanity or Universal Man. To Tagore, universal humanity was an ideal but not an abstraction ; it had to find its concrete expression in the personality of each individual human being, in human and social relationships, in individual national cultures, and in the meeting of different cultures of the world. This ideal of the Universal Man supplied a great motive force in his own life and works.

In an early essay (1884) Tagore said it was only through a deep appreciation of the beauty of his own country that he could develop a sense of values in respect of other countries. He attached great importance to the development of national languages. In 1892 he pointed out that the union of education and life in India can be achieved only by making the mother tongue the medium of instruction. He admitted that the individuality of his own Bengali language, or of any other language, is the major obstacle to its being understood by others. Yet, whatever power and beauty the language has is due precisely to that individuality. He held that only if Bengali literature thrived on the individuality of the Bengali language that there could be concord between those who speak the Bengali language and those who speak other languages.

For India to achieve true unity all her languages must be fully developed ; each of her peoples must manifest its distinctive genius through its own language.

Tagore also emphasised the social and economic foundations of national unity. In the 1880's he said that the ultimate object of all political movements in India must be the integration of national consciousness. Speaking of the Indian National Congress in 1898, he said : every year the Congress must make some progress in the advancement of the welfare of the people. Even if there was on

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direct political gain, any advance of national unity would be lasting benefit.

Every country and every nation must solve in its own way t challenge of history. To India has been given her problem fr the very beginning—to attain unity in diversity.

India had on her soil innumerable groups of tribal people fr time immemorial. In course of time, came in successive wav a wide variety of peoples and cultures from the neighbouri countries ; some were matriarchal and some patriarchal, like t people of the Vedic tradition. They acted and reacted on o another and formed the matrix of the ancient Hindu culture India. Buddhist and Jaina religions emerged and made their contr butions. Tagore said : "The Muslims came repeatedly from t outside, with their stores of knowledge and their wonderful religio democracy and made their contributions to Indian music, archit ture, pictorial art, and literature, and stimulated the great religiou movements of the middle ages." Still later came the nations fro the West, among whom the British became dominant.

Tagore said "Hindus and Buddhists, Muslims and Christian shall not die fighting on Indian soil ; here they must find harmony. The inmost urge of India is to find the one in many, unity i diversity. India rejects none, destroys none and strives to find a place for all in a vast social order."

The history of India is not that of Hindus alone, nor that of only Hindus and Muslims. He said "Then the British came . . . They came not simply as men but as the symbol of the new spirit of Europe. . . . The spirit of modern age has cast its radiance from the western horizon, illuminating the entire span of world history. The mind of Europe, under some tremendous urge, has projected itself into every corner of the earth. Wherever it has gone it has made its conquests. What is the secret of its power ? The answer is to be found in the integrity of its pursuit of truth."

He recognised that the advent of the British was not an uncalled for or accidental intrusion. It was necessary for India to have contact with the mind of the West. He said "Let us admit that modern science is Europe's great gift to humanity. We in India must gratefully accept it."

Tagore was convinced of the need of the meeting of the different cultures of the world. He was aware that the nations of the world were coming closer together, but he was troubled that there was

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something aggressive and exclusive in nationalism which was obstructing the trend of history. In a series of essays in 1890's analysing nationalism in the West, he said "The Nation is the organised self-interest of a people where it is least human and least spiritual. It has evolved a perfect organisation of power but not of spiritual idealism"; and pointed out : "Every nation which has prospered has done so through its career of aggressive selfishness either in commercial adventure or in foreign possessions or in both. And this material prosperity not only feeds continually the selfish interests of the people but impresses men's minds with the lesson that, for a nation, selfishness is a necessity and therefore a virtue."

On the last day of the nineteenth century, he wrote a sonnet in Bengali, in which he made the prophesy :

> "The last sun of the century sets amidst the blood red clouds of the West and the whirlwind of hatred."
>
> "The naked passion of self-love of Nations, in its drunken delirium of greed is dancing to the clash of steel and the howling verses of vengeance."

Tagore rejected the cult of aggressive nationalism very decisively, and turned to the ideals of peace and universal compassion of ancient India. At Santiniketan, which means the 'abode of peace', he founded his school in 1901 and made it his chief centre of meditation and activities. Most of his philosophical and devotional works were written here.

The humanism of Tagore had its source of inspiration in his own spiritual experience. The universe can have significance only in terms of human values. There exists a universal mind of humanity which endures beyond the life of individual persons. The truth of science receives its validity by reference to this Universal Mind. It is, however, not merely a reasoning mind. It is also the ultimate ground of all valves. This is Universal Man. The meeting of humanity now receives a new significance. It is the acknowledgement of the spiritual kinship of man which is universal.

Tagore had visited Europe twice when he was young. In 1912 he set out on what he called a tour of pilgrimage to the West ; and since then he went abroad 9 or 10 times making personal contacts all over the world.

Shortly after the cessation of the First World War, Tagore travelled extensively in Europe. On his return to India in 1921 he

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said : "India's awakening is a part of the world. With the Great War the door of a new age has flung open. The peoples of the earth have been drawing closer to one another, almost unaware ; but as all humanity feels the stress of war, the fact of mutual dependence can no longer be denied. All at once the foundations of civilization, western civilization to be precise, seems to quake. It is evident that the tremors are neither local nor momentary ; they are world-wide and will not stop until human relationships, reaching from continent to continent, becomes based on true harmony."

He continued : "Henceforth any nation which seeks isolation for itself must come into conflict with the time-spirit and find no peace. From now onwards the plane of thinking of every nation will have to be international. It is the striving of new age to develop in the mind this faculty of universalism."

On another occasion he said : "The nations which have learnt to unite within their own boundaries cannot do so beyond their own. How to be free from arrogant nationalism is today the chief lesson to be learnt."

In 1921 he started the Visvabharati, sometimes translated as an international university, as a meeting place of the great cultures of the world.

In a message sent on the 70th birthday of Rabindranath Tagore in 1931, Jawaharlal Nehru said :

"I wish to pay deep homage to one who has been as a beacon light to all of us, ever pointing to the finer and nobler aspects of life and never allowing us to fall into the ruts which kill individuals as well as nations. .... Rabindranath Tagore has given to our nationalism the outlook of internationalism, and has enriched it with art and music and the magic of his words so that it has become the full blooded emblem of India's awakened spirit."

The fear of war again began to spread over the world. In 1935 Tagore pointed out : "The world saw the end of a terrible war only the other day. The victory that crowned one group of belligerents was a victory of armed might ; but because brute force is not man's supreme source of strength, that victory has proved unfruitful and is only sowing the seeds of fresh dissensions. Man's strength lies in mercy and compassion."

The Second World War started in 1939, and Tagore became more and more distressed as it appeared from continent to continent.

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Three months before his death, on his 80th birthday in May 1941, he wrote his last essay, on the 'Crisis of Civilisation' :

"The spectre of a new barbarity strides over Europe, teeth bare and claws unconcealed in an orgy of terror. From one end of the continent to the other the fumes of oppression pollute the atmosphere."

"I look back on the stretch of past years and see the crumbling ruins of a proud civilization lying heaped as garbage out of history. And yet I shall not commit the grievous sin of losing faith in Man, accepting his present defeat as final. I shall look forward to a turning in history after the cataclysm is over and the sky is again unburdened and passionless."

"The hour is near when it will be revealed that the insolence of might is fraught with great peril ; that hour will bear out in full the truth of what the ancient sages have proclaimed :

"By unrighteousness men prosper, gain what seems desirable, defeat enemies, but perish at the root."

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CHAPTER XIII

The Religious Creeds among the Patidars of South Gujarat—A Panoramic View

—*K. M. Kapadia*

The two main divisions of the Patidars, Leva and Kadva, are quite well-known. But the three groups among the Leva are not so much known as these main divisions. Under the influence of Islam, two deviant groups emerged among these Patidars; the Uda or the Bhakta Patidars, also known as Kabirpanthis and Matiya Patidars, who proudly call themselves Satpanthis. The history of these deviant groups is, as is usual in case of all creeds, shrouded in mythical tales. The present generation is shedding off the beliefs and practices of the sect to which they belong. Under the circumstances the task of studying the history of these sects becomes more difficult.

The Leva Patidars appear to be the Vaishnavas of Vallabh *sampradaya*, though they do not show any allegiance at present to any Maharaja (head) of that sect. This inference is supported by two facts. The idols worshipped in the temples which the Patidars visit in their villages are addressed by them as *Lalji* or *Thakorji*, the very words by which the deity in the Vaishnav *Haveli* (temple) is also known. The birth of Krsna, Krsna *jayanti*, is celebrated as the greatest festival of the year even by that section of the community, the Bhaktas, whose affiliation to the creed of Rama is evident.

Ramananda, believed to have been born in 1300 A. D.,[1] proceeded, on 'being insulted by his brethren for his social inferiority', northwards and approached Raghavanand of Ramanuja* order at

1. G. S. Ghurye accepts R. G. Bhandarkar's date; *Indian Sadhus* (*1953*), p. 173. According to Tara Chand, with whom Kshitis Mohan Sen and some other scholars agree, 'His career may provisionally be accepted to lie in the last quarter of the fourteenth and the first half of the fifteenth centuries.' *Influence of Islam on Indian Culture* (1946), p. 144; K. M. Sen, *Medieval Mysticism of Indian* (1935), p. 70.

*The earliest *Acharya* among the four *sampradayas* of the Vaishnavas, who flourished during the eleventh century A. D.

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Benares for being initiated. Ramanand, coming from the lower caste, was out to destroy caste rigidities and consequently on his visit to various villages he did not observe commensal taboos. On his return, therefore, he was asked to perform a penance, *pryaascitta*, for the suspected breach of the commensal regulations which were insisted upon by his order. As Ramanand refused to submit to this demand he was expelled from the order, whereupon he formed a sect of his own. This is indeed a momentous event in the religious history of North India for the central theme of Ramananda's teaching, namely, a person's caste and position in life are matters of litte importance so long as he or she has genuine faith in God. 'Let no one ask a man's caste or with whom he eats. He who shows love to Hari becomes Hari's own.' The social position of a man, said he, should be decided not by birth but by the excellence of *bhakti.* In accordance with his preaching, he accepted as his disciples all persons who approached him and were found worthy, irrespective of their caste, sex or creed. Another major contribution of the Ramanandi cult was its chastening influence. Ramananda substituted Rama as his tutelary deity in place of Visnu, the deity of the Ramanuja order. Installation of Rama as personal God arrested the more sensuous worship of Radha Krsna, which reached culmination in erotic raptures in the Radha-Vallabhiya sect, with its central headquarters in Vrndavana.[2]

The Ramanandi sadhus carried the worship of Rama and along with it the message of Ramananda far and wide in the country. One, Tehaldas by name, reached Navsari in the latter half of the last century. Popular tradition assigns the arrival of the Ramanandi sadhus to as early as the 17th century. A daughter of Shah Jahan, the Moghul ruler, is reported to have donated the land which was till recently in charge of the Mahant of this sect. But a person who had contacted Tehaldas vouchsafed that the hillock in the centre of *Dudhia talao* that is popularly known as *Bavani tekari,* was made over to him by Sir T. Madhav Rao, the Dewan of Baroda, in 1875. Tehaldas is said to have taken *samadhi* in 1878. Tehaldas was fifth in succession from Prahalladdasji.* If Prahalladdasji ever

2. G. S. Ghurye, *Caste and Class in India* (1950), p. 106 ; *Indian Sadhus* pp. 65, 170 ff. ; Tara Chand, pp. 143 ff. ; K. M. Sen, pp. 71 ff. ; R. G. Bhandarkar, *Vaisnavism, Saivism and Minior Religious Systems* (1928), pp. 94, 124 ; Eney. Religion and Ethics, Vol. X, pp. 570 (b), 571 (b).

*Prahalladdasji-Ramdasji-Ramsevakdasji-Purshottamdasji-Haridasji-Tahaldasji.

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visited Navsari, then it is possible to concede that a Mahant preaching the worship of Rama came much earlier, but nothing can be said definitely about his headquarters or the impact of his teaching. The history of this Ramanandiya sect must therefore begin with 1875 for its social impact on the surrounding villages in Surat district in general and of Navsari taluka in particular.

It seems the sadhus of *sampradaya*, probably under the direction of the Mahant of the *tekari*, went to the villages and opened their temples at central places—Panchpipla, Adada, etc. Panchpipla near Dhaman seems to be the central headquarters as the Ramanandi sadhus used to meet here in a big fair-festival once in a year on the occasion of Krsna *jayanti*. This big gathering of the sadhus here stopped recently after the passing away of the Mahant whose influence in the area was great. There is a corroborative evidence to strengthen this inference. The deity in the temple at Dhaman is said to be Nrsimha.* The temple of Nrsimha is also found in a village in Bardoli taluka. Though the deity in the temple of Tehaldasji in Navsari is Ram Panchayatana and the *sampradaya* has Rama as its tutelary deity, the *upasya* deity of the Mahant is Nrsimha. Secondly, the Mahant of Navsari used to send his sadhus to villages at the time of harvest to collect grains for use in his *matha*. This was known as *madhukari*. The paractice of *madhukari* still continues among the Bhakta Patidars even after their affiliation to Kabirpanth, the only difference being that it is now collected by the head of their temple at Surat and not by the Mahant of the *tekri*. The installation, *pratisthapana*, of this *upasya* deity of the Navsari Mahant in Dhaman testifies to the intrusion of the Ramanandi cult from Navsari into the rural area.

The Rama cult was thus accepted and sought to be integrated with the old Vaishnavite practices in some villages by that section of the Patidar community now known as the Bhaktas. But the birth of krsna continued to be celebrated by them as the biggest festival, though they speak of it as Rama *jayanti*† in their discussion with you. The Bhaktas when they meet each other, young and old, male and female, wish each other Ram Kabir. Very often young men and women pronounce it as Ramkabi and this slant in

*The temple being closed owing to a serious quarrel between the people and the *Bawaji* of the temple, it was not possible to identify the idol or idols there.

†Rama *jayanti* is celebrated by the followers of Rama on the 9th day of the first half of Chaitra (March-April), that being the birthday of Rama.

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their wishing form will one day conceal the significance of this form of wishing. One can easily see in it a mixture of the Ramanandiya Rama and the saintly Kabir who is equally regarded as an incarnation of Visnu by the Bhaktas.

In most of the villages the temples of Rama (people call it Ramji also) are in charge of *Bavajis* who are not always celibate. It is quite likely that the sadhus who were sent from the Navsari centre for the propagation of the cult were ordained to be celibate. They, however, lapsed into marital union with women in villages and then settled as householders. These temples, consequently, have at present no link with the Mahant of the *tekri.*

Historically Vaishnavism in this area is earlier than the Ramanandiya cult. Vallabhachary, the founder of this Vaishnav sect, *pustimarga*, flourished between 1479 A.D. 1531 A.D. He visited towns and cities on the Western coast—Ahmedabad, Surat, Navsari, etc.—but could not have made deep impress by his itinerary. His religion is, however, found to have attained great hould on the people of Gujarat in the 18th century ; and Havelis (temples) were built in towns of Gujrat by the beginning of the 19th century. The Vaishnav *Haveli* (in Navsari) seems to have been a century old. The bell presented to this *Haveli* bears the date, 15th day of the bright half of Asadha of Samvat 1927 (1871 A. D.). Evidently, then, the Patidars had become the followers of Vallabh *sampradaya* in the fifties or sixties of the 19th century at the latest.

Of the twelve disciples of Ramananda, Kabir, Sena and Raidas founded sub-sects of their own, of whom Kabirpanth, the sect of Kabir, is the most outstanding. Kabir is said to be a child of a Brahmin widow who was brought up by a Muslim weaver.[3] Kabir carried forward the doctrine of his Master by preaching a religion of humanity where distinctions of caste, creed, community or sex had no place. Likewise he firmly adhered to the message of his Master, Ramananda : 'Why do you any longer call me to go to the temple ? Him, omnipresent and all-pervading, I have met in the very temple of my heart.' And he preached : 'The city of Hara is to the east and that of Ali is to the west ; but explore your own hearts for there are both Rama and Karim.' 'The Hindu resorts to the temple and the Musalman to the mosque, but Kabir goes to the place where both are known.' The apostle of the faith of

3. K. M. Sen, (p. 88) categorically calls him a son of a Muslim weaver. So does R. G. Bhandarkar (p. 97) ond G. H. Westcott.

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humanity who taught that 'the divine disclosed itself in the human race as a whole' preached a religion of love which united all castes and creed.[4] Kabir had moved among the Muslim Sufi saints before he was allegedly ordained Ramananda[5] and his mind was imbued with sufi doctrines, which largely influenced his philosophy.

Kabir went a step further than Ramananda. He denounced formalism and all paraphernalia of externalism with which both the Hindu and the Muslim religions were overlaid. He showed supreme contempt for superstition, dogmas and rituals. 'When he felt that his end was approaching he left Kasi the city whose holiness was considered so great as to confer paradise on those who died there, and migrated to Maghar where death entailed rebirth as an ass.' So also, 'When on the occasion of the *sraddha* of Ramananda, all other disciples of the guru came to Kabir for milk, he approached the skeleton of a dead cow and begged for milk. This strange conduct of Kabir naturally exciting comment, he very humorously remarked that a dead cow's milk would reasonably be a fit drink for a dead person.'[6] He shunned idols and pilgrimage, and rejected all features of Hinduism which were against the spirit of human brotherhood.

Unlike his Master Ramananda, he did not believe in extreme ascetism and running away from the world. Consequently, instead of monastic life he lived the life of a householder and worked as a weaver throughout his life. Some of his similies are drawn from his craft. He preached the conquest of the passions and sublimation of the human instincts by channelling their expression in fervent and passionate *bhakti*. As an unlettered man of low origin he probably had no competence for philosophy for which he evidently showed contempt.

The irony is that his pupils failed to put into practice the message of their Master. On his death both the Hindus and the Muslims claimed him as their own, and while one pressed for cremating him the other, for the burial of his body. The Muslim followers of Kabir kept aloof from their Hindu compatriots. The main shrine

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4. K. M. Sen, p. 73 ; Tara Chand, pp. 148, 150 : E. R. E., Vol. VIII, p. 633 (a) Cf. also 'Mecca has verily become Kasi, and Rama has become Rahim.'

5. Indian Sadhus, p. 213ff.

6. Tara Chand, p. 149 ; K. M. Sen, pp. 95-6, 93 ; E. R., Vol. VII, 133 (a).

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of the Muslim Kabirpanthis is at Maghar near Gorakhpur where Kabir died ; that of the Hindus at Benares where he was initiated.

Kabir's teachings spread far and wide and by the time they reached Gujarat there had already developed among his followers twelve different sects one of which is Uda or Udasi-Kabir. When and how this sect was found is not known. The popular tradition is that a stage practising penance at Shuklatirth, on the bank of Narmada, nearly 13 miles away from Broach, was awaiting the arrival of a saint, at whose hands a branch would blossom into a tree. For long such a saint did not appear there. At long last Kabir came there and at his touch the branch blossomed into a big banyan tree which is known as Kabirvad.[7] Kabir could not have started on his itinerary, if ever he did, before the last decade of the fifteenth century,[8] and if this tradition is accepted as true, the birth of this sect has to be placed sometime at the close of that century. It is more probable that a sadhu of the Dharmadasiya branch of Kabirpanth came to Shuklatirth and propagated its doctrines. The Udakabirs regard the Kabirvad and Shuklatirth as the head-quarters of their sect and visit Kabirvad as a place of pilgrimage.

What we know definitely about this sect is that it diverged into two branches—one with its headquarters at Punyad near Miyagam (its followers being Patidars of Kanam taluka in Baroda district), and the other with its headquarters at Motasanja near Zagadia. Narmada is the dividing line of the two branches. The former was in charge of Dharmadas who was a householder and upheld *saguna bhakti*, i.e., the worship of a photo or an idol. Jnaniji, who led the second branch was, on the other hand, a celibate and upheld *nirguna bhakti*, i.e., devotional songs without any idol. The Uda Patidars know these branches as *bunda* and *nada*.

The other deviant group is known as the Matiya Patidars who are the followers of Imam Shah. They would like to call themselves Satpanthi, though popularly they are addressed as Pirana Panthi. Why the community is called Matiya is not known. How it came under the influence of Islam is also not known. There is a popular

7. Kshitis Mohan Sen (pp. 98-9) records that 'during his visit to Gujarat Kabir met two brothers Tattva and Jiva on the bank of the Narmada . . . at the touch of Kabir it (the tree) blossomed into new life.'

8. Kshitis Mohan Sen (87-8) seems to place Kabir in the first half of the 15th century. Bhandarkar (p. 98) and Ghurye (p. 213) on the other hand, hold that Kabir died in 1518.

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tradition that once some pilgrims on their way to Benaras or some holy place met a Muslim *fakir* who promised them the sight, *darsana* of their desired deity there and save them from the troubles of long journey which was also insecure and hazardous. Those who put faith in the words of the *fakir* were favoured with the sight of their desired deity and being awe-stricken by the miraculous power of the *fakir* they became his followers. They are the Matiya Patidars. This legend evidently is the product of Hindu susceptibility to a belief in the divine powers inherent in a saint.

For the historical foundation of this sect the material collected by W. Ivanow[9] is very helpful. It is, however, necessary, to dispose of another historical account of the act given by Sadruddin of Navsari before we approach Ivanow for the history of the sect. Though the Matiyas in S. Gujarat are the followers of Imam Shahi, they honour, as their Guru, the guardian of the shrine of Sat Gur Nur, popularly known as Sayyid Sadat, at Navsari. Sayyid Sadruddin was the brother of Pyara Saheb, the last head of the shrine and has written the history of the shrine, *Pire Tavarikh.* Though Ivanow had conceded that 'we know absolutely nothing about the date at which the *Pir* settled or died in Navsari, who he was and what religion he really preached,' Sadruddin has conjured up history which takes the *pir* of Navsari to the days of the Solanki ruler, Siddhartha, of Patan (1094-1143). Pir Sayyid Nuruddin Nur Muhammad, writes, he, who came to Patan during the reign of Siddhartha was known by the name of Baba Haji Rajan whose shrine is found there. This *pir* was also known by people as Sayyid Sadat and by his followers as Sat Gur Nur, Nur Muhammad the true teacher. He died in Navsari in 1094. Ivanow writes : 'The followers of Sat Gur Nur at present give 487/1094 as the date of his (Sat Gur Nur) death in Navsari... In fact, this is the date of the death of the Fatimide caliph of Egypt, al Mustansir billah. It is quite possible that for some reason this date became familiar to the local followers of the saint, and was accidently associated with his death'. He adds : 'There is no doubt that Ismaili missionaries were at work in this part of India under the early Fatimids. Quite possible there were also Qarmatian missionaries here before them. But while several graves of such ancient missionaries are still known in Cambay, and still revered by the Bohoras, or the Ismailis preserving the Fatimid tradition, they know

9. W. Ivanow, The Seat of Imam Shah in Gujarat, Journal of Bombay Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society (New Series), September, 1936, pp. 19 ff.

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nothing about Pir Sat Gur Nur. It is quite possible therefore that the grave really may contain the remains of a very ancient Ismaili missionary ; but it is also possible that he came about the time of Imam Shah.'[10]

We are told that Sayyid Muhammad Fadil Shah, being tried of the atmosphere of hatred, enmity and intrigues at Pirana, 'tried to settle in Navsari, at the shrine of Sat Gur Nur, but was unsuccessful in this, and returned to Ahmedabad.[11] This was sometime about 1728. The latest date for the shrine at Navsari, therefore, is the close of the 17th century. One interesting fact about the guardians of Sayyid Sadat is that they are Sunni. The author of *Tarikhi Burhanpur* records that 'Muhammad Shahi Dula, and his sons and grandsons are all good Sunnis.'[12] The guardians of Navsari shrine has thus link with the Burhanpuri *pir* Muhammad Shahi Dula became a *pir* of the Imam-Shahis, at the age of 12, on the death of his father, Sayyid Muhammad Hashim, in 1636. Again, the staunch Satpanthis in Navsari taluka at present are the Aththiyas. The term *Aththiyas* came to be applied officially for the first time to the followers of the sect during the Imamship of Muhammad Shahi Dula. This is another link of the Matiyas in Navsari with the Imam Shahi missionary in Burhanpur in the 17th century. Earlier a missionary of the sect, Sayyid Khan, who is said to have composed a treatise in Gujarati ; 'Treasure of the Mysteries of Religious Knowledge', had visited 'Surat, Burhanpur, and the towns of the Deccan and Karnatak' and converted Hindus by thousands. After his death in 1572, 'the members of the *jamaat* decided to postpone swearing allegiance (bayat) to (his son) Sayyid Abu Ali Hashim Muhammad Salih, until the representatives of all castes converted by him, "from far and near," came together.' He was finally accepted and his son Abu Muhammad Hashim became all powerful at Pirana. One can say from this record that the heads of the shrine at Pirana, finding their position shaky there, had proceeded to South Gujarat, thus providing foothold to the sect since the latter half of the 16th century, but the sect gained its strength in South Gujarat in the forties of the 17th century only.

We are told that there was a further division of the community into the Satiyas who were the followers of Muhammad Shah Daula's

10. Ibid., p. 60.
11. Ibid., p. 57.
12. Ibid., pp. 51, 48, 46.

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son. Bal Muhammad, and the Panchiyas, followers of Meghaji Karbhari, the coachmen of Raji Tahira, the wife of his eldest son Shahji Miran Shawai. These Satiyas and Panchiyas are more often known as Matiyas ; they are not known to call them Satpanthis nor do they visit the temple as the Aththiyas do. Aththiyas form an endogamous group and are not prepared to have marital relations with the two other groups. It is these groups who mainly pledged their loyalty to the shrine at Navsari and honoured its guardian as their spiritual head.

It is possible that Sadruddin may have relied upon some traditional historical record but he has not indicated his sources. In *Tarikhi Burhanpur*, it is stated that Muhammad Sadruddin, the son and successor of Shamsuddin Muhammad, went to Navsari, near Surat, in Gujarat. His son, Sayyid Kabir(uddin) Hasan belonged to the Suhrawardi affiliation of the Sufis and died in Uchh in 1491. His youngest son, Shah Imamuddin, went to preach Islam in Gujarat and converted a large number of Hindus. Let us turn to the history of the sect as reconstructed by Ivanow, to ascertain the validity of this historical record. Ivanow starts by saying that 'The dates in the history of the sect usually are very unreliable, confusing, and contradictory.'[13] With this limitation he begins the history of Immam Shahi : The Shia missionaries of the Nizari or Persian Ismailism appeared in the Punjab and Sindh in the beginning of the 14th century, probably soon after the fall of the stronghold at Alamaat in 1256. The great saint of Multan, Shamsuddin Muhammad, popularly known as Shamsi Tabriz, abdicated his Immamship in favour of his son and came to the Punjab in 1310 A.D. His third descendant *pir* Shihabuddin was most probably the founder of the sect. The third great *pir* in the line was Abu Qalandar Hasan Kabiruddin who is supposed to have moved south and settled in Bhawalpur State where he died in 1449. A son born to him there probably in 1449-52, Imam Shah, moved to Gujarat where Muslim power was consolidated under a Muslim dynasty, in 1461 and settled at Pirana, near the village Giramath, situated about nine miles from Ahmedabad, three miles off the Cambay road. The Muslim ruler, Muhammad Begra (1458-1511) helped the missionary in his task of converting the Hindus to this new religion. Further the new religion made the conversion easy for the Hindus by allowing them to live as Hindus if necessary while assimilating certain beliefs and practices of Islam. Imam Shah was confirmed as a represenative of Nizari

13. Ibid., p. 35.

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Ismailis and he continued to share with the parent sect the religious tax, *dasondh*, collected from the followers here. But his son Nur Muhammad appears to have severed his connection with the parent sect in Persia sometime about the first quarter of the 16th century. The relaxing attitude of Imam Shahi and this breach with the Nizari Ismailis were resisted by the staunch followers of Satpanth and they branched off as a separate sect and deviated more and more to the beliefs and practices of Islam. They are the ancestors of the modern Khojas. The Satpanthis, on the other hand, are never considered good Muslims by Muslims ; the Satpanthis themselves acknowledge no affiliation to Islam ; nay, they would protest if they are said to be Muslims. Unfortunately they are not looked upon as true Hindus by the Hindu though they consider themselves better than the Hindus, as they have discovered the 'true religion.'

It is evident that while Ivanow recognises Sadruddin as the founder of the sect he does not accept his trip to Gujarat. The first to come to Gujarat, according to him, was Imam Shah. The Aththiyas also recognise Imam Shah as the founder of Satpanth and look upon Pirana as their place of pilgrimage. They still respect the authority in charge of the shrine there as their spiritual head and pay their *dasondh* to the *Kaka*.[14] The penetration of this sect into Gujarat cannot therefore be dated earlier than the latter half of the 15th century. We know even from Kshitis Mohan Sen that the first Sufi to carry on spiritual activities in India was Makhdum Sayyid Ali al Hujwiri who settled in Lahore and died there in 1071. Another eminent Sufi, Khwaja Muinuddin Chisti who came to Delhi in 1193, moved to Ajmer, Delhi being unsuitable for his work, where he died in 1236. He did convert Hindus who remained neither orthodox Hindus nor orthodox Muslims. The converted Brahmins—Hussaini Brahmins—accepted such Mohammadan ideas and practices as did not clash with their Hindu belief, customs and rituals. But the

14. Headmen appointed from among the converts were called *Kaka*. Their duty was 'to instruct those who were not strong in the religion, to settle their disputes, and, the most important, to collect the religious taxes, which he had to forward to the *pir*.' The *Kakas* thus 'played an important part as go-betweens, bringing about mutual understanding between the missionaries and their converts.' Ibid., p. 38. Later on Nur Muhammad appointed a *Kaka* to supervise the property of the shrine and distribute its income judiciously to various claimants. In course of time the *Kakas* became all powerful de facto King makers and rulers of the shrine though de jure they are the servants of the *pir* of the shrine.

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activities of these early Sufis do not reach Gujarat. It was Barhamuddin Qutab-i-Alam of the Suhrawardi sect in India who came to Gujarat and died in Batawa in 1453. His son, Shah Alam too seems to have confined his preachings to Ahmedabad.[15] We saw that in *Tarikhi Burhanpur* Sayyid Kabiruddin Hasan is said to belong to the Suhrawardi sect of Sufis. His date given in the *Tarikhi* cannot therefore be accepted.

Some persons of the Kazi family in Navsari told the present author that Hazrat Shah Fazarulla, their ancestor came to Navsari from Joanpur in Lucknow in 1301 A.D. (700 A.D. Hijra) and settled near the Bagalia tank on the site where stands today the old secretariat of the Gackwar, *Juna thana*. He is associated by them with the Jumma Musjid in the town but the local Muslim community has challenged this claim in a legal suit, the Musjid being the work of the Muslim conquerours of the 13th and 14th centuries. Another saint Makhdum Nasu-riddin came in 1422 A.D. (825 A.D. Hijra) and settled near the Sarbatia tank. He exercised far reaching influence on the people of the town. A mosque with a vast tract of land as its property, adjoining the shrine of which Sadruddin speaks, is known as the mosque of Makhdum Sahib. The area from Sarbatia tank to Charpul is known after the saint as Makhdumpara. No sufi is known either from Sen's account or this local tradition to have visited Navsari in the 12th century, the period assigned to Sat Gur Nur by Sadruddin.

The two deviant groups show varying degrees of impact of Islam and different modes of integration of the Islamic beliefs and practices in their old Vaishnavite religion. What is striking is the fact that while the Leva Patidars who are still Vaishnav are indifferent in their observance of the Vaishnava rules of conduct, these deviant groups are strict in their observance of this code. It is only when one begins to analyse their Islam-oriented religious life in the background of this historical perspective that it becomes more intelligible and less mysterious.

An orthodox Vaishnav does not accept food or water touched by other person, including a number of his family, who does not strictly observe *marjad*. The Udas are equally fastidious in their observance of the rules of pollution and purification. The present author has seen the Uda Patidar coming to Navsari with a *loti* and cotton-string in his bag and drawing water himself from the well to

15. K. M. Sen, pp. 11 ff.

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quench thirst. If they could not accept water from a non-Uda, how can one think of acceptance of food, even if cooked in ghee? Strange it may seem that even for a caste dinner where more than a thousand persons dined, a Brahmin cook was not engaged, but they themselves cooked and served. They would never use even utensils used by any one other than a member of their caste. Even the flour required in the preparation of dishes was ground by them. The Patidar who was gone abroad had to go to the *bavaji* of Surat temple on his return to India and go through the initiation once again at his hand. He was admitted to the caste dinner only thereafter. The initiation rite served the purpose of *prayascitta*, purificatory rite, which could not be enjoined in this sect which dispensed with rituals.

Such strict rules of pollution and purification are also observed by the other deviant group, the Satpanthis. The Satpanthi is supposed to leave his bed at about 4 a.m. He is considered impure before bath and therefore does not touch his cloth. Answering the call of nature is also considered an act entailing impurity and as such bath is enjoined after it. Even urination requires purification by washing the hands with earth and water. A Satpanthi therefore takes bath after his morning duties, puts on clothes washed the day before and goes to the temple for prayers in this purified state. This is exactly the code of conduct enjoined for a Vaishnav.

This Vaishnavite zeal for purity and purification among the Satpanthis is seen here, there and everywhere. To illustrate it one may refer to their attitude towards a woman in her impurity or to an eclipse. A woman in menstruation is not allowed to touch anything and anybody. A woman in confinement has to observe strict rules of purity for at least 20 days. None would accept water from her for 40 days. On the expiry of 40 days she is purified by a mantra and then allowed to enter the kitchen. Impurity during the course of menstraction or the period of confinement is observed still by the Hindus except the few educated ; the Satpanthis in consonance with their strictness for purity, observe them more scrupulously. Similarly an eclipse is considered by the Hindus to entail impurity which is washed off by a bath at the end of it. The Vaishnavas are more fastidious in this respect. Staunch Vaishnavas abstain from food for twelve hours or even more before the onset of eclipse. During the period of an eclipse they get together in the temple and pass the period singing *bhajans* in front of the deity. At the end of the eclipse the temple is completely washed. The Satpanthis also sing *bhajans*

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during the period of an eclipse ; only in consonance with their idea of purity necessary before prayers, they take bath before and not after the eclipse.

Besides this important attribute of the Vaishnavism of Vallabha *sampradaya* there are a host of other things in the life of the Uda Patidars which compare very favourably with the religious life and practices enjoyed by Vaishnavism. The practice of initiating a child soon after his birth—known as *kanthi bandhavi*, with a tulsi rosary has a familiar ring of Vaishnav mode of initiation. The Vaishnavas after their morning bath, put a *tilak* mark on the forehead and on various parts of the body, popularly called *chhapa tilak*, generally with vermilion. The Udas similarly have *chhapa tilak*, though their form is not on the Vaishnav line, with *gopichandan*, the earth known to the Vaishnavas also. In a Vaishnava home food is served to the deity before the members of the family dine. The Uda Patidars do the same mentally as they do not worship any deity.

The Udas get up in the early morning and recite, on leaving the bed, *prabhatiyas* and *mangalaarti*. The word *mangala arti* one hears in the Vaishnav temple. So is the word '*Vadhai*' or the *padas* songs, sung to welcome the birth of a god or the guru or the advent of a new season ; the Udas have also their *bhajans* for *Vadhai*. The *padas* of the Vaishnavas and the *bhajans* of the Udas sung after the fifth day of the bright half of Maha (February) up to the Holi (February-March) are called *fag*. The *bhajans* which the Patidars sing at *mangala arti* and throughout the day are composed in various *ragas* —bilaval, asavari, etc.—the ragas in which one so commonly hears the *padas* in a Vaishnav Haveli. An interesting similarity between the Uda Patidars and the Vaishnavas is found in the practice of *hindola*. The deity in the Vaishnav temple is placed on a swing every evening for about a month, from the fourth day of the dark half of the month of Asadha (July). The Uda Patidars sing songs of *hindola* for about a month from the third day of Sravana (i.e. fifteen days later), which they call *kevada tij* or *bhakta tij*. On the first day they meet at one place for these *bhajans*. In the Vaishnav Haveli four *jayantis*—Ram Jayanti, Nrsimha Jayanti, Krishna Jayanti and Vaman Jayanti—are celebrated. The Udas appear to celebrate all these *jayantis*. Every Bhakta Patidar rears *tulsi*, basil plant, in his house. *Tulsi* is looked upon as the wife of Krsna and in Vaishnav temples every year. Krsna's marriage with *tulsi* is celebrated on the eleventh day of the first half of Kartak (November).

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There is no temple in a village. The worship is offered in the home. In every house there is what they call a *gadi* in front of which the individual sits and sings devotional songs ordained for different periods of the day and for different occasions. On a *jayanti* day or such important occasions they meet in the house of a man, who is considered most pious in the village, and sing songs there. The man is respected as *bavaji* on the occasion. One can see even in this worship of the *gadi* a close resemblance to the Vaishnav mode of paying worship to the *guru*. There are at a number of places *bethak* where the founder of the *sampradaya*, Vallabhacharya, or his son or his eminent descendants are known to have rested during their itinerary for preaching the religion. In temples which were later on built on these sites worship of the *gadi* which represents that particular *guru*, takes place more in the fashion of the worship of the idol in the Haveli.

Both the Udas and the Satpanthis have assimilated certain traits of Islam but the scope and nature of this integration differs widely. Islam condemns idolatory ; it is iconoclast. Both the sects have apparently despensed with idol worship, yet their faith in it is quite evident, more so in the case of the Satpanthis. This is natural because the followers of Imam Shah were never asked to give up their Hindi practices.

All members of the community in the village gather together in the temple and sing songs in company with the accompaniment of *kirtans*, cymbals. There is no idol in the temple. A *kalasa* full of water is placed on a raised platform and Hindu gods—Brahma, Visnu, Mahes, Sakti and Vasundhara are invoked to pervade the water. Worship is then offered to the deities so installed, with flowers, scents, camphor and kesar. At the end of the worship devotees sip the water and take *prasada* i.e., partake of the food offered to the deity. The worship is performed by the Bhagat. A member of the community who lives a strict life of restraint in consonance with the inhibitions and taboos enjoined as morals by the religion and who is not much interested in the routine affairs of the society is selected for this office. He does not accept water from anybody, much less can be accept anybody's food. Imbued with piety he remains fastidious in following the rules of purity. He is consequently a proper person to prepare food offered to the deity. Members of the community who desire to serve food to the deity especially on such an occasion as sraddha in the family, can not prepare it in their own home even though they observe strictly the rules of purity. They

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have to send the raw material in the temple where it is cooked by the Bhagat and served to deity on their behalf. One can see here once again a very strong impress of Vaishnav *marjad*. Congregation of the devotees for prayers found among both the Udas and the Satpanthis though not unknown among the Vaishnavas, is markedly an Islamic trait. It does not necessarily mean that this is imported from Islam, but it would not be wrong to find in it the first impress of Islam.

The Uda's mode of worship, as we have seen, is more symbolic than that of the Satpanthis. They also show greater leanings to Islam in this connection. They worship the book which is placed on the *gadi*, though I did not find this practice when I recently visited an orthodox aged Uda. But the old man vouchsafed that the tendency to place some photo, probably of Kabir, behind the *gadi*, if not on it, is recently evident. The Udas must have some inner urge for idol worship ; it will be otherwise difficult to explain the recent acceptance by a prominent section in the community the Agas dharma.

This Sanatana Jain dharma, the Jain religion in its pristine glory, was founded by Shrimad Rajchandra whom Gandhiji mentions with admiration in his autobiography. At the age of seven he became *satavadhani* and knew his former life. He carried on trade till he was twenty-three to pay off the debts he had incurred in his previous life. He then retired from active life for a year and then preached this religion of abstinence from seven *Vaishnavas*, incorrigible habits, and prescribed seven *abhakshvas*, things avoided as food. In the temples built, at Dhaman and Salodra, a big human size photo of Shrimad Rajendra is placed and the followers read books of his philsophy in company sitting in front of it. As a form of worship they take *arti* over this photo. 'Arti is a kind of group-prayer to the accompaniment of the waving of light, which is a well-known item in the complex system of worship of orthodox Hinduism.' The worship is not confined to the temple but is carried into every home. The headquarters of this sect being at Agosa on Auond—Cambay line, it is popularly known as Agaso dharma.

Though the Satpanthis have not discarded worship of a deity in the temple, they have integrated many other known traits of Islam in their religion. They offer worship six times a day—before sun rise, at twelve in the after noon, at three after the midday, at the time of sunset and at nine and twelve in the night. People wash their hands and feet in the temple before reciting their prayers. Their rosary

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for reciting prayers consists of 37 beads and reciting prayers three times over the rosary constitutes one full prayer. (The rosary among the Vaishnavas consists of 108 beads). Fast is observed for one month from the second day of Phalgun (March) to the first day of Chaitra. The month of the fast however changes after every three years when it is placed a month ahead. That is to say, in the next cycle after three years it will begin on the second day of Maha (February) and end on the first day of Phalgun. Their shifting their month of fast one month ahead every three years reflects an attempt to adjust the Hindu calendar to the Muslim calendar. Similarly, even when they apparently follow the Hindu calendar, they interpret it in Muslim manner. As in evident they begin the month, as the Muslims do, with the second day of the Hindu month and not with the first day in the manner of the Hindus. The second day of the month on which the moon appears is considered a semi-religious day by the Satpanthis, on which fast is observed for 24 hours. If the day falls on Friday, it assumes greater significance and the fast is observed for eight days. When the fast is for a single day, no food or water is taken once at the expiry of 24 hours. It would be evident that these observances are more Islamic than Hindu and they are integrated in the new religion without compunction.

Every Satpanthi is enjoined to set apart one-tenth of his income, *dasondh*, for the religious head. The amount may not be necessarily one-tenth of the income. *Zakat* in Islam signifies that every Muslim should spend about 2.5 per cent of his total asset in charities for his kin, the poor or an orphan in the community. In Satpanth, the payment, however, is made to the head of the sect at Girmatha. The head is also entitled to receive from his followers other contributions such as the money placed by a person at the time of the prayer on the dais on which the *kalas* is placed. This again is a Hindu practice ; you cannot go empty-handed to a god or the guru and a coin is usually placed before a deity when a person goes for *darsana*, the sight of the god. At the time of his death the Satpanthi has to confess all his sins of commission and ommission and in order to be free from these sins money-penalty can be paid. The fine thus paid willingly goes to the head. After the death of a person, all the members of the family meet together in the temple at twelve in the night on the following Monday and Friday, and perform the rites in his honour. This rite is known as *uthamana*, the word used by both the Hindu ahd the Parsis for the post-funeral rite. Among the Hindus it is performed on the same day immediately after returning from the cremation ground. All the relatives attend

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it and the members of the caste and friends participate in it by visiting the bereaved family for consolation in the evening. Among the Parsis it is customary to pay a token amount in charity at this meeting. The Hindus perform the main rites on the tenth, eleventh and the twelth day of the death. On the thirteenth day a cot with a bed and all its paraphernalia thereon is handed over to a Brahmin along with some money or a gold ornament. This gift is known as *sajja*, a derogated form of the Sanskrit word *sayya*, a bed. This has its religious (in as much as it conduces to the happines of the dead in his new home) as well as a social value (for the giver as an indication of his social status). The Satpanthis also perform this *sajja* rite and send the money equivalent to the head at Girmatha. The two distinct rites of the Hindus in honour of the dead are mixed up in a single rite, though the terms referring to these rites are retained. Hindu beliefs are thus utilised to the advantage of the religious head of the community to augment his sources of income. The Satpanthis likewise continue to believe in the performance of *sraddha*; but instead of celebrating it individually in the home, it is partially made a group function. On the day of the *sraddha* of a person, his family members send to the temple materials for the deity's dishes on that day. The food is shared after the prayer as *prasada* by all the members of the congregation.

In short, not only some of the Islamic beliefs are incorporate in this religion, but even Hindu beliefs have been given a new orientation compatible with the new environ in which the old beliefs are set. The hard Hindu crust is still perceptible and rigidly maintained by the converts to this religion who believe themselves to be the followers of purified Hinduism, the true Hindu religion. And their claim is not entirely unfounded if their taboos and insistence on purity are viewed on the background of the shastric traditions. Islam could not adversely affect the deep-rooted traditional culture and that is why we find merely a juxtaposition of the Muslim and the Hindu practices and not the belonging of the two into a new religion.

We have all along maintained that in the strictness for purity the deviants came very close to the followers of the Vallah School of Vaishnavism. It may be contended that the emphasis on purity and observance of certain periods of impurity are characteristics of the Hindus as a whole, and not of the Vallabhite Vaishnavas only. Similarly, avoidance of such food as onion, garlic, etc.—and the Satpanthis taboo even asaphoitida—is practised by many Hindu castes outside the halo of Vallabha Vaishnavism. Admitting this to be

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true, it should be accepted that it is only in the Vallabh *sampradaya* that the concept of impurity by mere touch of a thing has become a hallmark of its religious dogma. Again, a marked influence of a Vallabh *sampradaya* is evident in Gujarat as a whole, and in south Gujarat much earlier than either of these sects and it is consequently pertinent to view the religious life of the deviant groups on the cultural background of the parent community.

The Aryasamaj movement of Swami Dayanand Sarasvati reached Surat district in the wake of the present century. Bhupatrai Jamiyatram Shastri, Principal of the Premchand Raichand Primary Teachers' Training College at Ahmedabad, was a staunch Aryasamajist and powerfully influenced his pupils. The seed was thus sown and it took roots in the district when the preachers of the movement like Pandit Govindram and Mahatma Munsiram, with the co-operation of the local stalwart like Kumvarjibhai of Surat, Gulabhai Raghunathji Desai of Chikhli, Krishnaram Pandit of Kharsad and Madhavbhai of Supa strove hard for its spread among the masses in the early part of this century. Even a Bhakta Patidar of Bajipura in Bardoli district, Bhaktibhai Durlabhbhai by name, became a staunch follower of Aryasamaj, so much so that he donated 200 vighas of land valued at Rs. 1,00,000 for starting a *gurukula*, ashram school, at Supa in Navsari taluka. The Patidar community as a whole was, against this new inroad into its religious belief and more so the Bhaktas. The Aryasamaj had a common meeting ground with the Bhakta Patidars, namely, both did not believe in idol-worship. At the same time the strict commensal taboos of the Bhaktas were condemned by the Aryasamaj and the ritual of Aryasamaj, *homa*, etc. had no place in the religion of the Udas which was conspicuously against *karmakanda*, rituals. The Patidars did not take fondly to the new religion, but expressed its indignation towards it by threatening those who were initiated into it with excommunication in 1916-17. Persons were forced to remove their sacred thread and revert back to their old fold. In spite of such a protest against this new movement, the community had to connive at its acceptance by leading persons. Members who met, when Makanji Sola was initiated into it in 1917-18, at his place to ask him to remove the sacred thread were won over to solemnise it. And similarly when Bhaktibhai among the Bhaktas accepted it the event had to be treated with indifference.

The Satyagraha movement was received by this time launched by Gandhiji and his message was received by the Patidars of the dist-

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rict through Kalyanji Mehta and the Patidar Ashram at Surat founded by him in 1911. The Patidars in general took to Khadi and his programme of Harijan uplift. The Bhaktashram at Navsari run by the Bhakta Patidars was thrown open to all Hindu students including the Harijans. This was indeed a revolutionary measure for the Bhakta Patidars who were even then so strict about their commensal taboos that a Patidar of Bajipara was fined for taking tea at the house of a Bania, which is acknowledged to be a caste higher than the Patidar.

The younger generation of the Matiyas has almost completely shed off all the traits which their ancestors accepted from Islam. This is due to the fact that their faith in their spiritual head of the shrine of Sayyid Sadat, and consequently in the shrine of itself, has considerably declined during the last 30 years. This decline in religious faith came to be further accentuated by another fact. In the last decade of the last century some Matiyas left India for Africa in search of employment. It was easy for them to go because the ban imposed on sea travel on the Hindus did not operate in their case. Initially they worked hard as unskilled labour or a hawker but in course of time they settled down as traders and prospered. The magnanimous donations these Matiyas made to the *dargah* of Sayyid Sadat—silver doors of the musoleum and silver covering of the tomb, *dharmashala* attached to the *dargah*, a big hall studded with marbles—and to their spiritual head helped to add to the prestige and prosperity of both. The influence of the new environment in the foreign land made the younger generation more rational and specific about their faith. The accumulation of wealth has urged them to aspire for a new status and leadership in their own home villages. They therefore desire to be recognised and treated as Hindus and be a part and parcel of that community. There is a spate of temple-construction in Matiya villages. Generally the idol of Rama is installed in these temples. In some villages more than one idol and even a bust or a statue of Gandhiji are found. In some places Brahmins are employed as *pujaris* in these temples and some even go to the extent of engaging Brahmins as priests to conduct marriage and other rites. They do respect the wishes of their old father or guardian to bury him and tombs are found in the fields of the Matiyas, particularly in Bardoli taluka. But they practise cremation. With this change in attitude they, except perhaps the old staunch Matiyas, are reluctant to admit that they followed any Muslim practice at any stage, except burial in place of cremation which is

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the avowed Hindu practice, and the recognition of the head of the shrine of the Sayyid Sadat (Mir Pyare Sahib since 25-9-1901) as their *guru* who had to be invited on the occasion of marriage in the community. They are also the staunch followers of Ghandhiji and the satyagrah movement influenced the Matiyas as much as it did the Udas.

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CHAPTER XIV

The Traditional Theory of Caste

—S. P. Nagendra

Modern sociological theory regards the caste system as a variant of the ascriptive system of stratification in which the allocation of role and status is governed by non-rationnl principles such as age, kinship, birth etc. Not much, however, is known about the actual mode of the working of these principles, but the assumption behind the view seems to be that caste system is anything but a normal form of social organisation. The traditional theory or what is disdainfully called the Hindu theory of caste, is a radical anti-thesis of this view ; it considers the system as a model of just and healthy society in which the distribution of privileges and responsibilities is based on the law of ones' nature. According to this theory, then, the caste system is the most truly natural or normal form of social stratification. If must be remarked at the very outset that the theory like all traditional doctrines is an enunciation of certain metaphysical principles which cannot be justified on sociological grounds. In what follows no attempt will, therefore, be made to prove the theory ; our aim, instead, will be to show that it is based on the consistency procedure and requires no additional proofs for its validation.

The texture of the theory is made up of number of principles, all penetrating into one another and centering round the supreme principle of what the Hindus call dharma.

Dharma is a difficult word to define. The root 'dhri' (sans) from which it is derived means 'to hold', 'to sustain', 'to support', 'to keep'. Following this meaning. Dr. Bhagwan Das has offered definition of the term which considering its extremely subtle and indeterminate nature, is perhaps the best ever attempted. It is as follows :—

'That which holds a thing together, makes it what it is, prevents it from breaking up and changing it into something else, its characteristic function, its peculiar property, its fundamental attribute, its essential nature, is its dharma, the law of its being primarily. That which makes the world process what it is, holds its parts to-

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gether as one whole in a breakless all binding chain of cause and effect is the law of nature or nature's god, dharma, in the largest sense the world order. That scheme or code of laws which binds together human beings in the bonds of mutual rights and duties, of causes and consequences of actions arising out of their temperamental characters in relation to each other and thus maintains society is human law Manava dharma.'[1]

The definition makes it clear that dharma is the principle of being par excellence ; viewed from the microcosmic standpoint it is the law of one's nature ; viewed from the macrocosmic standpoint it is nature's law or the law of cosmic being. Now, to say that the caste system is based on the law of one's nature is actually to say that it is based on dharma. In a dharmic system each individual will exist in his naturally ordained place or in other words the allocation of privileges and responsibilities in a dharmic system will be determined by the specific requirements of each individual's nature. It will, that is to say, be a fixed or more appropriately 'an irrevocable' system of stratification. But it must be borne in mind that every fixed order of relationships would not constitute a dharmic system. The latter must be understood as a metaphysically determined system and in this sense distinguished from a logically closed homoestatic system in which the position of each part is determined by the structural requirements of the system as much and in which no part is supposed to share the existence of other parts or to exist independently of its relationship with the whole. In a metaphysically determined system the part whole relationship assumes a different significance. Hence the part is consubstantial with the whole, which means that the former does not derive its existence from its relationship with the latter even though in certain respects it may be subordinate to it. The nearest example of a dharmic or metaphysically determined system is a hierarchy (GK hieros=sacred+arkho=rule) a ritually closed system of stratification within which the position of each individual is ritually fixed, predetermined that is to say. In distinguishing between a dharmic and homoestatic system, we are not reiterating, however, the sociological distinction between atonism and holism ; the latter distinction, we maintain, is based on a reductionist fallacy. Nor do we intend to suggest that the dharmic system is a model of the psycho-social world and the homoestatic system a model of the biophysical world. The dichotomy of nature and man is also based on a wrong ontology. Both man and nature are included within the unity of the dharmic system ;

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they do not represent two disparate realms of determination and freedom but are two different though consubstantial levels of being. In fact on the metaphysical level of reference there can be no opposition between determination and freedom ; they would both appear as aspects of Manava dharma. In conforming to the law of one's nature man is essentially asserting his freedom and in asserting his freedom he is essentially sacrificing it. More about this point later on.

If a dharmic system is a natural system, it follows that a dharmic system is also a normal system because in their essential meaning nature and norm are identical terms. What we have to demonstrate now, is that a dharmic system is bound to assume a caste like form. Let us see what the term caste actually represents. Of all the definitions of the concept, the one which seems most appropriate is that given by Rene Guenon. He says 'Caste which the Hiudus describe indifferently by one or other of the two words Jati and Varna is a social function determined by the particular nature of each human being.'[2] Though somewhat unusual, the definition is nevertheless in perfect accord with the orthodox view on the nature of caste. According to the Gita, for instance, the functions of each of the four castes are born of their nature (swabhava). 'The functions of the Brahman, Kshatriya, Vaishya and Shudras, O Parantap have been allocated according to the qualities born of their nature.'[3] The suggestion implicit in this statement is that the caste system is a naturally determined organisation of social functions. And this is also the implication of Rene Guenon's definition. We have been using the term 'nature' over and over again without saying anything about its actual connotation. The term ordinarily refers to the sum total of habits and despositions acquired by man in the course of his adjustment with the external environment. At least this is what it means in current psychological usage. But it is essentially a metaphysical concept : its meaning cannot be determined in psychological terms. The 'nature' of a thing is its essential attribute, characteristic property—that which makes the thing what it is. One of the implications of this statement is that the nature of a thing is something 'given' to it, something which it has not acquired but got readymade.

In terms of the above meaning of the concept a naturally determined organisation of functions can be interpreted to mean a 'given' or 'unalterable' system of functional differentiation, a system to be taken for granted. And this precisely is the point that the traditional theory of caste aims to emphasis. If there is any unmistakable thread of identity running through the diverse versions of the theory, it is

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that the caste system is not a man made order but a primordial model of social organisation within which to quote Coomaraswamy 'every one shall be enabled to become and by no misdirection prevented from becoming what he has in him to become.'[4]

It would seem that we have been arguing in a circle ; the statements that we have made about the traditional theory are all tautological. But if this is any shortcoming of our exposition, it is inherent in the theory itself. It can be expressed either in tautological statements or in the hortatory language of the myth. There are thus two principle versions of the theory : Metaphysical and mythical. But since it was primarily addressed to the faithful, in the traditionally available accounts of the theory, the mythical version stands in sharper relief than the metaphysical. We shall soon return to the Purusha Sukta and other myths concerning the origin of caste. But before we do so, we must show the relationship between the model of the caste system and its concretely, existing form. The question that we have to examine in this connection is : How can a natural model of human society assume the form of a social stratification based on birth and ritual ? We said above that the nature of a thing is its 'characteristic property.' From this it would follow that human nature consists of qualities which are exclusively man's own, which, in other words, make for the humanness of man. According to the Hindu view the swabhava (nature) of an individual comprises two sets of qualities : gotrika and namika.[5] Gotrika refers to those qualities and despositions which the individual inherits from his gotra or lineage ; these he shares with all the members of his family. But besides these hereditary qualities, there are certain other attributes of his nature which are specifically his own ; which he does not share with any other member of his family, but which rather mark him off from the other member of his family. Of any two brothers for instance who have inherited the same set of gotrika qualities, one may be a prodigy, while the other may be a fool. These unique qualities of the individual are what individual names are meant to express. They have been, accordingly, called namika. Thus the metaphysical concept of swabhava or nature becomes the principle of birth and ascription on the sociological plane. But it must be borne in mind that Jati comprises both gotrika and namic qualities. It would be a mistake to think as many sociologists do, that it simply refers to biological birth or hereditary qualities. The latter is only an index and a very sure index at that, of one's swabhava, the tendencies and qualities that

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will be manifested in the course of one's existence and that will entitle him to a role in society. This explains the significance of the statement that everyone is a shudra by birth ; one becomes a dwija (twice-born) by virtue of samskaras (ritual training).[6] In order to eliminate the possibility of a misdirection by which an individual might be prevented from developing his individuality, the Hindu society had devised a well planned system of ritual training aimed at perfecting his natural abilities. Both the so-called elements of 'nature' and 'nurture' are thus included within the meaning of the Jati concept. But 'nature' in this context does not mean biological upbringing ; it refers, instead, to ritual training or transformation.

The Indian caste system (Jati Vyavastha) then, with its characteristic emphasis on hereditary occupation and ritual observance is the nearest approximation to the model of natural social hierarchy. But as is well known the caste system is a four-fold hierarchy with each hierarchical division comprising innumerable sub-castes. There are some other features of the system also : endogamy, restricted commensality and connubium, for instance. In the traditional theory there is no direct reference to these features ; the theory only suggests that there can be four main types of swabhavas and four types of functions corresponding to these swabhavas. But if the theory is based on a normal view of life, then it should be possible to show that human nature would normally tend to be differentiated into four forms and human action likewise would tend to be organised into four principal types. Again if the Indian caste system is the nearest approximation to the Chaturvarnya model of the Gita and other traditional sources, then it should also be possible to deduce the general features of the caste system from its basic principles. Let us see if it is possible to do so. The natural tendency of functions, in every social system normally organised, would be to divide into two fundamental categories : ordinary and extra-ordinary. Functions which require no special skills for their performance will fall into the former category, while those requiring highly specialised knowledge and training for their execution will fall into the latter. The extra-ordinary functions would again tend to be differentiated into three main types : technic-economic, political-legal and cultural-religious. A logical analysis of the concept of action would readily suggest this typology. Such an analysis, for obvious reasons, cannot be attempted here. It would suffice to say that action will generally have three principal modes of orientation : end-oriented, means-oriented and agent-oriented. There may be one more mode of orientation : situational, but since it cannot assume any meaningful form, we can

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easily exclude it from the category of action. The organisational form of agent-oriented action, we call cultural-religious, that of end-oriented action political-legal and that of means-oriented action, technic-economic. It can also be shown that these three types of actions will inevitably tend to be organised in a hierarchy, that is, a natural order of super and sub-ordination. The cultural-religious by virtue of being oriented to the agent (the ultimate end of life) will be the superior most action and occupy the top position in the hierarchy. The technic-economic-action by virtue of its mode of orientation will be inferior to both cultural-religious and political-legal actions will be placed, lower to them. But the ordinary actions will have to be placed lower still in the hierarchy just because they are ordinary. This four-fold organisation of functions has very close resemblance with the natural division of Karmas as suggested in the Gita. The cultural-religious function belongs to the Brahmans who constitute the spiritual and intellectual authority. The political legal comprising the royal, administrative and military functions belongs to the Kshatriyas. The technic-economic including the varied range of technical commercial and economic functions belong 'to the Vaishyas and the ordinary functions which do not require any special skill for their execution belong to the Shudras. The first three classes are, therefore, rightly called dwija (twice-born) for, the dwija is actually the initiated one, he who has undergone an esoteric training. The Shudras were not considered fit for this training for the simple reason that it did not accord with their natural disposition. But it will be wrong to conclude from this that the functions assigned to the Shudras were non the less important than those assigned to the dwijas.

In fact, every society has its dwijas and Shudras, even the secular societies of the modern west, have not been able to despense with the necessity of distinguishing between the ordinary and extra-ordinary spheres of life. The continuing dichotomy of the elite and mass in modern societies only shows how meaningful distinction between dwijas and Shudras.

In a hierarchical organisation based on a clear cut differentiation of functions, restrictions such as those associated with commensality and connubium are bound to exist. Much has been said by western scholars about the origin of these restrictions. But the important point that they have failed to see is that in every society organised on the basis of a bipartite division of life into sacred and profane, there must be a set of rituals aimed at maintaining and preserving

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the discontinuity of the two spheres. If the two spheres are allowed to encroach upon one another the very purpose of their division would be defeated. A number of ritual interdictions exist in primitive societies whose primary object is to realise the state of natural separation between the sacred and profane spheres of life. The commensal and connubial restrictions prevailing in the caste society of India are thus simply an application of the metaphysical principle of differentiation of functions. Their aim is to prevent any undue mixing or confusion of functions and to minimise the chances of an individual deviating from his duties and engaging in pursuits which do not accord with his natural disposition.

In order to demonstrate finally that the Indian caste system is a contingent form of the dharmic model of human society, we must show that it is also consistent with the principle of individual freedom. For as we said above, in the dharmic system, the part though in certain respects subordinate to the whole is yet quite independent of it. On the face of it, the caste system, however, seems a complete negation of the idea of individual freedom ; it does not permit any freedom of choice either in regard to private matters like marriage or public matters like vocation. In what sense then, is it compatible with human freedom ? To answer this question would entail a review of the entire philosophy of life as understood by the Hindu. That will not be possible here. But a few general remarks will be in order. The paramount (param) aim (artha) of life according to the Hindu is the attainment of Moksha. Moksha literally means 'liberation.' Hence the attainment of Moksha, means the liberation of the jiva (life monad) from the chain of actions (karma bandhanat). More positively it means the attainment of a state of pure being (sat) pure consciousness (hit) and pure bliss (ananda) a state of perfect identity between the jiva and Brahman 'wherein all qualifying attributes are transcended, a state of intelligence beyond the pairs of opposites wherein all ideas of separation and variety are effected."[7] Karmabandhan is actually the dynamic counterpart of what we earlier called the principle of metaphysical determination. The paramount aim of life according to the Hindu, then, is the overcoming of this determination. It is a curious paradox of Hindu thought that while man is supposed to be totally governed by the law of karmic determinations, the ultimate end of life is supposed to be freedom from determination. But for all that it is a paradox it is a most meaningful paradox. In the concept of the ultimate end is grounded also the possibility of its attainment. And it is this possibility that constitutes the essential basis of human freedom—

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the freedom to choose to be or not to be. Despite all the limitations of this nature, man is always free to decide whether to shake off the burden of life and enjoy everlasting happiness and freedom or to suffer perpetual pain and bondage under its dead weight. Of the three kinds of karmas, Sancita, Agami and Prarabdha, the force of the first two can always be destroyed by Vidya (genesis). It is only the third, the Prarabdha over which man has absolutely no control. It consists of karmas accumulated in the past which have started showing results. The Sancita are those accumulated karmas which have yet not started bearing fruit but which are sure to bear the fruit if they are not destroyed. The Agami comprise those karmas which are accumulating and which will become seeds of destiny if one were to continue in the path of ignorance (Avidya). It is possible for man to prevent the accumulation of Agami karmas, equally possible it is for him to destroy the potentially of the Sancita karmas, but to undo the Prarabdha is entirely beyond man's power. One cannot change his jati once he is born into it but it is within one's means to escape the cycle of birth and rebirth should one choose to escape it. Now to the extent to which it is possible for man to transcend the law of his nature inspite of being determined by it, he is free even within the frame-works of the karmic law of determination.

So far our discussion has been confined mainly to the metaphysical aspect of the traditional theory. It is time we turned our attention to its mythical aspect. To show the link between the two aspects of the theory, it would be necessary, however to make a few more observations about the concept of Moksha. There are two accepted ways of realising Moksha, the way of renunciation and the way of action, Pravritti[8] Marga and Nirvitti Marga as they are called in the Hindu tradition. The Gita calls them Samkhya Yoga and Karma Yoga respectively. The Samkhya Yoga or the Yoga of Knowledge is the way of total renunciation of action. Accordingly therefore, it is also called Samnyas Yoga. The second too is a way of renunciation but unlike the first it involves no abstention from work but is based, on the contrary, on a complete affirmation of life. It requires everyone to carry out his duties in a spirit of total non-involvement, disregarding completely the consequences thereof, the gains and losses that they will entail. To do one's duties in this spirit of detachment (anasakti) is to do them skilfully and a skilful performance of work is true yoga (yogah karmsu kausalam). This is the essence of Karma Yoga or Nishkarm Karma Yoga as enunciated

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in the Gita. The Nishkarm Karma is also the highest form of sacrifice, for all sacrificial operations according to the Gita are in essence, a sacrifice of desires. Now the emphasis, in the caste system, on everyone sticking to and skilfully executing his natural duties irrespective of whether they are externally good or bad, is a clear indication of the fact that the system has been designed to facilitate each individual's fullest participation in the sacrificial operation through which the ultimate end of life can be realised. Thus what was earlier defined as system based on Dharma would now appear to be a system determined by the requirements of sacrifice. And this brings us direct to the mythical aspect of the theory. There are several myths concerning the origin of caste. In the Vishnu Purana we get the following statements : 'Brahma made this four-fold system for the performance of sacrifice.'[9] And 'when true to his design, Brahma became desirous to create the world, creatures in whom harmony and goodness (sattva) prevailed sprang from his mouth ; others in whom passion (rajas) predominated came from his breast ; others in whom both passion and ignorant darkness (tamas) were strong proceeded from his thighs : others he created from feet whose chief characteristic was ignorant darkness, of there was composed the system of the four varnas, Brahmanas, Kshatriyas, Vaishyas and Shudras, who had respectively issued from his mouth, breast, thighs and feet.'[10] There is a similar statement in the Gita also. It is like this : 'The four-fold system (chaturvarnya) was created by Me according to the division of qualities (gunas) and functions (karmas).'[11] And according to the Purusha Sukta of the Rig Veda 'His mouth became a priest (Brahman), his arm was made a nobleman (Rajanya), his thigh was transformed into a farmer (Vaishya), from his feet sprang the serirb man (Shudra). The moon was produced from his mind, the sun sprang from his eye, air and fire proceeded from his mouth and wind came from his breath. The intermediate region was produced from his navel, the sky from his head, the earth from his feet and space (lit. the quarters of the sky) from his ear ; thus did he frame the world.'[12] The suggestion implicit in all the three myths is that the caste system has created by a super-human agency for the performance of sacrifice. Now anyone familiar with the anagogic nature of the mythical language would agree that there is nothing personal or anthropomorphic about any of three figures occuring in these myths. Brahma, Me and Purusha do not refer to divine persons ; they are rather the archetype of man the maker. 'Creation' and 'sacrifice' likewise should not be taken to mean deeds accomplished by a personal agency. They are on the

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other hand, archetypes of human action. Similarly the relationship of mouth, arms, thighs and feet in the body of the Purusha (Universal or Cosmic man) is the archetype of organic relationship.

All that the above myths seem to suggest is that the caste system is a reproduction of an archetypal model, the chaturvarnya or the natural hierarchy. The Purusha Sukta for instance, which is perhaps the completest Vedic myth of creation clearly suggests that the four-fold varna hierarchy is a reproduction of the Cosmic Man. The implied meaning of the statements in the Gita and the Vishnu Purana is that all works irrespective of whether they belong to the Brahman, or the Kshatriya, the Vaishya or the Shudras, are an imitation of or are born of creation (sacrifice). Understood in anagogic terms sacrifice and creation are identical operations. 'With sacrifice the Lord of Creatures of old created creatures and said 'By this you shall bring forth (fruits and offsprings), let this be your milker of desires. Foster by this the gods and let the gods foster you, fostering each other, you shall attain to the supreme good. Fostered by sacrifice the gods shall give you desired enjoyments ; who enjoys their given enjoyments and has not given to them, he is a thief.'[13] And again 'sacrifice is born from work, work from Brahman, Brahman from Akshara and therefore the all pervading Brahman sarvagatam brahma is established in the sacrifice.'[14] In the Gita thus —not only is sacrifice shown to be identical with 'creation' and 'work', but sacrifice, creation and work are all shown to be consubstantial with Brahman. The archetypal character of the sacrificial operation is further emphasised in the following passage 'Brahman is the offering, Brahman is the material of the offering, by Brahman is material poured into the fire of the Brahman.'[15] There is, however, a close resemblance between the view of sacrifice taken by the Gita and that taken by the Vedic tradition. The Satpatha Brahman thus says 'The sacrifice is the other self of gods . . . therefore the sacrificer having made the sacrifice his other self takes his place in the sky, this heavenly world.'[16]

It is curious that certain castes of south India are still called 'Balija' born of the sacrifice[17] and both in India and Ceylon the position of each caste in the social hierarchy is determined by its part in the sacrifice. Take for instance the barber and the washerman. The barber is ordinarily supposed to be a man who shaves and the washerman likewise a man who washes dirty clothes. But these popular notions about the service castes are true neither in the modern context nor were they true in the traditional context. The

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barber is actually the man who does the ritual shaving and so is the washerman, the man who does the ritual washing. The status of the barber and the washerman in the caste system is determined thus by the respective position of each in the sacrifice. The first holy tonsure (Chaula Karma) which is a ceremony of removing the profane hair from the head of the child is to be done by the barber. This he does in a number of ways, especially by removing the polluted hair from the heads of all the male members of the family. No ceremony in the household will be completed without the part played by the barber. The washerman's role is equally important. Besides washing the polluted clothes—there are several occasions of pollution in the Hindu household but birth and death are the well known ones—, he (strictly speaking the washer woman) offers blessings to the bride at the marriage ceremony for her happy and prosperous conjugal life. At a Tamil wedding the washerman spreads cloth for the bridegroom (who for the time being is god Shiva) to walk upon.[18] And 'in the rear other washerman assisted by barbers sing or howl blessings and praises of which he (the bridegroom) is the subject.'[19] The barber carries the tali or marriage necklace and the cloth called Kurrai for the bride.[20] At funeral the barber the washerman and the drummer are sent for not the musicians. The barber prepares the fire for the cremation and conducts the person who lights the fire three times round the pyre.[21] The barber and the washerman are thus looked upon even till this day as low order priests performing rites which the high order priest cannot touch.

It is clear from what has been said above that there is absolutely no difference between the metaphysical and the mythical aspects of the traditional theory. They are just two ways of stating the same truth. Whether we say that the caste system is a metaphysically determined organisation of social functions or that it is an organisation determined by the requirements of sacrifice we are making substantially the same statement. If the traditional theory does not find favour with modern sociologists—the reason is not that it is intrinsically unsound but that it is wholly out of tune with the prejudices of modern sociology. It is, no doubt, meaningless in the modern context to say that the caste system is a sacrificial organisation. But the fact that despite the increasing secularisation of life in modern India, people have yet not ceased to believe it to be so and tenaciously cling to this belief, is evidence enough that at one time or another the system must have corresponded to a sacrificial organisation

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Part IV

Socio-Cultural Planning and Development : Theoretical Perspective

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CHAPTER XV

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"Economic" Methods for Sociological Problems

—J. Tinbergen

1. The Aims of Development

Every country in the world today is concerned about developing its economy and, more broadly, its society. While sometime ago the aims of the process of development may have been mainly economics ones, it is nowadays generally understood that they by far surpass what is traditionally considered to be of an economic character. In a way it will always be a question of convention where to put the frontiers of economic science. Sometimes the frontiers between the individual sciences are traditional and quite arbitrary. A good example is the frontier between physics and chemistry. Many phenomena in which the forces at work between molecules play a role are considered a physical subject. Usually the forces working between atoms—as parts of molecules—are considered to be a subject of chemistry. But the forces working inside the atoms are again a subject for physics.

Similary it may well be that once we shall discover that it is more natural to shift the frontier between economic subjects and the subjects of some adjacent sciences. Actually it seems to me that we have already shifted the dividing line. Sometime ago it was customary to say that economics deals with problems how to organise the satisfaction of material needs of a population. Today, we include also non-material needs to the extent that their satisfaction require the use of scarce factors of production or scarce goods.

Even if we agree to do so there can be no doubt that quite a few of the aims of development are not subjects of economic science. This is true without the slightest doubt of among these aims we find the improvement of health, of justice—whatever the meaning of that phrase—or freedom in one or more its innumerable meanings. But it also true for some aims on the verge of the economic field such as employment. Moreover there is every reason to ask ourselves whether not more extra-economic aims should be added to our development programs, for example in the purely moral or cultural

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field. Every day we become more concerned, in the developed countries, that with all the increase in wealth that we witness, some moral and cultural values are threatened. Hooliganism and juvenile delinquency or the lack of taste for artistic values are some phenomena leading to that concern. Related to such questions is the one connected with the "creation" of needs. Would it not be more attractive to strive consciously for a style of simplicity in many things, having in mind an old saying that simplicity is a characteristic of the truth ?

However this be, I think it can be stated that most development economists and politicians nowadays agree that the aims of develoment policy should contain serveral extra-economic aims ; for simplicity of speaking let me call them "sociological aims".

2. Opposition against the Use of "Economic Methods"

In discussion between sociologists and economists about the methods to be used in selecting projects for a development program the former repeatedly protest against what they sometimes call "economic methods." It is the intention of this article to discuss the possible meaning of the latter phrase and the justification for such protests.

It is not quite clear what precisely is meant by the words "economic method." In all probability a clear example is method of selecting projects only on the criterion of profitability. Another example is the use instead of the latter criterion of the somewhat more general criterion of the "national income test." This may be a test in which the contribution of any project to national income, per million of capital invested, is taken as the selection criterion. But the concern of some sociologists does not stop here. Even when more general aims are admitted they resent the use of "prices" in the judgement of projects, say a price for the contribution to national income as compared with contribution to health or "justice" or "freedom." More general still, some seem to resent the use of figures at all and maintain that some of the aims cannot be measured and that here is the true character of the things which the economists do not treat in the correct way.

In all honesty it should be added that much an attitude is not restricted to "some sociologists" ; in fact we have known, for a long time, discussions of a similar character between economists, more particularly between those called "literacy economists" and

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those called "mathematical economists.". Moreover the controversy prevails everywhere between those who try to approach a subject in a scientific way and those who deny the possibility or desirability of much an approach. Our remarks in the reminder of this note are by no means new therefore ; they only are an application of an old argument to a new outer appearance of the old controversy. Today, however, so many decisions of practical relevance are influenced by one's attitude in this conflict that it seems worth while to be repetitive.

3. *"Economic" Methods versus General Scientific Methods*

It will be our thesis that what is felt by some sociologists to be typical for "economic" methods in reality is nothing else than a scientific method in a general way and that whoever denies the admissibility of such methods denies the admissibility of using scientific methods.

In order to facilitate the presentation of our argument let us recall the method of appraisal of projects for development nowadays advocated by development economists. For each project a "yield" figure is calculated consisting of a faction. In the numerator of the fraction the value of the contributions to the aims of development policy to be made by the projects is found and in the denominator the value of the scarce factors of any kind that have to be sacrificed for the execution of the execution of the project. Both the numerator consist of several terms, each of them representing the value of one of the contributions to the aims or one of the quantities of scarce factors used. Each of these values is the product of the extent of the contribution or use and of the price attached to it.

What justification can be given for such a procedure and why is this justification not narrowly economic in character but rather of a general scientific character ?

The most general question involved is the use of figures. I think there is no excuse needed for doing so. Whoever takes a decision will base this on a comparison of alternatives, whether consciously or unconsciously. His preference for one alternative over another always implies that he has an ordering in mind which is the only thing our yield figures try to specify. To deny the admissibility to use figures here means to deny the admissibility to take decisions or to have preferences. Without them a policy cannot exist.

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The next question involved is the use of the yield as a fraction. His function is to make it possible to compare projects of different "size"; that is requiring different quantities of scarce factors. It is a practical and natural way of making comparable a variety of projects which differ in size; but it might be replaced by more complicated methods of comparison.

The third question involved is the one of the use of prices. Here again the essence is whether or not we admit that taking a decision implies making a comparison. As soon as plurality of aims is admitted, making a comparison implies attaching relative "importances" or "values" to the attainment of alternative contribuions to these aims and it is a question of words whether such relative values should be called prices or not. It should be made clear here that development economists when speaking of prices do not suggest that these prices should be market prices. In fact there is a difference in character between the prices to be attached to contributions to aims and those to be attached to scarce factors. In principle the economist recognises the policy-maker's autonomy in fixing the former but not in fixing the latter prices. In other words, the relative values attached to aims can be freely chosen by the policy-maker, but those attached to scarce factors cannot. Even the latter are not necessarily market prices, however. The well-known concept of "shadow" or "accounting" prices illustrates the possibility of a deviation between market prices and prices expressing the scarcity of the factors concerned. It is essential, however, that the scarcity prices are dependent on the quantities availably and on the demand made for them by the set of projects chosen. Taking other prices would lead to inconsistencies in the programme, namely the use of more of a certain factor than is actually available. Again we may say that avoiding inconsistencies is a much more general concern than only the economist's one; it is every scientist's concern. But certainly here we are touching a problem which is very typical indeed for the economist's field of thinking. It may be seen as an argument to widen the realm usually considered his.

5. *"Operationality" as a Further Requirement*

Having shown, I think, that much of what is sometimes felt to be an economic approach is just only a scientific approach to decision making and hence applicable as well outside the realm of economics, I now want to turn to another requirement of development planning which again may be seen as characteristic of an

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economic attitude but in fact stands for a much more general attitude. It is the requirement that research undertaken in direct or indirect support of development policies should be as "operational" as possible. In a general way we may say that there are two types designing scientific activity. One type is directed at satisfying our curiosity and the other at reaching certain aims of policy. As a rule scientific activity starts in the first way. When it is discovered that scientific knowledge can be used to further certain concrete aims part of the activity takes the second form. Of course there is no fundamental difference between the two aims; upon closer thought, both in some way are forms of reaching higher levels of satisfaction. The differences are that the first type of scientific activity satisfies a few people very intensively and large parts of the community only in a weak way; while the second type of scientific activity is directed at the satisfaction of more pressing needs of large sections of society and undertaken in a more systematic way. The first type has an exploratory character and often takes the form of trial-and-error process; the second type, called the operational type, is based on some ends and tries to reach these with a minimum of sacrifice of scarce factors. It tries (but not always succeeds) to avoid doing irrelevant things. One was of illustrating the difference is that in order to cure some "evil" it is not always necessary to know how this evil was caused but sometimes sufficient to know how other factors than its causes can also eliminate it. This is particularly important if the causes are factors not under the control of man and if there exist other factors which are under man's control.

Economists have developed gradually more of the second type of research than of the first type. Other social sciences often still are in the phase of exploration. Many sociological descriptions of the habits or other activities of some groups are not directly helpful in finding out the means to improve people's happiness. Sometimes the economist's approach may suggest to the other social sciences subjects of research which are more relevant to our policy decisions than these sciences' own programs. Again this should not be seen, however, as an attempt to impose "economic" methods of thinking, but rather introducing more generally "operative" attitudes. The sense of urgency of the work to be done felt by development economists reflects the real urgency of so many needs of this world's population. The more this urgency is also felt by other social science workers, the better.

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CHAPTER XVI

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The Concept of the Future as a Factor in International Society

—B. Landheer

A sociological investigation of the concept or image of the future as a scoial factor has to be based upon a preliminary analysis of the factor "time". Without a concept of time, there is obviously no image of the future.

In the classical civilisations of Egypt, Greece, Rome, India and China, the concept of time occurred in terms of religious and philosophic thinking about the creation of Man and his gradual further development. In the case of created religions there was often a cleavage between the period proceeding the creation of the religion in question and the subsequent period in which Man was placed within the context of this specific religious system. In the natural religions the life-cycle was mostly presented as itself eternal, though preceded by a prehuman period and followed by an often vaguely conceived supernatural life.

As long as human life is closely linked to nature, time remains a vague concept, connected with the rhythm of nature and attuned to Man's own natural rhythm. This is evident in expressions like "A day's march "or" A distance of week's riding." Time is not exact, neither subjectively or objectively, like we can still observe in more primitive regions.

Next to the subjective time-concept in terms of the individual's own rhythm and the objective time-concept in terms of natural occurrences, we find the concept of "historical time" with the advent of the civilisations. They each date "historical time" in their own way, and the idea that a significant event deserves to be dated as the beginning of a new "historical time" persists until Napoleonic times.

A more exact time-factor is introduced by the exact sciences and followed by the rationalistic sciences of social evolution and social progress which attempt to think in more or less concretely-timed stages since the 18th and 19th century.

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The French sociologist G. Gurvitsch has pointed out that different time-concepts and different social rhythms persist in modern society for different classes and social groups. The time-factor in agriculture or industry differs, while there is also a difference among classes and nationalities.

The boss 'lunch-hour' is not an hour, that of the clerk is.

The time-concept of East and West used to be different, but modern technology is eliminating this difference.

"To be on time" used to be an attribute of social discipline, while now it begins to be the expression of the adaptation to a machine-dominated existence rather than a social virtue which was the prerogative of certain classes, like the military.

The most modern concept one might call "mechanical-time", and this time-concept has only a weak link with the natural rhythm of life.

The concept of "mechanical time" has penetrated into our social thinking, and it has created the impression as if time is a factor that can be manipulated at will, just like age, but even to a higher degree. We make plans for five years or ten years, without taking into account that there is a factor of netural social growth that cannot be manipulated, but must be given.

The subdivision of mechanical time goes far beyond the threshold of our consciousness, and we are fortunate, in terms of our mental health, that time and space have retained their natural psychological proportions, though this fact is often ignored by modern society, much to its own disadvantage. It would be a strange result if the worship of speed would ultimately prove unable to change our psychological dimensions, but this may be remarked only in passing.

It is clear that the human aspect of the time-factor is to distinguish present, part and future. As such these concepts have a two-fold link to Man's natural existence as an individual and to his existence as a group-member. Only in the second sense Man lives "within history", in the first one he lives in terms of the organic life-stages ; youth, maturity and old age. Both these time-factors cannot be altered voluntarily, but what we can alter and influence is Man's concept or image of time. This may lead to a marshalling at energy in a specific situation or period, but it does not add to or substract from the available vital energy as such.

In this study we shall only be concerned with the social time-factor and its impact on images of the future.

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It is remarkable that the time-factor in modern social thinking is almost neglected entirely, with the exception of short term thinking in concrete social planning. The result of this is that the image of the future has become a largely symbolic concept that is used to give cohesion to existing societies, but it does not function as a guiding theory or belief for social policy.

In addition, much modern social thinking can be termed "formula —or recipo-thinking" in which it is assumed that if find a correct social formula, either in political, economic or legal form, the rest will take care of itself. Apparently this magic formula is never found, as we cannot assert that society, and particularly world-society, is progressing towards a clearly conceived future.

The absence of the time-factor in our social thinking has made the image of the future a propagandistic device instead of a philosophical vision. Both the Western as well as the Communist world maintain that their view of society is also the future of society, though this is obviously logically impossible. As soon as mankind would form the society, this society could at best be initially shaped according to some pattern, but it would show a gradual evolution of its own, quite different from the Western or Communist society of our period. In addition, a world-society would be a "closed society", and not consist of the mutually antagonistic societies of the present time.

It is a grave danger that the political pressures at present are so strong that the whole question of the further evolution of Man has been pushed to the background, while it should occupy the centre of our interest.

There is no other possibility, therefore, than to go back to the periods when meaningful questions about Man's future were asked and tentative answers formulated. As it will not be possible to survey in this article the development,—theories of Comte, Spencer, Turgot, Condorc pt and a host of others, not to mention the thinking of Plato and Aristotle, we must take as our starting-point a simplified theory of social evolution which must be generally acceptable.

It will cause no argument to divide human evolution into three stages : the adaptation-processes of small groups (the stage of preliterate society of about 500,000 years) ; the stage of more complex and dynamic social groups, generally referred to as civilisations and states (the period of "history" which has lasted about 6000

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years up to our time) ; finally, the stage of complete, subtle and permanent adaptation : the period of a permanent and lasting Mankind-society.

The first aspect of the simple scheme which is rather startling is the short duration of the period of "history" by which we really mean the changing pattern of international and intercivilisational relationships, mostly seen in the perspective of one state or one civilisation. We have no history of Mankind, if we mean by that a history written under the perspective of Man's evolution as it has empirically presented itself. We always operate with value-judgements, like progress, the development of science, the spread of democracy, etc., while strictly empirically, we can only observe that Man has succeeded in creating larger groups in the history-stage while these groups in regard to each other have behaved in an antagonistic fashion, more primitive often than in the so-called "primitive" period.

In the preliterate stage, there was that one might term : low group-capability and ample room for expansion. As group-capability was low, the available social space was not much utilized. In the history-stage, group capability rose, and with it the capability for expansion. There remained ample room for increased domination over nature and simpler social groups, but it is obviously a process which is limited by available social space : territory that furnishes adequate living-possibilities in relation to group-technology.

The history-stage will end when the process of human social adaptation reaches its upper-limit : this means when group-capability will be high, and room for further expansion exhausted. It certainly does not mean that at any amount Mankind will present the picture of an egalitarian uniform world-society, as evolution plants in the direction of greater and not of less differentiation.

It is obvious that in the period of expansionistic social groups there was no calculable time-factor. The expansion was a function of group-capability and of a general situation over which there was no control.

Therefore, it is impossible to speak about a political time-factor as politics means the maximalisation of power in a constantly changing field. Only if a political decision has been arrived at, it becomes possible to construct a military time-table. This military time-table can, however, be altered at any time by political decisions, but as has been pointed out by A. Toynbee, greater technical

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complexity gives a momentum of its own to the military machines which becomes less controllable by political decisions which may seem expedient on short notice.

As military time becomes increasingly mechanical time, political decision-making is pushed into a time-schedule which is no longer operational in political terms.

Ralph Lapp in his "Kill and overkill[1] : the strategy of annihilation" describes how the time for political decision-making has been reduced to fifteen minutes by modern rocketery. As this would seem to make sane political decision-making impossible, the conclusion would be that technology has to be pushed back to a threshold where it becomes again politically operational. This would mean arms-control or the building up of technical control-systems that would prolong the period available for decision-making.

The predominance of mechanical time has not only rendered political decision-making almost impossible, but it also obscures the building of an image of the future which could give direction to political decisions. Politics if not embedded in a social system which has ethical, religious or legal foundations becomes in itself a field of mechanical action and reaction over which conscious control becomes impossible.

The reconstruction—or perhaps it is better to speak of a "regeneration"—or process could only take place upon a psychological basis. It would have to reestablish a hierarchy of values in which the image of the future gives content and direction to politics, and politics to the world of technical means which are necessary for its implementation.

At present the opposite situation prevails : technology, science and industry push politics while the image of the future only occurs in a simplistic or strophied fashion. In addition, this image is derived from the nineteenth century instead of being meaningful in relation to the present. This situation has arisen out of a concatenation of politics, technology and industry which did not exist to the same extent in the past when those three realms of life had a certain independence and their own rhythm as well as their own "time".

This fateful development took its beginning in the period of totalitarianism when the traditional decentralisation of society was annulled by overriding goals which were basically expensionistic. Modern society has not been able to get rid of this "escalation of

1. Ralph Lapp : Kill and overkill : the strategy of annihilation.

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social power" and it has indeed become much stronger in a world composed of competing nations and block, all striving for power.

This striving for power as the ultimate motive explains the absence of an efficasious image of the future as no such image can arise out of those atomistic and individualistic strivings. An image would mean that there would be an awareness of the need to overcome this power-competition. While such an image exists in the vision of a coordinated world-society, it rarely becomes a motive for international action.

The strengthening of the image is therefore highly essential, and, in addition, the image must be given a time-factor in order to function as a motive. If we want to translate an ideal into a reality, we must have some notion of how much time will be required as otherwise the image simply continue to exist as a psychological mechanism.

This fact is quite evident in the case of national societies which after projecting an image of themselves proceed to develop a time-schedule in order to reach a situation which conforms to some extent to the image.

For international society as a whole, or more accurately speaking, for world-society, there is no comparable situation. The image of a coordinated world-society exists by itself while reality does not seem to get any closer to it or may even recede.

This, obviously, also depends upon the image as there are several rudimentary images of a functioning world-society.

The most current one is of a world-society in analogy to a state, but not a state composed of individuals, but of states, combined in a sort of federation. It is often assumed that we are approaching this image because the number of states has been increasing. This quantitative measure is hardly decisive : we would have to prove that the coordination among states has increased rather than their member.

This greater coordination is evident among allied groups of states, but it has decreased in relation to the power-blocs, at least compared to the international relationships of the nineteenth century. In addition, purely rational links do not indicate a common sense of belonging or a superstructure which expresses common values.

There is much confusion in regard to the image of world-society as a world-state or a world-federation. If one thinks in terms of

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centralized power, there have been no indications of a transfer of national power to a central agency. On the contrary, the growth of national power has progressed at a prodigious rate.

Without the greatest power at the center, a world-state in the real meaning of the world is not conceivable.

The other possibility is to view world-society as a voluntary federation of states, but there is no federation until federal power grows and national power diminishes. Also of this there is no evidence.

What remains is the cooperation of states in regard to their common interests. This means that international organisations have to deal with a fluctuating field in which there are no focal points. The common interests of the states fluctuate with the political conditions, and at the moment the common interest of the superstates is only to avoid all-out nuclear war, but there is no guarantee for the near or more distant future, as this common interest is not strong enough to lead to even a minimum institutionalisation. If the interest were visualised as a more permanent one, it would lead to a reduction of armaments to the level of reasonable defense.

Particularly in this case, one can clearly see the disadvantage of the absence of a time-factor. While the general image of disarmament via the United Nations remains valid, the operationally more feasible pattern of arms control or regional arrangements remains inactive.

If there were a time-factor involved, it might be more workable to project stabilisation or freezing of armaments for a certain period ; then a period of a regional security-system upon the basis of arms-control by superstates (self-limitation of their own role, restriction of others), and finally, a universal system for the world as a whole.

The general image persists but is inoperative, while a partial realisation in stages based upon a time-schedule is neglected. The proposals for general and complete disarmament by the United States and the Soviet Union have a time-schedule, but it has been derived from the general image. As the general image of a world-state is not operative, the secondary time-schedule cannot be either.

This brings us to the crux of the whole matter : the image must be realistic in order to become operationally valid for or, to use another term, in order to furnish a set of workable motives.

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This means that we must look for other images that are less remote from the given political reality of today. It is clear that a realistic image must affect common interests visualized over a very long period.

It seems reasonable to assure that self-preservation is a common interest. The second common interest should be the limitation of expansion, either in political, ideological, economic, scientific or cultural form an expansion breeds conflict. Conflict breeds war, and war means annihilation.

It is this chain of causes that is neither clearly accepted, nor analysed. The nations of today do not fear each other so much today, but they fear the expansion of tomorrow.

Therefore, the world needs an immage in which the matter of expansion has been solved.

Is this possible ?

In the first place, the natural tendencies of an expanding world-population and the desire for a higher standard of living work in the direction of a contraction of world-society. Secondly, the political tendencies which strive for complete control over large parts of the world operate in exactly the opposite direction. This means that there is a conflict between overt and covert tendencies, and this may partially explain the high rate of tension which prevails in world-society.

It also means that purposive and one-sided expansion prevails over the more natural tendency towards a world-society with a diversified cultural pattern and a global division of labor. It would be possible to devise a time-schedule for the operation of this natural tendency, while the forced and limited expansion of conflicting power-groups cannot by any stretch of the imagination be brought within a time-schedule that would result in a coordinated world-society.

This psychological cleavage between natural tendencies and artificial ones is perhaps the gravest problem of our world as it prevents the emergence of an operational image of the future.

The absence of such an image is in itself an indication of severe frustration and of one-sided efforts, as a natural mentality would tend to create such an image as a normal attribute of the human mind.

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In any complex society the future must be a part of the present, and the absence of an image of the future of world-society indicates that this society finds itself in the abnormal condition of excessive tensions and an almost pathological concentration on extreme means of military power which have no longer functional significance in terms of an operating world-society.

The creation of an operational image of the future with a time-schedule would do much to reduce and alleviate tensions as we cannot conceive the future but in terms of better international coordination. Otherwise, there will in all likelihood be no constructive future, and we can only hope for an order which would gradually establish itself without any purposive guidance.

To leave matters to chance is a very unconvincing solution in a period which boasts of the knowledge and its mastery over Nature and Man. It leaves open the possibility of unwilled catastrophies from mechanical causes or from pathological individuals or groups of which there are many.

It seems quite evident that an operational image of the future cannot be that of an effective world-government as there are no indications that this is the road along which we are moving.

Social reality shows the creation of spheres of interest of the superstates and a number of uncommitted nations. As in terms of military strategy, the power of the superstates becomes increasingly concentrated within their own borders and their own naval forces, the spheres of interest tend to become more affiliated political and economic areas than subsidiaries of power in the strict sense of the word. This trend towards a certain decentralisation of the power-blocs is particularly evident in the case of Western-Europe, notably France and Western Germany, and in the case of China.

Though this trend towards regional development has been sparked by technical developments, it has nevertheless also psychological roots. It is quite natural that the ties between war-time allies weaken after a certain lapse of time, and the continued suggestions of the aggressiveness of the other side is beginning to lose its psychological efficacy, particularly since both sides are more than adequately protected against such eventualities.

The image of regional development is not only more realistic, but also more attractive. A regional group of states is economically more viable than single medium-sized or small states. In addition,

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propinquity is a sound basis for functional social relationships while regional groups will withstand better the danger of being drawn within the orbit of the power-blocs as is quite evident already in the case of some regional groups.

Particularly a more independent role of Western-Europe and a better relationship with Eastern Europe would do much to reduce world-tensions. Western-Europe is still hesitating between integration as a means to escalate bloc-power or as a means to create greater independence for Western Europe through rather loose forms of cooperation.

Recent developments seem to indicate that social reality points in the direction of the second alternative. This leads to the question whether it would not be desirable to give greater formal emphasis to the principle of regional organisation, a regional security-system and a formalisation of the relationship between global and regional organisation.

In addition, it might be possible to give a realistic time-schedule to such developments, particularly, in regard to an arms-control system that would have to start with stabilisation under definite ceilings. The repercussions of this in the economic sphere would give a clearer picture about the inter-relationship between economy and arm-systems.

As the moment the interplay of military, industrial and scientific factors has led to a blurred image of the responsibility of various sectors of our society. It looks very much as if technology has become the prime moving factor, and this situation obscures political responsibility, as well as the relationship between arms-systems and meaningful political goals that are based upon a constructive image of the future instead of an antagonistic one.

An antagonistic image of the future is a non-image as we can only conceive of the future in terms of more and not of less international coordination. Such an image exists, but it is not sufficiently concrete, nor does it present an idea in how much time a more workable situation could be reached.

It is essential that world-society should develop clearly visible intermediary levels of regional and bloc-decision-making, and that it should also strive for functional coordination of specific groups across national societies, especially in the scientific and technical

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sectors as a roll-back of technological, innovation is needed for a functioning society.

Perhaps the most important aspect is that we conceive the future as a set of alternatives. There is not one definite, deterministic pattern, but there are a number of possible patterns among which we should strive for the most meaningful solution, based upon a concept of "historical time".

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CHAPTER XVII

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Sociological Aspects of the Development of Law From Mere Custom to International Law

—Johann Mokre

"Law" in the most general sense of the word means some regularity either in the ideal world (if we speak laws of mathematics) or in the real world (if we speak of laws of nature). In both cases it applies to the (ideal or real) world of being. It may, however, also refer to the world of "what ought to be", the world of "oughtness". In this essay we are concerned only with this meaning of law. This is the cause with ethical, customary or legal rules. They, too, are norms for a regular behaviour, but regulating it not ontologically (by casuality) but deontologically or axiologically (by demanding something). These norms, too, belong to the ideal (not real) sphere. They may, however, come in contact with reality in two ways. Either they may be apprehended by some real psychic act of volition (they are "given") or what is intended by the command may be actualised (they become "effective").

Whereas the conceptual part of a theory of ethics or law or even legal dogmatics deals with the ideal norms only it is precisely the "giving" and the "actualising" of these norms which makes them "positive" and an appropriate subject of sociology as an empirical science.

From times immemorial demands have been made or commands have been given by parents to children, by lords to slaves, by employers to employees, by kings to subjects, by priests to the faithful, by friends to friends. They are, however, not always given explicitly (with the explicit intention of giving a norm) but sometimes implicitly (by doing something with the implicit idea it ought to be done like this). Very often these commanding norms are accompanied by sanctioning norms which tell what ought to happen if the command is not complied with. Norms of religious ethics may refer to an other-worldly sanction, norms of custom or of law refer to a sanction to be performed by acts of men. Customary rules may perhaps permit us the expression of antipathy by avoiding the

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company of the breaker of the customary rules or even the offender's exclusion from the particular group. Rules of law not only permit but demand strictly the execution of some sanction in case of contravention. And that holds good not only for the explicitly given statute law but also for the implicitly given customary law. Thus, where vendetta is customary, private vengeance is permitted ; in case of the outlaw, however, it is demanded. One sees ; the difference between custom and law is very subtle and people may often hardly be aware of it in a period of transition from more custom to customary law. Moreover, in primitive times rules of religion, of ethics, of custom, and of law were often not distinguished in the people's minds.

But even what was genuine law passed through quite a few stages in the course of history. One could distinguish three periods : (1) the right of the stronger ; (2) the principle of equality ; (3) the protection of the weaker.

In early times whoever thought himself to be offended was entitled to pass judgment himself on the illegality of aggression, to decide on the means of reaction and to react himself. But inasmuch as he was entitled to do so, even in those primitive times the reaction (as a sanction) was distinguished from the illegal aggression, (as a delict). This imperfect procedure is, of course, apt to favour the stronger.

The next step was to establish some kind of arbitration deciding more or less impartially the legal question, but still leaving the execution of the award to the party involved or to the public as a whole. It is very significant that in cases of group conflicts which are much more difficult to be dealt with arbitration and private sanction extended far into our times. Not long ago labour conflicts were settled in some states by a court of arbitration convened for the special cases and strikes as well as lockouts were recognised means of sanction. By and by institutionalised courts and much later special organs to carry out the sanction came into being. Obviously this process of specialisation paralleled the general differentiation of social functions from primary to secondary group thinking.

All the time, however, there persisted the idea that law is something pre-existent possibly present in a diffused way in the people's minds. The appropriate way of law-giving was, therefore, customary law which was supposed to express in some mythical way the

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"people's spirit". Conceivably people in the judiciary business were regarded to be most likely to "find" this everpresent law. Here are the roots of the idea of common law and judge-made law. Because quite understandably judicial awards had for this very reason high prestige they were followed "from precedent to precedent". It is only at a very late stage that a formal law-making procedure was followed in diets and parliaments.

It is less than half a century ago that more and more the idea prevailed that formal "equality before the law" actually meant inequality for people in unequal economic educational and social conditions. Whereas so far law had served to settlling out the different conditions giving e.g. equal franchise without special requirements of income or education. And finally social legislation would protect the underprivileged by limiting the full liberty of contacts, recognising collective bargaining and abolishing class privileges in the judicial procedure.

It is astonishing how closely parallel the development of international law is. Since it has to do almost only with conflicts between groups—and very powerful groups namely status—which, as we saw, are rather difficult to settle the development was far slower in this "inter-state law" than in "inter-state law". For centuries there persisted here the identity of the offended, the accuser or plaintiff, the judge and the excutioner in one subject, and consequently the unorganised self-define based on customary law. There have existed, however, cases of arbitral courts convened for the special case since the times of antiquity side by side with this primitive procedure. Little more than half a century ago a step to make easier the choice of judges was made in the Hague conferences by putting up in times of peace lists from which the judges could be chosen in case of conflict. This is about the first attempt of a general organisation.

Since the era of the League of Nations there has existed a Permanent International Court, nowadays called International Court of Justice. Side by side there continue to exist the previous institution of individual arbitration and the Court of Arbitration at the Hague. A later stage in international law was the organisation of a procedure of sanctions. The first hesitating steps in this direction were taken by the League's Council, followed by the Security Council of the United Nations. And similar to privileged classess in the national law the big powers retained some privileges in international law. But let us not forget that in the League's Council not only the big powers but every member had a veto power. This unanimity

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principle can also be found in primitive legal communities e.g. the old custom of "*gotong royung*" in Indonesia, Only in the past few years has it been partly superseded by the idea of Supra-Nationality in some European Communities. There a majority vote binding also the dissenting members is possible and decisions by a community organ can bind citizens of member states directly.

One should not forget that international law needs with some particular difficulties. The lack of a legislative body and consequently the law-making by custom and treaties makes for rather slow progress. This situation is also responsible for the complete lack of protection of weaker members in the community of states. It is true liberal spirit when the idea of "sovereign equality" has the consequence that treaties between the United States and Panama or between the Soviet Union and Finland are regarded to be concluded on an equal footing. There is no social legislation in international law.

Finally attention should be called to a strange phenomenon whenever voting occurs. If there are three million votes against two million the latter will as a rule willingly give in to the majority. If there are three people against two this is far less probably. In the international community there were not long ago not very many members and even now only somewhat above one hundred. Therefore, a majority is less likely to prevail upon a minority which makes for the cumbersome unanimity principle.

These features of international law can be understood best by the fact that it is a comparatively young and yet developing law. It should not be compared with the type of law one can find in modern states but rather with the early stages of it. Doing that and having in mind that the development of "Intra-state law" took quite a few centuries whereas the decisive steps of development in international law date only from about 1900 one should be surprised not because so little but so much has been achieved in this comparatively very short span of time.

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CHAPTER XVIII

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Social Economics and Social Welfare Minima

—*K. William Kapp*

In paying homage to the memory of D. P. Mukherji, we honor a social scientist who has worked in a tradition of social inquiry which, in many respects, is the antithesis of classical and neo-classical economic analysis. We refer to the tradition of institutional or social economics which holds diametrically opposing views concerning the nature, scope and purpose of social analysis as campared with orthodox economics. Whereas the latter treats the socio-cultural framework such as the institutional and value saystem, (e. g. the degree of competition, the distribution of power between different social group, the tastes and habits of consumers, existing skills, techniques, the scope of governmental control, etc.) as given, social economics considers these factors as true variables which are not only subject to change but of strategic importance in social causation. Hence, whereas orthodox economics may be said to treat the economy as a closed, or at best a semi-closed system, social economics views the economy as an open system which is embedded in a socio-cultural matrix of which it is a part and from which it receives its structural and organizing principles as well as a variety of "disturbing" impulse. Whereas classical economics postulates a tendency toward self-correction and equilibrium as either actually operative or at least as the most fruitful hypothesis for theoretical analysis of the economic process, social economics advance the principle of cumulative causation as the main hypothesis for the study of social processess. While traditional economics is thus preoccupied with the search for levels of equilibrium defined in terms of economic and individualistic utility criteria, social economics is concerned with various social inefficiencies reflected in social ("unpaid") costs as well neglected social benefits of various sorts as the characteristic outcome of social processes left to themselves. Whereas classical economics tends to abstract from power and conflict which are believed to be kept under control or at least not subject to abuse and while neo-classical economic has re-introduced some elements of market

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power into its models of duopoly and oligopoly, social economics considers group conflicts and power in its original and countervailing from as regular social phenomena which social inquiry can ignore only at the risk of serious distortion. Whereas neo-classical economic tends to confine economic science to the study of rational conduct or rather to the forms assumed by human behavior in disposing of scarce means (L. Robbins), social economics concerns itself with the actual provision of goods and services for the satisfaction of actual individual and public purposes in a changing socio-cultural environment.[1] While orthodox economics and particularly "normative" or welfare economics develop criteria of optimality in terms of subjectively defined utilities or revealed preferences, social economics looks toward an objectification of social welfare criteria and aims at establishing social budgets of supply and demand which take account of productive powers and potentialities as well as of shortfalls in consumption and social welfare minima. Whereas neo-classical concepts define wealth (and production) in terms of utilities which are scarce appropriable and hence marketable and social economics widens the concept to include these social or public utilities which are not fully appropriable by an individual producer or consumer but diffuse themselves to all members of society and hence are not exchangeable. (Cases in point are such important public goods and prerequisites of economic development as science, technology, education, health, transportation and the whole range of goods and service usually referred to as social overhead or infra-structure. Whereas traditional economics says more or less aloof from any considerations of the quality of life and culture which emerge under different forms of economic organization, social economics considers the evaluation of the consequences of different forms of organization as a matter of legitimate concern for the social scientist. In this way it preserves the critical responsibility of social inquiry, it remains a "science of dissent" which will not justify a particular *status quo* merely on the ground that it survives and is "successful." Indeed, it refuses to accept as criteria of success those superficial

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1. "Economics is the study of the structure and functioning of the evolving field of human relations which is concerned with the provision of material goods and services for the satisfaction of human wants.....economics is the study of the changing patterns of cultural relations which deal with the creation and disposal of scarce material goods and services by individuals and groups in the light of their private and public aims." See A.G. Gruchy, *Modern Economic Thought*, New York, Prentice Hall, Inc. 1947, pp. 550 and 552.

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cannons of judgment on the basis of which different forms of social organization tend to "measure" their respective performance. Above all, social economics refuses to regard man as an object, or what is the same thing, as a resource or capital : instead it considers man whether in his capacity as a worker or a consumer as an end of all economic activity. In short, social economics insists on as essentially humanistic approach in its analysis of economic processes.

It would not be difficult to extend this catalogue of opposites[1] in an effort of further clarifying the relative positions of orthodox and social economics. However, the foregoing list may suffice to indicate that we are confronted not merely with different theoretical representations of economic systems and social processes but with radically diverging notions as to the scope, method and objectives of social analysis. While this does not preclude the possibility of an occasional synthesis between specific conclusions, it should serve as a word of caution against the ever present temptation to reconcile opposites, or in this case specific concepts and theories which start from different epistemological points of departure.

Above all it must be emphasized that what is at issue is not the question of theory versus ideographic description of particular events, or, for that matter, of abstraction and simplification versus common sense empricism, but rather what kinds of concepts and what kinds of theories are appropriate and required in order to discover underlying regularities and to explain the causal relationships in social systems. Social economics has always insisted that the particular complexity of social processes, occurring as they do in essentially open systems, makes it essential that social inquiry follows the lead of its subject matter and adapts its concepts and its theorizing to the nature of the specific problem with which it has to deal. That is to say both concepts and methods of theorizing in the social sciences must be such as to enable us to take account of the typically open character of the particular social system which interests us as social scientists. This perception of the essentially open character of social systems commits social inquiry to a type

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1. For an earlier attempt to develop such a list of opposites see J.M. Clark's experiment in the simultaneous truth of opposites and his surmise that the *antitheses* of some of the axioms of orthodox economics may contain a more urgent and vital truth for the present generation than the traditional axioms. "The socializing of Theoretical Economic" reprinted in *Preface to Social Economics*, New York, Farrer and Rinehart, 1936, pp. 3-43 ; esp. pp. 22. ff.

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of theory which does not abstract from what are precisely the key chracterstics of social processes and social behavior : the fact namely that they occur within a network of interrelatoinships from which they derive their pattern. Hence to treat social systems as closed or even semi-closed systems may enable us to arrive at generalizations concerning isolated uniformities or logical inter-relationships between one or two variables. However, the power of prediction of such pure theories is bound to be limited. For purposes of prediction in social inquiry we need a framework of theoretical analysis which takes into account the interaction of a greater number of variables. This is essentially the meaning of D. P. Mukherji's insistence on the need for systematic social inquiry : "When I say theory I do not mean isolated propositions summarising observed uniformities of relationships between two or more variables howsoever useful and precise the establishment of such propositions may be. I mean by theory another type of generializations which logically hangs together, from which 'statement of invariance' can be derived, and into which the type of isolated propositions mentioned above can be logically fitted."[1]

In the following we propose to deal with three pairs of opposites which we consider to be of control significance for economic and social theory : the concept of human behavior versus that of rational action, the principle of cumulative causation versus equilibrium analysis and the contrast between social welfare minima and criteria of formal optimality.

Rational Action versus Human Behavior

Social inquiry can accept the concept of rational action which pure economic theory has developed only as a fiction of strictly limited and indeed doubtful significance. No doubt, human behavior and choice are marked by deliberations and fore-thought as well as other factors. However, the conclusion that the individual performance for A against B must be due to the expectation of greater pleasure is a retrospective interpretation of choice *as if* all alternative "sources of pleasure" had been compared. Actually such a retrospective interpretation is purely verbal or tautological in as much as it simply designates as greatest pleasure that

1. D.P. Mukherji, "Indian Sociology and Tradition" in *Sociology, Social Research and Social Problems In India*, R.N. Saxena (ed.) Bombay, The Asia Publishing Hous 1.

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what has been chosen.[1] But apart from the purely verbal character of the "solution", the concept of rational action is ankered in the problemational attempt to consider as comparable and measurable what Bergaon had shown to be not magnitudes (i.e. quantitative *increases* or *decreases*) Or equalities in sensations of "pain" or "pleasure" (or disutilities and utilities) but qualitatively different sensations of increases or decreases.[2]

There is still another reason why the concept of rational action n the voluntaristic-individualistic sense must remain doubtful and misleading as a frame of reference. This was pointed out by D. P. Mukherji : "I have the following that the frame of reference, which is the first requisite of a theory, is not the 'actor-situation' as Talcott Pursons would have it, for the simple reason that the unit of the Indian social system is not 'the individual as actor, as an entity which has the basic characteristics of striving towards the attainment of "goals", of "reacting emotionally or affectively towards objects and events and of, to a greater or lesser degree cognitively knowing or understanding his situation, his goals and himself.' Action for the Indian is not individualistic in that sense ; it is 'inherantly structured on a normative teleological', but not on a 'voluntaristic system of coordinate of axis'....."[3]

This is precisely the point which needs to be raised not only with regard to human conduct in India but in relation to human action in general and particularly the action of consumers in affluent societies. For in such societies consumers' wants and preferences are continuously and indeed to an over increasing extent shaped by producers and sellers with a commercial interest in individual preferences and choices. In fact, not only consumers' preferences and choices are being influenced by advertising and sales promotion, but the rate of obsolescence (i.e. the effective life-span of goods and services) is deliberately shortened. For this reason as well as for reasons shown earlier by Dewey and Myrdal it becomes clear that the traditional teleological means—ends schemata must always remain an arbitrary division of reality. Not only are "ends" not given but they are themselves means to some further more distant "ends."

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1. W. Stark, Diminishing Utility Reconsidered in KYKLOS, Vol. I, 1947, 4, p. 334.

2. *Ibid*. p. 323.

3. D. P. Mukerji, *op. cit*. p. 24.

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Furthermore to distinguish ends and means and to give the former some separate ultimate status is contradicted by the fact that "ends" and "means" stand in a dynamic relationship to each other in the sense that ends need to be changed in the light of and continuously adjusted to available resources.[1] Under these circumstances it becomes urgently necessary to replace the ideal type concept of rational action by a real type concept of human behavior. Such a concept can be constructed only on the basis of an empirically verified theory of motivation which takes full account of the nature of man both as a product and a maker of his culture. Such a concept of human behavior takes account of the influence of tradition, values, habits, emotions in concretely specified cultural situations. While excluding the possibility of deriving from it formal scientific principles of universal validity and relevances the real type concept of human behavior would make it possible to use in economic analysis the results of other social disciplines such as cultural anthropology, social psychology and sociology. This was Max Weber's and also Veblen's intention. It must remain one of the epistemological commitments of social economic analysis which formulated its theory in terms of real types and not in terms of ideal typical concepts (i.e. concepts which are either one-sided accentuations of particular aspects of human behavior or pure fictitious constructs with no counterpart in reality.

Equilibrium Analysis versus Cumulative Causation

Turning from the concept of human behavior to the problem of social causation social inquiry at the same time broadens the frame of reference and the unit of investigation by introducing as a working hypothesis the principle of cumulative causation. (By working hypothesis we mean "a guiding principle of interpretation in the light of which we look at facts in order to see whether it improves our understanding.")[2] Like the real type concept of human behavior

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1. For a more detailed analysis of the reasons which induce us to consider the traditional ends-means schemata as logically inadequate and untenable see Gunnar Myrdal, "Ends and Means in Political Economy" reprinted in *Value in Social Theory*, Paul Streeten (ed.), London, Routledge, Kegan Paul, 1958, pp. 206-230 and Paul Streetan, *op. cit.* Introduction pp. XXI-XXV. For an earlier discussion of the ends-means problem see John Deway, *Human Nature and Conduct*, New York, Henry Holt and Co. 1962.

2. R. G. Collingwood, *The Idea of History*, New York, Oxford University Press, 1956 p. 94. See also Arthur Schweitzer, The Method of Social Economics, mimeographed manuscript 1961.

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referred to above the principle of cumulative causation follows the lead of the subject-matter with which social inquiry is concerned : it drawst he logical conclusions from the fact that various social sub-systems are typically open and interacting systems and each embedded in a socio-cultural environment from which they receive their structural i.e. their 'organizing direction.' Unlike the model of equilibrium analysis and marginal valuation which Weblon rejected as "technological" in character, the principle of cumulative causation views social process (events) as the outcome of a circlular and hence cumulative process in which a number of causes interact upon each other and with their effects. As soon as the scope of social inquiry is thus adapted to the open character of its subject-matter social analysis is concerned with processes of considerable complexity which differ radically from those perceived in the light of the narrower frameworks of interpretation which follow the pattern of the principle of equilibrium analysis. Instead of giving rise to tendencies towards self-corroboration and balance the interaction of causes and effects tends to take place in such a manner as to push the process on and on in the same direction. While there may develop countervailing forces tending towards balance of a more or less unstable character, the specific social processes which we observe within the context of such a unstable and precarious balance are cumulative and self-sustaining. In short, they are on-going and dynamic processes in the course of which the entire social system may change. Whereas equilibrium analysis views social processes as deviations from or movements toward some assumed underlying order or position of "normalcy", the principle of cumulative causation provides a principle of interpretation which permits us to encompass in a single theoretical framework a great number of causal factors together with their effects. It focusses attention from the very outset on the reciprocal interaction of cause and effect and thereby alerts us to the self-sustaining character of social processes and their outcome. Above all it directs our attention away from the futile search for the primary cause of social events. Nevertheless it is and remains from beginning to end a framework of *causal* analysis rather than the teleological search for level of "normaly" or equilibrium. In fact the principle of cumulative causation is peculiarly suited to serve as the main hypothesis for all social inquiry. In form and origin the principle of cumulative causation differs from that of pure theory ; it does not operate with ideal types but stays at the level of what has been called "Gestalt" theory

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making use of real types or categories.[1] Nothing will prevent the social scientist from using the principle of cumulative causation for the elaboration of specific theories for such special problems of social dynamics as economic fluctuations, the emergence of social costs in business enterprise, the rise of juvenile delinquency, the persistence of racial prejudice and caste discrimination or the drift toward regional economic indequalities within a country or the growth of disparities between developed and under-developed countries.[2] For these reasons we believe with Myrdal that the principle of cumulative causation provides the most fruitful working hypothesis for the study of underdevelopment and economic growth.

In a much neglected remark V. Pareto pointed out that serious difficulties arise in the study of phenomena from the fact that "many causes interweave their effects" and that pure science (e.g. the mathematical theory of equilibrium) would be of little or no use in overcoming these difficulties. If the mathematician Pareto was correct in his appraisal of these difficulties, it would seem to follow that social inquiry must aim at some form of analysis which avoids both a naive empiricism which fails to remove itself from the world of phenomena (e. 4. process, events) and pure theory which constructs its concepts and models in terms of ideal or fictitious types. Social science in order to be successful as an instrument of prediction must stay at an intermediate level of analysis between the ideographic approach of many historians and the level of abstraction at which pure theory or mathematics prefer to proceed. Causes and effects in social systems interweave in a concatonation of reciprocal and cumulative interaction. Hence, if social inquiry is to follow the lead of its subject-matter it has no other choice than to stay closer

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1. For a distinction of real types and ideal types or for that matter of "Gesalt" theory and pure theory see A. Spiethoff, "Pure Theory and Economic "Gesalt" theory ; Ideal Types and Real Types" in *Enterprise and Secular Change*, F. C. Lane and J. C. Riermersma (ed.), Homewood, III, R. D. Irwln, 1953 pp. 444-463.

2. Indeed the principle of cumulative causation was first developed as a result of and in connection with the study of the negro problem in the United States and the recognition of increasing international economic disparities for which traditional theoretical frameworks were unable to account for satisfactorily. See. G. Myrdal, *An American Dilemma, The Negro Problem in Modern Democracy*, 2. Vls. New York, Harper and Brothers, 1944.

3. V. Pareto, "On the Economic Phenomenon—A Reply to Benedetto Crocs" reprinted in *International Economic Papers*, No. 3, New York, The MacMillan Company, 1953, p. 185.

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to the world of experience than pure theory and mathematics are capable of doing without adhering simply to a phenomenological or ideographic-descriptive approach of particular events.

Social Welfare Minima Versus Formal Optima

The foregoing analysis leads directly to the theory of optimum allocation of resources and to the formulation of criteria for economic planning. Most schemata of allocation and optimization are derived from the logic of rational choice. They define a position of formal optimum with apparent precision. However, such precision is the result of withdrawing into the verbal part of pure theory. These schemata do not and cannot transcend the limited horizon of their own tautologies. They assume that the hypothetical, decision-making, entities (individuals, governments) act rationally even though they may not necessarily imply that the actual world of experience is made up of rational and efficiency-seeking man or agencies. The essential limitations of all formal schemata of rational allocation and optimization rest not so much on the lack of realism of their underlying assumptions—even though one sometimes wonders how wide a gap between assumption and reality can be tolerated in social theorizing—but on the fact that they are capable of defining optimal solutions only undergiven i.e. state conditions. This is due to the fact that as all pure theory they are formulated without reference to social space and time. That is to say they do not take into account, and are indeed incapable of taking into account, either the actual historical conditions and possible time horizons of society, or the actual basic needs and requirements of human life in a given social milieu. Hence as the result of their tautological character and due to the fact that their failure to specify any particular social space and historical time makes them incomplete they are not only inherently behavioristic but in effect take existing institutional frameworks for granted. Moreover they tend to operate with an artificially limited individualistic time horizon. Under these conditions they define at best partial (individualistic) optima rather than a general social solution of the problem of social efficiency which could claim general validity. Above all they are not based upon substantive desiderata and objective requirements of human life and survival either now or in the future. They do not include within the range of their considerations the possibilities of changes in, or alternative institutional arrangements which might make possible improvements in allocation

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and social efficiency. Instead, they are at best only second or third best solutions of the problem of social efficieney. In short, as already pointed out, they are in form and content purely formal definitions rather than substantive solutions of the problem of disposing of scarce means. Orthodox economics has been slow to admit these limitations of pure theory for the formulation of substantive welfare criteria. In fact it is only during the last years that increasing attention has heen devoted to the more important shortcomings and ambiguities of all formal definitions of social optima. Indeed, "the wreck of welfare economics"[1] or of what has been called "economic welfarism"[2] and "welfare scholasticism"[3] respectively stems precisely from a growing realization that there is no bridge from formal welfare and utility concepts to social welfare in any substantive sense of the word because these formal definitions are based upon an analytically feasible but substantively false distinction of individual and social aims and "economic" and "non-economic" ends. Hence the formal definition of economic efficiency in the allocation of scarce resources remains empty and ambiguous because it provides neither operational nor indeed correct criteria for the interpretation of the degree of success or failure in the solution of the problem of social efficiency. The solution of the problem of social efficiency is not a formal or abstract technical problem which can be solved like a crossword puzzle, by filling words (means) into empty spaces (ends) until all spaces are "coherently" filled (criteria of optimality). Hence it becomes necessary to look for alternative criteria which are substantively and operationally useful for the formulation of practical policies of allocation or planning. In short, we cannot avoid the delicate and difficult task of formulating objective alternative criteria for the allocation of resources and the determination of the rationality of the performance of an economic systems. This is a problem of the greatest practical significance which urgently calls for an answer by social scientists. We cannot go here beyond offering a few rudimentary suggestions. We agree with those who have pointed out that the real issue connected with the elaboration of substantive welfare indicators cannot be handled

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1. J. Baumol, *Welfare Economics and the Theory of the State*, London, Longmans Green, 1952. (Epilogue).
2. J. R. Hicks, *Essays in World Economics*, Oxford at the Clarendon Press, 1959, preface, p. VIII.
3. G. Myrdal, *Value in Social Theory*, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1958, p. 242.

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within a formal framework of economics. Such subjectivist categories as consumers' surplus and revealed preferences or even social welfare functions, or external economies are not capable of catching either the broader non-economic aspects of social welfare or the important "externalities" of costs and benefits to which I refer as social costs and social benefits.[1] In fact, as long as we inquire merely into the formal structure of rational action and aim only at formulating formal criteria of rationality and optimality we cannot hope to develop operational criteria of the performance of concrete economic systems. Criteria of substantive rationality can be derived only from a substantive theory of essential human needs and behavior. Such a theory must take account of the dynamic structure of human needs (physical and mental), their objective and cultural determinants in different social milieus and may well have to start from an analysis of the individual and social consequences of any failure to mainiain at least a social minimum for all members of society and indeed of mankind. To this effect it will be necessary to define with greater precision what Veblen once called the actual costs of gross output "counting costs in terms of manpower and necessary consumption"[2] and what Francois Parrons calls the costs of man ("count de 1' homme"[3]). These minimum costs measure the basic and essential requirements of human life and survival which, if not satisfied over a period of time, diminish human vitality, undermine physical and mental health and in the end are capable of destroying man himself. As just pointed out these minimum costs of human life can be determined and must be defined with reference to the specific conditions of a given social and cultural milieu. If they are not covered for all members of society all averages and all calculations in terms of aggregate net national income must remain as Perroux points out naive and indeed devious measurements.[4] These minimum costs of basic human needs and survival may be assumbed to be sufficiently identical over time and similar to space to permit an approximate,

1. K. William Kapp, *The Social Costs of Bussiness Enterprise*, Bombay, The Asia Publishing House, 1963.

2. Th. Veblen, *The Vested Interest and the Common Man*, New York, The Viking Press, 1919, p. 63.

3. F. Perroux, *Feindliche Koexistens*, Stuttgart, K. E. Schwab, 1961, p. 552—

4. *Ibid*. p. 553.

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objective determination and quantification.[1] Thus, it is known what the minimum requirements in calorific intake under different conditions are, and we also know that there are wide disparaties in such intakes between different countries, and between different groups within a given society. Similarly we can establish the negative effects of shortage of essential proteins and vitamins in terms of their temporary and permanantly damaging effects on the human organism and their temporary and permanent impairment of human vitality and efficiency.[2] Similarly, the negative effects of such inadequate level of nutrition and inadequate medical care can be expressed in terms of increased rates of morbidity and mortality and lower rates of life expectancy. In modern industrial societies maximum tolerable levels of water and air pollution have been calculated[3] which it could be dangerous and indeed fatal to ignore because any contamination in excess of these levels endangers human health and human life. In short, the determination of the minimum requirements or elementary human needs makes it possible to objectify a considerable part of the prerequisites of human (i.e. civilized) life and of social welfare. To do so does not involve us in arbitrary, incomplete and erroneous decisions. On the contrary, they are objective and scientifically substantiated measurements at our disposal. Conversely, to ignore these objective minimum requirements on the grounds that the principles of economizing are not concerned with substantive criteria of optimality and must abstract even from what science may show to be essential does indeed give rise to an incomplete, partial, arbitrary and erroneous definition of optimality.

Once we have determined the minimum costs of human life in terms of basic and elementary needs we shall have at our disposal a set of objective welfare indicators which would enable us to program at least the minimum economic and social tasks of civilized societies. The translation of these indicators into the formulation of practical

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1. ". . . the wants of men are sufficiently identical over time and simila in space to assume that they all want food, shelter, clothing, transportatior amusement, intellectual fare, and the life ; that the specific forms which thes wants take differ from time to time and place to place with the technology an complexity of production and social organization, but nevertheless, there i essential parallelism residing in the identity of man as a member of the specie homo sapiens." S. Kuznets, "National Income and Economic Welfare" in *Economic Change*, New York, W. W. Norton, 1953, p. 294.

2. A. Keys, etc. al. *The Biology of Human Starvation*, 2 vls. Minneapolis The University of Minnesota Press, 1950.

3. K. William Kapp, *op. cit.* esp. chps. on air and water pollution.

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welfare policies becomes then a manageable problem by planning systematically the gradual removal of the actually observed gaps and deficiencies. Such gradual i.e. incremental improvements rather than the attainment of an operationally undefinable optimum provides the appropriate and operational model of rational forethought and rational policy making.

We need not spell out here in detail the practical steps necessary to translate social welfare minima into economic policies. Suffice it to say that so far not even the most advanced countries among the developed nations have made systematic use of the opportunities offered by objective welfare indicators of the kind outlined above. As a result, the degree of success in the performance of their economic system, as well as the degree of substantive rationality and social efficiency in the performance of their respective economic systems still fall far short of their objective potentialities. Nor indeed can the developing countries claim to have paid much attention to the attainment of the social welfare in their planning and allocation decisions aiming at accelerated development. The systematic elaboration of social welfare minima can serve not only as a criterion of allocation and social planning but as the basis of objective benchmark surveys showing how far either industrial economic systems (of either the Western or the Soviet type) or the economies of underdeveloped countries fall short in meeting the minimum requirements of civilized human existence.

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CHAPTER XIX

Social Development

—J. A. Ponsioen

Development can be considered as a process or as a temporary result of that process. As far as a result, it is usually considered to be an economic category measured by the increase in a nation's per capita income. It is generally recognized that the process itself is more complicated. Even when looked upon from the economic viewpoint, it implies such factors as increasing division of labour, re-division of labour over various economic sectors, market enlargement, intensification of capital formation, mobilization of human and material resources, new patterns of consumption etc. The yardstick applied by economists, the rise of per capita income, is not very clear in this respect. It shows the results, but hides many of the factors behind them, although it should be recognized that it is the central factors with which all other results or welfare aspects correlate.[1]

Nevertheless, sociologists are uneasy about using these average figures except when studying them as part of the mythology of numbers, such as Pierre George did in a recent article.[2] Sociologists are unhappy with them, not so much because of the technical difficulties involved in producing these figures, but because of the fact that such averages are apparently produced for the purpose of comparing welfare situations at different times in the history of a political unit, or between political units, and actually give little information about the internal situation of the society concerned. Average figures, whether on income, demography or literacy, conceal varieties which are as vital for comprehension of the functioning of the societies concerned as for policies to be designed. Average income figures, for example, do not show division of income per class neither per region. Differentiation according to classes, however, may go so

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1. Simmerman, L. J., The Distribution of World Income 1860-1960 Coutr, in E. de Vries (ed., Essays on Unbalanced Growth), The Hague, 1962.

2. George Pierre, Quelques Aspects des mythes du nombre, Art. in Cahiers Internationaux de Sociologie, vol. 23, p. 39. Paris, 1962.

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far that the average does not indicate the income of the majority of the population, or, as in Venezuela and South Africa, in reality is hardly made at all. Differentiation according to areas, mainly over existing towns, industrializing area, developing countryside, and primitive areas, is so significant that if it is desregarded, no knowledge can be obtained about potential resources and no rational development policy can be designed.

Thus far, the sociologist's criticism regarding the usual approach of economists to development. Economists, very rightly, may ask the sociologists whether they would substitute this definition of economic progress by one of social progress, and whether the sociologists could provide a better yardstick of overall development. The sociologist then begins to stammer. He cannot define development sociologically. The word progress has been banned from his vocabulary as it implies so-called value judgements which may cause disagreement with his colleagues. He will surely contest the idea that economic or material progress equals human or social progress, but he cannot clearly define the contents of human or social progress and has no yardstick with which to measure them.

M y I take this opportunity of this publication in the Memory of Professor D. P. Mukerji to contribute to a solution of these problems from sociologist's point of view.

Sociology finds difficulty in defining its proper field, but there are two concepts for its indication, sociology has clarified the meaning of the normative sociological concept, that is, those relationships and structures which enable a society to meet the expectations of its members. Sociological progress, then, would seem to mean an improvement of structures and human relations for a better coverage of these needs. Nothing is said here about the very changes in the expectations.

Strangely enough, we are less clear about the meaning of the key-concept "social". When used in opposition to the field of economics, the social field seems to cover not only social relations and social structures, but also psychological attitudes, motivations, values and ideas, and, last but not least, all activities directed toward those people whose standing is weak and who are unable to make use of the opportunities offered by their society. The concept 'social' seems to be rather a collection of all non-economic factors.

Nevertheless, and especially when compared to the economic field, it seems worthwhile to provisionally collect all these f-

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into one term because, in actuality, there is apparently an autonomous field which interplays with the economic, and is called "social". This is revealed most clearly when the Western development process is compared with that of many of today's developing countries. In Western economies, the social field shows itself a first glance as an increasing number of welfare institutions for an ever increasing number of people. This progress seems to have been conditioned by the economic possibilities, although, it can be stated too that the new social institutions more and more forced the economic institutions to follow fresh paths, never, however, beyond the capacities of the economy. In developing countries the inverse often seems to be true, and the social field reveals even more its autonomy. Economic resources, i.e. capital, labour force, technical knowledge, are possibly available or can be made available, but their usage may be restricted because the people are not yet able to cope with them. The so-called social pre-conditions have then not yet been realized. In such cases, the conclusion is that social development should precede economic development. The newly introduced economic institutions can certainly force social institutions to follow new paths, but never beyond the social capacities of the population.

As the social field now reveals itself as being autonomous, it cannot be defined in relation to the economic field. Social development therefore has to be formulated in its own terms.

Four different spheres are especially indicative of the social realm :

(1) the cultural and mental background from which individuals operate and which causes their willingness or unwillingness, their fitness or unfitness to take up their various tasks in the economic development ;

(2) the insututions and social structures, types of groups and organizations, by which the people are able to cope with these tasks for collective as well as for individual purposes, or, in their words, which enable them to bring their mental background into use ;

(3) the regulations of a society which enable individuals to cope financially with the opportunities offered, this being done through redistribution of income or by special grants in case of need or unexpected drop of income :

(4) the welfare services of a society by which individuals are assisted who, through lack of finance, knowledge or capacity, are

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unable to meet their own needs so that these have to be covered with the help of others.

The question is now : do these fields possess a common denominator or a common ground which constitutes the social factor proper?

At first glance, this does not seem to be the case. If there was a common ground, there should be consistency. But when related to the process of development in many countries today, these four fields seems to be contradictory rather than consistent. A real change in cultural and mental backgrounds to enable a ready performance of the new economic tasks, means increasing individualism and a search for wealth which will break down the traditional operational structures at the same time as they will hamper the creation of new organizations for promotion of common interests. People impelled by their individual and material desires are used to demand that political forces should satisfy them by legal regulations instead of themselves working and cooperating for this satisfaction, and they thus hamper necessary investments in the economic infrastructure as much as the establishment of efficient interest organizations. Moreover, as has been demonstrated by the new urban areas, modernization often creates more problems than it solves, and if it tries to solve them, requires more social services than the economic situation can bear. People can then be found without incomes, without traditional, mutual or communal aid, without educational facilities ; many families are broken up, new forms of criminality appear, many old and new tensions come to the surface and look for many suitable scapegoat. It has been said that the general situation of commencing development is one of all kinds of vicious circles,[1] and this seems to be true also for the social fields.

However, when we examine the actual process of development in the West, we do find easily a common denominator in the three last mentioned spheres of the social field : the growth of structures and organizations ; the extension of social legislation ; and the development of social services, all of which have definitely stimulated each other.[2] Together, they appear to constitute the new legal—, security —or social system of the industrial society as such. The possible substitution of the concepts 'legal', 'security', 'social', is very relevant for our point of research into the social phenomenon. Together,

1. Janssen s. j. L.H., Vicieuze cirkels en planning in Africa, Leyden 1962.
2. Ponsioen, J. A. the Evolution of Social Policy since Industrialization ; contr. in E. de Vries, Essays on Unbalanced Growth, The Hague, 1962.

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interest organizations, legislation, and social services enabled the west to control industrial societies for the well being of their members engaged in industries. And it is interesting to note that these institutions gained operational value only half-a-century or sometimes longer after industrialization had started. They were not able to commence their work as long as the belief prevailed that economic forces by themselves would automatically bring about "the greatest happiness for the greatest number". It was the fundamental belief that economic forces could be subjected and used, that institutions could be created to direct these forces towards self-defined goals, such as the safety, security and welfare of every individual in our society. This belief was the basis of the social as compared to economic conception.

Little attention is usually paid to the cultural and mental background, mentioned on the first field of the social realm, when studying the Western process of development. The cultural backgrounds of capitatism, industrialism or international commercialism are usually revealed in terms of rationalism, materialism. Consideration is seldom given to that factor of mental and cultural change which brought this field into consistency with the three other fields mentioned under the heading "social", that is, that mental change which makes people look upon society not as an automatic process, but as a process to be dominated, controlled, guided.

Here we touch upon the real essence of the concept 'social' as a normative concept : it is power over society and culture in order to make them serve our desired goals. Society and culture have usually been considered as facts just as much as nature. After having mastered nature, we have gradually and partially learned to master social relationships, their framework which is society, and their mental contents which make up culture. Now it is evident, although this evidence was itself a conquest, that we could not master nature except by obeying its laws. These were soon revealed by the natural sciences, and we realized that the more we know about them, the more chance we have of mastering nature. The same holds true for society. We have learned thar society and culture can be mastered if we have a thorough knowledge of their laws. Again, economics provides the clearest example of a social sciences which helps us to learn the laws of a given social system and thereby to master that system with a view to promoting economic welfare. However, one new discovery had to be made in the social field. Nature was a given datum, but not so society or culture, which are man-made. Social

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relationships exist always and everywhere, but not their systematization. Behavioral patterns, institutions, attitudes, collective values and ideas exist always and everywhere, but not their integration into one cultural system. Keynes made a great contribution to economics when he demonstrated that system-building could be mastered even when it was based upon the freedom of its participants, if we knew the laws of their behaviour. After having mastered system-building, we could master the system itself and make it serve our ethical goals, if its laws were recognized and obeyed.

Sociology's vocation today is to discover and explore the laws of society-building from the many human relationships, and the way to make one culture from the many mental contents of viarous groups. In this way, the laws can be mastered and society and culture can be built, after which, again by learning and obeying the laws of that constructed society and culture, they can be made to serve our ethically defined goals.

Of course, this also happened in the past. There were economic systems, man-made systems, before Keynes, but owing to lack of knowledge and conscious policy in their making, these systems were weak and often deficient ; neither were we able to steer them to service of our goals. Societies and cultures have always existed, but they were sometimes only weakly integrated, they were full of internal tensions, contradictions and clashes. The first stage of social development is therefore the actual construction of the society and culture in which tensions, divergencies, even contradictions, may exist but should be functionally related to the whole. The second phase is then the increasing power in the use of the established society and culture in making them serve our self-defined goals.

It may seem to some students that social development thus coincides with an efficient political system which constructs and steers society. Although there may be some truth in this statement, this was not the lesson learned during the Western development process. The political system gained efficient control over Western society only after the citizens themselves had established strong organizations, efficient institutions, well-functioning social services, and had thereby gradually built up coherent systems. On such a basis, the political system could indeed become efficient in the guidance and improvement of the social systems. This is also the reason why Western political systems are still much less efficient in the cultural than in the welfare field : private activities, institutions and services in the cultural field are much weaker and less coherent among

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The history of social policy along the three lines of social action, social legislation and social assistance, has also revealed its goals which I am inclined to consider as one of the laws of social development itself ; they were : the increasing security of each individual in his legal, economic and cultural position ; increasing equality of opportunity from whatever class or region he may come ; and increasing liberty as to freedom from restraint and freedom of choice. If we examine these goals, we see that social development in the West has certainly not yet reached its end.

One difficult question remains before I may conclude. Have we a suitable yardstick with which to measure social development as it has here been defined ? This yardstick should quantify the qualitative attitudes and powers, and should also be a factor which corelates with all other aspects of the development process. Moreover, as a manifestation of mastery, it should by itself indicate conscious counteraction to spontaneous tendencies. As such, I cannot suggest a better yardstick than the distribution of income according to class and to regional distinctions ; the greater the inequality, the greater the incapacity to master social relations in one social system or to master the system itself ; the greater the equality, the greater the mastery. (This is hypothetical, of course. The value of a yardstick has to be proved in practice. For example, it may prove to have an operational value in a money economy but not in a barter economy).

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Neither in this yardstick as easy to establish as is the per capita ›me. To learn the distribution of income, field research is essary, whether it is done by the taxation office or by a sociologi- institute. The knowledge of the distribution of income, however, ers the great advantage of a direct result : a much more refined owledge of the society concerned. It also offers the advantage of indirect : a measure of the degree of social development.

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Punitive Vs Therapeutic Justice

—Paul H. Landis

The punitive approach to justice has deep roots in the Western World. The "eye for an eye" and "tooth for a tooth" philosophy of the Old Testament has been more rigorously promoted than the New Testament philosophy of the golden rule, which attempts to have these administering justice place themselves in the position of the culprit and act from empathy rather than from vengeance.

The idea that punitive justice in itself is effective as a way of correcting the errant one, and is even more effective as a method of deterring others who would follow the delinquent path dies hard in our legal institutions and in our moral philosophies. Yet, there is little in modern psychological theory or in penal experience to support it. Since Freud, it has been known that motivation is largely an attempt to satisfy deep emotional, often unconscious, needs-not rational ones, or even conscious ones. Penal theory which assumes that punishment can deter either the offender, or the observer, for whom he is being used as an example, fails to take into account the great reservoir of the unconscious in human motivation. It fails to recognize that in this area of the unconscious, it is not logic that works but frustrated needs.

Experience in human discipline, in the nome, school, church, and community ; in dealing with children, adolescents, and adults, has demonstrated that punishment is an inferior method of training. Its great weakness is that it too often stimulates resentment, increases frustration and therefore breeds rebellion. The child, who is handled by punishment, builds a spirit of rebellion and disrespect. The adolescent who is handled by punitive methods must be crushed entirely, and his spirit destroyed, or he will rebel either openly or by circumvention when out of reach of parents or other authorities. If he does not openly rebel, there is risk that he will rebel on the inner-emotional level and become a victim of mental disease. On the level of civic administration, it has long been known that punitive methods increase a sense of aggression and hatred toward the

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society and leave many a prisoner, perhaps the majority, feeling that they want to get even when they re-enter society. The few prisoners who are reformed under a punitive regime, are likely reformed by influences other than the punishment itself.

Punishment is not reconstructive, it is not therapeutic, it does not rebuild habits and philosophies that make for efficient social functioning. It does not relieve frustration or provide the patterns by which the individual can so adjust to his social environment so as to be free of frustration.

A brief survey of history indicates how illogical the Western World has been in this area. Mental disease was once treated by punishment, torture, and denial. This practice was apparently rooted in the conception that mental disease was devil possession, that the individual was responsible for being possessed and only if he were punished and tortured could the devil be driven out and sanity restored. Today we are shocked, and rightly so, when we read of mistreatment of mental patients by sadistic attendants in mental hospitals. Yet in the light of modern standards, the long history of the treatment of the mentally ill has been sadistic.

Handling of the alcoholic was, until very recently, punitive and still is for the lower social-economic classes in most municipal courts. The assumption has been that the town drunk is an immoral man, that he deliberately violates the standards of the community and he should, therefore, be thrown in jail or otherwise punished. It is not unusal, in the skid row sections of American cities, to have a drunk put in jail dozens of times each year to sober up.

Enlightened social policy has shifted from this conception of alcoholism to the conception that alcoholism is a disease and should no more be punished than physical disease as such. It is believed that the proper treatment is the medical, social, psychological one, not the legal one grounded in punitive justice. Drug addiction has followed the some course of historic treatment and contemporary revolution of value judgement.

In the area of juvenile delinquency one sees perhaps the clearest picture of the gradual transition from a punitive, stern approach to a more humane, therapeutic one. In an earlier day, children and adolescents were thrown into jail and rigorously punished for their errors. It was assumed that such methods would in some way sanctify the individual, returning him to society able to function as a

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moral human-being. Even if it did not, there would be social gain in that this example would warn other young people to pursue a straight course.

Research shows that such treatment did not cure juvenile delinquency. Juvenile institutions proved to be schools for crime, rather than schools for reform. An overwhelming proportion of young people came out worse than when they went in.

Gradually through the development of Juvenile Court Philosophy the whole trend of law has been in the direction of therapeutic treatment of the child and the adolescent. The theoretical basic for this approach in the view that human nature is not innately evil, as theology held, but good, and any warping of it can be balmed on the family primarily. and other social groups that have custody of the child.

The Juvenile Court now approaches the problem of correction in the informal atmosphere of a consultating inquiry with child. parents and professional workers present. The wisdom of case workers, psychologists, perhaps physicians. and others is sought in an effort to ascertain the indirect factors which explain the overt behavior.

We are deeply indebted to Freud and his followers here for having convinced the Western World that latent factors beneath the surface are the significant ones ; that delinquency is but a symptom. it is not the disease itself. The roots of the disease lie in the subconscious. The approach of law in more enlightened courts, is to remove the cause, rather than deal with the symptom by punishing the child who manifests them. Punishment may give society a sense of righting wrong, but it will not relieve the frustration, fears, complexes and inner emotional turmoil that lies below the surface of the overt act.

Many would return to a rigid discipline as a cure-all for the delinquency plague of modern youth : require the school parents to be authoritarian, and return to the rod ; require the school to return to the stern hickorystick age. or the community to put police power of the ruthless sort above the educative approach to the law enforcement, but there is no evidence to justify a return.

Within the family, for example, studies of the relationship between the authoritarian parent and the behavior of teenagers show that children under authoritarian discipline show the least desire to

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emmulate parents and to meet their wishes.[1] These same studies indicate very clearly that it is in the democratic family, where the directive, educative, counseling approach is used that one finds the greatest loyalty to parents and their standards and the greatest desire to be like parents when grown up.

One of the most striking facts in the American school system today, compared to the days of my own childhood, is the fact that the overwhelming majority of small children and most adolescents like school. They hate to miss school. School offers them a challenge, a motivation, an environment of growth, freedom, a world where their expectations can be fulfilled and their aspirations raised.

The school room of earlier generations, with its stern hickory-stick imposed order, its emphasis on disciplines in learning, rather than motivation, was for the vast majority a place of dread and fear. Under the new approach, learning achievements are far superior to those under the old.

In the United States one of the very slow changes from a punitive to a therapeutic approach is found in the area of divorce. The sacred conception of family life, and the sacramental character of the marriage bond, which has made the family more or less immune to inspection, has at last been challenged as psychologists, sociologists, and finally the courts havs come to see the family as a series of inter personal interrelationships rather than merely as an institutional arrangement.

The philosophy of divorce in the United States, and much of the Western World, has been punitive in that an adversary situation had to be established with the one party bringing accusations of wrong doing against the other. This was the only type of relationship which was considered grounds for a divorce case. These accusations had to be for one or more of the causes which a particular government considered appropriate causes for dissolving the marriage. In some states the only cause recognised has been adultery ; in others the law has gone so far in recent years as to admit mental cruelty. Because only specific causes are recognized by the law, reasons presented in the court for the divorce more likely than not are fiction. The adversary situation had led to a great deal of deception

1. Paul H. Landis and C. L. Stone., *The Relationship of Parental Authority Patterns to Teenage Adjustments,* Washington Agricultural Experiment Stations Bulletin No. 538, September 1952,

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on the part of those testifying in court ; the atmosphere has often been one of purjury ; for collusion between mates has often been involved.

This public display created by the adversary situation has been damaging to couples, damaging to children, and damaging to the public at large, when aired by the media of communication. Private matters of no consequence to the public have provided many a juicy news column, thus adding further damage to the family unit involved.

In the United States a serious attempt at changing this philosophy has been underway for about 10 years. Judge Paul Alexander, Court of Common Pleas, in Toledo, Ohio has taken the initiative.[1] He has been in charge of an interprofessional committee of the American Bar Association and the National Council of Family Relations, which has attempted to approach divorce from a therapeutic viewpoint. Viewing the family as a series of interpersonal relationships, which may function poorly from the standpoint of the interest of the people involved, the court seeks professional help in understanding the particular series of relationships which exists. Judge Alexander has a staff of some 70 professional workers in his own court to handle divorce cases. If there is a child under sixteen in the family, it is mandatory that before the couple appear in court, professional workers investigate various aspects of the family situation. The court hearing is informal rather than legal. The sole concern of those who sit in judgement is that of finding the best solution for the persons involved, first of all the children and secondly the couple.

Under this new philosophy, if divorce seems to be the desirable solution, it is granted. The interest of the court is not in saving marriages, but human beings.

We have stressed some of the newer conception of human diseipline which have emerged, and which show hopeful signs of a better day for mankind. It must be recognized that there is still much punitive law enforcement in court jurisdictions. Courts take their cue from president, rooting their practice in history. For the most part they do not approach justice from the perspective of enlightened psychology, or of current knowledge developed in sociological research.

1. "A Therapeutic Approach", *Conference on Divorce*, University of Chicago Law School, February 20, 1952.

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This is one of the serious defects in the training of lawyers and judges. It is also one of the serious defects in the training of police officers and law enforcement personnel in general. There has, however, been a break with tradition even in this area. The legal clinic has become a part of legal training in a few law schools. Here the approach is not legalistic, in the sense of being concerned with the law as law ; it is rather clinical, in the sense of trying to determine what is the proper approach to a particular kind of human problem. It is only a step from view to the clinic becoming a sociological research center in which the effects of particular types of discipline are studied. The next step is to correct jurisprudence in the light of the affect of particular solutions and revise sentencing accordingly.

Certainly if our knowledge of human motivation is sound, the legal clinic will soon need the aid of professional counsel, for it must know much more about the personality being dealt with than is given by the accusing police officer who describes the symptoms. The court will have to recognize that to function effectively, it must have the aid of psychology, medicine, psychiatry, sociology and social work rather than a generous shelf of law books setting forth the evidence of the precedent.

Edward H. Levi, of the University of Chicago Law School, has proposed that law must go far beyond the fact of handling cases and adjudicating disputes.[1] He believes that out of the clinic and the co-operative efforts of lawyer and social scientist may well develop law revision staffs which, on the basis of clinical practice and research, could take an active part in law making itself, rather than leaving it entirely to judges and legislatures. He feels that the lawyer must not simply be an advisory in the law forum, but should also be able to extend relevant knowledge and help with the simplification and clarification of laws themselves.

John M. Murtagh, Chief Magistrate of New York City, has described his effort to practice the idea that law is to *help*, not merely to *punish*.[2] He believes that this issue is the paramount one of courts today, and is the liveliest question now current in criminal law. He feels that there are a growing number of judges who are socially

1. Edward H. Levi, *Four Talks on Legal Education*, The University of Chicago Law School, 50th Anniversary Year, 1952.

2. "I sat in Judgment," *Saturday Evening Post*, Vol. 226, November 7, 1953, pp. 18ff.

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We have stressed some of the newer conception of human diseipline which have emerged, and which show hopeful signs of a better day for mankind. It must be recognized that there is still much punitive law enforcement in court jurisdictions. Courts take their cue from president, rooting their practice in history. For the most part they do not approach justice from the perspective of enlightened psychology, or of current knowledge developed in sociological research.

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1. "A Therapeutic Approach", *Conference on Divorce*, University of Chicago Law School, February 20, 1952.

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This is one of the serious defects in the training of lawyers and judges. It is also one of the serious defects in the training of police officers and law enforcement personnel in general. There has, however, been a break with tradition even in this area. The legal clinic has become a part of legal training in a few law schools. Here the approach is not legalistic, in the sense of being concerned with the law as law ; it is rather clinical, in the sense of trying to determine what is the proper approach to a particular kind of human problem. It is only a step from view to the clinic becoming a sociological research center in which the effects of particular types of discipline are studied. The next step is to correct jurisprudence in the light of the affect of particular solutions and revise sentencing accordingly.

Certainly if our knowledge of human motivation is sound, the legal clinic will soon need the aid of professional counsel, for it must know much more about the personality being dealt with than is given by the accusing police officer who describes the symptoms. The court will have to recognize that to function effectively, it must have the aid of psychology, medicine, psychiatry, sociology and social work rather than a generous shelf of law books setting forth the evidence of the precedent.

Edward H. Levi, of the University of Chicago Law School, has proposed that law must go far beyond the fact of handling cases and adjudicating disputes.[1] He believes that out of the clinic and the co-operative efforts of lawyer and social scientist may well develop law revision staffs which, on the basis of clinical practice and research, could take an active part in law making itself, rather than leaving it entirely to judges and legislatures. He feels that the lawyer must not simply be an advisory in the law forum, but should also be able to extend relevant knowledge and help with the simplification and clarification of laws themselves.

John M. Murtagh, Chief Magistrate of New York City, has described his effort to practice the idea that law is to *help*, not merely to *punish*.[2] He believes that this issue is the paramount one of courts today, and is the liveliest question now current in criminal law. He feels that there are a growing number of judges who are socially

1. Edward H. Levi, *Four Talks on Legal Education*, The University of Chicago Law School, 50th Anniversary Year, 1952.

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2. "I sat in Judgment," *Saturday Evening Post*, Vol. 226, November 7, 1953, pp. 18ff.

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minded and who believe that to be fair means to help. He identifies himself with this philosophy.

In his own work he finds that legal practice requires the aid of social agencies, if the bench is to approach the social ills of society with any intelligence and to made decisions that are socially helpful rather than merely punitive. He believes that the court that approaches its problem with the idea of being helpful must have at its disposal all relevent "environmental and psychiatric facts" conceraning a case. He admits that few courts now have such facilities. Even probation officers are far too few and too limited in training to be the asset they might be to the court.

He feels that the better Juvenile Courts point the way to what must be done in all criminal courts ; that is, to know the case with which one is dealing from the viewpoint of psychiatry, social work, and psychology, not merely from the standpoint of the criminal offense and criminal legal precedent.

The new court, for example, does not deal with the prostitute merely as a painted hussy, but as psychopath needing treatment. It does not deal with the chronic drunk as a person needing another term in the city jail, but one needing reference to an alcoholic rehabilitation center, introduction to Alcoholics Anonymous, a job, and other such therapeutic attentions.

In the new court there is no fixing in matters like traffic tickets. He describes how New York City, through the use of mechanical card sorting equipment, can process in a matter of minutes the 4,000 traffic summons that are handed out each day. It can be quickly ascertained whether or not a ticket has been paid. With such objective methods, and no courting of political favor, the game of ticket fixing is soon up. Everyone is treated alike.

He believes that the social-minded judge must not only be fair, but that all devices of science, including those of social science, must become his tool, in making the law a helpful instrument in social reform. His conclusion, from wide experience in dealing with offenders, is that for the most part offenders need, not merely judgment, but help. Whether they ever get it or not is up to the more fortunate citizens who must carry a sense of social obligation. The socially-minded judge cannot place the sole burden of guilt on the person brought before the court. He sees a part of it residing in social forces that impinge on the victim.

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One could only wish that these philosophies were general among judges, among professors in law schools, among policemen, judges and law enforcement agents collectively. They are not. They are merely tokens of a dawning day in the area of human discipline.

This gradual transition toward a more humane approach to discipline has not been made without protest from those who feel that the "eye for an eye" approach is a safer social policy. The critics blame the increase in delinquency, crime, school misbehavior, divorce and other social ills to the lax enforcement of regulations and the failure to impose punitive reprisals. This, they claim, is the way to social disorganization and chaos. Discipline becomes a mockery and open rebellion safe.

This argument did not begin with the new approach, nor is there any evidence in sociological research that supports its logic. Let us grant that those who have been reared under the iron hand, may well be unable to use the liberty of social self control, but those reared under a different regimen are much more likely to internalize social controls and become self regulated.

The controversy as to where to draw the line between rigor and toletration in discipline is one of long standing in Western Civilization. Religious philosophy has embodied a rigorous punitive philosophy, as we have seen and so has law. These are among our least flexible social institutions ; they adapt to new knowledge in the areas of psychology and sociology very slowly indeed.

Let those who would return to a rigid punitive justice not forget that this method has not been without both personal and social damage. The balance between justice and mercy is always a delicate one. When to wink at violations, when to close ones eyes and not see ; when to be humane and seek to reform, and when to declare a case beyond hope of reform ; when to ignore violations of the rules for the greater social good of the person and the cause he promotes ; when to ignore them because of the excessive social damage of disciplining the offender, are eternal problems of social control in the home, church, school, and state.

Toleration of delinquency carries risks. Among them is the danger of making cynics of the stern duty-minded, and of making it easy for the tender-minded to rationalize the irown offenses. Hypocritics in high places are great comfort to those of lesser

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privilege who cherish their little sins. But the scales of justice cannot be evenly balanced in any kind of disciplinary regime. Evidence strongly suggests that the therapeutic approach, toward which we are moving, promising both less social damage and more effective social control.

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Part V

Socio-cultural Planning and Development : Processes & Problems in India

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CHAPTER XXI

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Social Research and Social Welfare in India

—*R. N. Saksena*

Social suffering is the result of the failure of society to adapt its culture and social institutions to human needs and social change. The individual usually fulfills his needs and urges as a member of the social group. When he fails to safeguard his personal interests, the social group steps in to give him necessary aid and support or even to create the basic conditions for his happiness.

The need for social assistance to individuals and groups is certainly not of recent origin. Charity and mutual helpfulness are rooted in the nature of man. From the earliest days not only the monastic and priestly orders but the ordinary man have been giving shelter, food and clothing to the needy and the destitute. Social service in the sense of mutual aid has long been known in our country as in the rest of the world. It has been enjoined by religion and sanctified by traditions.

In the old idea of chartity the individual was the focus of attention, the group as such did not receive much notice. With the increasing social awareness and application of scientific knowledge to every-day life the emphasis has shifted from the individual to the social group. Thus, the United Nations has defined social welfare as 'A state of complete physical, mental and social well-being and not merely the amelioration of specific social evils.' Such a goal inevitably leads to a shift of emphasis from the principles of *laissez-faire* to the concept of a Welfare State, the main characteristic of which is the assumption of the responsibility for the provision of minimum standards of economic and social security for all the citizens. This entails the obligation to guarantee the satisfaction of fundamental needs like food and shelter and security at minimal level, and render help to the individuals in adverse circumstances. The methods adopted for the satisfaction of these needs are of paramount importance and constitute the core of social policy.

Both the objectives and means of social policy are in some degree controversial, but in general there is a much greater degree of

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agreement in regard to objectives than in regard to means. The recognised objectives of social policy as laid down by the principles enunciated to United Nations, or pledged by the Constitution of the International Labour Organisation, the Atlantic Charter, the Mutual Agreements. The Final Act of the United Nations Conference on Food and Agriculture, and other instruments and statements of policy, may be summarised as following :—

Opportunity for suitable employment for all those who seek work ; good wages and reasonable conditions of work, opportunity to secure adequate food, clothing, housing and medical care ; social security arrangements which, in addition to affording financial protection against the hazards of life in an idustrialised society, include prevention and medical services capable of making a positive contribution to building up the vigour and vitality of the masses ; reasonable leisure and adequate facilities for recreation and culture : greater equality of occupational opportunity ; and proper care and training of the young.

As regards the means of attaining the objective, mentioned above, there is much greater diversity of opinion, but it is being increasingly recognised that society as a whole, acting through the State, has the ultimate responsibility in regard to all of them. How much should be undertaken by voluntary organisation acting with the assistance and encouragement of the State, how much should be left to private initiative, will always remain a matter of great controversy. There are extremists on both the sides. But the Welfare State is a compromise between the two extremes, and as such, inspite of all its imperfections it sets a pattern for any humane and progressive society. It guarantees a minimum decent standard of living without removing incentives to personal enterprise, and it brings about a limited redistribution of income by means of graduated high taxation. yet does not pretend to establish economic equality among its citizens. All are assured of adequate help in case of need, whether the need is due to illness, old age, unemployment or any other cause. The realisation of this social responsibility is essentially a sociological concept. Society exists for the individual and at the same time he constitutes an integral part of society. It follows that in a Welfare State if an individual is willing to work and has capacity to work but fails to set a job, it is not his fault. There must be something fundamentally wrong in the social organisation itself due to which he is not able to get any work. Thus social policy should aim at providing all the facilities that are essential

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for promoting and maintaining the living standard of the individual. Thus constitutes the core of social policy of Welfare State, particularly in a under developed country.

The Constitution of the Repulic of India pledged to the people, *Justice*, social, economic and political ; *Liberty* of thought, expression, belief, and worship ; *Equality* of status and opportunity ; and to promote among them all ; *Fraternity* assuring the dignity of the *individual and unity of the nation.' Contemporary planning and* development activities in India are keyed to the objectives defined in the Constitution. The task was difficult, but India took it boldly. The Planning Commission was set up by the Government of India in March, 1950 to prepare a plan for the "most effective and balanced utilisation of country's resourcess." In December, 1952 the final varsion of the First Five Year Plan was submitted to Parliament. The Central objective of planning was defined as initiating' a process of development which will raise living standards and open out to the people new opportunities for a richer and more varied life." Economic planning was viewed as "an itegral part of a wider process aiming not merely at the development of resources in a narrow technical sense, *but at the development of human faculties and the building up of an institutional frame-work adequate to the needs and aspirations of the people.*" The First Five Year Plan was followed by another 5 Year Plan and now we are in the process of experiencing the impact of the Third Plan. But the essential object of all the Plans is to accelerate progress by removing all the lacunae that exist in the socio-economic life of the people.

However, the influence of sociology in this field can not be ignored, since as Gunar Myrdal points out, "While there was little participation on the part of social scientists in actual technical preparation of legislation and still less in administering induced social change, their influence was neverthless very considerable, and that this influence was due in the main to their exposition and propagation of certain general thoughts and theories."[1] This particular influence of sociology has been through general studies social development and surveys of living conditions in all strata or in certain groups. In all studies and surveys there is always a sociological core which should direct and inspire a whole mass of social investigations. What is, then, the sociological core ? Henning

1. Gunar Myndal, *The Relation between Social Theory and Social Policy.* The British Journal of Sociology, September, 1953, p. 215.

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Friisl in his introductory paper on The Application of Sociology to Social Welfare Planning and Administration has summed them up as following :—

1. First is the study of the social forces which are active in shaping the demand for various forms of social welfare. In this connection the actual living conditions and economic structure are basic targets for study, but the social attitudes and values related to social welfare and the institutionalisation of such values are very important.

2. Studies of living conditions of "problem groups" and their "needs" for social services have been the field of social welfare research, to which sociologists have given most attention. "Whether studies of living conditions are dealing with "problem groups" or "normal families," the questions which are relevant to social welfare planning are those which are related to "needs" for services, met or unmet. The information gathered must be organised in such a way that the researcher can confront his factual material with various standards of income and services, specified by policy-makers, administrators or interested groups or suggested by himself."

3. It is possible to secure some information on the opinion held by "consumers" and the "producers" of social services on preferred welfare standards. Such survey focuses attention on three types of data : (1) public knowledge on existing benefits and services; (2) public evaluation of the adequacy or inadequacy of these benefits and services ; (3) expressed wishes for changes."

Thus, whether it is the question of finding out need for social welfare or the nature of it or the adequcy of what is being done in the nature of welfare, social research affords the answer. But at times forces may be encountered, which are openly or tacitly hostile to research topics which carry or appear to have overt political implications or appear to threaten the authority of large-scale organisations. The growth of bureaucracy is one such force. Bureaucrats have one attitude in common, a self-assumed role and self-image of political neutrality. This is based on the assumption that administration, specially civil service, and to it may be added bureaucratised research services, can be wholly rational. This leads to create suspicion in the minds of the administrators regarding socical research into contemporary problems done by independent agencies, particularly academic, whose findings may challenge the existing or rationality of structures and system. This danger is particularly great

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when bureaucracy is really strong, which creates a kind of 'peaceful conformity' among the masses, a situation that J. S. Mill has described as "the deep sleep of decided opinion." This creates a kind of conflict between 'professionalism' in social research and bureaucratisation of social research in the field of social welfare. In our country the Government, both at the Central and State levels, have tried to arrive at a solution of establishing a professionalised research service of their own, The Central Institute for the Studies and Research in Community Development at Mussoorie, Research Programmes Committee of the National Planning Commission, the Action and Planning Research Institute at Lucknow and various Tribal Research Institutes are typical examples of such an enterprise.

But in this process of bureaucratisation of social research there is a lurking danger of self complacency on the part of those who are engaged in social research in government service ; for the bureaucrat soon gets accustomed to listen to his own voice or of his boss and considers himself to be superior to the rest. At least that is the tradition which seems to have been handed over by the British bureaucracy and may constitute the basis of the out-look of the present one. The danger may be particularly great in a society, which is fairly backward according to literacy standards and is tradition-bound, where the bureaucracy has been given a high social prestige and even constitutes the elite. Thus, government-sponsored research may give only a coloured view of the problem they intend to tackle. This danger is real and has to be looked into.

Social research may be defined as a scientific undertaking for solving or understanding a social problem, 'which, by means of logical and systematised methods, aims to discover new facts or verify old facts and to analyse their sequence, inter-relationship, causal explanations and the natural laws which govern them.' The primary goal of social research is to understand social life and thereby gain greater measure of control over it. In other words, social research is a method of studying, analysing, and conceptualizing social life in order to, "extend, correct or verify knowledge, whether that knowledge aid in the construction of a theory or in the practice of an art." This comprehensive approach to human problems can prove to be more fruitful if we cross boundaries, defined by various disciplines. This will also stipulate and extend the scope and predictive power of behavioural scineces, including all the specialities involved.

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There are three main disciplines which may be considered the 'core science' of human behaviour in society—namely, anthropology, psychology and sociology. The anthropologists, psychologists and sociologists have repeatedly found themselves treading the same path and have had to establish some kind of rapproachment. Out of this situation has emerged the realisation that all the disciplines have many mutual problems, they may be approached from different points of view. All of them deal with human behaviour, though their focal points are different. The sociologists are mainly concerned with the relation between 'actor' and 'situation' comprising 'social objects.' Thus their frame of reference is *social interaction.* The anthropologists focus their study on 'culturally organised action and patternised behavior', while the psychologists lay stress upon individual motivation and behavioural traits. In other words, all these social sciences find themselves in each other's company in some way or other. The question, therefore, arises ; Cannot the integrated approach prove more rewarding than the approaches of single discipline ?

It is suggested that there should be some kind of unification of social sciences, which need not necessarily lead to scientific authoritarianism. As Gillin has suggested : "In approaching the possibilities of inter-disciplinary collaboration, we propose, if the figure be appropriate, not a Monolithic State, but rather a Federal Union of the specialities dealing scientifically with human behaviour in society. In such a Federal Union the several member disciplines would be able to pool their scientific resources for the solution of certain problems requiring multidiscipilinary treatment, while maintaining a species of 'State's Rights', that would guarantee full freedom for each member to attend to concerns that seem to be of more specialised interest". Thus, collaboration in social research does not in any way infringe upon autonomy of the established disciplines nor hinder such research with new findings that are discovered by those equipped with theoretical guidance and technical knowledge peculiar to their respective specialities.

In social research, attention is mainly focussed on areas of social problems, that is, situations defined as unfortunate, partitularly when commonsense efforts and corrections have failed and more precise knowledge is needed. Thus, in inter-disciplinary social research, one is compelled to start with a situation which needs explanation instead of abstract question which needs an answer. It is, therefore, obvious that inter-disciplinary approach covers the entire field of human behaviour in society.

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Its main concern is the social man and all that he stands for. Such an approach is nothing new in the field of social studies. Parsons derives specific laws from several dimensions and explains social interaction as enbedded symbol meaning systems, which may be transmitted between various systems of action. Kluckhohn explains human behaviour in terms of value orientations which are related to human problems of key importance. These include the innate dispositions of man, the relation of man to nature, the significance of the time dimension, the modality of activity most valued and the dominant modality of man's relations to other men. Kluckhohn shows how these five orientations can be used as a means of categorizing various societies. Again, Thompson contends that societal systems must be viewed as a multi-dimensional pattern in the space-time of which it is a part. But all of them agree on the integrated nature of human action or behaviour which can be uuderstood only by crossing various boundaries.

However, considerable confusion is created by using the same terms, but in different context, by the various disciplines. All the social disciplines feel that they have some understanding of such terms as culture trait, complex, culture area, ideal pattern, behaviour pattern, acculturation, material culture, cultural intergration, social system and so on, yet a good deal of controversy prevails among all of them as to the exact meaning and content of these various terms. But a general frame work of theory for the study of social man can provide a setting for arriving at a clear understanding of the various terms used in all the disciplines. This, again, necessitates inter-disciplinary approach in the study of social problems.

This approach is almost essential in conducting social research in our country. In the wake of Independence, the country was faced with many social problems which needed a new technique to handle them. For a very long time the village social system continued to remain integrated, because external factors could not enter social organisation, power structure and leadership retained their traditional hierarchical character. But since the attainment of Independence, Indian village life has been faced with a new challenge involved in the process of democratization and innovation. With many legislative and tenurial reforms and finally with the inception of development schemes of rural reconstruction, the village social system is confronted with new forces and change. Therefore, today the village—its social organisation, its culture, its value pattern; its

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leadership, its economic structure, in fact, the entire village community—is standing at the threshold of a new era.

Again, changes of far-reaching socio-economic importance are being ushered in by the villagers themselves, greatly facilitated by innovating leadership on the one hand, and the conscious attempts by the State on the other, so that the people may be motivated to pursue their own goals and build an economically sound and productive system. It is for this reason that village studies and monographs represent a new trend in Social Research in India, what is termed as rural analysis.

Recently illuminating village studies have been published by Srinivas, Dube, Majumdar, Oscar Lewis, Gough, Beals, McKim Marriott, Steed, Mandelbaum and others. All that they have succeeded in achieving is describing the habits and customs, rituals and ceremonies and economic structure of the villages. The social structure of villages has been studied in terms of caste ranking and socio-economic relation of castes. It could be expected that for process the determinants of these inter-caste ranking were discovered, but it is difficult to establish any consistent set of criteria even for a single village. The chances of discovering general principle applicable to rural society are remote.

Finally, all these studies the fundamental fact that the Indian village is a community. So far it has been a self-contained socio-economic unit. It has never concerned itself with the great political upheavals that has taken place in the history of India. What is the vital force that kept the Indian village community alive and self-sufficient throughout her history. The present studies fail to give an answer. However, this approach to rural sociology may have some appeal to cultural anthropologists since it affords them opportunity to interpret a traditional society in terms of assumptions of modern thought. But such an attitude implies the refusal to understand tradition in its correct perspective. There is another danger in such ethnographic-monographic studies. It has led to certain implicit or explicit generalisations which are unwarranted not only because they have been inducted from insufficient data because evidence to the contrary is available. Under these circumstances exaggerations and important omissions can hardly be avoided.

Thus, social research in the processes involved in rural change has to take into consideration all the factors that are involved in

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transforming the social economic life of the village, in which an inter-disciplinary approach can be more helpful. Even from a practical point of view, while the policy-makers and administrators must share the primary responsibilities for initiating and implementing rural development projects, the social scientists can give them invaluable help in the areas of social organisation, human relations and values involved in the process of introduction of the new innovating factors.

It is true to a great extent that at present in the case of government-sponsored village welfare work the relations between the common village people and government officials are characterised by considerable distance, reserve and distrust. It is not because villagers are not appreciative of what is being done for them by the State, but their reaction to any innovation is very sharp. Either they reject it in its totality or accept it. There is little scope for experimentation, since in this process of rejection or acceptance traditional values play a very important role. Again, a peculiar type of vacuum exists in the life of the villagers. Some recent governmental measure, such as radical tenurial reforms, creation of statutory village panchayats, introduction of community development programme and the constitutional ban on public practice of untouchability, have raised their level of expectation and aspiration. This has also affected inter-personal and inter-group relations in the village. While the expectations have been aroused, 'in concrete terms people have not had enough evidence of it so far to warrant a shift in their attitude'. In a community, which has been reared on tradition for centuries, a new programme or scheme can only be accepted after their resistance has been overcome, not through exercising authority but by creating understanding. This explains to a great extent the lack of people's participation in community development programme. Therefore, a full appraisal of their attitudes, values, sentiments and beliefs as well as the socio-economic effects of the new experiments ought to be obtained first before launching any new scheme. In this field, for current appraisal, the only possible approach can be inter-disciplinary.

It is, therefore, obvious that the inter-disciplinary approach in social research can enable us to arrive at important decisions in matters of great social importance. At the same time, in social research, it has proved to be the only correct approach, especially when a special problem has to be understood in its totality.

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In India, after regaining Independence, there has been a widespread awakening among the people and greater realization of the social and economic problems which confront the people. Greater emphasis on community projects and other welfare activities has also accelerated this process. And, thus greater demands are being made on social scientists to devote more attention to the study of manifold problems that arise out of the crucial changes that are taking place in the country. Thus, social research assumes a greater significance. Should this research be segmented or integrated? This needs re-evaluation in our concept of social research as applicable to Indian conditions. For, what is needed is the harnessing of our research competence to problems of rehabilitation and social reconstruction. The best suited research methodology can only be an inter-disciplinary approach under the existing circumstances.

Before an integrated approach in social research is made possible, it is necessary that 'integration must be achieved in the minds of collaborators'. It may entail a different orientation of a social scientist to acquire a fuller understanding and realisation of an integrated approach. His academic training and acumen, his active participation in understanding of the convergences and differences of various social sciences, should be such that it leads to a clear understanding of the unified science of human behaviour. This experiment has been very successfully tried in the Harvard University Department of Social Relations under the inspiring leadership of Parsons and his associates, and promises to be fruitful if tried in India. For, in the final analysis we find that while dealing with complex social problems, they have to be studied in all their individual aspects as well as in their entirety. In the words of Brightman, "Frontiers are necessary; and frontiers must be crossed." It is, therefore, not intended to suggest that there should be no specialised studies by individual discipline. But in an integrated approach what one discipline lacks the other would apply. This also implies that the social scientist must be aware of his own frontiers before crossing the frontiers of others. In short, he has to be a competent specialist in his field and a competent generalist having a sound grounding of the theory and techniques of other social sciences.

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CHAPTER XXII

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The Crisis In University Education

—*M. S. Gore*

1. The organisational pattern and its pre-requisites.

The first three Universities of Modern India were established in the year 1857 in Calcutta, Bombay and Madras. They were governed by three separate Acts but all the three acts set in identical pattern of University organisation. This was the pattern of an affiliating, examining University. The University was to hold examinations, charge fees and award degrees. The teaching at the undergraduate as well as postgraduate levels was undertaken in the Colleges which were located in the city where the University itself was located and in farther away district towns. Despite some modifications and variations this is still the basic pattern followed by all except a few universities in India. The one hundred and odd years of experience in University education has only helped to amplify, refine and complicate the many rules by which this impersonal pattern of education focussed on examinations and degrees is made to work.

The pattern was copied from the organisation of the London University. It offered certain advantages. It provided a way for unifying the programmes of instruction in the colleges which were already in existence and which were themselves not capable of individually developing into universities. It was inexpensive. The Universities were supported by the Government, but the colleges were not—unless they were government colleges. Even later when a system of aid to private colleges was introduced (1882) it limited the responsibility of the Government to only a portion of the approved expenditure. The pattern also followed for a quick and indefinite multiplication of colleges affiliated to the same university and thus met the problem of large numbers. In 1857 there were 27 colleges in the country, 1882 there were 68 and in 1902 there were 179. This pattern provided the Government with an easy objective way of picking out talent for jobs in Government offices.

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This last point regarding the linkage between college education and recruitment to Government jobs needs special notice. In the particular economic and political conditions in India, it has been an important factor in motivating individuals to enter educational policies. As early as 1854, the *Education Despatch of the Court of Directors* (Wood's Education Despatch) had laid down a policy that a person with education should be perferred over one without and had foreseen that 'the numerous vacancies of different kinds which have constantly to be filled up, may afford a great stimulus to education.....'. Their expecation has been more than fulfilled. In fact, for a long time the possibility of securing a Government job was the dominant goal for students entering colleges. Simultaneously the emphasis laid upon a university degree as the single criterian of education, due partly to its easy essessibility and partly to the literacy emphasis of Brahmanic scholarship, had the consequence of making it seem that the acquisition of a degree was the only objective of education. This, as will be seen later, has influenced not only the student but also the educator.

This pattern of affiliating universities could function only under certain conditions. The first of these related to the appointment of examiners. Since all students from different colleges were ultimately to receive their degree from the same University, it became necessary that the university should have all the initiative and authority in the appointment of examiners, The Acts of 1857 gave this power to the universities. They were to appoint and remove all the examinations conducted by them. The separation of the teaching and the examining functions put the teachers themselves, however indirectly, in the position of being examinees. They were judged by the performance of their students. This introduced an element of rivalry between the different colleges. If the competition was to be fair one, it was necessary that the examiner—the judge in the situation—was a third party. Hence the emphasis on choosing a majority, if not all, examiners from among persons who were not teachers in that university. This was achieved by a rule requiring a certain proportion of the examiners to be 'external' examiners—i.e. from outside the university itself. Even the internal examiners were usually appointed from among those who did not teach the subject to a particular class.

Another aspect of this requirement of fairness was that the identity of the examiner as well as the examinee should be kept secret. An elaborate machinery had to be devised to ensure secrecy.

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Every university has a separate 'confidential' branch which corresponds with examiners through sealed covers, ensures the secret and last-minute publication of the question papers, gives special code numbers to the answer-books written by examinees, and is responsible for the publication of results. Neither the examiner nor the examinee knows about the other's identity. Since many of the examiners are from other universities, it has to be ensured that the questions that they have set for examination are within the area that the student is expected to know. Hence a step has to be provided for in the sequence of examination procedures where the question papers are scrutinised and moderated by a group of persons who while familiar with the university syllabus in the particular subject have generally no immediate interest in any institution or individual. Despite concealment of the identity of examinees every examiner has to give a written assurance that he has no immediate relative, friend or a person in whom he is otherwise interested who is a candidate for the same examination. The logic of 'objectivity' in examinations is inexorable and very harsh indeed ! No one seems to notice that in all this concern for 'objectivity' the teacher appears, by implication, to be a suspect person. He cannot be depended upon to objectivity assess his own and other students.

If objectivity calls for endless measures of secrecy in the organisation of an examination, it also calls for comparability in standards of instruction in the different colleges. The university exercises great authority in this area in respect of colleges affiliated to it. The subjects to be taught, the groupings to be allowed, the portions and topics to be covered and even the books to be used are all specified by the university on the recommendations of its academic bodies. Normally this situation would not give rise to problems by itself. But in the Indian context where the number of colleges teaching a particular course may be as many as thirty or forty and the number of teachers involved is easily between a hundred and two hundred only a very small minority of them are likely to be represented on these academic bodies. For most of the teachers, therefore, the syllabii and the text-books are prescribed by a distant body which they cannot easily influence and in whose deliberations they do not participate. Also, the large number of persons and institutions that are affected by any changes in the decisions and the somewhat involved, time-consuming process of bringing about such changes serves to make the academic bodies inflexible and inert. Somewhat charitably, this inertia is often described as academic cautiousness and explained on

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grounds of concern for the traditions of a university. Incidentally, the formal listing of topics and books facilities the work of the external examiner who can now know what exactly the students is expected to have learnt in his class.

By the same measure, however, this system makes the job of the teacher as uncreative one. In his concern for covering 'portions' for the examination, he misses the intellectual excitement of developing a theme, experimenting with new interpretations and in the effort, contributing to the subject which he is teaching. On the other hand, he covers portions in a text-book, dictates notes for the un-understanding, scans old examination question papers and has term-end sessions to instruct his flock in the strategy of appearing for an examination. The emphasis is on the mastery of a text, not the exploring of a subject. It gives rise to a type of scholarship which at its best shows mastery over other peoples' ideas, quotes diverse sources, analyses a question from several points of view but usually fails to come up with a synthesis or a constructive suggestion. It is diffident of taking positions on issues and finds it difficult to apply known facts to new situations.

Nothing brings out more effectively the essentially redundant role that our college teacher plays than the enormous popularity achieved by 'guides', 'notes' and 'three-hours-before-the-examination' pamphlets among the students. If the main aim is to pass an examination and obtain a degree these 'guide' books, which set out questions and answer them, serve the purpose atleast as well as the class teacher does. They are more unashamedly oriented to objectives in mind. So is the instruction in the coaching classes and teaching shops that abound in our educational centres.

Some teachers are still respected for their scholarship, some are admired for their brilliance in speech, some are loved for the personal concern they show for their students, but most have to depend upon the traditional authority of their role as teachers to hold their own with the students. The tragedy of the present situation is not that every teacher fails to make a significant contribution to the subject he teaches, but that the system of which he is a part provides no incentive for those who are capable of such contribution to work for it.

It would be wrong to put all blame for this situation at the doors of our universities and their system of examinations. There are other factors reponsible for it. But before leaving the subject of university organisation, it would be important to note another of its

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features. A reference has been made above to the rigidity of our curricula. One aspect of this rigidity is the very limited number of combinations that a student can choose from in appearing for an examination. The number of approved courses offered in each subject is limited to about a dozen. Usually not all these optional courses are taught at the colleges. The economics of college organisation precludes that possibility. Also, the difficulty of arranging an examination schedule providing for a large variety of optional courses for thousands of students also serves as a check on the number of alternatives followed by a university. Besides, university rules also tend to limit the possibility of a student choosing courses from different subject groupings. Here again the present organisation of college instruction would make it difficult to allow students to exercise such a choice. The most convenient thing from the administrative (and economic) point of view is to have a group of students admitted to college go through as common a set of courses as possible. Since they have all to appear for examinations and complete their programme of study at about the same time arranging examinations is a major operation. It can be undertaken only about once in a year. Students cannot choose their courses, pass them individually and determine their own time schedule of study completion. For the students this situation minimizes his area of choice—of the course, the teacher and the pace of completing the total requirements. As larger and larger numbers of students press in upon universities this inflexibility of our course organisation tends to become a major problem. The controversy about morning colleges and evening colleges would become largely pointless if students as a rule had a wider choice of courses and a more flexible programme by which to complete their total degree requirements. This, however, is not possible in the context of a system of centralised examinations arranged once or twice a year for students of all colleges in a university.

Education aims and the social context

Another major factor that has influenced the growth of education in the country is the general economic and political situation in the country. This was a situation characterised by foreign rule and a general paucity of economic resources. Both of these have tended to determine the type of orientation that modern education received in the country.

For almost three quarters of a century after their establishment, universities in India provided one type of education—described

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euphemistically as education in the liberal arts. Initially this was done in conformity with the best traditions of British university education. But after the Industrial Revolution, British education made quick adjustments both at the level of schools as well as colleges. Vocational and technical education became available within the normal schooling system and technical and professional courses received a university status even in the older universities. In India this change has not taken place to date at the school level though technological courses have for some time been available in the universities. Even at the university level the opportunities for technological education are woefully inadequate.

Generally, it is assumed that this inadequacy can be explained in terms of the inadequacy of economic resources. This is undoubtedly partially true, but this does not constitute the entire explanation. Our cultural traditions which looked down upon manual work by high caste individuals and the limitation of education to persons of the higher castes was another factor equally responsible for the lack of interest in technical edncation in the initial stage.

For a long time and almost until recently college education was looked upon as a preparation for a white collar job, preferably in a Government office. A Government job assured security and also a channel for upward social mobility of however limited a character. The number of students enrolling in the colleges has gone on steadily increasing. Today we have close to one million students in our universities. A vast majority of them are still studying the 'liberal arts' courses. The growth in the number of white-collar jobs however has not kept pace with the number of students graduating from colleges. Their education has not specially equiped them for anything else.

This is a situation with serious implications for the educational system as a whole. It affects the motivations of students and their attitude to education. The teacher who is also a part of the society is subject to similar experiences. Having failed to secure a Government job or having conceded failure even without trying for it, he has often taken to teaching as his second best choice. He is looking for security and not for intellectual adventure. Some of these implications will be examined in the next section. Immediately we will turn to see how Government as the largest single employer tends to set a pattern of values in education.

Faced with the problem of having to select and recommend in-

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dividuals for a large number of posts and from among even large number of applicants the Government recruiting agencies have to devise some quick methods of security. If 'objectivity' is important in university examinations, it is even more important in selecting persons for jobs. For the more important posts this is achieved by setting another examination—a competitive examination—for all candidates. For the others, they tend to attach a great deal of importance to the candidate's performance in university examination. The quickest index of this performance is the 'Class' or 'Division' obtained by a student in the examination. Hence the great significance attached to securing a good Division. For most jobs persons who have failed to secure a second Division fail also to meet the minimum eligibility condition. One cannot question the justifiability of such a procedure as an impartial way of screening candidates. One would even imagine that this should provide a good incentive for students to do well in their studies to examinations. And performance in examinations in often looked upon not as an index but the substance of scholarship. In the background of the organisation of university instruction and examination this emphasis upon 'Division' further helps the crystallization of a technique of doing well in examinations as separate from doing well in one's studies and even less of having enjoyed them. This gives rise to the curious phenomenon of people who have obtained a good Master's Degree in Literature but who rarely open a book of plays or poems after leaving school. If we are looking for people who develop a sense of commitment to their subjects of study, this system of education is the least likely to provide them.

3. *College organisation and the college teacher*

There is hardly a country, even among the most developed ones, where educational institutions do not suffer because of the paucity of resources available to them. But the undergraduate college in India is probably in a category by itself. Specially if it is located in one of the small district towns, it will be found to have meagre endowments and little state support. It depends for a substantial part of its revenue upon the fees paid by the student. Here again the fees charged from each student cannot be very high. Its economic viability, therefore, must depend greatly upon large student bodies and small teaching staff. The average size of the student body of a college consists of over 1500 students and the students teacher ratio is rarely less than 25 : 1 (In the British universities

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this ratio is 9 : 1). Not unusually about 150-200 students jointly attend a class.

Wherever there are a large student bodies with small staff the method of instruction most likely to be adopted is the lecture method where the students expect the teacher to keep talking for a whole hour on one of the topics prescribed for study. This method is also suited to the concept of 'covering' a syllabus for an external examination. There is little scope for discussion even if the teacher were inclined to encourage it. No one can reasonably expect him to provide individual attention. He would be a specially good teacher if he knew the names of half his students. Since the syllabii outlined by the university and even the text-books prescribed remain usually unchanged for long periods the young teacher finds that his book-notes made during his own student days can help him to get by for some year initially while he is still preoccupied with overcoming his 'stage-fright'. Later he is too lazy to change them.

The word load of a college teacher is also heavy. He has to teach between 18-22 hours per week. This leaves him little time to do any other professional work of his own. His vacations are of course free. But these he tends to fill up by accepting the work of correcting examination scripts for one University or the other. The longer he has been in the field, the more contacts he has had and the easier it is for him to become part of the informal mutual appointments system that develop whereby "your university appoints me as an examiner and I appoint you in return." This additional work brings in much needed money for an otherwise ill-paid teacher.

The teacher's professional commitment is weak. There is nothing in the college educational system which encourages or requires him to function as a professional outside his class-room. He has sought security in his employment and this he is assured. After the first year of probation he gets a tenure appointment with regular annual increments. His promotion in the college depends more on seniority than on his contribution to his subject. In fact, in the under-graduate college, there are no academic designations corresponding to 'Reader' or Professor. The Heads of subject departments are called college Professors and they usually get appointed by seniority. Persons who have achieved these positions are not likely to encourage, let alone guide, any research work by younger colleagues.

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Our system of education has thus institutionalized the role of a non-creative subject teacher who functions much the same way as a high school teacher would—reading, explaining, annotating paragraph by paragraph the text-books which his students have to learn up for their examinations. His interest in students is judged by whether he dictates 'notes' and memory points on 'difficult and important' portions—i.e. the ones more likely to appear in the examination paper—of his syllabus. He rarely uses the college library and no one really expects him to have seen recent issues of professional journals.

The uninspired, unmotivated teacher makes a poor spectacle. He is frustrated in his work and in his social ambitions. The better teacher must move over to take up administrative work—as principal, vice-principal, bursar or warden of hostel—to find satisfaction, additional income and social recognition. For, within the educational sphere, again, it is the administrator who wields authority and can exercise initiative. Those who achieve these positions become identified with the college and with the policies of its governing council. These positions are usually attained on the recommendation of the Principal of the College. Inevitably he picks up those who are likely to go along with his policies. If he is fairminded person and applies his policies impartially he can still give leadership to the college staff as one single group. If he wavers he may find that he has helped create factions in college. At any rate those who have tried and failed to achieve any position in the college constellation will remain frustrated and unidentified with college administration. Sometimes their frustration may take an active form and then we find the emergence of the phenomenon of 'parties' among college teachers.

It may be argued, and with justification, that factious groupings are not unique to the Indian campus and that they are found in British and American colleges as well. Probably, but what is unique in our context is that the unchallenging and unrewarding nature of his academic work invariably leads the teacher to look upon administrative and elective positions as plums to be coveted and acentuates the problem. The relationships between colleagues are more subject to 'political' pressures. The absence of alternative jobs outside college and the difficulties in the way of moving from one college to another compel dissatisfied teachers to continue in the same college. The wounds fester and vitiate the college atmosphere. Some teachers make college 'politics' their major pre-

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occupation. This malady affects the small, teaching universities to an even greater degree. Here the non-teacher members of university and college bodies find ready allies among the frustrated teachers. In this atmosphere univerity elections are characterised by much manourring and behind scene deals. Small wonder if life on the campuses is disturbed further by acts of student 'indiscipline'.

4. *The student in college and the university*

The college student presents and experiences an entirely different set of problem. The first relates to his motivation. Enough has been said in the earlier sections to suggest that interest in the subject of study is likely to be the least important of the many factors that motivate him to join college. It is not suggested that in other countries average student joins college because of a burning passion for a particular subject. The chances of making out a career by following a certain course of studies is naturally an important consideration with most young men. The peculiarity of the Indian situation is that a vast majority of students in colleges have to pursue courses in which they have no interest either for subject-matter or as preparation for a career. In fact, they know that often the value of the course lies only in the fact that it earns them a Degree at the end.

For some reason a university degree is considered essential for nearly every kind of job. On the other hand, a degree does not ensure a job. Jobs are few and for a college graduate with a liberal arts degree the while-collared jobs are even fewer. In this situation the Class or Division that he obtained become rather important. Here again he cannot always be very helpful. By the time he enters college a student usually knows where he belongs in the general distribution of students. He may be quite aware that academic work is not his forte' and yet he must need pursue it. A student who has reconciled himself to his own poor performance cannot awaken to a new challenge. He is a drag. Unfortunately there is a large number of them in college. They set the tone of college life.

The poorly motivated, self-denigrating student follows his own routine and rhythm. He attends college regularly, puts in the required attendance but does not study. He has never seen the inside of the college library after the first 'get acquatined' tour on his day of enrolment. He has no set purpose. If he can afford it

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he might indulge in minor luxuries, but most of the time he can't. He finds security in the company of others in the same predictment. The college is his hang-out. He enjoys the sheltered freedom and the newness of his environment. But soon he tires of it ; because inside him he is worried and helpless. He stirs himself into activity three months before a university examination, burns midnight oil, nervously completes the examination and awaits the result.

The non-creative teacher and the unenthused student are apt counterparts to each other. In an otherwise stail life the student finds excitement in the occasional agitations that crop up on an Indian campus. The idealism, however misconstrued, that tinges these agitations bolsters his self respect. He has a cause to fight for. Anything from a 'hard' examination paper to a live international issues will be found suitable. Some of the students become adepts at whipping up enthusiasm for any new issue—good, bad, relevant, irrelevant. The background of nationalistic agitation which had the seal of legitimacy has contributed in no small meausure to this situation. But the real fuel is provided by the lack of his involvement in academic life, by the failure of his teacher-idols, by the irrelevance of much of what he is expected to do in terms of his own future as a useful worker and by his helplessness in the face of it all.

The 'politicking' teacher thus finds his counterpart in the 'politicking' student. Outside parties, and sometimes even his teachers, might take interest and encourage him in his activities. He finds a heroism which he is denied in his day to day life. Unconsiously he moulds himself on the pattern set up agitative leadership. At a time when hunger strikes and processions are legitimate weapons in the armoury of politicians it is difficult to dissuade students from using them. In the academic climate that prevails on our campuses students are often led to believe that they stand in the same position as workers do to their employees. The fact that their mutual interests are not in conflict and the teachers have nothing to gain at the expense of the students is lost sight of in the heat of controversy.

5. *Changes that are needed*

This crisis in college and university education can be looked at from may points of view and has been attributed to many diverse causes. The analysis undertaken in this paper leads us to the conclusion that it is not this or that aspect that needs to be modified ; it is

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the basic pattern of our higher education that must be reorganised. We must devise a system in which the teacher plays a central, creative role. The pattern of the affiliating, examining university has failed to provide such a role for the teachers. Even our smaller teaching universities have failed in this purpose by their continued insistence on rigidly prescribed courses, text books and external examiners. In fact, one finds that the problem of 'student discipline' has manifested itself with more than normal fury on the campuses of our small, unitary universities. In the larger, affiliating universities which have no single campus, the students probably find it difficult to organise themselves and to identify objects which can serve as targets for their anger and frustration.

The reorganisation that is required is not easy to bring about. We are afraid of giving autonomy to small colleges because we think this will lead to a fall in standards. We do not consider our college teachers ready to formulate their course or evaluate their students. Yet unless we are ready to trust them that far, we may not be any nearer the solution of the problem. Even today despite the efforts of the Inter-University Board, Committees of Equivalence and the system of external examiners, it has not been possible to ensure comparability—let alone equality—of standards between universities. Even within the same university no one can seriously argue that the standards achieved by different colleges are even relatively the same. The standards must always depend upon teachers and the students. It might be useful to accept this fact and let at least selected colleges confer their own degrees. In course of time colleges will have earned their reputations based not upon the number of First classes etc. but upon the contribution of their teachers and graduates to the field. They will find it necessary to arrive at definite arrangements with universties if their graduates are to continue for higher studies.

This change, however, must be accompanied by a change in our system of recruitment to Government jobs. The possession of a college or university degree should not by itself be considered a criterion of eligibility or competence—except in technical professional fields. There is a need to 'devalue' degrees except in so far as they are directly related to the specific intellectual equipment that a job calls for. In the long run the removal of the excessive importance attached to degrees will be one way of ensuring that only adequately motivated students will apply for admission to

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CHAPTER XXIII

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Human Relations and Democracy

—Humayun Kabir

Dhurjati Prasad Mukerji was a pioneer in the study of sociology in India. For him, sociology included every aspect of human life and thought. His approach was broad and liberal and he brought to the study of every problem a rich background of knowledge in many fields. He was interested in economics and politics, literature and philosophy, music and the finearts. He was thus in the line of the great humanists who regarded everything human as the object of their study and regard.

Dhurjati Prasad Mukerji wrote extensively and yet his writings express only a fraction of his personality. He was a brilliant conversationalist and those who have not heard him discussing problems with his friends cannot have a full idea of the richness and quality of his intellect. Witty and incisive, there was an essential kindliness in his nature. It was this combination of an acute intellect and warm feelings which made him such a memorable personality.

Dhurjati Prasad Mukerji's major interest was man. I have therefore attempted brief study of an aspect of human relations as a tribute to the memory of a scholar who combined intellectual analysis with the greatest human sympathies.

I

Problems of human relations affect every one of us at every moment of our lives. One may indeed say that the whole of human experience is a continual study and adjustment in human relations. Whether it is politics or industry, problems of human relations and therefore of management become important wherever large groups of men congregate. Industrialists sometimes sharply differentiate between bureaucracy and business management and think that the methods of Government are slow, cumbrous and rigid. The difference is however one of degree rather than of nature. Where there is a small unit, whether it is in administration or in politics or in

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industry, decisions can be taken on the basis of personal knowledge and insight. This becomes impossible when the size of the unit expands. In some of the industrial empires in Europe or America, which deal not in terms of lakhs or even crores of rupees but in billions and trillions of dollars, some of the characteristics found in public administration enter into business as well.

Wherever large groups of human beings are involved, certain general principles have to be laid down. When there is an immediate personal contact between the authority and those who have to submit to that authority, decisions can be quick, immediate and tinged with personal relationship. When the scale of operation goes beyond a certain size, abstract principles must come in. And once abstract principles are brought in, deviations from those principles become difficult to sustain.

The larger the unit, the greater the need for abstract principles and the greater are the risks of any deviation. That is why in governmental action, regulations sometimes become rigid. In the industrial field, there may be a little more flexibility, but there also, regulations become increasingly more important as the scale of operations increases. Bureaucracy is often abused, but it is not possible to think of any large scale unit anywhere—whether in the political field or in industry or in commerce—which can function without some kind of bureaucracy. Bureaucracy operates by laying down general principles and applying them to specific instances. A new problem however arises when rules take the place to personal assessment. Once direct relations are weakened through such informal laws, how can we ensure that good human relations will be maintained ?

There can be no denying that friction is one of the greatest causes of inefficiency in human affairs. It is also one of the greatest causes of economic and material loss. Just as a machine requires lubricants to ensure that the friction does not go above a certain level, in human relations also we require lubricants. Whenever the element of friction is eliminated, efficiency is immediately increased. We may take an example from industry but it will apply equally to social and political affairs. Every captain of industry knows that a contented labour force is one of the greatest factors for improved production. Without a contented labour force, even the most up-todate machinery cannot give the desired results. The essence of good management is therefore the elimination of friction.

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In the political field, various measures have been adopted for the elimination of friction of which perhaps the most important is the evolution of democracy. Democracy, with all its faults, is the most efficient form of Government that the world has known till now. There is a popular superstition, not in India alone, that dictatorship is more efficient than democracy. History proves beyond the shadow of any doubt that in every clash between a democracy and a dictatorship, the more democratic form has triumphed. That is true of four thousand years of history of which we have knowledge. There are two sound reasons for this. One is that in a democracy there is a greater possibility of knowing what exactly is wanted. Community of purpose is achieved through discussion and debate which are essential features of democracy. Where there is no democracy there is no discussion, but only orders from above. In such circumstances, orders are liable to be misunderstood. Every captain, whether in industry or administration or war, thinks that he has given clear instructions on a particular point, but sometimes his ablest lieutenant may interpret the orders in a different way. The lieutenant's lieutenant may deviate further from the original intention. Each deviation in itself may be marginal, but if there are several intermediaries, the actual executant may do something quite different from what the captain had intended.

After the World War of 1939-45, there was an elaborate analysis of the causes of Hitler's defeat. Hitler had started with tremendous advantages. He had the inner lines of communication and a more compact area. His resources were within his immediate control and he had the advantage of initial surprise and yet he lost. It has been proved that a major reason for his defeat was misunderstanding at almost every level of command. This was due to the fact that even when people did not understand what the orders were, they carried them out. In a democracy, we constantly ask : "What is it that you mean ?" In a dictatorship, no body dares to ask such questions, for a question may be interpreted as implicit criticism. The result is that in a dictatorship, orders are invariably misunderstood. Any single misunderstanding may be slight, but the cumulative effect is decisive. It is like the transition from black to white. There are many intervening shades of grey, but black and white stand in sharp contrast.

The second reason why democracy has always won is that frictions can be eliminated in a democracy through various rational methods. In a dictatorship, the only way of getting rid of a tyrant is

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to cut off his head. In a democracy, there is always the possibility of replacing a ruler without removing him physically from the world. It has therefore a great step forward when the ballot replaced the bullet as a method of meeting political conflicts.

The demand of the modern age is to apply these principles to the industrial world. As democracy grows inside industry, one of the major causes of friction will decrease. How industrial democracy will be achieved is yet uncertain and one may point to shortcomings and defects that have been revealed whenever democratic principles have been extended to the industrial field. This not surprising for neither is political democracy yet perfect. There are still rigidities and causes of friction in the machinery of political democracy inspite of the fact that men have thought and fought over such democracy for almost two thousand years. In the field of industry and commerce, democracy is only biginning but human nature being what it is, democracy will ultimately offer a solution in the industrial field as well.

This brings us to the question of leadership. Leadership is more important in democracy than in any other form of human organisation. In other forms, the accident of birth, wealth or status may help a person to exercise authority without having the qualities of leadership. And because the vast majority of people are predisposed to accept whatever orders are given, friction does not arise to the same extent in other forms of social organisation. In a democracy, the leadership has to be won. It has to be deserved and achieved. In democracy in the political field, one of the major problems is to choose the leader. This refers not only to the leader at the top, but to a whole hierarchy of leaders, for without a hierarchy of leaders democracy cannot work.

The problem of hierarchy raises the immediate question of delegation of authority. This is in fact one of the most difficult problems in the democratic management of men. In autocratic systems, some one is in a position of authority and everyone takes orders from him. In democracy, authority is derived from popular support. This tends to make the situation even more difficult for persons who occupy positions of intermediary leadership. In a monarchy, an able king is normally not afraid of any rival and therefore he can delegate authority to his subordinates without mental reservations. In a democracy, the lieutenant may and does at times become a potential rival of the leader. In fact, the position of Number Two vis-a-vis Number One in such a set-up is extremely difficult. If he does not

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exercise initiative and authority, the leader will correctly decide that he has no enterprise and can never become Number One. On the otherhand, if he exercises too much initiative and independence, there is a danger that the leader may become jealous. It is only through a properly worked out system of hierarchy, in which power is delegated at suitable levels, that this problem can be resolved.

Friction in human relations arises from the desire for power. Corruption is another major cause for such friction. In all relations of human beings, the best and basic lubricant is a sense of justice. There is the old English saying, "Not only must justice be done, but people must feel that justice is being done." Wherever there is the feeling that everything is above board and there is fair play and justice, one of the major causes of friction disappears.

The problem of corruption is ultimately a problem of leadership. It is inescapable when incompetant persons get to the top through extraneous circumstances. When a person achieves leadership through character and ability, people accept his leadership even when they do not agree with him on all points. Even those who are disappointed cannot nurse any sense of grievance or resentment. Democratic leadership in order to be successful must therefore be based on intellectual and moral qualities.

Inefficient leadership leads to corruption in at least three different ways. An incompetent person is not master of the situation and finds it difficult to make a decision. He invariably procrastinates. It is a common human failing that whenever we are faced with a difficulty we cannot resolve, we try to push off the evil day. Delays however inevitably lead to corruption, for if a thing cannot be done in the normal course, people do not hesitate to resort to abnormal ways.

The second way in which inefficient leadership brings corruption is by the creation of a circle of advisers. An incompetent man lacks self-confidence and therefore seeks to strengthen his own decisions by collecting a coterie or group to lend him support. It is such groups that enable him to function at all and, naturally, members of such groups demand returns for the services they render. In this way, vested interests grow up which are more anxious for their own benefit than the general good.

Inefficient leadership also causes corruption by encouraging the formation of cliques and intrigues which oppose one another. When

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a man achieves leadership through character and ability, he is accepted by the community. In the case of an inefficient person, people wonder how he could get to the top and attribute his success to patronage, cliques and intrigues. This encourages the formation of new cliques and groups and there develops an unseemly struggle for power in which moral standards are bound to suffer.

A hierarchy of leadership based on ability and character thus offers the best solution for human problems whether in politics, administration or industry. These qualities are not the preserve of any particular section but spread throughout the community. Anything which confines the choice of leadership to any special section therefore militates against the principle of justice and fairplay. This is why the hereditary principle has been steadily eliminated from different spheres of human activity. In the field of politics, it has disappeared almost completely. In the field of industry and commerce, its scope has been severely curtailed in all advanced countries of the world. As opportunities are equalised through spread of education for all, the hereditary principle gives way to selection on merit. It cannot be said that man has succeeded in establishing equal conditions for all, but the trend in that direction is unmistakable. One may hope that as the democratic principle is extended to all aspects of life, a major cause of friction in human society will steadily diminish and perhaps one day disappear.

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CHAPTER XXIV

Emotional Integration or Social Integration : A Social-Psychological Analysis

—*Kali Prasad*

Unity in Diversity

India embodies a large variety of people, cultures, languages and regional differences which present a curious kaleidoscopic pattern. But this heterogeneity is not peculiar to India : other large countries like the U.S.A., U.S.S.R. exemplify a similar diversity. Even smaller countries like Switzerland, Yugoslavia and Scandinavia consist of groups and communities which speak different languages and profess different faiths. No state today is completely homogeneous and it is not necessary that it should be so. In fact, a country with a dead homogeneity and a monolithic culture would represent a dreadful state of affairs. It would be a negation of all that is distinctively human. Individual aspirations, individual freedom, initiative and opportunities for the development of individual talents and the flowering of individual genuis would be utterly impossible in a State which is characterised by such homogeneity even if it were at all possible. The richness and diversity of people's cultures and their distinctive pattern is not by itself a disadvantage; on the contrary, it is these that lend not only colour but also strength and individuality to a country. One must therefore guard against the mistaken cry that the diversity in India must somehow be subdued into a kind of homogeneity without which the country cannot develop. India is really one and indivisible. "However different the languages are and however differently derived, differently sustained and expanded and enriched, the basic thought underlying every language, the one common unifying thought, ideal and focus, has been the mythology of India, the ancient lore of India, the ancient songs of India and they extend from the banks of Brahmaputra to Cape Comorin" (an excellent illustration of this is provided by the great epics and the Puranas which are attempts at welding the heterogenous strains in our culture into one whole, one *weltanschauung*). The underlying unity is the *unity of thought*, the unity of a philosophic concept and philosophic traditions which are

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distinctively Indian. This philosophy and the system of values which goes along with it, characterises the life and conduct of the people of India irrespective of their religion, culture, their blood-groups, or language and religion. We are not at the moment concerned with the evaluation of this philosophy ; whether it is good or bad, but we must recognise the fact that a philosophic substratum underlies Indian life and and Indian culture. From Kashmir to Comarin wherever we might go, one feels that the peoples' belief and their behavior are motivated by these basic existential philosophic concepts. For instance, the concept of Dharma, of Karma, and of Moksha characterise in ever so many ways the thinking and the conduct of the people as a whole. One would, of course, come across instances where this faith is alive and vivid and also instances where it has suffered an attenuation which has rendered it into a mere mockery of the Original. Nonetheless, vague or vivid, conscious or otherwise, the influence of the philosophy is universal.

National Unity

From the above it would be obvious that the bases for national unity and integration cannot be discovered in geographical and regional factors or common linguistic forms or prevailing cultural mores etc., but in recognising and emphasising the *philosophic and intellectual* factors as distinct from merely emotional elements. In this sense "emotional integration" is a misleading phrase, for the stable foundations of integration in a society cannot be based on fluctuating emotions but on more abiding factors such as comprehension and a vivid *understanding* of the main-springs that motivate individuals and communities and the values that inspire them. It is these *ideas* and values that characterise Indians like any other people and bind them together. One might illustrate these ideas as they influence attitudes that our people take toward material goods, toward nature, time and movement, cause and effect, toward the preferred types of inter-personal relationship-patterns, toward what psychologists call a "modal personality" and in general toward the ultimate goal of life. The basis of the unity of India then is *not religious as some people understand it but philosophical*, something which has been summed up in what is usually called the Hindu view of life ; for Hinduism is more a Philosophy, a way of life than a doctrine or a creed. This view of life is fairly abstract and perhaps a little vague and elusive but its vagueness and generality makes it flexible so as to accomodate divergent modes of thinking without surrendering the basic principles.

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In the context of this philosophic view one might try to analyse the various factors which would enable us to understand our people and also help us in organising a programme of integrative action which would develop and strengthen the sense of unity in the country. For instance, we have to understand how our system of values anchored in traditional philosophy can be modified or is being modified under the stress of the modern changing world. We have to see to what extent some of the values which are inhospitable to the changes in contemporary life could be modified or abandoned ; how on the other hand, some values which can accommodate social change could be further strengthened and developed. This is a task which is beset by great difficulties. It involves a *re-interpretation of our traditional philosophy* and also an understanding of the foundations of behavior which may be explored with a view to seeing how change could be produced and accommodated. In this dual task the philosopher and the social psychologist and the social thinker should bend their efforts toward developing a new concept or a new philosophy relevant to the needs and goals of a society in transition.

The Principle of Enlargement

One of the fundamental principles underlying our philosophy is the common idea that all individuals reflect the same principle of consciousness which is pervasive, universal and ultimate. This principle enables one to see one's neighbour as basically as one self. Consequently, it assumes that the 'natural tendency' of a man is to look upon others as *participants* in the life and culture prevalent around him rather than as competitors in a merciless struggle for survival. This is directly in contradiction to the Hobbesian, and later evolutionary principle of conflict and survival of the fittest. Men are not combative by nature ; if at all, they are more co-operative than combative. Successful psycho-therapy offers an interesting illustration of this. Most patients (like ordinary persons) brighten when they know that they are not alone in their misery. This imaginative integration of interest proves helpful in dealing with the difficulties of the patient. Similarly, social conflicts are resolved by bringing a resistant interest in line with more inclusive and wider values.

Psychologists have been studying the growth and the development of the individual on this basis of enlargement in childhood. The studies of Piaget and the investigators are relevant here. Piaget found that children around seven and eight years of age are unable, for

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instance, to think of themselves as both Genevese and Swiss. When asked to draw a circle for Geneva and Switzerland they usually draw two circles side by side and they insist that if they are *Genevese* they cannot at the sametime be Swiss. Loyality to the homeland does not yet exist, if at all there is the lesser loyality only for their town or for the sector in which *tye* live in the town. In the same manner they show even greater "cognitive impoverishment" concerning foreign countries. The child's reactions at this stage are wholly egocentric. His responses to various objects and places are centexed round some affective aspects of his own behaviour. For instance, he would say that I like Geneva because I was born there, or I like Bern because my uncle lives there. He is the centre of his reference in all such perceptions. In the words of Piaget the child has not developed the process of "decentering" that is, moving out of the unity of his own age or self to any large social unit.

Ages seven and nine are transitional. Although the child draws a circle for Geneva inside the circle for Switzerland "he still has difficulty in translating spatial enclosures into terms of 'social enclosure'. He may say, for example, I am Swiss now so I will not be Genevese any longer. The concept of the homeless is gradually growing but in a self-centered way." At this age he looks upon foreign lands with suspicion and contempt ('the French are dirty ; the Americans want war : all people wish to become Swiss'.) The child has obviously taken bits of these stereo-types concerning other countries from association with adults and has integrated them in the texture of his affective self-centredness.

It is only at the age of ten and eleven that there is any appreciable progress in "decentring", and now egocentricity begins to yield to the principles of *reciprocity* and *relatedness*. He now gives fewer personal reasons for his effective attachment to his homeland and he understands how members of other countries are attached to their own lands." The cognitive reciprocity does not necessarily mean that the child is capable of saying good of the peoples he knows". He may still despise them. Whether the child develops his affective provincialism along with cognitive provincialism seems to depend largely on the attitudes he learns from his parents.

Now this study has certain important bearing on the understanding of the problem of integration. In the first place, it shows that maturation and time are required to achieve decentering from the unit of self to a progressively larger social unit. This process may be

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arrested at any stage especially in its affective dimensions. To be a successful normal individual it would be necessary that both the cognitive and affective enlargement develop together in relation to this social medium. Secondly, the individual grows by a successive process of 'decentering' from his family, neighbourhood, town, state and Nation in a manner such that his large loyalities do not clash with his narrower loyalities and this is possible only to the extent that his smaller loyalities can be maximally accommodated in the larger loyalities. This does not mean that pride *amor propre* in himself, in his kith and kin, in his group and country must necessarily be abolished ; it only means that these loyalties would be in place only in so far as they do not produce confiict and tension in the large whole to which he belongs. There may be competition and struggle but this struggle need not lead to extermination but would be utilised as in games and sports for giving an opportunity for building up and structuring normally adjusted individuals.

Cognitive Style

There have been a large number of studies of prejudice, that have dealt with its origins and the development and have suggested groups and tension-reduction techniques. For the most part these prejudices arise from unconscious bases and especially exemplify regressive and atavistic behavior. But it is clearly recognised that prejudices are also learnt by the child while he is growing in his environment. But comparatively there are fewer studies of what has been called the *cognitive style* of life. Like prejudices, the cognitive style is also a matter of learning and cultivation. This style emphasises the habit of rational thinking and an objective appraisal of one's situation and the necessity of taking a ' balanced view' of things. Such habits of rationality-oriented behavior can obviously be cultivated at home, school, and in various social and political and religious institutions.

Two Levels of Integration

The problem of integration can now be viewed at two levels : (i) sense-imaginal and emotional level and (ii) the intellectual, the understanding & organismic level. As has been said earlier integration at the first level represents, an arrest of development or a regression to primitive modes of adjustment by the individual to his situation. Like the behaviour of the child this behaviour is dominantly egocentric and is characterised by such bipolarities as : assendance—submission ; Aggression-complacency ; boastful or conceited attitude ; subdued and dependent behavior ; insensitive-

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hysaerical ; self-assertive-submissive etc. Integration at this level is obviously shortlived and is quite fragile. It cannot withstand the onslaughts of reality and is not to collapse into regressive and atavistic behavior.

It is a well-known psychological fact that a person who remains fixated (or regresses) to the infantile level "misvalues" individuals around him and his inter-personal relationship just as he had "misvalued" the significant people of his childhood (his parents or parent-figures), his early emotional tie-ups remains unresolved and in consequence he is prone to distort the images of various people he meets in his life. The inter-personal misconceptions of his early childhood lie at the root of his present interpersonal difficulties. As an adult he would find himself *compulsorily* misjudging people and their reactions in accordance with his unconscious needs. In fact he might even be dimly aware of his distortions, but he feels helpless to change these anachronistic, distorted interpersonal relationships even though they are disapproved. This conflict leads to insecurity and anxiety and in turn it infects, others with the same feelings so that the group in which the individual operates shows symptoms of similar insecurity and anxiety—And, if such a person happens to be a leader it leads to what, Goldstein has called, "catastrophic reactions".

It also leads to its characteristic anxieties and suspicions often bordering on paranoia, from the mildest to the most virulent *type*.

Charismatic Leader

Individuals, and groups 'integrated' at emotional level give rise to and respond particularly to 'charismatic' leadership. This leadership is more or less independent of the office or status occupied by the leader "and is justified and legitimized by a social recognition of certain special extrasocietally sanctioned qualities imputed to the personality of the leader. In the eyes of his followers what the charismatic leader does is right because he does it—...When the actions of an ordinary person in authority go beyond his functions they are illegitimate. By contrast, no act of the charismatic leader can be illegitimate as long as he sees fit to perform it." The personality of the Charismatic leader conforms to childish fantasies of omnipotence and this leader might be looked upon as representing an arrest of development at the infantile level. In under developed societies (economically, socially and educationally) one often witnesses the phenomenon of charismatic leadership. In our own country today

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we have this phenomenon in a certain manner. Some of the leaders of the country owe their power and attraction to certain charismatic and 'mystical' trends in their personality. It would be interesting to speculate to what extent such trends and traits are to be found in the personality of leader of the type of Pt. Nehru who has the socalled 'mass appeal' or of Vinoba Bhave. The charismatic leader has illimitable power and while it is generally known that power corrupts it is not as well-understood that power *infantilises*. This is, the power-centered individual behaves much in the same manner as in infant with remarkable bipolarities of conduct and action. Much of the confusion that prevails in our own society today may be understood with reference to the type of leadership that we have.

Like the infant the charismatic leader is taken up with an idea or image or fantasy, charges it (largely unconsciously) with the fervour of gross emotion (and sometimes a evengelical zeal) and launches action-programs on its basis only to change soon to something equally irrational. All the while the followers cannot say anything and remain mute participants and bewildered spectators of the drama they do'nt understand. Nor is there any need for them to do so, for the leader knows and has his own "reasons" or insight into what action he demands. This type of leadership occurs particularly in crises where the normal processes of thought and action are largely suspended. It is in its nature authoritarian and dictatorial. The crisis might be the creation of the leader himself and having created one he feeds on it and moves from one to another until the whole structure collapses like the dollhouse of the infant.

Failure of Leadership

Whatever spectacular success such leadership may achieve, its failure is certain. In the pyramid of power that is built up the top is easily disassociated with the lower echelons which are completely neglected, for they are neither recognised nor appreciated. Consequently, they do not feel involved or responsible. In this situation factors such as indecision (order, counterorder, disorder), avoidance of responsibility, unnecessary work and sacrifices, quixotic errands, etc. begin to operate and cause confusion. The top leader would lose confidence of the people and hysteria may result. There would be inevitable search for scape-goats, blame throwing and accusation and counter accusations. A new leader may arise, but if the same pattern is followed the consequences would be the same.

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Two Types of leadership

Here, we might make a distinction between *two types of leadership* : one inferior to the other. The inferior type follows the '*pleasure principle*' by promising gratification of instinctual drives such as hunger, action, greed, revenge etc. immediately without consideration of the end results. Since these needs perpetually recur, their satisfaction is temporary. They relate to 'nature in the raw' and are associated with competition more than co-operation. The other kind of leadership follows the '*reality principle*'. The more leadership follows the reality principle, the higher would be its evaluation and more permanent its achievement. Reality-orientation obviously includes awareness of interpersonal-values which involves subordination of personal ends and postponement of personal satisfactions in the larger interests of the whole group. This is especially significant in times of crises. The more the group in a stress situation fails to avoid regressive tendencies, the greater the likelihood that the group will accept and follow inferior leadership ; in fact, it will accept a psychopath or a paranoid. 'It has always been observed that in situations of crises, a group can either react with an unusual degree of patience, self-control, inventionness and heroism, or can react oppositely, with impatience, lack of control, stupefication, egotism and paranois.' How the group would actually react would depend on the quality of leadership ; 'on the organisation of reserve echelons of leadership'.

The 'reserve echelons' of leadership would determine the organisation of the social, political and cultural character of a society much more than the top lavers of leadership in the grouy. Integrative influences (like the disintegrative ones) in a social group owe to the proper functioning of these echelons of leadership. And their proper functioning depends on i) an ideology or ideal purpose or objective, ii) the character and composition of the individuals constituting the group. Without dedication to an ideology or purpose it is difficult to see how people can be held together and move together toward its realisation. The idea itself must be anchored in the *real* needs and aspirations of the people as distinct from some phantasy or dream objective however impressive and rain-bow fringed it may be. It is important that the ideal must be *reality-oriented* otherwise it would lead inevitably to frustration and mass discontent. Secondly, the traditions and historical background and the socio-economic conditions of the people are obviously highly relevant. In a sense these in themselves throw up the kind of leadership that is available at any

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time. However, it is the total psycho-dynamical situation that may determine the emergence of leadership rather than any single factor or set of factors.

Dual Obligation and Training in Leadership

Now a leader (both top and lower ladder) has a dual obligation : He must embody in himself the faith of an ideal, a faith that is *live* and animates him and his behavior, a faith that is born of a reality-oriented ideal, a faith that is capable of translation into productive action in his social-miliue. Also, he must be keenly perceptive and must be able critically to approach history and traditions and time-honored values on the one hand ; on the other, he must be capable of making a forward thrust into the future carrying with him only such influences as provide a firm base for the forward leap. The part is useful only to the extent that it enables one to go forward to the future and not as a dead weight which drags. In this sense he should be able to understand and work for *transformations of traditions* and act as a catalytic agent. This implies a process of transcendance, or self-transcendance which is essential not only for his own self-realisation but also for the realisation of his adopted social ideal. All this is obviously impossible without considerable learning, training and self conscious reflection. This assumes a level of sophistication which is unattainable without good education and adequate social adjustment. There are *no natural leaders* of this type. They are a product of training and education. This training places emphasis on the values of both initiative and individuality on the one hand and co-operation and democratic adjustment on the other.

Two Types of Social Organisation and Leadership

Corresponding to the two types of leadership—the authoritarian and democratic there would be two kinds of social organisation. The first kind would be based on *power relationships* among individuals and the second kind upon *functional social relationships.* In the first kind an important aspect is the *power* of giving with-holding gratifications (which may include prestige, recognition etc. as well as food, shelter, money, etc.) ; in the second kind the important thing is the *good* of a particular activity, or the ideal objectives of a community or group. The first appears in authoritarian or autocratic leadership and subservient followership invariably marked by rigid hierarchy as in a society based on caste. The second which is democratic appears in a social organisation where individuals can make their individual or unique contribution in collaboration with others in the

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group, where both vertical and horizontal mobility is unhindered and free. Here although the specific functions of each individual may vary widely and may demand different degrees of skill or responsibility, they all function with a view to achieving group-objectives. The special excellence of one member gives the other member pride and a sense of achievement. Through their functional identification with each other, and through the sense of their own necessary interdependence as a group, they are enabled to regard him and each other with positive feelings untainted by ambivalence.'

This is not the case in first kind of group organisation where relationships of power-identification are charged with high degree of ambivalence. Here the lower strata depend on the 'higher' and the whole hierarchy is topped by the highest leader who exercises a kind of hypnotic sway on all. Communication is one-way, from top downward. Through the process of power-identification the leader and all the lower leaders are 'loved', for they can provide gratification to their followers, but they are also hated for the deprivations they can and have to impose on them. In this way they (followers) gain a sense of fulfilment by 'sharing' in the leaders' superior power identifiying themselves with him and with one another. The conscious barrier between self and others is lowered and they fuse into unity as a group. The individual could even sacrifice his life for the group or for a symbol of the group (e.g. a flag). Despite this there are 'ritual barriers' between them and the leader (leaders' inexplicable 'insights', 'pre-ordained status' etc.) which put them in an accepted subordinate place. The moment this position of the leader is challenged, there would be suppression and tyranny and hatred of the leader might break out in denunciation and violence (ambivalence). The internal cohesion of the group under such leadership can be maintained as long as there are external threats, an outside 'enemy' toward which the hostile feelings can be directed. For this reason such a leader would always have an 'enemy' and keep inventing one when none exists in reality. The authoritarian leaders and dictators have to resort to this device continuously to maintain their power (the power —fear complex).

Our Young Democracy

Our young democracy with its proposed aim of a socialist-pattern presents a rather unique situation. Our present social organization is a caste-based hierarchy with varying degrees of rigidity, with practically-insignificant mobility along vertical dimensions and with status

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being determined by birth rather than achievement. This basic structure being anti-democratic could favour a leadership that is in conformity with established values. The situation is poradoxical : a tradition-centred social organisation with orthodox values of a pre-industrial culture and the super structure of democracy, a modern kind of industrial democracy with the values of industrial culture. The experiment which we have launched is unique in contemporary times. The difficulties that are occuring today in various spheres can be understood when we realise this new situation—new wine in old bottles. Leaders selected on adult franchise in a democratic manner are hardly able to develop attitudes and temper congruent with democratic leadership. And so also the followers. The relation between the two takes after known patterns that are basically authoritarian and not recognisably democratic. Hence, failure of adjustment with the resultant stresses and strains. Even in countries which have been democratic for long the difficulties are great, and in our situation they are understandably far greater. For, when an established social order is once disturbed it takes some time for equilibrium to return at a new level. This is a period of transition, of travail and a supreme effort under the stimulus of a clearly thought out philosophy is necessary today to organise into a purposeful unity all the divergent tendencies that are coming to the surface. For this *all* the echelons of leadership—not merely the top—are essential, for they must all be involved in the decisions made and feel that they are participants in programmes of action. Involvement and active sense of participation or sharing are the essence of democratic functioning and leaders and people must be trained into this habit of *integrative living*.

The Disruptive Factors

But there are a number of disruptive factors that operate as obstacles to the cultivation of habit of integrative or *shared living*. some of these are :

(a) Racial or regional or so-called "cultural superiorities"
(b) Provincial or Regional Stereotypes
(c) Regimentation of Knowledge
(d) Excessive traditionalism
(e) Language and culture as divisive agencies ; the language barrier
(f) Rigid hierarchies (e.g., caste) making communication or mobility difficult

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(g) 'Historicism' and 'Historical *Karma*' and historical memories
(h) Cultural nostalgia or Romantic revivalism

Toward Integration : A Psychological Problem

(a) While achievement of independence has given a value feeling of freedom, a feeling of *individual worth and recognition* has still to be developed. The prestige of the individual has to be rehabilitated. As a result of centuries of dependence and the consequences of a social order which has submerged masses of people to an 'inferior' or 'second and third category' of individuals, consciousness of freedom and its implications for the individuals in all starta has yet to be developed and realised. This is basically a psychological or social-psychological problem. Economic and social development would help this, but societies have been known where economic adequacy *alone* has not helped to realise their status and prestige of human individuals.

(b) With the advent of freedom was expected a sense of solidarity and unity in the country which has not come. The fundamental unity of the country as a whole has still to be realised. This realisation assumes awareness of common interests and more than this the sense of belongingness to a common cultural heritage, common symbols, myths and legends and common system of values.

(c) Language as a divisive and as a cohesive factor : Linguistic romanticism and linguistic fanaticism have prevented integration. While the need for communication on an all-India basis is recognised by all, the question as to the extent Hindi or any other language is going to fulfil this function remains a difficult one. The formula in this regard may be : mother tongue, Hindi or English. English to be in universities till such time that Hindi can replace English. Hindi as language for communication and administration, not for literary or "cultural" purposes. In this regard some of other regional languages are (to date) much richer.

(d) *Dynamics of communication* : The paramount need is need of easier and speedier communication. Apart from physical or material communications, there is the process of communication that stresses the need for development of attitudes of understanding and fellow-feeling, of participation and co-operative living, of the sharing of cultural norms and values, of the assimilation of diverse modes of symbolic behavior, of the transmission and evaluation of functional categories like power, authority, confidence etc. The processes and levels of communication of these different forms of behavior with

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their peculiar patterns of distortions and consequent anxieties need most understanding and sympathetic evaluation. All this would imply flexibility of thinking and imagination associated with higher reaches of the educational process.

(e) Familial upbringing and schooling would need a shift in emphasis from the rigid 'we-group' attitudes to more inclusive groups and wider areas of *identification* until all regions and the country as a whole may come more and more in one orbit of interest. This again is a matter of training and cultivation.

(f) Since most of one's attitudes are already well-formed before the university stage, the university can perhaps canalise some of these and modify them. These attitudes are mostly built round hierarchical organisation of the social structure in which an individual has "his place assigned by birth". The attitudes imply inter-group tensions, frustrations and repressed hostilities, aggression and free floating anxieties. Sometimes these repressed hostilities break out into open conflict but ordinarily this does not happen though the 'tension' always remains, in the form of prejudice, stereotypes, etc. The reduction of this 'conflict' or tension would depend upon :

(i) reduction of hostility, which depends upon minimization of frustration and insecurities and their attendent anxieties.

(ii) Proper canalization of existing hostilities, through sanctions, diversions, redefinition of situations, etc.

Thus the anxiety and frustration which our social order continually generates can be reduced to manageable proportions only if at least two conditions are fulfilled : First, if our physical and economic situation are reasonably comfortable and secure, and, secondly if we derive adequate security and gratification from satisfactory inter-personal relationships. If people are anxious and frustrated by society and if, moreover, they live in social isolation many of them will try to discharge their aggression explosively through acts of violence or hostility.

In attacking many specific phenomena of social pathology one is attacking "symptoms"—not "causes". The result, if successful at all, will be merely to shift the currents of hostility not to eliminate them. An attack upon "causes" must consist : (a) in ameliorating basic situations which are productive of "realistic" and hostilities ; (b) in devising improved techniques of child socialization and of subsequent inter-personal relations so that the total amount of "free-floating agression" is decreased,

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(g) Information, Education and propaganda are likely to reduce these tensions and conflicts. Ordinarily those who have information about other people and groups have more favourable attitudes than those who do not have such information. Also, information is more effective when it is presented as part of the ordinary action of a group. Discovery of facts by members themselves leads to the reduction of prejudice. Changes of attitudes of groups is more effective than of the isolated individuals. When individuals are able to identify their own values and life-activities with individuals of other groups, tensions are reduced—hence where inter-personal relations in groups are concerned the key word is "*Personalize*".

(h) *Direct-re-orientation of values* may be achieved in the following order of effectiveness (1) direct personal communication. (2) radio, mass media, printed material. But this may vary according to the nature of subject, type of appeal, type of audience, etc.

For instance, attitudes of aggressive nationalism go with the following 'cluster' : *Nationalism, out-group prejudice, conventional and rigid moral codes and religiosity.* This emphasises the dangers of nationalism. But while this has to be guarded against our problem is to achieve national unity and integration. Sharing of common values or 'the core values' of our culture would enable identification in a much greater degree than by any other means.

University as a Democracy

The University provides an ideal institution for training and practice of democracy. Free expression of thought and frank discussions of problems of all kinds is the best training in democratic thinking and behaviour. Apart from this it also provides opportunities for free and *creative thinking.* The values of equality, co-operation, respect for individual opinion and appreciation of basic commonness of all humanity can be learnt and assimilated. And, the effectiveness of the university life may be judged by the manner and extent of such an assimilation. The university should be free to develop its talents in an appropriate direction without being hampered by political or regional considerations. Once a student is trained in such an atmosphere of freedom, trust and recognition he will develop a degree of involvement not merely in those immediately around but in the welfare and prosperity of people in the country as a whole . .

Some Suggestions toward Integration

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(a) Free movement and exchange of teachers and students from

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one university to another on all-India basis particularly for (1) lectures and seminars, (2) specialised training, (3) research, (4) community experience etc.

(b) Organisation of summer courses (Vacation courses) in different regions and in different universities admission to which should be open to all universities students. This would engage the energies of students during vacations when formal instruction ceases in a University.

(c) Strengthening of student organisations with a view to canalizing their activities in constructive efforts. These organisations may be required to provide squads for helping constructive-work in different universities in the country.

(d) Cultural associations which would especially emphasise :

(i) Appreciation of art, literature, drama & poetry, found in different groups and regions in the country.

(ii) Information and sympathetic understanding of the customs folk-ways and manners, rituals and values of different sub-cultures of our country.

(iii) Students' dramatic societies which would give open-air or "arena theatre" performance in different regions or areas or areas of the country.

(e) Language clubs or literary associations which would foster study of different languages of the country (1) short courses (by using modern technical devices) be given. (2) Translation of books (on different subjects) by students be specially encouraged.

(f) Hostels and Halls be organised on a "mixed" basis i.e., students of different groups (castes) and regions all live together. No separate Hostels for any community or group or region.

(g) No denominational organisations or groups or caste or communal and sectarian basis to be allowed by universities.

(h) Inter-university migrations be encouraged for short terms without any extra fees etc., and with adequate facilities.

(i) Stipends and fellowships be freely given to all students from any region or groups.

(j) Travel grants and facilities or transport and communications.

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(k) Inter-university meeting or students and teachers not merely for "cultural" purposes, but for academic and administrative purposes too.

(l) An inter-university survey of the needs and requirements of students specially the conditions of their living, their difficulties etc.

(m) Emphasis on *achievement only* irrespective of the complexion and character of the groups or regions. No special privileges to any particular section or group.

The Basis of Integration

We may sum up by suggesting the following bases for social integration :

(1) The cultivation of a *scientific attitude.* This attitude is characterised by objectivity, openness, readiness for experimentation, freedom of initiative and lively faith in exploration of possiblities in all spheres of human activity. Seientific attitude must not be confused with what may be called "Scientism" which is fanaticism of science, a dogmatic belief in the magical properties of science as it may be operating in certain fields, an obsession with certain assumptions and a refusal to see their tentative character. The development of correct scientific attitude has to form a fundamental part of education at all stages. It must be recognised as a basic value of modern living which has its anchorage in buoyant, belief in the possibility of understanding of human and natural phenomena of the universe through experiment and critical empiricism rather than faith in hoary traditions.

(2) *The production and training of a new leadership* : This leadership is democratic (not authoritarian) cutting across all barriers of caste, or religion, one which is wedded to an animating faith in the functioning of both individuals and groups and above all, in the dynamics of their relationship. It must be emphasised that such relationship is a matter of *perseverant training and education.* It has to be broad-based and drawn from the widest range. Such leadership is committed to the values of modern democratic and secular society (secular does not mean irreligious but stands for openness and toleration toward *all* religious and this is the characteristic attitude of Indian (Hindu) way of life). In our country today such leadership is scarce—which is one reason why programmes of development do not arouse enthusiasm. The leaders who talk about them do not themselves have the necessary equipment, training and faith. Hence,

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they do not carry conviction ; they do not contage. For instance, much of the criticism directed against the people for their lack of enthusiasm for our plans, properly goes against the leaders. This is a point that cannot be over emphasised. Let us not make people the scape-goat ; let the leaders at least share the blame. The details of what consitutes the ingredients of such leadership cannot be discussed here, but it is clear that the new, modern leader must have good general education, intimate knowledge of his people and his country as also of the modern world, high integrity and purposefulness and above all a sincere conviction in his own programme and his ideology with complete toleration for others. Such a leader may not necessarily be a 'peace-planner', a 'group-therapist' a 'social diagnostician' but he must be educated, well-informed, sympathetic and tolerant. We do not need the tub-thumbing emotions arousing variety of leaders today ; we need not balanced and informed men of understanding, sympathy, integrity and vision. But these do not grow spontaneously in nature ; they have to be trained and groomed with care and devotion. Have we made any provision for such training in leadership in the Third Plan ?

(3) Our national genius has always encouraged adaptability, adjustment, assimilation and regard for the opinions of others and a distrust of dogma and fantacism. It is on the broad base of these values that social and emotional integration can be organised. These values symbolise a philosophy of life which permeates all the srtata of our people and they have guided the course of history for centuries. We have to stress them and remind ourselves how on numerous occasions in our past history crises have been resolved by conscious attempts at readjustment and re-organisation under the dominance of this philosophy. The basic concept of this philosophy emphasised the highest degree of *toleration and universal sympathy.* With the adoption of the twin goals of democracy (socialist pattern) and industrialisation it is essential to stress the concept of a free society inherent in our own philosophy. Both democracy and industrialisation imply a free, casteless, open society and the present tensions and conflicts might be viewed as the vain struggles of an old order of privileges for survival. Caste which has been the greatest hindrance is beginning to yield to pressures of the above processes as well as to strategic social legislation. The pace of social change may be slow but there is evidence of modification of the caste hierarchies and the values associated with them. Science and modern industrial technology are hastening the pace or change and there is no doubt that planned development would help the process. This

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would imply (1) new and freer patterns of interpersonal relationships and complex group-dynamical constellations ; (2) equality of the individuals irrespective of their caste-complexions and regional affiliations and (3) recognition of *achievement* rather than inherited status. (4) This inevitably suggests a *socio-economic basis* for fixing and evaluating an individuals' position in society. The social situation becomes the crucial determinant for the relative place and value of both the individual and groups as distinct from traditionally sanctioned hierarchies and preferences. Three types of social situations may be envisaged :

(i) which requires no change of cultural pattern for the resolution of competing interests ;

(ii) which requires change in some institutions for the resolution of social difficulty in order to increase available individual satisfaction ; and

(iii) in which the society is faced with an emergency that threatens its security so that the solution lies in changing the institution not to maximise individual satisfaction but to maximise group security—and solidarity.

In the first two situations attempt is made to effect social integration by minimising interpersonal frustration without radically modifying the institutions operating within the culture. In the third existing institutions have to be modified so as to provide for maximum security of the society itself. The present condition in the country today corresponds to the third type of social situation, and we need to change institutions in a way such as might insure maximum solidarity and security with an eye also to securing individual satisfaction or at any rate to avoiding individual frustrations.

Social integration may have two objectives :

(i) the individualistic (leading to the ideal of an open, democratic society) in which the purposive drives of the members of the society seek as much satisfaction as possible for *all* concerned ;

(ii) the functionalistic (embodying the ideal of the authoritarian functional society) in which the motive force derives from the survival tendency.

The first is appropriate under stress of emergency. Some mixture of the two seems to be called for under contemporary conditions.

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The problem in social integration today is to judge what degree of individual freedom and of social compulsion is appropriate in our situation. This would suggest the concept of an *adjustable society* which permits maximum freedom of satisfaction for its individual members that is consonant with the safety and preservation of society as a whole. (5) In a transitional society such as ours *resistance to social integration* demanded by commitment to democracy and industrialisation emanates from loyalities to traditional systems. There is a *psychological gap* ; for, while we are overtly committed to the concept of a modern society, people lack the psychological attitudes required to give reality to this concept. The carry-over effects of the traditional society such as pull of the past high respect for traditional lore, for caste-hierarchies, and the persistent tendency to inhibit individual initiative and discourage innovations indicate the need for psychological readjustment so that the attitudes of fear and reluctance and patterns of threat-oriented behavior yield to the development of appreciative and confident conduct. This psychological deficit may be made up by cultivation of value-orientations that may accommodate maximum change. But the progress from the traditionalist to the transitional and from the latter to the modern (industrial) society must neither be too slow nor too rapid. If it is too slow, if opportunities to participate in promoting it are too limited, if existing institutions cannot adapt in time, there is bound to be widespread frustration and disillusionment ; on the other hand, if modernisation is more rapid than can function effectively and purposefully, then again, it will lead to a throw-back or regression to the transitionalist, and outmoded orthodoxies. The success of a program of social integration would depend on the *rate and character of the change* introduced and the segments of the society that adopt and *accept* it. But both these in turn, would depend upon whether appropriate value-orientations have been built in, and whether the concept underlying them has been incorporated as a guiding principle of everyday life.

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CHAPTER XXV

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Social Development, Education and Unemployment in India

—*Victor S. D'Souza*

Social Development and Social Problems

Social development is the process by which a relatively simple society is transformed into a relatively advanced one. Accumulated studies of several societies show that advanced societies resemble one another in certain important characteristics and they all differ from simple societies more or less in the same manner.

One of the most important differences between simple and advanced societies is a difference of scale[1], i.e., the network of social relations in space and time. In advanced societies the social relations are more widely spread and the members are influenced to a large extent by the culture of the past. The largeness of scale in advanced societies is manifested in an increase in the area of communication of information as well as emotional expression, in the degree of unity and continuity expressed within and outside the community, in the range of social pressure, in the area of close economic cooperation both within the community and ouside it, in the capital inherited from the past generations and so on. With the increase in scale in a society the material environment is brought under greater control, the range of secondary or impersonal social relations increases, religion becomes more and more non-magical, division of labour becomes more specialized, literacy and education increase, and social mobility, both vertical and horizontal, increases.

These are some of the significant factors which are always found to be correlated in advanced societies. The correlation can be explained by the fact that they are functionally inter-connected and support one another. For instance a greater control of the environ-

1. For an elucidation of this concept and the ideas about social change discussed in this paper, cf., Wilson, Godfrey, and Monica Wilson. The Analysis of Social Change. Cambridge Univ. Press, England, 194.

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ment is not possible without specialization, increase in education is necessary for greater specialization, greater educational and economic opportunity facilitates social mobility and so on. In social development, therefore, all such factors have to be simultaneously changed from a lower to a higher order. The change must be even or proportionate in all the related factors. Consequently, social development cannot be secured by changing just one factor.

The fact that the different factors are inter-connected is not sufficient to ensure proportionate change in all the factors such that when one of the factors is changed the others will re-adjust themselves automatically. For, the related factors are also autonomous to some extent. Thus, for the smooth functioning of the society a kind of balance must be maintained between the types of occupations on the one hand, educational and training facilities on the other. Yet it is possible to introduce new types of jobs without the requisite training facilities and *vice versa.*

Two further implications emerge from this analysis. First, if efforts are made to push up just one of the factors, say economic productivity, disregarding the other factors, this factor may show an increase for some time, but without the requisite support of the other related factors, it will gradually relapse into its original state. Thus, not only social development cannot be achieved through the development of any one factor, but the substained development of this factor itself is not possible without corresponding changes in the related factors.

Secondly, the uneven development of the factors may give rise to social disharmony and conflict. An analysis of the societies where there is greater tension and unrest, such as some of the African societies, makes it clear that social disharmony and conflict are associated with a disproportionate change in the relevant factors of social development.[1]

The role of education in social development can easily be understood when analysed against this background. Education is one of the important factors of social development. The increase in economic productivity, consumption, etc., in advanced societies has always been accompanied by an increase in education. The very fact that culture is transmitted and maintained through the process

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1. *Ibid.*

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of education would make it clear that advancement in education is a pre-condition for social development. Education therefore is functionally inter-connected with a large number of factors, chief among them being occupation.

Uneven Change in Education and Occupation leads to Unemployment

The inter-connection between education and occupation has far-reaching implications for social development. The occupational structure of a developing society undergoes a rapid change. The change is such that the proportion of jobs requiring higher education and training expands at the expense of the proportion of occupations requiring little or no education on the part of the incumbents, This would imply that in a developing society education has to keep pace with the rapidly changing occupational structure. It is with this aspect that we are more concerned in trying to understand the problem of unemployment in India today.

The problem of unemployment particularly in the urban sector[1] is assuming a dangerous proportion day by day. A common and plausible explanation is that the increase in population which according to the latest census (1961) is of a phenomenal nature, being 2.3 percent per annum, has outstripped the increase in employment opportunities. Therefore, it is argued that full employment, like self-sufficiency in food, will remain a receding target unless the growth of population is effectively checked. In the meantime greater industrialization is recommended as a palliative. While there may be some truth in such a line of thinking it does not seem to provide a satisfactory explanation and remedy. For, the unemployment problem in India is not merely one involving the number of unemployed persons but also the quality of such persons. It is charged with seeming contradictions. While education is supposed to improve the qualifications of persons for employment, it is precisely among the educated section that unemployment is increasing.[2] Secondly, while unemployment among educated persons is increasing, there is an unsatisfied demand for qualified persons for filling up certain posts. These contradictions can be satisfactorily

1. According to the National Sample Survey (Eighth Round) about 9.4 percent of the labour force in the urban areas was unemployed in.

2. This aspect of unemployment is peculiar to India and other underdeveloped countries, for in advanced countries unemployment is more acute among the uneducated persons.

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explained by the hypothesis that in India at present the variables of occupational structure and education are undergoing an unbalanced change.

The occupational structure of India, in an underdeveloped state of economy, was too heavily weighed down by unskilled and other occupations of low prestige. In the absence of accurate studies it is difficult to give an exact proportion of such jobs. Roughly over sixty percent of occupations are of this type even now. They require little or no education on the part of persons employed in them much less do they attract persons with education. However, in recent years with the growing economy there has been a perceptible change in the occupational structure of India. The proportion of jobs at higher levels of prestige which require greater amount of education and training is expanding at the expense of the proportion of jobs of low prestige which do not require education.[1]

The data regarding occupations presented in the Census of India reports do not give a clear picture of the changing occupational structure in relation to the educational background of the workers. However the distribution of the workers according to the primary, secondary and tertiary industries would provide us with a clue. In a developing society the proportion of occupations in the primary sector is found to decline in favour of the secondary and tertiary occupations which require a relatively higher degree of education and training on the part of the workers. In India, too, there was such a trend noticeable during the period 1921 to 1951, the proportions of workers in the primary industries in 1921, 1931 and 1951 being 75.99%, 74.75% and 72.12% respectively. But in the 1961 census the proportion of workers in the primary industries was 72.28% indicating no significant change as compared to the figure of the previous Census.[2] This is all the more surprising because the period of the 1961 census was characterised by the greatest economic development in recent decades. The lack of change may be due largely to the change in the definition of the concept of worker adopted in 1961 which resulted in a large number of persons who were not regarded as workers in 1951 being returned as workers in 1961. The

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1. I have shown this with reference to the occupational structure of Poona *vide* Victor S. D'Souza : "Implications of Occupational Prestige for Employment Policy in India" in *Artha Vijnana*, (Gokhale Institute of Politics and Economics, Poona) Vol. I, No. 3, September, 1959, Pp. 234 and 235.

2. *Census of India*, Paper No. 1 of 1962, Table 6, P. 398.

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proportion of such persons was relatively large among the cultivators who are engaged in a primary industry. On the other hand if we consider only the workers in the urban sector with which we would be presently concerned and where the proportion of workers in the primary industries is relatively small, we find that the proportion of such workers in 1961 was 12.52% as compared to 15.12% in 1951 which represents a marked decline.[1] Even as regards the total working force, after a statistical analysis of the census data for the years 1901 to 1961, V.S. Swamy has come to the conclusion that there does seem to be a small but definite shift from the primary to the secondary and tertiary sectors.[2]

Side by side with the growing economy, giant strides are being taken towards the growth of education. As a result the proportion of literates has risen to 24% in 1961 as against 16.6% in 1951. The literates here are given as a proportion of the total population including children below the school-going age. Therefore the rise in the proportion of children in the school-going age who have been receiving education in recent years is much higher. From 1950-51 to 1955-56 the number of pupils in recognised institutions increased from 4.8 to 6.8 million in the Secondary stage, from 2.2 lakhs to 2.9 lakhs in the Intermediate stage and from 2.0 lakhs to 3.4 lakhs in Collegiate courses.[3] This has inevitably resulted first of all in a steep rise in the proportion of the educated persons who have been entering the working force in recent years. Secondly, since the majority of the school-going persons do not go beyond the high school stage and since the full impact of the recent growth of education has yet to be felt at the University level, the bulk of the rise in the proportion of the educated among the new entrants into the working force is made up of persons educated upto the matriculation level.

The unemployment problem in India can now be explained in terms of the peculiar changes that are taking place in the variables of education and occupation. The variable of education is no doubt changing in a direction favourable for the change in the occupational structure, but it would seem that the change in the former is far more rapid for the change in the latter. The contraction in the pro-

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1. *Ibid,* Statement 54 on p. LXXI.
2. *Ibid,* P. 426.
3. *Education in India,* issued by the Ministry of Education and Scientific Research, Government of India, New Delhi,

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portion of lower prestige jobs is slower than the reduction in the proportion of uneducated persons who would be willing to accept such jobs.[1] This has resulted in a shortage of unskilled labour at any rate in some parts of the country. At the same time the occupations requiring education are not increasing at a sufficiently fast rate to absorb the more rapidly increasing number of educated persons in the working force, thus giving rise to unemployment among the educated.

Higher education and specialization have to be linked to the types of jobs available or planned for. In India where industrialization is making rapid progress the jobs requiring scientific and technical education are fast increasing. On the other hand, although our educational institutions are being geared to the new needs, they are not able to produce, in adequate numbers, persons with the right qualifications. Hence the unsatisfied demand for qualified persons for filling up certain posts.

Unemployment among Educated in Urban Centers

The above analysis would explain the unemployment problem in India, It can be supported by data regarding urban unemployment called out from some of the city surveys recently conducted. The studies selected are those of Poona, Hubli, Jamshedpur, Kanpur, Lucknow and Calcutta.[2] The selection of these studies is not influenced by any bias but is governed by the availability of the sources to the author. The relevant data in the different studies are presented in different forms and hence are not suitable for pre-

1 It is a well-known fact that educated persons do not like to accept unskilled and semiskilled jobs, which is also supported by data regarding the educational background of the working force given in the recent city surveys in India.

2. Sovani, N.V., D.P. Apte and R.G. Pendse, Poona : *A Resurvey*, Gokhale Institute of Politics and Economics, Poona, 1960.

Dhekeny, B.R., Hubli City, Karnatak University, Dharwar, 1959.

Misra, B.R., *Report on the Socio-Economic Survey of Jamsedpur City*, Patna University, Patna, 1959.

Majumdar, D.N., *Social Contours of an Industrial City—Social Survey of Kanpur*, Asia Publishing House, Bombay, 1960.

Mukerjee, R.K., and Baljit Singh, *Social Profiles of a Metropolis*, Asia Publishing House, Bombay, 1961.

S.N. Sen, *the City of Calcutta*, Bookland Private Limited, Calcutta, 1960.

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paring common tables. They are therefore presented separately. The studies were conducted during the period 1954 to 1957 and so refer to the situation during the first phase of planned social development in India.

Table I shows the educational qualifications of the persons in the working force in Poona is 1955. Of the 8902 persons in the sample who were in the working force, 726 persons or nine percent were unemployed. 258 persons or 35.5 percent of the unemployeds were seeking employments for the first time and are hence termed freshers. The unemployed persons who were previously employed are termed non-freshers.

TABLE I

Percentage distribution of the Working Force in Poona according to educational qualifications and employment status

Employment status / *Education*	*Employed*	*Unemployed*		
		Non-freshers	*Freshers*	*Total*
Illiterate	28.9	28.2	5.4	20.0
Literate	8.2	8.1	1.1	5.5
Less than Matric	47.0	55.5	66.8	59.5
Matric	10.4	6.0	22.5	12.0
Graduate and other higher qualifications	5.5	2.2	4.2	3.0
Total percent	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Total Number	8,176	468	258	726

Source : N.N. Sovai and others, *Poona—A Resurvey*, pp. 212 and 304.

Since different types of occupations require different degrees of education, the occupational structure of a community puts a limit on the educational requirements of the working force. Ideally[1]

1, Used in its value free technical sense,

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speaking the working force should be distributed in the various educational categories in the same proportions as required by the occupational structure. It is obvious that in a community where there is full employment the distribution of the working force in the various educational categories is in keeping with the requirements of the occupational structure. Where there is unemployment, the right proportions required by the occupational structure would roughly correspond to the educational distribution of the employed persons. Other things equal, in a community where there is unemployment which is owing to the rise in the population outstripping the rise in employment opportunities, the distribution of the unemployed persons in the various educational categories should be in the same proportions as among the employed persons. If the educational distribution of the unemployed persons follows a pattern different from that of the distribution of employed persons, it is indicative of an uneven change in the variables of education and occupational structure.

The data from the Poona study show that the pattern of distribution of the unemployed in the various educational categories is different from that of the employeds. In the educational categories of illiterate and literate the proportions are lower among the unemployed. On the other hand, when we consider the categories of less than matriculation and matriculation, the case is just the opposite. The disparity in the educational characteristics is all the more striking when the freshers among the unemployeds are compared with the employeds. While the combined proportions of illiterate and literate on the one hand and of less than Matriculation and Matriculation on the other, are 37 and 57 percent respectively among the employed, they are 6 and 87 percent respectively among the freshers. The non-fresher unemployeds, in their educational characteristics, resemble the employeds more than the fresher unemployeds. It can be easily inferred that the educational background of the persons entering the working force is vastly different from that of the educational requirements of the occupational structure. There are now more persons with education upto the Matriculation level than there are suitable jobs for them.

It may however be argued that the comparatively lower degree of unemploymnet among the illiterate persons is not so much due to a reduction in their proportion in the working forces but due to the comparative ease with which unskilled jobs can be secured. But a look at the educational distribution of the unemployed non-freshers

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makes it clear that the illiterate persons in the working force are as much exposed to the risk of unemployments as the educated persons.

In Hubli City, the sample studied included 4,185 persons in the working force of whom 330 persons or about eight percent were unemployed. 154 persons among the unemployed were freshers and the remaining 176 non-freshers. Table II shows the percentage distribution of the working force according to employment status and education. The presentation of data in the table is somewhat similar to that in Table I and the pattern of distribution of the working force in the various educational categories also is more or less similar. Here too it is clear that the educational background of the persons entering the working force is different from the educational requirements of the current occupational structure.

TABLE II

Percentage distribution of working force in Hubli according to educational qualifications and employment status

Employment status / *Education*	*Employed*	*Unemployed*		
		Non-Freshers	*Freshers*	*Total*
Illiterate	37.9	27.8	7.1	18.1
Primary	43.4	56.4	46.7	51.9
Less than Matric	10.7	13.0	28.7	20.4
Matric, Graduate & other	6.4	1.7	14.9	7.7
Higher qualifications	1.6	1.1	2.6	1.9
Total percent	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Total number	3,855	176	154	330

Source : Dhekney, B.R., *Hubli City*, pp. 78 and 150.

In the Jamshedpur study no distinction has been made between the freshers and non-freshers among the unemployed persons. However, considering the fact that over 70% of the unemployed persons fall within the age range of 15 to 24 years, it is clear that a sizeable

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proportion of the unemployed persons are freshers.[1] So also the educational background of the employed persons is not shown separately. There is, however, some information regarding the education of the working force as a whole. In the working force 39.7 were illiterate and 60.3 were literate.[2] The educational distribution of the unemployed persons is shown in Table III.

The unemployed persons have been divided into the two categories of residents and immigrants. Bnt the educational distribution of the residents and immigrants is almost of the same pattern.

TABLE III

Percentage distribution of unemployed persons in Jamshedpur according to educational qualifications

Education	*Residents*	*Immigrants*
Illiterate	19.0	19.9
Private and Primary	45.8	45.6
Secondary	28.7	27.2
Intermediate	5.3	5.7
Graduate	1.2	1.6
Total	100.0	100.0

Source : Misra, B.R., Report on Socio-Economic Survey of Jamshedpur City, p. 123.

From the information regarding the educational background of the unemployed persons and the total working force, it is clear that the proportion of the illiterate persons among the employed is more than 40%. Therefore, the proportion of illiterate persons among the unemployeds is less than half of that among the employeds. It may be surmised that the proportion of illiterate among the unemployed freshers would be still lower. Thus the pattern of the educational background of the unemployed persons does not correspond to that of the occupational structure. The evidence points to the conclusion that the new entrants to the working force possess too much education to be properly absorbed in available jobs.

1. Misra, B.R., *Report on Socio-Economic Survey of Jamshedpur City*, pp. 122.

2. *Ibid.* p. 111.

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The Jamshedpur study also provides another piece of significant information. It is stated that although there was considerable amount of unemployment (the exact proportion is not given) there was not a single technically qualified person among unemployeds. Jamshedpur is an industrial city and so it provides greater employment opportunities for the technically qualified persons. The inference that can be drawn from this information is very clear. Industrialization by itself does not solve the problem of unemployment. While it may create more jobs, job-seekers will have to be fitted for these jobs through suitable education and training. If these changes do not take place side by side, not only will the unemployment problem remain unsolved, but the progress of industrialization itself would be retarded.

Table IV shows the percentage distribution of the employed and unemployed persons in the working force in Kanpur according to educational qualifications. Here also the unemployeds are not distinguished according to fresher and non-fresher categories, However, the information follows the same trend as in the preceding tables and leads to the same conclusion.

TABLE IV

Percentage distribution of working force in Kanpur according to educational qualifications

Employment Status / *Education*	*Employed*	*Unemployed*
Illiterate	29. 1	16.2
Primary and Private	33. 3	38.1
Secondary	21. 6	32.5
Technical	4. 3	3.1
College	6. 6	6.5
Post-Graduate	3. 6	2.3
Continuing	1. 0	1.3
Unspecified	0. 5	—
Total percent	100. 0	100.0
Total number	6,931	438

Source : Majumdar, D.N. *Social Contours of an Industrial City*, pp. 116, 117 and 129.

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The Lucknow study gives the educational qualifications only for the unemployed persons in the working force. However, the unemployeds are divided into freshers and non-freshers as in Table V.

TABLE VI

Percentage of unemployed persons in the working force in Calcutta in each of the educational classes

Period of Study *Educational Classes*	*1954-55*	*1955-56*	*1956-57*
Illiterate	3.5	3.4	4.3
Literate	6.0	5.2	5.1
Primary	7.7	11.5	8.1
Below Social Final	*17.0*	*18.7*	*12.7*
School Final and Undergraduate	16.5	14.0	9.8
Graduate	5.0	8.5	5.2
Post-graduate	8.8	3.3	2.3
Total Unemployed in Working Force	10.0	9.2	7.6

Source : Sen, S. N., *The City of Culcutta*, p. 112.

TABLE V

Percentage distribution of unemployed persons in Lucknow according to educational qualifications

Education	*Non-Freshers*	*Freshers*	*Total*
Illiterate	24.5	10.1	17.8
Primary and Private	26.3	16.7	21.8
Secondary	40.8	54.4	47.1
Technical	1.2	0.7	1.0
College	6.2	15.2	10.4
Post-Graduate	0.6	2.9	1.7
Total per cent	100.0	100.0	100.0
Total Number	138	159	297

Source : Mukherjee, R.K. and Baljit Singh : *Social Profiles of Metropolis.* p. 125.

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As in the case of Poona and Hubli studies where the unemployeds are divided into analogous categories, in Lucknow too the pattern of educational distribution of freshers is markedly different from that of non-freshers. The tend is same in all the three cases except that in Lucknow the proportion of college educated persons is relatively too large among the freshers. This may, in part, be attributed to the fact that the facilities for college education provided in Lucknow are among the best in India and for too many persons are receiving college education to be suitably absorbed in available jobs.

Table VI shows the percentage of unemployed persons in the working force in each of the educational classes in Calcutta. The information has been given for three years. In a way the presentation of data in the manner shown in this Table is more appropriate for bringing out the correlation between education and unemployment. The Table shows that unemployment is much above the average in the educational classes of Below School Final and Under graduate, a fact which clearly supports the inferences drawn from the previous tables. In Calcutta too, unemployment is more marked in the age range of 15 to 24 years, showing therapy that a large proportion of the unemployed persons are freshers.

Unemployment among educated in Punjab :

The author has also analysed elsewhere[1] the problem of unemployment in the Punjab, from three available studies conducted in the rural areas of Jullundur and Karnal districts in 1955[2] and in the Patiala City in 1953[3] and 1958[4]. The relevant findings may be briefly stated here. Both in the rural and the urban areas studied there was a considerable degree of unemployment. In the rural area it was 8 per cent of the worknig force and in Patiala 7.4 per cent both in 1953 and 1958. In both cases the proportions of educated persons among the unemployed are much larger than among

1. "Main characteristics of Economy of Punjab" in *Khadi Gramodyog*, Bombay. Vol. X No. 6 March 1964.

2. Economic & Statistical Organization, Government of Punjab : *Report on the Survey of Rural Unemployment in the Punjab.* Board of Economic Enquiry Punjab Publication No. 76.

3. Directorate of Economics & Statistics, PEPSU : *Report of the Survey of Unemployment in Patiala*, 1954.

4. Economic & Statistical Organisation, Punjab *Report of Employment and Unemployment Survey of Patiala City.* Publication No. 26. Chandigarh 1960.

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the employed persons. Again, among the unemployed persons the proportions of educated persons are very much larger among the freshers than among the others. In the rural areas, while most of the occupations of the employed persons are those relating to cultivation, most of unemployed persons desired occupations other than cultivation. Among the unemployed freshers the proportion of persons desiring non-cultivation occupations was higher still.

In general, in the Punjab, as in other parts of India, with the increasing socio-economic advancement there has been a tendency for the proportions of workers in the male and female populations, particularly the latter, to decrease.[1] In some of the more developed districts like Ludhiana, Amritsar, Jullundur and Patiala, the proportions of female workers in the female population range from 3 to 4 percent. But of late, in the urban areas, there has been a reversal of the tend in the employment of women. Now more and more educated women are seeking employment. In Patiala, for instance, the proportion of female workers in the female population had risen from 2.6 percent in 1953 to 3.8 percent in 1958. In both the studies unemployment among women in the female working force was much higher than that among the males. As against 7.0 and 6.7 percent in the male working force in 1953 and 1958 respectively it was 17.3 and 15.6 percent in the female working force for the corresponding years respectively. There were relatively more unemployed freshers among women than among men. So also the proportion of educated persons was higher among the unemployed women than among the unemployed men.

The tendency among women to enter into the labour force is noticeable mainly in the urban areas where the education of women has risen rapidly in recent years. Consequently, unemployment among women is mainly an urban phenomenon. In the rural areas studied there were only 3 women among 203 unemployed persons. The new class of women who join the working force in the urban areas require occupations of higher types and so they have to complete for the limited number of jobs. They have also to contend with certain handicaps characteristic of their sex in India which hinder mobility and render certain types of jobs unsuitable for them. Consequently unemployment is prevalent more among women than men in the working force.

1. Also cf. Vector S. D'Souza : "Implications of the Occupational Prestige for Employment Policy in India" in *Artha Vijnana* Poona, Vol. I, No. 3, September 1959 pp. 233-247.

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These findings also indicate that the unemployment problem in the Punjab is to a large extent the consequence of the rapid change in the variable of education.

Conclusion

Thus in all the studies considered the proportion of unemployed persons among illiterates in the working force is relatively very small. Unemployment is more marked among the educated persons upto the Middle School and Matriculation levels. It is prevalent to a lesser extent among graduates and technically qualified persons, being negligible among the latter. A sizeable proportion of the unemployed persons are seeking jobs for the first time and it is among these that the above characteristics are manifested in greater degrees. In some parts of the country the unemployment problem among the educated women is even more acute than among educated men. All these peculiarities of the unemployment problem in India are explicable in terms of the hypothesis that in the earlier phase of Planned Social Development, the variables of occupational structure and education have not been changing evenly. More data and studies are, however, needed to prove the hypothesis conclusively.

Summary

Social development is the process by which a relatively simple society is transformed into a relatively advanced one. Certain significant general variables of society are found combined in lower and higher proportions in simple and advanced societies respectively. These variables are inter-connected so that when a simple society is to be developed, all the variables should be changed proportionately. Uneven change in the variables would give rise to social disharmony and conflict.

Education and occupation are two of the important general variables of society. They are inter-connected in the sense that higher types of occupation require higher degree of education and conversely, persons with higher education aspire for higher jobs. In social development, therefore, changes in the variable of education and occupation should balance each other, or else, it would lead to social maladjustment such as unemployment.

In recent years, with the growing economy there has been a perceptible change in the occupational structure of India. At the same time the variable of education too has been changing in the right direction. It would, however, seem that the change in educa-

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tion is far more rapid in volume and less in structural content, to accommodate the change in the occupational structure. Available data show that unemployment in India is prevalent more among the educated persons than among the uneducated. Among the educated the freshers are more unemployed than the non-freshers. Again, among the educated persons, those who are technically qualified are least affected by the unemployment problem. The prevailing situation is explicable in terms of the hypothesis that the changes in the variables of education and occupation have not been supporting each other adequately.

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CHAPTER XXVI

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Cities and Traditions

—*Brij Raj Chauhan*

One of the criticisms of the 'folk-urban continuum' theory of Robert Redfield was that it did not define the urban end of the continuum and put all the cities in the broad category.[1] This defect was remedied by Redfield and Singer in their article "The Cultural Role of Cities"[2] and in the work *Primitive World and its Transformations* by Redfield. In later writings, Singer tried to study the city of Madras in India as an area for giving more information on the concepts developed in the earlier works. A more recent work of Gideon Sjoberg[3] is designed precisely to study the non-industrial cities. The purpose of this paper is not to test the folk-urban hypothesis but to concentrate on the nature of urbanization at work in an underdeveloped area where the old traditions and the new forces have begun to work simultaneously. The purpose of the paper is to evaluate the study of Madras done by Singer in the light of the concepts that have been advanced and comparative material available from other parts of India. In section one of the paper, an effort is made to present the concepts, in the second the facts of Madras and Bombay are seen for comparative purposes, in the third the arguments are discussed and conclusions stated.

I

The classification of cities proposed by Redfield and Singer may be put in the following form :

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1. Oscar lewis : *Life in a Mexican Village* quoted by Horace Winer "The Folk Urban Continuum" in Lazarsfeld *The Language of Social Research*, The Free Press, 1957, p. 339.

2. Singer and Redfield, "The Cultural Role of Cities". The references in this paper are from pages as printed in *Man in India*, vol. 36, July-September 1956, pp. 161-194.

3. Gideon Sjoberg : *The Pre Industrial City*, The Free Press, 1960.

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	Administrative	*Commercial*
Pre Industrial	Lasha	Marseilles
Industrial	New Delhi	Bombay

The type of urban development in the upper category roughly comes near what they call primary urbanization. This process is carried on it the native traditions of the civilization and therefore, becomes the highest expression of that civilization. Problems of cross-cultural contacts arise more in the industrial era and cities in this period tend to show some of the characteristics of what Redfield and Singer call 'secondary' urbanization. The first type of development is called an orthogenetic development and the second heterogenetic. Their characteristics may be noted.

The city of orthogenetic transformation is a city of the moral order. It carries forward the culture of the people found in 'Little Traditions'. In such a process, the presence of the literati in the cities is significant. 'A sacred culture' of the rural people "is gradually transmuted by the literati of the cities into a 'great tradition'. Primary urbanization thus takes place almost entirely within the framework of a core culture that develops as the local cultures become more urbanized and transformed, into an indigenous civilization".[4]

The cultural consequences of such a process of urbanization have been summarised thus : "In short, the trend of primary urbanization is to coordinate political, economic, educational, intellectual and aesthetic activity to the norms provided by the Gaeat Traditions."[5] Implicit in such an account is the fact that such a transformation is integrative. Its opposite effect is disruptive and accompanies the process of secondary urbanization. The authors write : "The general consequence of secondary urbanization is the weakening or supercession of the local and traditional cultures by states of mind that are incongruent with those local cultures",[6] In the new urban centers arises a technological order. Some sort of economic rationality develops, and new crafts arise. People of different cultural backgrounds meet, bring new ideas, utopias and counterutopias. Nationalism flourishes there, nativistic leaders and reformers arise there, and people look more to the future than the past.

4. Redfield and Singer op. cited p. 174.
5. *Ibid*, p. 179.
6. Redfield and Singer op. cited p. 179.

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One of the reasons why Redfield and Singer propose the two processes to be analysed and studied is that urbanization in the West has been linked with certain values with which the new processes of urbanization now going on in Asia and Africa may not correspond. Some of the Western values may already be present in those cultures, some of these may be rejected, and in some cases the nationalistic movement might enable people to recover from their disruptive encounters with the West by returning to the "sacred centers" of their ancient indigenous civilizations.[7] Whether this happens or not is a different question ; but the possibility of studying urbanizing trends in countries of strong indigenous traditions also possessing some large cities in the past, is by itself a significant point of analysis. It is in this background that we turn to the study of two urban centers in India, viz. Bombay and Madras with special reference to the work of Milton Singer on Madras.

II

An urban center of a metropolitan size in a predominantly agricultural nation is expected to differ from the general population in many respects. Some of the differences can be stated from sources that can give statistical measurement of these trends. It is not possible at this stage to use statistics for the other variety of points that are being raised for discussion. First let us look to those aspects that can be measured.

1. In underdeveloped countries, there is a larger proportion of males than females in a city. As compared to the general population, the larger the city, it is expected that the more wide will the gap be. For India, the sex ratio for urban areas has been 121 males per 100 females and for rural areas 104 for the period 1921 to 1941 (Davis 1951 : 139).[8] For cities for of over 5,00,000 population it has been varying from 161 to 175 during the period 1881 to 1941, (Davis : 140).[9] For the city of Bombay, the situation has been more precarious than Madras. Sex ratios of the two cities are :

Madras	109
Bombay	168

7. *Ibid*, p. 194.
8. Davis : *The Population of India and Pakistan*, Princeton N. J. 1961, p. 139.
9. *Ibid*, p. 140.

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This leads one towards the hypothesis that in terms of orthogenetic growth Madras shows stronger tendencies than Bombay. A look at the sex ratio for the two states brings a different picture. In Madras state as a whole, sex ratio was 99 and the city of Madras was the most maculine of the cities in the state. However, the difference remains between Bombay and Madras in other factors also.

2. A city contains many people who were not born there. If they can be treated as migrants, their proportion to the total population of the city gives an idea of the people who have come from outside.

Percentage of Migrant Population in two cities

	Madras	*Bombay*
1951	39.2	70.1
1341	12.5	72.6
1931	21.3	75.4

Source : *Census of India* 1951 Vol. III, Pt. I, p. 75 : Vol. IV, Pt. I p. 35.

3. Age distribution : The higher proportion of migrants can disturb age distribution in a city. Here again the sex ratio among the younger population would be more in favour of males in the younger age groups. Figures from the Census Reports for Bombay and Madras for 1951 have been collected and shown in the following table :

Sex and Age Distribution of 10,000 Residents in cities of Madras and Bombay, 1951

Age Groups	Males		Females	
	Madras	Bombay	Madras	Bombay
Less than 1 year	126	117	116	119
1 to 4	348	393	324	387
5 to 14	1164	924	1057	847
15 to 34	2142	3094	1752	1552
35 to 54	1106	1443	1023	663
55 and over	383	260	452	201

This table makes it clear that in the age group 15 to 34 and 35 to 54 the two cities have a proportionately higher sex ratio. They

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also suggest that Madras is not so much removed from the general life of the cultural hinterland as Bombay is. In Bombay in the age group 15 to 34, males out number females two to one and the same is the case for the next higher age group. In Madras at no stage does the sex ratio show a difference of even 25%. As one studies the effects of heterogenetic development one would find them more in Bombay than Madras, perhaps likewise one may look for more of orthogenetic development in Madras.

4. The pattern of livelihood in Madras is slightly different than that of Bombay. Agriculture is not important in any of the cities, Commerce and transport are roughly of equal importance; but industries are more developed in Bombay than in Madras. On the other hand service and miscellaneous group is a bit stronger in Madras. The following table shows the distribution for 1951 :

Percentage of Persons engaged in various occupations in Madras and Bombay in 1951

Occupations	*Madras*	*Bombay*
Agriculture	1.9	0.55
Production other than agriculture	24.8	31.7
Commerce	22.0	24.3
Transport	9.3	8.4
Other services and Miscellaneous	42.0	31.7

Source : Census Reports of Madras and Bombay 1951.

5. Literacy : Literacy is considered as a mark of urbanization. In this respect both the states have a higher percentage than the nation as a whole. Their urban centers also show this trend. In the proportion of literates Madras is as developed as Bombay. In Bombay city literacy in age groups of people above 5 years of age is 59.3 for males and 43.1 for females. The corresponding figures for Madras are 61.4 and 38. It should be borne in mind that the literacy rate for the state as a whole was 28.6% for males and 10% for females. The gap between literacy of males and females is narrower in cities. It is often said that the females are more conservative than males. One of the reasons is difference in education, and the other in experience of going out. The spread of education, among women in cities is a major change for the less developed countries ; and it remains to be seen whether ultimately they will

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adopt more of the westernized methods or adopt the classical styles of life. In regions where traditions of music and dance are more developed, one can expect on that front some orthogenetic development, in other fields of life some heterogeneity cannot be ruled out.

These demographic factors provide the base for understanding cultural role of cities. Singer noted these factors in passing but did not use them for analysing the process. Let the arguments of Milton Singer be taken up for review now. He has tried to seek how a great tradition of Hinduism works in a modern heterogenetic city, like Madras. Three methods of study were suggested :

(i) through a study of its sacred geography
(ii) ,, ,, ,, professional representatives.
(iii) ,, ,, ,, *cultural performances (including* religious rites and ceremonies).

Singer followed the last method named above.

According to him there have been changes in cultural media, radios, movies and printed words are now in use ; places of performance have changed to secular ones, and performances are more for aesthetic taste than for observing them on some festival only. These changes have come but they have not so far led to complete secularization in the city. From the account given by Singer the argument can be put forward in the following form :

Items	*Change from*	*To*
Place of performance	sacred centers	cultural centers
Performers	priests and pandits	movie actors and concert artists,
Occasion of performance.	sacred	secular
Media	cultural media	mass media
Values	religious merit	mass entertainment and aesthetics
Attention and type of activity.	ritual observances and sacred learning.	popular culture and arts

Source : Singer op. cited 154-160.

What is the effect of these changes on the great traditions of Hinduism ? Does the adoption of modern mass media change also

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the contents of the sacred tradition ? Two processes seem to check this shift from the local traditions ;

(i) within the city limits some of the literati of the folk order continue to live and meet the needs of people who are nearer the folk level than the urban. "Little and Great Traditions are not neatly differentiated along a village-urban axis. Both kinds of tradition are found in villages and in the city in different form."[10] (Singer 1960 : 154, 155).

(ii) when the trends of the Western culture begin to act upon the existing culture, the latter tries to use the former for its purposes in its own ways. These two ideas may be illustrated.

Some of the ideas that fall in the first category are better expressed by Sjoberg, and though these are not specifically meant for Madras, they can be understood as being true for an Indian city of that type. He writes : "Families and individuals consult diviners of various persuasions on matters of illness, the meaning of dreams, auspicious names of children, the proper time for marriage and funerals, or whether a couple should be married at all."[11] (1960 : 281). The specialists for the higher groups are more trained, for the lower groups apprentices may be sufficient.

The second category of movement may be reflected in the themes adopted by the modern playwrites, and stories brought forth in movies. Stories from the epics and the events connected with the religious life of the people are also put on the stage. Classical forms of music and dancing developed by the indigenous civilization acquire an important place even in modern entertainment. Singer says "The effect of the mass media, in other words, has not so much secularized the sacred traditional culture as it has democratized it (1960 : 158)". This means that the mass media has enabled a larger number of people to see and listen to religious performances than it had been the case in the past.

At a third level, modern styles and contents have also begun to appear. Novels and dramas relating to social reform can now be seen as a new development in the Indian cities. The use of the radio and the news papers and magazines has brought about some

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10. Milton Singer, "The Great Trdition of Hinduism in the City of Madras" in Charles Leslie (ed.) *Anthropology of Folk Religion*, Vintage Press, New York 1960.

11. Gideon Sjoberg, *The Pre-Industrial City*, The Free Press, 1960 p. 281.

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change in traditional values, and problems of the urban and the industrialized society are also depicted in various ways. This was an expected development. Singer takes it more or less for granted, and then summarises the over-all effect of the three trends : those of the literati, the folk, and the modern intellectuals in this way: Although several of the older ritual and village folk froms survive in the urban environment of Madras, the distinctive cultural developments in the city have been the revival and modernization of classical forms and the creation of popular devotional forms in each of the major media—literature, puranic (mythological), recitation, drama, music and dance. . . . Urbanization has adopted the traditional forms to create modern versions of class and mass culture. It is also beginnning to produce a form of urban culture that derives neither from the sacred culture nor from the folk culture. This is either an importation from another urbanized culture—as in the novel, the social play, the symphony—or represents a creative synthesis of indigenous and foreign sources" (1960 : 160).[12]

With respect to cultural traditions, there is a difference between Bombay and Madras. Bombay has for long been the more cosmopolitan of the two cities connected with industry and overseas to an extent greater than Madras. Industrial changes in India were closely linked with the development of cotton market. In this respect Bombay was well situated near a black cotton soil area ; early cotton industries developed in Bombay and the nearer city of Ahmedabad. The volume of trade with England was higher from Bombay ; and for its location as well it could well be called the gate way of India. Thus influence of westernization appears to have been a bit greater on Bombay than Madras. The former also became the movie production capital of India. The city lay almost in the middle region of India and developed a heterogeneity even of the indigenous variety. The local poplution used mainly the Marathi language, the traders from Gujerat formed a significant proportion of the population and used Gujerati language, the traders from the neighbouring state of Rajasthan used their own language, and the workers from U.P. in most of the cotton factories came from the Hindi speaking area with a different dialect of their own. Madras was located in one region, had been a center of two major languages, and three others had been used, but the degree of mobility in culture that Bombay had was more wide-spread and

12. Milton Singer op. cited. p. 160.

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westernized. One could almost say that the two cities could have differed as do San Francisco and Los Angeles ; one a more sophisticated center and the other a more open one.

But all the traits of westernization and secularization do not appear to go at the same speed even in Bombay. Some of the sociologists in Bombay have thought that what happens as a result of urbanization in Bombay can to some extent tell what will happen in the rest of the country in the future. From this point of view some studies were made in the family structure and ideas of people with regard to open or closed group of marriages. It has been that a majority of the intelligentsia interviewed, did not favour marriages outside caste groups. It was also found that many of the caste groups in the city organize their own social activities like those of recreation on Sundays or other festivals, run their caste magazines, and use modern mass media to spread this knowldge to other members of the caste of different parts of India and some of the castes have developed national organizations of their own to the extent of having even some tournaments of recent games.

In addition to the facts cited above, Bombay has a difference from Madras. The origin of the former city is linked with a local Goddess called *Mumba Devi* and after her name the city is locally called Mumbai. Madras has had a secular origin. However Madras become an important center of traditional learning in the south and Bombay never acquired that status. The picture one gets of Bombay is essentially of an industrial-cum-port city of great commercial significance. In cultural terms, with a much greater youthful population than Madras, Bombay is looked upon as a source of fashion and new things in India.

These facts highlight the way Bombay make it self different from Madras. Bombay has more variety both national and international : and these factors have effected the life and values of its citizens. Even then Bombay is still not a secular city ; it has as yet not got rid of all the legacies of traditionalism, in other words, it has still some of the characteristic features of the orient. Fortune tellers are linked with the richest of the brokers; some community functions are continued; in terms of marital relations older values have been modified to a rather little degree.

III

In discussing the problem of metropolitan cities in an indigenous civilization feeling the impact of modern influences Singer opened

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a good question for analysis So far major studies of urban communities in India have been limited in scope from this sociological point of view. Characteristics of the population have been mentioned, ecological studies have also been made, but very few attempts at finding out the cultural effect of the city and the process of transformation of indigenous and foreign elements undertaken. In the coming years, future development of urban Sociology in India will have to look more to the human meaning of the presence of diverse people and their interaction with one another. Many people from the villages are including larger cities on their sightseeing trips when they visit holy places situated near the big centers; more people from rural areas are coming to urban centers for work, education, and obtaining facilities from the administration. This interaction between the people of the village and the cities is occuring through both the town dwellers and the villagers going to and fro. Thus the cultural role of cities of the newly independent nations of Asia has to be understood a little more seriously. Emerging nations as pointed out by Singer not merely want new technology, they also look for retaining their national ideas and seek the national image. The city both as a center for ideology and Utopia (and counter Utopia as well) plays its own role and it needs to be studied.

Singer's study is however, only a small beginning. It was related to one aspect of cultural life that of discovering the Great and Little Traditions in a heterogenous city. In this paper, an effort was made to extend such an analysis in two ways:

(i) by introducing comparative material from Bombay and stating some points on which further comparison would be made;

(ii) by introducing the demographic variables at a more solid footing into the analytical frame of reference than was done by Singer. Another approach that is suggested here is that a metropolitan city like Bombay or Madras requires to be studied also in the way it brings various sectors of the nation together. In other words in a large country like India, the concept of one Great Tradition will have to be revised to make room for many regional traditions also. It happens to be the case that all the metropolitan cities in India happen to be linked with a hinterland not merely in geographical terms, but also in cultural terms. Calcutta happens to be located in a predominantly Bengali speaking area with a calender of festivals slightly more important in the region for certain ceremonies than others;

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Madras has a different linguistic area (Tamil), Bombay has now Marathi as the main language of the people. The language of the 'folk' people in a city and its regional characteristics, the role of cultural minorities, and the educated intelligentsia still remain to be studied. In fact today the carriers of a western ideology to the masses are the bi-lingual people in a region. The extent to which the regional language and literature have incorporated the styles and contents of more westernized elite remain to be studied at the regional levels. As such, while the work of Singer is recognized as a landmark in making Urban Sociology in India a little more than geographical and ecological in character; it is suggested that, that lead has to be followed and modified to suit more regional studies and comparative evaluations.

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CHAPTER XXVII

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The Study of Complex Cultures

—*S. C. Dube*

In recent years Sociology and Anthropology have evinced increasing interest in the study of complex societies and their cultures. The conventional approach of studying single communities—tribes, villages, or castes—as isolates is gradually being discarded; the contemporary trend is to study them in relation to the wider social and cultural network within which they function. It is generally recognized that this net-work, often reaching out to the boundaries of the nation-state, provides certain vital contexts that are essential to the understanding of any single community in a proper perspective. Some understanding of the whole thus becomes necessary for an accurate analysis of any of its segments. Also, while it is accepted that an understanding of the sub-systems (or of the isolable segments of the society) is required for the comprehension of the social system as a whole, it is open to doubt whether the traditional approach, of segmental studies, by itself can provide a complete and consistent picture of the larger social system. The new interest in the study of complex societies and their cultures, thus, raises a series of important conceptual and methodological problems that call for sensitive and imaginative handling.

This essay is divided into two parts : the first analyzes some important anthropological approaches to the study of complex cultures ; the seeond examines the major hypotheses and concepts used in the study of Indian Society and offers a tentative frame-work for the study of cultural processes in India.

I

Anthropological Approaches to Complex Cultures

In studying the culture of a complex society, such as is defined by the boundaries of a modern nation-state, the problem inevitably arises : how are we to look at this culture so that out of the diversity of class, caste, linguistic, and regional forms will emerge the common

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core of cultural behaviour that makes it possible to speak of the society as an entity. Traditionally in anthropology the researcher was free to determine the limits of his society—his unit of observation. Often the subject of study was a small, relatively homogeneous, and isolated group, in which cultural boundaries were coterminous with geographical, linguistic, or associational boundaries. The anthropologist in such a case did not have to be concerned with the problem of homogeneity of culture, because he was able to choose for observation a group so small and isolated that a high degree of homogeneity was almost certain to exist. On a somewhat more complex level, when the peasant community was taken as the unit of study, its geographic boundaries still proved satisfatory in defining the limits of a cultural whole. As Redfield, Foster, and Opler, among others, have pointed out, the peasant community in most of the world is not isolated from contact with surrounding communities and with the far-away centres of urban civilization ; it is, in fact, dependent for many necessities of village life on the world outside. Yet, for purposes of study the "llttle community" is undeniably an isolable, relatively homogeneous entity. The village can usually be described adequately in terms of a common culture—of shared values and world-view, of shared techniques and customs. And where class, linguistic, or ethnic divisions split the society into distinct subgroups, these are rarely too numerous or diverse to be handled within the framework of a larger "village culture". Contacts with the outside world can satisfactorily be treated "from the inside looking out", that is, as, an integral part of the culture under study.

Today, however, students of peasant communities are becoming increasingly aware of the larger whole of which these communities are but a minute part : the modern nation-state. Redfield noted that

> In the case of civilized societies and national states...The problem is how to understand a community that is not only a simple band or village but is perhaps many villages in important relationships with manors, towns and cities. Because no one village is really independent, but is a part of a much larger and more complicated system, our interest is drawn toward the description of the more complicated system. Detaching one's self, so to speak, from the village one moves to consider the whole region or even the whole national state as the entity to be studied and understood. (1655a : 128)

But unable to limit the cultural unit by the former considerations of size, isolation, and homogeneity, the anthropologist, presented

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with societal boundaries drawn for him by political accident, will have to find criteria for establishing the presence of a common core of culture in the behaviour and beliefs of a large and diverse group of people.

Definitions of "culture" usually include the words "shared" or "common" with reference to habits, values, achievements, or whatever else may be taken as the criterion of analysis. Sharing or group participation is indeed the very essence of the culture concept. A culture develops when groups of people living in constant interaction come to share certain ways of behaving, thinking, and doing things. And although each individual obviously does not act mechanically and with complete conformity in every situation, it is possible, within a given culture, for one to find the range within which most, if not all, behaviour will fall, and the limits beyond which it will not go. The extent to which all members of the group share in this range of behaviour is an index of the cultural homogeneity of the society.

It is clear that in no society does each person participate in all aspects of his culture. But it is also obvious that the extent of the individual's participation in his culture will vary with the size of the group, the amount of cultural content, and the degree of specialization of roles, as well as with the rate of change and the nature of outside influences. Ralph Linton (1936 : 271-287) has offered a set of concepts which can be useful in discussing the question of the nature of cultural participation, particularly with respect to the culture of the modern nation-state. He suggests the classification of the elements of a culture into three categories, according to the degree of participation in them by the members of the society. Those ideas, habits, and conditioned emotional responses which are common to all sane adult members of a given society Linton terms *universals*. He recognizes two other types of cultural behaviour. *Specialties* are behaviour patterns characteristic of subgroups within a society—occupational groups, classes, the two sexes, and other possible socially recognized categories of individuals. As they are shared by all members of the subgroup, the specialties might be described as the "Universals" of the subgroup. Linton's *alternatives* refer to behaviour patterns which are open to individual choice or which are shared by groups of individuals who do not constitute a socially recognized category.

A culture, according to Linton, is composed of two parts : a core of *universals* and *specialties*, well-integrated and fairly stable, with a

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surrounding fluid zone of *alternatives*. The cultural process involves a continuing interchange of traits between the two zones. Ways of thinking, acting, doing, which begin as personal idiosyncracies are gradually accepted by more and more people until they come to have the place of *alternatives* in the culture : eventually they may penetrate the cultural core as they gain general adherence. Cultural *universals* and *specialties* are similarly drawn out of the central core and pass into the realm of *alternatives* as they fall into disuse and are replaced.

Useful to us in our attempt to deal with the problem of national culture is Linton's observation that the difference between folk cultures and modern civilizations "is primarily a matter of the proportion which the core of Universals and Specialties bears to the fluid zone of Alternatives." (1936 : 283) In folk cultures "the core constitutes almost the whole". (1936 : 283) ; in other words, there is a high degree of participation in the culture, the number of shared elements is great, the avenues of choice are few. A folk culture is well integrated, change is slow, and few items remain unassimilated without disappearing entirely.

On the other hand, the core of a complex civilization is small in proportion to the number of *alternatives*. This in Linton's view, is a result of the breakdown of the closely-integrated social units of the folk society which, in turn, is caused by the increasing size of the group, the consequent lessening of the pressure for cultural enformity, and the rapidity of the appearance of new culture content.

These hypotheses were put to test by Robert Redfield in his study of four Mexican communities, published later as *The Folk Culture of Yucatan*, in an attempt to find a satisfactory characterization of folk culture. He found that it was indeed possible, as one went from the village to the town, to characterize the differences in terms of a breakdown of the core of *universals* and an increase in the range of *alternatives* and *variants* open to individual choice. In this context Variants may be understood as *alternatives* which are shared only by certain individuals not constituting a socially recognized group.

But the modern civilization has a further characteristic which must be clarified before we can use Linton's concepts in a definition of national culture. Not only are there more *alternatives* and *variants* in a complex urban culture than in a peasant village, but there are also a much larger number of *specialties*. There is an important distinction to be made here between what we might call "Role" and "Sub-cultural" *specialties*. Every culture contains some patterns

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which are connected with the performance of particular roles necessary to the functioning of the society ; differences in age and sex behaviour, occupational techniques, and behaviour associated with specific status and power positions cannot necessarily be correlated with stages in the development from folk culture to modern state. They constitute in a real sense part of the cultural core of *universals.* Subcultural *specialties*, on the other hand, refer to behaviour patterns peculiar to various segments or subcultures within the society, determined not by role, but by considerations of class, language, ethnic affiliation, or locality. The modern nation state, in contrast to the folk culture, includes a large number of subcultures ; the total cultural content of the civilization includes a correspondingly great number of *sub-cultural specialties.* Linton himself recognized this characteristic of the modern nation. Speaking of the applicability of his three-fold classification of culture elements to the study of small homogenous groups, he says,

> When we turn to larger units such as tribes, or more especially modern states, we find a vastly more complex situation. While ethnologists have been accustomed to speak of tribes and nationalities as though they were the primary culture-bearing units, the total culture of a society of this type is really an aggregate of subcultures. (1936 : 275)

Linton lumps in "the peculiarities of the various subcultures" (1936 : 275) with the *specialties* and thus presumably includes them as part of the cultural core with the *universals* and with what we have called *role specialties.* For his concern with the dynamics of culture and with the problems of integration and disintegration this lumping together is useful. In our search for a way of conceptualizing the culture of a modern state as a comprehensible whole, however, it might be more useful to think of the cultural core of shared patterns as including the *universals*, the *role specialties*, and the *alternatives* (in Redfield's sense, 1941 : 348). Beyond this area of common national cultural forms are the *subcultural specialties* and the *variants,* shared only by segments of the total population. Redfield seems to approaching this type of conceptualization when he looks for "the unity of the culture of the society, that is, the extent to which it may be described as a single culture and to which it must be seen as a series of related sub-cultures..." (1941 : 46). He takes Linton's idea of the core of the *universals* (by implication living out Linton's *specialties* from the core) and reinterprets it to mean "the extent to which the entire society can be described in terms of a single organi-

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zed body of conventional understanding." (1941 : 349) Although Redfield, being primarily interested at that time in the folk culture, did not elaborate upon these ideas in respect to the modern nation-state, his discussion does suggest a way in which Linton's *universals* could be effectively used in the study of national culture.

A second possible approach to the problem of the study of national culture is suggested by the work of Julian Steward, whose thinking has been specifically oriented toward the study of contemporary complex socio-cultural systems, rather than of the folk society. Actually, Steward's writtings imply several conceptual approaches to national culture. He speaks first of *national patterns*, a set of formulated, nationwide institutions which can be regarded as systems in themselves and are not suited to ethnographic methods. These national institutions—such as the economic system, organized religion, and governmental structure—are viewed as a framework within which the individual lives, carrying out his daily activities "within the context of a fairly small segment of society that consists of people substantially like himself and who therefore may be said to have a sub-culture." (1955 : 66) Sub-cultures are a result of vertical cleavages within the society—forming regions, neighbourhoods, ethnic groups—and of horizontal cleavages, dividing occupational groups, castes, and classes.

Steward's national patterns and subcultures are in reality, of course, not separate systems. Thus the nation-wide institutions have in each subculture a distinctive aspect which cannot be determined by a study of the formalized patterns ; likewise the character of each subculture is coloured by the existence of a common national framework. From the anthropologist's point of view, then, the study of national culture, using this approach, would include a knowledge of the nature of each nalional institution through the specialized social sciences, as well as a consideration of the localized aspects of these institutions in detailed ethnographic study of each subculture.

A different, non-institutional approach is suggested by Steward when he speaks of nationally shared traits, national characteristics, or the cultural common denominator. These concepts might be likened to Linton's *universals*. Steward attempts to go further than Linton, however, and investigates the features which he feels go to make up the national common denominator. He lists first those common behaviour patterns which arise from "more or less compulsory conformity with the basic national institutions that affect all individuals..." (1955 : 73). Traits derived from what he somewhat

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vaguely calls "the basic cultural heritage" (1955 : 73) are the second component of the national characteristics. Third in the series are those cultural forms which are induced by the mass communications media. Although some type of descriptive analysis of the elements which go to make up the national common denominator or core of *universals* (in our sense) could be useful, Steward's distinctions seem inadequate. "Institutional behaviour" is a fairly clear-cut concept and it might be possible in practice to distinguish such compulsory activity from other kinds of cultural behaviour. Steward himself point out, however, that behaviour in conformity to the national institutions is not in any real sense "shared" by members of different subgroups, because it finds its own interpretations within the context of the subculture. The terminology chosen to describe the second feature of the national characteristics is particularly unfortunate. "Cultural heritage" is generally identical with "culture", in its broadest anthropological sense. If this is the meaning intended by Steward, then it is inclusive of the other features of his "common denominator", and no such distinctions need be made. If some narrower meaning is intended, as perhaps "culture" in the lay sense, the expression should be more precisely defined. The third "kind" of national characteristic is defined by Steward in terms of a process: the way in which certain cultural elements are transmitted. Although it would, of course, be possible to classify national cultural elements with regard to the means of their dissemination throughout the culture, we would have then a problem of a different order from that involved in attempts to classify the content of the body of nationally shared traits. Further, when Steward brings into his concepts material items—like radio, film, newspapers—which are characteristic only of specific civilizations at a specific point in time, he makes his theoretical framework useless for dealing either with pre-modern complex civilizations or with present-day cultures that have not yet reached a certain level of technological advance. It appears that on the whole this approach of Steward to an analysis of the common denominator of culture cannot be very fruitful for our purposes.

Steward does, however, make us realize some of the difficulties involved in any attempt to discover empirically the nature of the nationally shared traits in a given civilization. He points out the enormity of the task of quantitative analysis, by statistical sampling, of the actual commonality of cultural behaviour (*universals*, in Linton's terms) in a large and complex nation-state. In fact, Steward seems to come to the conclusion that it is not very profitable to look

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for shared traits in this type of cultural unit. What national traits there are take on a different meaning in the context of each subculture ; therefore the proper area for research is the intensive observation of each subculture "as a whole." (1955 : 77)

M. N. Srinivas (1952), interested not in national culture as such but rather in the complex socio-religious system that is Hinduism, has introduced the concept of *spread*, a concept which has a wider application than the one for which it was intended. The spread of any cultural element is the area in which it is shared, the groups by which it is carried. Srinivas found that some Hindu rituals and beliefs were common to people of all strata, all over India ; these had thus an All-India spread. He saw further that Hinduism could be divided into Peninsular Hinduism, and the Hinduism of various regions and locales. Using Srinivas's concepts, the religious forms of any local group could be perceived as consisting of ever widening circles, at the centre of which are those forms which are peculiar to the group and at the outer edge of which are those rituals and beliefs that characterize All-India Hinduism, the *universals* of the Hindu religion.

Similar to Steward, Srinivas makes a distinction between horizontal and vertical spread. Because of the complex social stratification in Indian society—stratification which, in a lesser form, is characteristic of any complex civilization—the culture of different strata in one region or locality may differ considerably. On the other hand, the culture of the same layer of society in different regions may be essentially similar ; such a phenomenon is called by Srinivas *horizontal spread. Vertical spread* represents those cultural elements which are shared within a geographic area, regardless of caste or ethnic divisions.

The similarity of Srinivas's All-India spread to Linton's *universals* and Steward's *cultural common denominator* is obvious. Operationally, however, it may be a more unable concept, since the focus is on the specific cultural from and its relation to the national culture, rather than on the national culture as such. The problem consists not in sampling all subcultures in order to find what is common to them, but to select certain cultural phenomena which are of interest to the researcher and then to investigate to what extent they are nationally shared. The concept of spread is useful also because it permits a finer classification of cultural traits than is provided by the other/or distinction between *universals* and *specialties, national characteristics* and *subcultural patterns.*

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At this point we might look a little more closely at the concepts we have been using : nation-state and complex culture. Perhaps in the study of national culture some distinction must be made between types of nation-states, or perhaps the term, at least, must be more precisely defined. Steward suggests that our statement about modern nations being compose of many subcultures may not be as clear cut as we have assumed. He notes that a civilization like that of Puerto Rico has many subcultural differences and few nationally shared characteristics, while the United States is becoming increasingly homogenous in culture—the chief variables using "well-developed mass communications, a high standard of living, and a relatively high degree of socio-economic mobility." (1955 : 63). Linton accounts for the same phenomenon in the United States by citing the loosening hold of the various subcultural groups on their members. Thus, following Linton and Steward, we might posit a range of types of nation-states—from the extremely heterogeneous society with strong subcultural solidarity, limited technical development, low economic standards, and social rigidity, to the highly industrialized, highly mobile and culturally homogeneous civilization at the end-point of cultural evolution. Whether the facts would support such a thesis remains to be seen.

Redfield and Singer (1954) have made a different and more interesting distinction between two types of civilizations. They speak of the *primary civilization*, the result of orthogenetic growth, developed from an indigenous folk culture ; and the *secondary civilization*, the product of foreign cultural influences impinging on native forms. India and China are good examples of what Redfield and Singer mean by a primary civilization ; Steward's Puerto Rico could be characterized as a secondary civilization, the product of Spanish, Indian, and African cultural influences. This distinction makes it possible to use an entirely new aproach to the study of national culture—an approach which views the civilization in terms of process.

Such an approach was suggested first by Srinivas, who, in his study of Hinduism, spoke of Sanskritic and non-Sanskritic elements in Indian ritual and belief. Hinduism as practiced in various regions, localities and castes differs in respect to the proportion of Sanskritic to non-Sanskritic forms. But, the system is a dynamic one ; traditional, i.e. Sanskritic forms are spread throughout the civilization by

> . . . the extention of Sanskritic deities and ritual forms to an outlying group, as well as by the greater Sanskritization of the

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> ritual and beliefs of groups inside Hinduism . . . the first results in Sanskritic deities assuming different forms in their travels all over India, while the second results in local deities assuming Sanskritic labels and forms. (1952 : 214)

Redfield (1955b), taking the essence of Srinivas' ideas and adapting them to the study of whole civilizations, has introduced two concepts with broad application, both area-wise and institution-wise : the *great* and *little traditions*. He conceives of these two traditions, characteristic of a primary civilization, as "currents of thought and action," (1955b : 4) represented by the literati, the reflective elite, the school, and the temple on the one hand, and by the unschooled, unsophisticated, and diverse local, regional, and caste groups on the other. These traditions are the result of long interaction between local *folk-communities* and the so-called *centres of civilization*, where, because of historical factors, an indigenous intelligentsia has developed. This elite group, concerned with the refinements of philosophical speculation, and of the arts and the pursuit of knowledge, has produced a consciously cultivated "cultural" (in the lay sense) tradition. The inspiration for the *great tradition* is found partly in the existing *little traditions* from which the elite has sprung, partly their thinking is original. But once the *grert traditions* has been formed, the process of interaction between the two contents of thought—a process much like Srinivas' Sanskritization—begins. Elements of the *little traditions* are constantly taken into and absorbed by the *great tradition*. Conversely, elements of the *great tradition* are accepted by the carriers of local traditions. Viewed as a whole this can be conceived as "a persisting and characteristic but always changing interaction between little and great traditions." (1955b : 14)

Mckim Marriott, in an interesting study of a north Indian village in terms of Redfield's great and little traditions (1955), has further refined this concept of interaction between the two traditions. He speaks of the twin processes of *universalization* and *parochialization*. The former concept is akin to Srinivas' Sanskritization : it refers to the "carrying forward of materials which are already present in the little traditions which it encompasses." (1955 : 197) The opposing process, that of *parochialization*, is defined by Marriott as

> . . . the downward devolution of great-traditional elements and their integration with little-traditional elements...a process of localization, of limitation upon the scope of intelligibility, of

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> deprivation of literary form, of reduction to less systematic and reflective dimensions. (*1955 : 200*)

These two processes, which constitute the dynamics of the *great* and *little traditions*, are not merely two-directional, but are rather circular and continuous in operation:

Here it might be noted that Marriott's term, universalization, does not in any way correspond to the *universals* of Linton. When Marriott speaks of cultural content becoming universal, he means that it becomes a part of that tradition, aspects of which are found throughout the civilization, but which is carried in its entirely by no one group. In Linton's scheme, on the other hand, a pattern becomes universal when it is participated in by members of every subcultural group. Mandelbaum, speaking about the nature of participation in the Indian tradition, makes this distinction somewhat clearer:

> . . . the "great tradition" is essentially a convenient abstraction. It is not followed in its pure literary form in the village or for that matter among city folk either. There is...the vast corpus of scripture and literature, *a reservoir from which elements may be selected for prominent notice during a particular period or among a special group.* (1955 : 249, Italics mine)

There are certain factors which make Redfield's *great* and *little traditions* difficult to use in the study of a complex culture for the terms are not closely enough defined for use in the analysis of field data. In attempting to apply the concepts two questions arise: What is the content of what we will call the great tradition in the civilization we are studying ? And how do we know to which tradition we should assign a given cultural element ?

Redfield speaks in several places of sacred literature and art forms as the repository of the *great tradition.* If we defined the content of such sacred production as identical with the content of the abstraction called the *great tradition,* much of the difficulty of correctly classifying cultural traits would be obviated. Elements of culture could be accorded great traditional status if they were present in the sacred literature or art, or were obviously derived from these sources. But such a definition of the *great tradition* has two disadvantages. First, it leaves unassigned many aspects of life in the civilization which are not within the scope of the religious aspect of life but are extremely pervasive. In any case, using the sacred literature and artistic expressions as the principal criteria for the *great tradition* is bound to limit the extent to which the whole culture of a given group

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can be analysed. A second disadvantage consists in the question : Is it proper to use such a static definition of the *great tradition* when, as the concepts have been formulated by Redfield, the process of interchange between the two traditions is a continuous and dynamic one ? The *great tradition,* according to Redfield, is always changing, expanding, taking in new elements, and loosing ones old. How then can it be described in terms of books which were completed hundreds and thousands of years ago ? Redfield apparently realizes the difficulties involved in such a specific definition of the *great tradition* : for this reason he makes no clear-cut statement as to what kind of things should be judged to constitute the *great tradition,* but prefers to speak in generalized, abstract terms. But, if one is going to use these concepts in the analysis of data with any kind of scientific accuracy, one needs to know their meaning more precisely.

To the second question, "how do we know to which tradition we should assign a given cultural element ?", we cannot give a satisfactory answer in terms of Redfield's theoretical framework. As Marriott point out—although he has done a masterful analysis of the interpretations of traditions in an Indian village—the inability to trace back the origins of many cultural phenomena in the centuries-long process of development makes the task of assigning them to one or the other tradition a difficult one. A detailed historical knowledge of the area might be of some help in tracing the starting point of many rituals and beliefs, but it would not reveal the origins of all. And it is seldom possible, particularly when dealing with semi-literate subgroups in a society, to learn enough about this aspect of their history. Although there are "residual categories of cultural contents...which represent neither the results of upward movement, nor the results of downward movement, but rather the stability of contents, created and retained within either tradition," (Marriott 1955 : 203) there is still a broad range of cultural content which cannot as clearly be identified with either.

A second major objection to the use of Redfield's concepts in the analysis of any existing civilization or sub-culture thereof is that no civilization is as definitely "primary" as his hypothesis would lead us to assume. Particularly in the present age, and in earlier times also, foreign cultural influence impinge on the indigenous civilisation and create new forces and directions of cultural activity. Unless one makes a very generalized analysis of a complex culture, without concerning oneself with lesser variables in the cultural process, one cannot take literally the primary-secondary distinction. *Civilizations*

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can perhaps be classified according to the degree to which heterogenetic growth has characterized their development, but they cannot be separated into mutually exclusive categories. A study of Indian culture, for example, would not be complete without a consideration of the influences of Western culture, not to mention the Muslim tradition which has played so important a part in the history of this civilization.

The value of examining these concepts for their possible illumination of the nature of national cultural patterns in complex civilizations lies chiefly in the possibilities which they offer for the interpretation of field data collected from sub-groups within those civilizations. It is not possible to do a field study of a nation ; one must necessarily be limited to the intensive observation of single, preferably several, small segments of that nation. The purpose here is to find some possible theoretical orientations which will enable us to relate such a limited study to the larger whole. In doing so, we will not be concerned as much with the understanding of the sub-culture—village, caste, religious community—as such, but rather with its implications for the culture of the civilization of which it is a part.

We have suggested here, using ideas from various anthropologists concerned with similar issues, basically three types of approaches to the study of national culture : the essentially quantitative, statistical approach suggested by Linton's *universals*, Srinivas' *All-India spread*, and Steward's *national cultural common denominator* : the generalized, functional approach implied in Srinivas' *Sanskritic tradition* and Redfield's *great* and *little traditions* ; and the institutional approach of Steward, which has something in common with both of the other two.

The concepts related to Linton's *universals* have the advantage of being specific—the criteria to be used in assigning a given cultural trait to the proper category of *universals, specialities*, or *alternatives* are well-defined and in most cases statistically determinable. In addition, since the phenomenon of varying degrees of participation in the total culture is present in societies at all levels, the concepts have a broad and generalized application. On the other hand, from a practical point of view, these concepts are somewhat unwieldy. It would be an extremely long and involved task to do a complete and accurate sampling of all or even of a representative group of the subcultural segments in a large society with many horizontal and vertical cleavages. Further, the interrelations of different aspects of

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the culture, the functional problem of anthropology, are neglected. One is left, assuming that the sampling has been successfully accomplished, with somewhat meaningless lists of traits and with no indication of how they are integrated with each other and what they mean in the context of different subcultures.

As yet, no study of a national culture using these concepts has been attempted. Srinivas uses the concept of spread in his study of the Coorgs of India, but has not developed it to the extent that he can say what are the cultural forms which are shared by all Indians. Also, he is concerned almost exclusively with Hinduism and its socio-religious implications, rather than with the broader problem of national culture as a whole. Redfield has used Linton's concept of *universals* in analysing data from the Yucatan, but his focus there is definitely on problems of integration of various types of folk and urban cultures, rather than on the shared culture of the wider area.

The approach of Redfield, Marriott, and Singer (1955) has a more functional and contextual orientation. The content of the terms used is assumed beforehand, in a general way, for a specific culture which is to be studied. The problem of the anthropologist is to fill in the details and investigate the process through a deep understanding of one subculture. These processes, though not always the details, can then presumably be generalized for the whole civilization. This approach has the advantage that on extensive study is not necessary for valid results, assuming the correctness of the original hypothesis. Since one is not looking for specifics in terms of nationally shared culture, one can speak of the national culture in broad, somewhat abstract generalizations based on data from a limited area. Practically, therefore, this approach is simpler than the other. Extensive investigation of the whole field is possible and desirable, but not necessary for useful conclusions. On the other hand, the initial problems of definition and classification are, as we have pointed out, complex ones. Another advantage in the use of the Redfield concepts is that it gives a more thorough understanding of the complexities, interrelations, and meaning of different aspects of the culture. The emphasis is on dynamics and process, rather on static form. The civilization is approached as an integrated whole, rather than an aggregate of culture traits : it is understood, not merely described.

In actual field research, their approach has been used by Srinivas in his analysis of Hinduism and the process of change within a caste group in southern India. Here his interest was primarily in the way

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the culture, the functional problem of anthropology, are neglected. One is left, assuming that the sampling has been successfully accomplished, with somewhat meaningless lists of traits and with no indication of how they are integrated with each other and what they mean in the context of different subcultures.

As yet, no study of a national culture using these concepts has been attempted. Srinivas uses the concept of spread in his study of the Coorgs of India, but has not developed it to the extent that he can say what are the cultural forms which are shared by all Indians. Also, he is concerned almost exclusively with Hinduism and its socio-religious implications, rather than with the broader problem of national culture as a whole. Redfield has used Linton's concept of *universals* in analysing data from the Yucatan, but his focus there is definitely on problems of integration of various types of folk and urban cultures, rather than on the shared culture of the wider area.

The approach of Redfield, Marriott, and Singer (1955) has a more functional and contextual orientation. The content of the terms used is assumed beforehand, in a general way, for a specific culture which is to be studied. The problem of the anthropologist is to fill in the details and investigate the process through a deep understanding of one subculture. These processes, though not always the details, can then presumably be generalized for the whole civilization. This approach has the advantage that on extensive study is not necessary for valid results, assuming the correctness of the original hypothesis. Since one is not looking for specifics in terms of nationally shared culture, one can speak of the national culture in broad, somewhat abstract generalizations based on data from a limited area. Practically, therefore, this approach is simpler than the other. Extensive investigation of the whole field is possible and desirable, but not necessary for useful conclusions. On the other hand, the initial problems of definition and classification are, as we have pointed out, complex ones. Another advantage in the use of the Redfield concepts is that it gives a more thorough understanding of the complexities, interrelations, and meaning of different aspects of the culture. The emphasis is on dynamics and process, rather on static form. The civilization is approached as an integrated whole, rather than an aggregate of culture traits : it is understood, not merely described.

In actual field research, their approach has been used by Srinivas in his analysis of Hinduism and the process of change within a caste group in southern India. Here his interest was primarily in the way

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in which a tribal, non-Hindu group becomes adapted to the majority culture and how Sanskritic and non-Sanskritic forms are thus intermingled and successfully integrated in the religious life of this community. Marriott has used the concepts in a study of the ritual life of an Indian village ; he speaks specifically of festivals and deities and of their associations with the *great* and *little traditions.* Singer has taken a broader field for study—something nearer to our national culture idea. He is interested in the "common cultural consciousness shared by most Indians and expressed in essential similarities of mental outlook and ethics," (1955 : 23) or the "cultural pattern of Indian civilization." (1955 : 54) He has chosen to study the carriers of agents of the cultural process involved in the interaction of the *great* and *little traditions* : dancers, singers, story-tellers, and other spiritual leaders, or what he calls "cultural specialties." (1955 : 25) Although his study was not intensive enough to result in any significant conclusions or generalizations about this process of interaction, it is interesting as an indication of the possible types of research which can be done by using this theoretical framework. Redfield suggests other possible areas of research—the cultural institutions like the temple or shrine, the sub-groups, like the sub-castes of bards in India, whose function it is to carry the *great tradition* and relate it to the various *little traditions.*

Steward's institutional approach is similar to that of Redfield, in that it considers the integration of national patterns with local traditions ; however, it has the specificity of the quantitative approaches. on the national level, all but the most formalized types of activity. Its disadvantage is that it disregards, It can be very useful in gaining an understanding of the subculture and its relations with the world outside, but not, I believe in gaining an understanding of the larger culture as such.

Singer has remarked significantly on the problem with which we have been concerned ;

> Methodologically there are two different ways to relate a limited field study to a total civilization. One way is to consider the unit of field study...as an isolate which contains within it the culture pattern. Once the pattern is delineated for one such field unit, it may be compared with the pattern found in similar units in other regions until enough cases are studied to give good measures of central tendency and of the range of variation in patterns...This procedure results in a view of the cultural pattern of a civilization as a kind of statistical aggregate of the patterns

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> of all those cultural molecules...which have been isolated for study ...[However] it is doubtful whether this procedure will reveal the required complexity of or organization...if...a unit is to disclose the cultural links with the past and with other regions, it cannot be regarded as an isolate but must be considered rather as one convenient point of entry to the total civilization...The general description of this organization [of lines of communication] in its most embracing spatial and temporal reach will...be a description of the culture pattern of the total civilization. (1955 : 35).

He thus concludes that the latter approach, that used by himself and Redfield and Marriott, is the more fruitful. At present both approaches seem to have their drawbacks, as we have pointed out. But more work needs to be done in the field on the whole problem of national culture, using both of these approaches and developing new ones as the data reveals fresh possibilities.

II

Cultural Processes in India

The multi-ethnic, multi-religious, multi-lingual and highly stratified Indian Society represents a culture of extreme complexity. Cutting through the bewildering maze of tribal, caste, religions, and subcultural differences one can nevertheless identify what may be termed broadly as the Indian Social System and recognize the outlines of an entity that stands out as Indian Culture. At the same time it will be admitted that these outlines are somewhat hazy and at the present time there is no consensus even in regard to their major landmarks. The Indologists, historians, and philosophers all too often identify the Indian Society and Culture with the abstractions and formulations in the classics, and with the conspicuous creations in the fields of literature, art, and architecture. They rely excessively on the texts, without going sufficiently into their social and cultural contexts. The anthropologists and sociologists are, on the other hand, overly concerned with the study of microcosms in their own cherished frames of reference, ignoring, by and large, the historical determinants and the socio-religious thinking that have been instrumental in shaping the communities they study. It is true that a "book view" of Indian Society and Culture presents us an over-idealized picture—a society like that perhaps never existed in the past, and it certainly does not exist today. Yet, the texts cannot be ignored, for without them the ethnographies and social analyses miss

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certain vital continuities and several aspects of the cultural fabric remain unilluminated. Some of the competing "reference models" that have generated a series of identifiable cultural processes in the country cannot be understood without the help of these sources.

My purpose in this part of the essay is to show that a useful way to study the complex culture of India is through the identification of these models, and, with them in the background, through a careful analysis of the processes set in motion by them. The linkages between the models and the interrelations between the processes also merit serious study. There is nothing startlingly new in the tentative framework offered here ; in fact, it draws substantially from the conceptual schemes discussed earlier.

It would be appropriate to begin with a critical assessment of two interrelated conceptual schemes used in the context of the Indian Society—Sanskritization, and Great and Little Tradition.

Mention has already been made of Srinivas's sanskritization hypothesis. It demonstrates the possibility and direction of movement in the status hierarchy of caste, a lower caste, especially in the middle regions of the hierarchy, can register an upward move "in a generation or two . . . . . , by adopting vegetarianism and teetotalism, and by sanskritizing its ritual and pantheon." (1952 : 30). The process essentially consists of taking over by the lower castes of the customs, rites, and beliefs of the Brahmins and of the adoption by them of the Brahmanic way of life. This major trend, first identified and scientifically articulated by Srinivas, is now widely accepted; his hypothesis has aroused considerable discussion and stimulated some very useful research. But it appears to have been overworked, not so much by its first exponent as by its later enthusiasts.

Much of the controversy aroused by it touches peripheral matters and not the central core of the ideas it contains. To begin with it appeared to have triggered a war of words. In the terminological debate over the aptness of the term *sanskritization*, the alternatives suggested—*Brahminization* and *Hinduization* for example—are perhaps more inapt and confusing. Srinivas has himself admitted that the term is awkward ; in fact in a later essay he even calls it ugly (1956) but a more suitable alternative remains to be found. Secondly much of the criticism of the content of the hypothesis is wide off the mark in as much as it was intended primarily to illustrate only *a* process and that too in reference to *a* community. Its critics

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erred in regarding the hypothesis as more comprehensive than it was intended to be. To correct possible distortion of the perspective Srinivas hastened to emphasise also the trend towards Westernization.

The sanskritization hypothesis has served its limited purpose well, but when we seek to adopt it as a major tools for the analysis of the complex cultural scene in India it is found wanting in many respects.

In broad outlines the "Sanskritic Model" appears to be attractive, but careful analysis shows that it is extremely deceptive. Sanskritic sources provide not one model but any models, some of them involving even fundamentally opposed ideals. What we call Hindu Philosophy is not just one school of thought, it is a compendium of many systems of thought, recognizing and advocating many divergent images of society and many different schemes of values. The margin of choice is wide indeed, and the selection of specific items out of the wide spectrum provided by Sanaskritic sources is conditioned by regional contexts and historical antecedents of particular groups and communities. It will be seen, thus, that a generalized all-India Sanskritic Model will be too vogue to be useful as an analytical tool ; it will be ncessary to have a series of such models to suit different regional conditions and historical antecedents. By the same logic the process of Sanskritization cannot be the same all over the country ; region-wise and community-wise variations in it will be too many and too significant to be brushed aside lightly.

Without wishing to enter into a semantic controversy, it may be mentioned that not all groups and communities draw their "models" from Sanskritic sources. Apart from Muslims, Christians, and Parsis, even within the fold of Hinduism there are significant groups whose religious classics are not in Sanskrit but in other language. The followers of Budha, Kabir, Raidas, Dadu or Jyotiba Phule—to take only some examples off hand—draw their inspiration from the writing of these mentors. These writings are not in Sanskrit ; often they are in a language that can be understood by the masses. Only a part of what they have said can be attributed to Sanskritic sources ; there is a great deal in what they have said that stands for a conscious rejection of some of the central ideas implicit in the Sanskritic Model. Will it not be more useful to speak of Classical Models rather than of a Sanskritic Model ?

The Sanskritization hypothesis is uni-directional and has a single focus. It concentrates on the ritual theme. Although it was

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extremely for the purpose for which it was intended its indiscriminate general application to the cultural processes in India has resulted in blurred perspectives. The importance of the ritual theme in Hindu life is undeniable, but at the same time the impact of the secular trends is not too insignificant to be ignored. Later empirical studies show that different Hindu groups in a given region are motivated not by one model but by a multiplicity of models, and that the cultural processes are multi-directional. The Brahmin does not provide a model to everyone and for everything; in fact in the process of the adoption of models provided by other groups certain significant ritual aspects of the Brahmanical Model are consciously or unconsciously ignored. The Kulin Model suggested by Narmadeshwar Prasad (1957), although it is not too well-articulated, has the merit of combining both ritual and secular elements. S. K. Srivastava (1959) and G. S. Bhatt think that in the areas of Uttar Pradesh they have studied, Kshatriyaization or Rajputaization trends are more important than sanskritization, for many Hindu groups, including even some Brahmins, adopt a Kshatriya (or Rajput) Model rather than a Brahmin Model.* For a proper understanding of the wider Hindu Society we thus need to recognize the presence of multiple reference models and reference groups. Also, the ritual trends cannot be considered in isolation from the secular trends.

In conclusion, the main points made so far in the discussion of the sanskritization hypothesis, as a total for the study of the complex culture of India, may be summarized :

1. The Sanskritic Model is too vague to be operationally significant. It would be more useful to think in terms of Sanskritic Models. By the same token there is no single *process* but many *processes* of Sanskritization ;
2. As some sizable and significant groups do not draw their inspiration primarily or even mainly from Sanskritic sources and their models are built around the teachings of mentors who consciously rejected same aspects of the Sanskritic Model, thinking in terms of Classical Models would be more satisfactory terminologically ; and
3. In view of the presence of multiple reference models and reference groups the position significance of the

*This observation is based also on personal communications by Dr. S. K. Srivastava and Professor G. S. Bhatt to the author.

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Brahmanical Model needs and to be re-examined. The ritual theme should be considered alongside the secular themes in contemporary Indian life.

The Great and Little Tradition framework has been discussed briefly in the foregoing pages. It remains to be seen how far we can use it as an operational tool in the study of the complex Indian culture.

In a critical comment on this framework in an earlier essay I have said,

> There is apparently no precise definition of Great or Little Traditions. To define the Great Tradition as the corpus of beliefs, rituals and social patterns embodied in the sacred canonical literature does not take us very far. Even the clarification that it often emanates from the Little Traditions of the little communities and is abstracted and synthesized by the urban *leterati*, does not help our understanding very substantially. It is difficult to reduce the inviolable central core of the more or less static ideas of a Great Tradition to a list of traits and complexes ; nor is it easy to classify them with any degree of precision, as universals, alternatives, and specialities. The concept must also allow for a wide nebulous area covering ideas and institutions that are not accounted for by the sacred or near-sacred texts. This only adds to our difficulties in using the concept as an analytical tool. Where there are more than one Great or near-Great Traditions, each with its canonical texts and ethical codes, the situation becomes all the more confusing. In such a situation we have no criteria for determining the elements which could be said to be basic to the Great Tradition. Scriptures and sacred texts themselves often illustrate certain aspects of evolution and change in society and their is by no means unanimity among them. When conflicting ideal patterns are laid down by the sacred texts, and there is no universality in the acceptance of one in preference to the others, the efforts to find the Great Tradition would be fruitless. It may also be added that the Great Tradition-Little Tradition frame of reference does not allow proper scope for the consideration of the role and significance of regional. Western, and emergent national traditions, each of which is powerful in its own way. (*1961 : 122*).

This otherwise attractive framework leaves us with a set of formidable operational difficulties.

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How do we define the Great Tradition ? Where the sacred canonical literature does not offer a consistent pattern, how do we reconcile the contradictory elements ? How do we identify the elements of the Great and the Little Tradition which have undergone transformation through the processes of universalization and parochialization ? How do we account for ideas and institutions not covered by the sacred texts ? And where do we fit in alien elements and the emerging trends ?

The way out appears to lie in adopting a more complex framework of traditions, when viewed together, would reflect more truly the contemporary cultural processes in India.

Any attempt to develop such a framework will have to recognize historical antecedents and regional variations, to accept the presence of multiple reference models and of divergent pulls, and to attempt a synthesis of both ritual and secular trends.

A six-fold classification of traditions, each to be considered in both rural and urban contexts, is suggested :

1. The Classical Tradition :
2. The Regional Tradition ;
3. The Local Tradition ;
4. The Western Tradition ;
5. The Emergent National Tradition ; and
6. The Subcultural Traditions of special groups.

It will be agreed that each individually identifiable culture-bearing aggregate in India has some kind of a Classical Model. It is rooted in mythology, religious lore and historical past. For a large number of Hindus it may be derived from Sanskritic texts, but they are by no means the only source. It would be useful to discover what parts of the contemporary culture are derived from or inspired by this model.

The Regional Tradition refers to the territorial spread of certain traits and complexes. It is intended to take care of spatial sharing of cultural elements that gives a distinctiveness and identify to the regional culture. When people migrate from one region to another some of their distinctive cultural traits travel with them. With the formation of linguistic states the regional identity is being increasingly emphasized.

The Local Tradition, again on the territorial level, refers to narrower traditions of local groups both individually and severally.

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All cultures comprised within the Indic complex, in some measure, draw their elements from these three traditions.

The Western impact has undeniably left its mark on Indian Society. Part acceptance of the Western Tradition in the ideological and technological spheres will thus have to be accepted. No study of the cultural processes aimed at building a comprehensive picture of India's complex culture can ignore the study of this tradition.

Over the years a strong national consciousness has grown in India. Its cultural consequences are significant. In part and at different stages it has given rise to *nativistic, revivalistic, reinterpretational* and *vitalistic* trends. Where the emphasis has been on the elimination of alien traits, customs, and values the trend may be called nativistic, and when the emphasis was on reinstituting the old schemes of values and social patterns the trend may be described as revivalistic. The reinterpretational trend is represented by the tendency of seeing and justifying new traits in an old frame of reference or of seeing and justifying old traits in a new frame of reference. The vitalistic trend is implicit in the efforts to import alien elements consciously with a view to fortifying the nature culture. A national culture comprising elements drawn from these four trends and with an idiom and symbol system of its own has developed in India. This also merits serious study.

To these we may also add the traditions of a sixth type—the sub-cultural traditions of special groups, such as the Ruling Families, the Bureaucracy, and the Landed Aristocracy. These groups have been governed partly by other traditions, but partly they have always had separate norms and traditions of their own.

These traditions do not function in isolation; each one significantly influences the others. A study of the dynamic aspects of their interaction is necessary to understand adequately the contemporary cultural scenes in India.

There is no short-cut to the study of complex culture; especially if it has the variety that characterises the culture of India. A series of community studies in representative rural and urban areas in the different regions of the country will still be needed. The multi-faceted and multi-dimensional framework suggested here will be helpful identifying and separating the local elements from the regional elements, and the local and the regional elements from what may be called the national elements. The analytical procedure implied in the framework may also be found useful. Initially it has the merit

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of being applicable to all sections of the Indian population, of considering ritual and secular trends together, and of combining the past and the present in one comprehensive scheme.

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CHAPTER XXVIII

Changing Institutions and Values in Modern India

—*M.N. Srinivas*

I do not think anyone would seriously contend that modern India is static. Many changes are indeed occurring in India today and a perusal of our newspapers ought to convince one of this fact. But there can be—and are—important differences in the interpretation of the changes which are occurring. What is the exact meaning of this change? Two interpretations are possible of it. On the one hand there is the view that the changes which are taking place at present in India are essentially superficial, and that they do not involve any fundamental change in the values of the people. On the other hand is the view that the Indian people are changing radically and that there is not sufficient awareness of this fact among their rulers. Those who hold the second view argue that if the country does not set before itself the goal of a socialist society and take rapid steps towards achieving the goal there will be violent revolution.

Last 150 Years Continuum

The interpretation of change will also vary according to the kind of perspective one brings to it. A few years ago an exceptionally well-in-formed editor-friend of mine was shocked when I suggested that the changes which were occurring in India today were in a sense a continuation of what had been happening during the last 150 years and that they could not be understood without a study of the latter. I was quite unprepared for the editor's reply which was to call me a "crusted reactionary". It was then brought home to me that viewing social events in a historical perspective is not entirely a safe occupation. An analysis of a situation by a sociologist is more likely to be viewed as providing a clue to his political views than as an honest effort at objective analysis.

Important changes occurred during British rule, changes which were qualitatively different from those which had occurred previously in Indian history. Underlying the changes which British rule brought in its wake was the Industrial Revolution of the West, and indirectly,

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the scientific spirit which gave rise to it. The introduction of railways, steamships, telegraph, printing and superior armaments enabled Britain to integrate the country politically as never before in its history.

Modern knowledge was also introduced into India by the British, and the use of the English language gave the Indian elite access, among other things, to that knowledge. The use of the English language also had the effect of restricting the new knowledge to the elite and this, apart from the cultural and ideological barriers it erected between the elite and the masses, made the task of dissemination of scientific knowledge among the latter, extremely difficult. The masses need to have a certain amount of scientific knowledge if industrial development has to occur in a big way. Finally, the introduction of British law and judicial processes brought in new legal and political values having potentialities of profound change in the Indian social structure.

Beginnings of a Clean Break

The British period in Indian history differed from the previous periods in that during it a process was set in motion which was to undermine eventually the foundations of traditional Indian society. To put it briefly, British rule meant the beginning of a clean break with the past, of a new type of society. In this sense, what Independent India is doing is a continuation of what was begun during British rule. But it is also clear that only an Indian Government can bring about successfully the economic, political and social revolution which was begun, perhaps not deliberately, during British rule. No alien Government, however powerful and efficient, could have done what the Indian Government has done in the relatively brief space of fourteen years. The dissolution of over 650 princedoms, the introduction of adult franchise, the reform of land tenures, the Five Year Plans, Panchayati Raj, the 'abolition' of Untouchability and the introduction of many welfare measures, are achievements of which any Government can be proud and which could not have been undertaken by an alien Government.

Above all Independence was necessary to release the dormant energies of the people, and it is likely that we are only witnessing the beginning of the release of a tremendous amount of creative national energy. For the first time in their history educated Indians are beginning to realize that the poverty of the Indian people is not inevitable and that given the necessary determination, discipline and effort it can be wiped out.

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This view again is revolutionary, and it would have been unwarranted before the Industrial Revolution made possible a much more thorough exploitation of the earth's resources than in the past.

It implies a clear break with India's intellectual past which is inevitably associated with the widespread poverty of the masses, with the need for charity on the part of the rich, and with human helplessness before epidemics, disease and mass malnutrition.

Activism and This-Worldliness

This is perhaps the right place to refer to a sea-change which has come about in the minds of Indian intellectuals as far as activity in this world is concerned. A certain lack of faith in the ability of human effort to relieve human suffering seems to have characterized Indian intellectuals in pre-British times. There was so much ignorance, poverty and suffering that nothing could be done to reduce it substantially. The idea of *maya* and the stress on the need to achieve one's own salvation are related to this collective helplessness. Prolonged contact with the West however, resulted in the Indian elite's becoming activist and this-worldly. It is a matter of common knowledge that Lokamanya Tilak spent the eight years of his incarceration in the Mandalay jail writing the *Gita Rahasya* in which he gave it an activist interpretation. It is significant that he should have sought sanction for action in the world from the *Gita*. Mahatma Gandhi was a great activist and he regarded politics as applied religion. In Pandit Nehru, activism exist divorced from religion.

It is evident that as a result of British rule for over a hundred years the Indian elite has become activist and this-worldly, and this is indeed a fundamental change. Indian nationalism and the desire for building a strong, prosperous, egalitarian, science-minded and freedom-loving India are in the last analysis expressions of this activism and this-worldliness. At the individual level this is seen in the dropping out of the last two *ashramas—sanyasa* and *vanaprastha*. That is, if they ever were widespread even among the "twice-born" castes. Elderly Indians today dread retirement and hang on to jobs as long as they can.

A tangible expression of Indian this-worldliness is seen in the modern craze for gadgetry. This characterizes the elite in whose homes one sees transistors taperecorders, cameras, refrigerators, electronic dolls, and what not. The desire for gadgetry is fast becoming a feature of all sections of Indian society including the poor in

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rural areas. The radio is a popular gadget the possession of which has some status-connotation among the poorer sections. In villages, youths like to possess wrist watches, torches and fountain pens, and their ownership frequently has more a symbolic and prestige value than a utilitarian one. There exists a vast goods, and gadget-hungry population in India, and there is no doubt that market research will become a popular and remunerative occupation in the near future. The analysis of the preferences of the people for certain goods, and changing these preferences, through advertisement, are already being done in a small way in India.

Legislation As an Instrument

It is relevant here to draw a distinction between changes which are initiated by the Government, Union or State, and changes which have come without Government sponsorship, and usually, over a long period of time. The Constitutional abolition of Untouchability, and the passage of the *Prevention of Untouchability Offences Act*, 1955 are examples of Government-induced change. Since Independence, there has been a spate of legislation affecting the lives of citizens.

A legislative measure may be effective as, for instance, the abolition of Zamindari, and another may not be so effective, as, for instance, legislation imposing a ceiling on land. It is well known that a legislative measure may have quite different effects from that which the rulers intend it to have. Thus, the introduction of prohibition, instead of preventing the rural poor from drinking, might give rise to an illicit liquor industry in the rural areas. The banning of the practice of untouchability, again in the short run, might only lead to clashes between the conservative high castes and assertive Harijans. Such clashes have occurred in many parts of India.

Weakening of Rural Hierarchy

Attitudes and values refer to processes which occur in the minds of men and women, and they may be referred to as the inner side of social institutions. It is obvious that where legislation is ahead of public opinion, the law cannot be said to mirror the sentiments of the people. The best that can be said in such a case is that the law will eventually come to reflect public opinion. In India today law is being used freely as an instrument of social change and there is therefore a hiatus between public opinion and the changes introduced by law. It may even be said that in such cases the moral rules actually recognized by the people require a course of conduct opposed to the

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law. Thus, social prestige and family honour require the payment of money and the giving of costly gifts to the bridegroom and his relatives, while the law bans dowry. Again, a groom may be expected to take dowry partly in order to demonstrate to his relatives and friends the fact that he is a valuable acquisition. If he does not ask for a dowry, the girl's people may conclude that something is wrong with him!

The effects of some legislative measures are seen in a relatively short space of time. Land reforms in several States benefited the actual cultivators at the expense of the land owner. The tenancy reform acts have assured the tillers freedom from eviction and a fair share of the produce except where loopholes in the laws have been taken advantage of by the owners to push the tillers out. Such legislation has certainly made a dent in the rural hierarchical pattern. During the last fourteen years, there has been a weakening of this hierarchical structure. Legislation making the practice of Untouchability an offence has also contributed to this weakening, for it must be remenbered here that Harijans are usually labourers and tenants and only rarely small land owners.

The preference given to Harijans in the matter of admission to educational institutions, in the granting of free studentship and scholarships, and in appointment to Government posts, has enabled them to move up, and this fact is resented by the higher castes. These Harijans will have quite different values and attitudes from parents. That is why the upper castes complain of the aggressiveness of the Harijans. The Harijan claim to equality is regarded as aggression, and it is, of course, aggression if the traditional structure is regarded as the norm. A new sense of self-respect is visible among Harijans and this leads them to refuse to perform the tasks which they performed before. This sometimes raises the wrath of the upper castes who resort to violence. In the rural areas there are occasional attempts by the higher castes to use physical violence against Harijans who try to assert the rights given to them by the Constitution.

Adult Franchise

The Constitutional decision to give franchise to all adults has had far-reaching effects on our social and political life. For the first time in their history, the traditionally under privileged sections of our society, have a say in the choice of their rules. People who used to get ordered about by the upper castes, have now to be approached for their votes. This has given them a new sense of

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their importance, though even now in the rural areas, traditional patron-client relations are still somewhat effective in the matter of voting. That is to say, a rural patron, who is usually a big landlord has in his power a number of people who are obliged to him in a variety of ways—they may be his servants, tenants, debtors and followers. The patron expects his clients to vote the way he wants them to, and many of his clients obey him. This is why I have called rural patrons "Vote Bank" and urban politicians have to cultivate these "Vote Banks" if they wish to stay in power. But the institution of the secret ballot ensures that voting does not entirely go along the lines of patron-client ties, and it would be safe to predict that voting will be increasingly free. When I revisited my field-village of Rampura in the summer of 1952 I found that the candidate who had the powerful support of the village Headman had been defeated and the latter suspected that his Harijan clients had "double crossed" him and voted for the rival.

Adult franchise has also meant that a new field has been provided for caste activity. Given widespread illiteracy and ignorance, it is to be expected that voting will be to some extent along caste lines. It has been recently argued that thanks to the institution of caste, the illiterate and politically ignorant masses of India are able to participate in the modern democratic process. The communication of ideas is strong within a caste and even the most backward members are included in this communication network. This is also means that generally the members of a caste share the same views as regards political parties, policies and individuals. This view is perhaps justified at the lowest levels of the caste hierarchy where there is a considerable amount of occupational economic and cultural homogeneity but not at the higher levels.

Caste Consciousness Strengthened

Voting, therefore, has strengthened caste consciousness. The successful candidate is expected to champion the interests of his caste. If, for instance, his caste had been classified sometime ago as a backward caste, the candidate is expected to fight for the continuance of its backward status, for backwardness entitles it to certain privileges and concessions. In fact, in many parts of the country the benefits of backwardness are being collard by castes which are no longer backward and any attempt to remove them from the list of backward castes is strongly resisted. The Kerala Government introduced the principle of "sub-rotation" to safeguard the interests of the more backward castes but they found that it

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did not succeed in giving them the necessary protection. The Mysore Government has split the "Backward" castes into "Backward" and "More Backward" with a view to safeguarding the interests of the latter. The Madras Government has split the "Backward" castes into "Backward" and "Most Backward".

A reference to dominant castes is here necessary. In many parts of India there exist numerically strong, land-owing castes and they occupy the middle, if not the higher regions of the traditional hierarchy. Land owner-ship has given them economic power in rural areas and their numerical strength has given them political power. Many members of these castes have received university education and they occupy important positions in the administration and are entering the liberal professions if not already well represented in them. Every State Cabinet has one or more members from each dominant caste. The dominant castes are well represented in all the political parties hnd, especially in the Congress.

In brief, the dominant castes have captured power at the State level and even more generally, at lower levels. A minister from a dominant caste is expected to be a spokesman for his castes, and to a less extent for his region. If he does not act as he is expected to, he is in danger of losing his following. This is why caste and regional pressures are so strong in modern India, Every caste wants to grab as it can and the struggle for 'backwardness' is part of the struggle for power, pelf and privilege.

Regional Aspiration

Similarly, regionalism means that the members living in a limited geographically area have become suddenly aware of its backwardness as compared with other regions, Regionalism is commonly deplored, but there is not enough realization of the fact that it is often a symbol of the desire for development. When the desire for development comes to a people, it comes all along the line and not mainly at the top. Village caste, region, sect, religion. language-group and State are all affected by it, and the smaller or narrower structural entities are more immediate to the ordinary man in the village than the highest or apical loyalty. The "cure" for this type of situation is to see that regional aspirations are to some extent satisfied in formulating the national plan. It should be clearly realized by the planners that in a democracy with 70 percent or more of illiterates, the only way of educating people about the necessity of planning is to give them tangible benefits such as irrigated water or a school

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or a hospital or a road or a bridge. There is much talk about planning by the people but in the last analysis what we have is planning for the people by a few back room boys. Every village or *taluk* should be encouraged to plan for its needs within a budgetary limit. The planners should study carefully the local priorities and implement them as far as possible.

In fact, in a democracy such as we have, only a part of planning can afford to be "rational". That is, the core of the plan should be such as to give the economy a leap forward while the rest should be plainly calculated to satisfy regional aspirations. This is necessary in order to rouse the people's enthusiasm and make them put forward their utmost. The enthusiasm of the people is a most important asset, far more so in a democracy than in a totalitarian society, and special efforts must be made to rouse it. So far no systematic effort has been made to rouse the enthusiasm of the people and canalise it for development.

Dominant Castes and Rural Mass

To come back to dominant castes, the leaders of the locally dominant castes are politically powerful and they use their political power to strengthen themselves in every way. Power feeds upon itself. These leaders are ambitious, able and shrewd men, and they are not the best exemplars of the virtues of a socialist society. They are out to acquire as much as they can, and to leave as much of it as possible to their descendants. These people did well out of the war, and the post-war years have added more power to their elbow. Bus and lorry lines, rice and flour mills, chairmanship of panchayats, Government contracts. Government jobs, seats in engineering and medical colleges, and legislative assemblies and even ministerships have gone to them and the members of their families.

It is a matter of common knowledge that the benefits of the Community Development Programme have gone, by and large, to the rural elite and at the expense of the rural poor. Where the rural elite belong to the locally dominant caste they are better able to exploit the rural poor than when they do not. The leaders of the dominant caste have a vested interest in keeping the masses down and it is time that there was better appreciation of this fact, especially by those in power. The rural elite are being used as the medium of contact with the masses by administrators. From the Village Level Worker to the Block Development Officer and the Collector, every administrator first contracts the leaders of the dominant caste in the village. Their aim

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is to get things done and they choose the easiest way of doing it. Targets have to be achieved and it is more important to achieve them than to bother about the means of achieving them. It does not matter if in achieving them the position of the local leader is strengthened. But not infrequently there is a conflict between the interests of the leader and the rural poor. Not enough thought is given to the problem of reaching the rural poor without having to go through the rural elite. Given the present drift, the conflict between the rural elite and the rural poor is bound to grow acute as the latter become increasingly conscious of the fact that they are not benefiting as much as they should from the various development programmes.

Rural Explosion

I have already said that tensions between the upper castes and the Harijans are likely to increase in the near future. This conflict will overlap to some extent with the tensions brought about by development. All in all I fear that we are in for a period of increasing unrest in our villages. This fear has been given an edge by the introduction of *Panchayati Raj* in some of the States. It has placed much power in the hands of the dominant castes, and there is no guarantee that they will not use it to oppress those who have traditionally obeyed them but are now beginning to assert their independence. Apart from this, it will introduce a bitter, and perhaps violent, scramble for power in the rural areas.

I hope I have said enough to indicate that changes of a far-reaching character are occuring among the peasantry. It is probable that the urban elite will not notice these changes till they have developed to an explosive point. But sociologists who spend fairly long periods in a single village or a few villages get an intimate view of the changes which are stirring in rural areas even though they are unable to say how general are the processes which they have found to be active in particular villages. A sure index of the change that has come over the country is the sudden and sharp rise in the demand for education at all levels. Parents in urban areas are poignantly aware of the difficulty of getting their sons and daughters admitted to schools and colleges. What is even more sticking is the greatly increased demand for primary education. The planners have been taken up surprise at this sudden and step rise in the demand for primary education. "It is now officially estimated that 85 percent of the children in the 6-11 age-group will be in school by 1965 as against 76.4 percent assumed in the plan. In absolute terms, pri-

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mary school enrolment is expected to increase by 20 million instead of by 15.3 million during the next five years." This is going to cost the country an additional Rs. 60 crores. What is particularly significant is that the bulk of this increase is in the rural areas. "This has resulted in an acute shortage of teachers, and the teacher-pupil ratio has deteriorated to 1 : 65 if not worse". (The *Times of India*, November 1, 1961)

The sharp rise in the demand for education is a symptom of the changing values and attitudes of the people, and over a period of time, it is likely to produce important changes in the society. An industrial society requires more "rationality", punctuality and discipline than an agricultural society, and the education of the masses is essential to effect the transition. Mass education, it should not be forgotten, is a facton in economic development.

Lower Groups Getting Sanskritized

The culture of the Indian people is undergoing a rapid change, and the change is not in a single direction. In the first place, the way of life, values and attitudes of the lower groups are being Sanskritized. The "lower" castes are taking over Sanskritic ritual on occasions such as birth, marriage and death. Employing a Brahmin priest is becoming increasingly popular except in a few parts of the country. The festivals of the viliage deities and calendrical festivals, are both being increasingly Sanskritized. *Harikathas*, *Yagnas* *Yagas* and festivals are celebrated with much ostentation in Indian towns and cities. Religious figures, whether in ochre robes or not, promising salvation or more concrete things to the people, continue to appear on the Indian scene. In fact, they enjoy an audience which they could not have dreamt of before newspapers, the microphone and the radio became popular. Everyone of them can be regarded as a Sanskritizing agent. Indian films frequently make use of religious themes taken from the epics and *Puranas*. The availability of low-priced books has enabled people to become acquainted with Hindu religious literature in a way not possible previously.

Sanskritization refers to a cultural process but it is essential to realize that it is usually a concomitant of the acquisition of political or economic power by a caste. Both are parts of the process of social mobility. It is necessary to realize that the caste system, even traditionally, permitted of a certain amount of mobility and that this has increased considerably in the last few decades. An interesting contradiction is seen here : "lower" castes which have become

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prosperous or powerful or educated like to assert their claim to a higher place in the hierarchy by taking on a new name and by Sanskritizing their ritual. On the other hand, they struggle fiercely to retain their "backward" status for taking advantage of educational concessions and Government jobs.

Modern India is full of contradictions, however, Sanskritization co-exists with its opposite, Westernization. While in a sense the entire country is undergoing Westernization, the educated and urbanized sections are becoming more Westernized than the others. Another contradiction is that the pace of Westernization seems to have increased after the withdrawal of the British from India. During British role, the Indian elite had only the British model before them for Westernizing. while, with the achievement of Independence, there also other models, including the American and the Russian. It is likely that the latter two will be more popular than the British model as the years go by. Westernization is associated with English education, with urbanization and industrialization, with scientific method and rationality. It is also associated with secularization. Sanskritization, on the other hand, is associated with a religious world-view, traditional education and ritualism. Co-existence is the order of the day, and highly Westernized Indians retain elements of Sanskritization, and Sanskritized individuals make use of Western technology to further a Sanskritic end. But ultimately a conflict will have to be postulated between the Sanskritic world-view and the Western world-view, between the religious world-view and the scientific or rational world-view.

A Personnel Philosophy

It is true that I am here equating the Western world-view with the scientific or rational world-view and this is not quite legitimate. The Western world-view is clearly more than the scientific or rational world-view, and technologically advanced Western countries, excluding Russia, have not given up religion. My point here is that in the West there has been a continuous debate for over a hundred years or more on the relation between religion and science, and there seems to be a greater awareness of the difficulties involved in reconciling a scientific world-view with a religious world-view than there is in India. Christianity has developed a kind of structure and institutions which Hinduism does not possess. It has church, trained priests, and a body of doctrine which has to face attacks from science. It is true that Hinduism has undergone a certain amount

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of change in the last hundred years or more. The Arya Samaj, the Brahmo Samaj and the Ramakrishna-Vivekananda Movement represent attempts on the part of Hinduism to respond to modern forces. But this does not alter the fact that Hinduism does not have institutional mechanisms which ensure that it responds to new intellectual and social forces. In short, it is difficult to see how Hinduism can withstand the impact of new ideas such as equality and rationalism. Hinduism has been much too dependent on institutions such as caste, joint family and the village community for its survival. All these three critical institutions are undergoing change due to the operation of a variety of forces, social and economic. Apart from this, the first two institutions have been under attack for some times from European and Indian intellectuals alike.

Social institutions and values are undergoing change in India. This will affect everyone—and especially the Hindus as Hinduism is dependent for its perpation on institutions which are changing in important ways. This ought to be a matter for concern because it is necessary to provide the younger generation with a sense of purpose and of values. Nationalism may provide the former for the people, but it will not provide the latter. Even internationalism will not be enough. What will be necessary is a personal philosophy of life, a *Weltenschaaung*. Where is this to come from ? If the bulk of the people derive their *Weltenschaaung* from their religion, and if this religion is very largely dependent upon a triad of social institutions viz caste, joint family and village community, which are changing in important respects, what will be the consequences for the people concerned and their country ? I am afraid I do not have an answer, but what worries me even more is that there is not widespread awareness of the existence of this problem.

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Epilogue

My Dear D. P.,

This letter should have been written to you when you could have received it. I had owed you a letter for some years—in fact, since the time I first met you in Lucknow in 1938. But then I went away to Europe and I found myself engulfed by the horrors of the Second World War. And, on my return to India in 1946, we were all busy working for the transfer of power from British to Indian hands. And, then, I suddenly heard that you were ill in Switzerland. Later, I knew of your return and expected to meet you anytime, any day, when I should come to Aligarh. Suddenly, while I was in Calcutta, I heard that you were dangerously ill. I saw you on that very day. I could only put my hand in yours, stare at your hollowed face without being able to say anything to you, because I knew that, though you could hear others speak, you could not say much. In that poignant moment, from your emaciated body, your sunken eyes and the pallor of your thoughtful brow, I knew that you could only survive this illness by a miracle. And I felt guilty and ashamed that I had never said to you the words I wished to put down on paper, words that I could not have spoken anyhow, because they were souvenirs of my inner conviction about the splendour of your genius. Perhaps, it is as well that these words were not uttered, because you would have felt embarrased by them in life, when you are past hearing now. And may be that what might have been a personal letter is best made into an open avowal, which may be received by those who shared my love for your person and who may ally themselves with my homage to your works.

For, in your case, more than in the case of many other teachers, it may be said that you passed on the torch to quite a few of your pupils. There are some names which come before me immediately when I think of the generation whom you taught in Lucknow and Aligarh and whom you educated through your books in Calcutta. I shall not mention those names, because they are all of living persons, but they will recognise themselves. Most of them are brilliant young people who have distinguished themselves as teachers, politicians, writers, publicists and artists.

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I have often talked about you to these pioneers. They have always wondered, in the middle of our conversations, what it was in your peculiar personality that made it so magical, so attractive and so influential. And the various estimates have differed. Some friends have said that it was your intellectual brilliance, some have said that it was your wide reading, some have suggested that it was your passionate love for truth. Again, some have ventured the opinion that it was because you were a creative writer, apart from being a professor, that gave you the enlightened perceptions which enabled you to communicate, in an integral manner. everything you wished to impart. I think all these friends are right, from their individual points of view. The truth is that you had all these things in you together. And when I say that I mean to suggest that you were a renaissance man, who had perceived the deeper nature of the transition from the age of our slavery to the age of freedom, in a comprehensive manner, and were willing to find out more in order to impart to others.

When your son told me that you had retired to Dehra Dun, sent all your books there, and were looking forward to further researches, I was confirmed in my appreciation that for you consciousness was the highest aim of life.

Unfortunately, many of your colleagues in our country had been taught to give information in the Universities and not to impart education.

As a product of the renascent efforts which began in your native Bengal, you had perceived the true nature of the synthesis between operative parts of the Indian tradition and the new learning of the West. More than Rabindranath Tagore, and the members of the 'Green Leaf' group, you had begun to question all the sentiments, the Ahibhnoleths, and half truths, of our Puranic literature and encouraged the scientific mode of reasoning. Perhaps, you were one of the most highly educated creative writers of Bengal, embracing the widest view of learning, in the sense that you wished to combine the humanities and the sciences in a single realm. Otherwise, how could you have combined the novelist in you with the sociologist, the political publicist, the historian and the man of letters ?

And, the vision of the future, which arose from your intense reading of the books of knowledge, gave to your books of passion more than the emotional female fiction writer puts into her soliloquies of despair. You vouchsafed to our generation, and the next,

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the new truth that reason civilises the instincts and emotion and that human culture cannot remain the barbaric heritage of feudalism and of the retrace of early capitalism, where the violent lusts of greed, hatred, cruelty and fear are exalted, and the law of the jungle which is war put upon the pedestal of heroism to justify self aggrandisement.

And this awareness polarised your thinking, so that you became one of the few spokesmen of socialist thought, not frightened, in spite of the cold war, to be called a communist.

But when the superficies of the banal arguments between reactionary capitalism and Stalinist communism have been laid to rest by a more intricate, subtle and deeper analysis of the issues of our time, you will be declared a humanist of the kind that Raja Ram Mohan Roy, Rabindranath Tagore and Jawaharlal Nehru wished us to be. And, in all the miscellaneous essays in which you put forward your tentative researches into the nature of the known and unknown man of today, will be discovered the various hunches which compelled you to project your dream of the time to come—of an order in which the abject squalor of the vast deprivation will have been ended to usher a new era, astride the vestiality, the horror and the negation of war, to the intellectual battle for survival in a leisure society, without the boredom forced by the machine and its corrollaries, on the dessicated, dehumanised and mechanical mind of the west in the early 20th century.

I am sure your many students will carry the implications of your philosophy of life into much brave thinking and action. The struggle for the revolution in thought, necessary for our time, will be a hard one. And we shall need to remember all your words, to print them, and to reread them. And I hope that the publication of those words will serve as a monument to your courage and integrity and foresight, because it is unlikely that the ungrateful intelligentsia of our time in this country is likely to give you any other memorial.

I know that there is no god, who sits in heaven with a long beard passing judgements on the good and bad deeds of men, to whom you could have gone after your demise. I know you are with us in the only way in which men survive—in our hearts and minds. And, sometimes we look inwards to caress the memory of your chiselled face. And, now, just-now I want to press your gentle hand which lay in the Dharmachakra mudra when I last touched it.

Yours

Mulk Raj Anand

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Page	*Para*	*Line*	*Printed as*	*Corrected as*
V	1	19	Statistic	Statistics
VII	2	13	Johnsonsian	Jonsonian
3	1	10	imminent	immanent
11	2	3	requires	require
11	(footnote)	6	taken	take
26	1	5	literacy	literary
33	2	18	aacription	ascription
33	2	18	scheduled cases	scheduled castes
33	2	21	non-equalitaan	non-equalitarian
34	2	1	changed	change
55	3	4	intincts	instincts
58	1	13	retification	reification
83	2	1	explaint he	explain the
91	1	10	mtanopantirrole	an important role
100	1	13	megation	megaton
102	1	14	beckning	beaconing
110	3	13	socientific	scientific
121	3	14		after 'Aparigraha' add (.) stop
122	3	16	quo	qua
124	3	19	suprahindividual	supra-individual
131	1	last line	karmaryevadhi-kararstu	karmanyevadhi-karaste
136	1	1	It	it
137	2	2	Hinu cosmic	Hindu cosmic
138	1	16	Indian	India
143	2	13		delete 'as' after 'Planning'
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187	(footnote) 1	1	Shill	Shils
230	(Table IV)	1	Language	Languages
233	(Table footnote)	1	stuaents	students
262	3	1	(sans)	(Sans.)
279	3	4	faction	fraction
281	1	4		add 'of' after 'types'
283	6	5	netural	natural
286	7	3	expensionistic	expansionistic
289	4	1	immage	image

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Page	*Para*	*Line*	*Printed as*	*Corrected as*
295	3	5	inter-state-law	intra-state-law (when it occurs the second time)
296	3	4	probably	probable
301	1	2	ankered	anchored
301	2	2	n	in
303	1	7	Weblon	Veblen
303	1	5 (from below)	normaly	normalcy
304	1	7	indequalities	inequalities
305	2	17	state	stated
306	1	2	efficieney	efficiency
307	1	20	Parrons	Perroux
315	2	3	viarous	various
318	3	1	nome	home
324	2	3	made	make
331	2	11	varsion	version
332	5	2	adequcy	adequacy
335	2	5	intergration	integration
337	2	9	roler	role
338	2	5—7		Delete "His..... approach"
340	1	14	essessibility	accessibility
341	1	21	objectivity	objectively
341	2	18	serves	serve
344	2	7	edncation	education
346	3	1	word	work
348	1	5	manourning	manoeuvering
348	3	4	while	white
355	2	6		After 'This' add "is"
355	2	11	bignning	beginning
359	1	7		delete 'and'
361	1	6	type	they
364	2	3	evengelica	evangelical
366	2	5	miliue	milieu
377	(footnote) 1	3	194	1945
394	4	5	Gaeat	Great
404	2	3	seeond	second
405	3	10	1655a	1955a
411	4	3	unable	tenable
412	1	6	compose	composed
415	1	6	ones old	old ones
421	3	3	any	many
423	4	7	leterati	literati
429	3	16	exist	exists

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meaningless. In fact, the indeterminacy and meaninglessness of all such theories has made possible the "production, coexistence, circulation, and interminable mutual dispute" of this sort of mutually contradictory theories on the market of sociology and other psychosocial sciences. Due to their vagueness and indeterminacy none of these theories has been able to prove its own validity and the invalidity of all the rival theories. The mutual dispute has been endlessly going on without a decisive victory or defeat for any of these conspicuously vague and self-contradictory hypotheses.

Marxian theory of determination of all "ideological superstructure," including religious creativity, by the economic factor (creativity), and the opposite theories of F. de Coulanges or M. Weber of predominant determination of economic and other forms of creativity by the religious and its *Wirtschaftsethik* factor can serve as examples of this sort of theory. Neither one of these essentially opposite theoreis has been able to demonstrate convincingly its own validity as well as the invalidity of its opponent. The same can be said of most of the other theories that single out of many forms of human creativity one of its forms as the main factor.

To sum up: logically all of these theories are very defective and none of them has successfully solved its "antinomies and dilemmas."

Still less successfully have they proved their contentions empirically. As a matter of fact their empirical evidence is poor, conspicuously inadequate, and in most of the cases represents but a few onesidedly selected illustrative cases allegedly confirming a pet theory. When these cases are confronted with an incomparably longer and fuller series or samples of the relevant facts, or especially by the total known universe of such facts, they invariably appear "unrepresentative," onesided, fragmentary, and inadequate.[1]

For these—logical and empirical—reasons my hypothesis of *the total human creativity in all its known forms as the main factor of constructive sociocultural change* appears to be more valid and adequate than any of the theories that take *one form of this creativity for such a factor*.

1. The unrepresentative, onesided and incorrect character of the "empirical corroborations" of the theories criticized can clearly be seen by confrontation of these fragmentary samples with much fuller, more systematic, and much longer time-series of respective facts given in my *Dynamics, Man and Society in Calamity*, and other works.

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Constructive Versus Destructive Changes

This thesis is correct only in regard to *the constructive historical socio-cultural changes.* Destructive or uncreative changes have been and can be caused by many physical forces like earthquake, floods, volcanic eruptions, hurricanes, etc.; by several biological agencies like epidemics, wrong heredity, negative selection, regressive mutations, and so on; by a multitude of superorganic processes like devastating wars, civil strife, crimes, stupid private and public tyranny, ignorance, insanity, and through misuse and abuse of human creativity for destructive purposes. From time to time in the history of various societies these destructive and uncreative forces have played mtanopantirrole by causing tremendous havoc in the social life of respective groups, by suppressing, hindering and slowing their constructive creativity, and once in a while by terminating their individuality and historical existence.

However momentous, these destructive changes have contributed little to the constructive solution of pressing human needs, to the enrichment of science, technology, philosophy, religion, fine arts, ethics and other compartment of human culture, to the world of great values and to the meaningfulness and happiness of human life. At the best, for a short time a small fraction of selfish and predatory humans may have profited from them at the cost of the suffering majority; once in a while these catastrophic forces may have stimulated human creativity in inventing new ways and means of protection from-their devastating results.[1]

But without human creativity they could not have produced even these modestly constructive consequences. And in comparison with their deadly effects their positive results have anyhow been comparatively insignificant.

Throughout man's long history he has survived and has largely overcome the incessant attacks of these forces of death and desolation exactly through the powerful grace of his constructive creativity. It is through this grace that he has built a superorganic stratum of reality different from the inorganic and organic realities. It is only through this constructive creativity that he has successfully solved his urgent needs and momentous problems. Finally, through continuous

1. See on the effects of wars, revolutions, famines, epidemics, upon psychology and behavior of individuals and groups, upon social organization and institutions, science, religion, ethics, law, fine arts in P. Sorokin, *Man and Society in Calamity*, chaps. 2-15.

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exercise of this grace man has been uplifting himself from the earliest state of man-animal to the states of the *homo faber* and *the homo sapiens*, to the state of man-creator ever striving even to transcend himself and to become a superman (in Nietzsche' sense: "man is a shame and disgrace; man must be overcome and transcended"). Uncreative men, like Herostratus, can burn magnificent temples like the temple of Diana at Ephesus, but they cannot build even modest chapels and houses. Violent men like conquerors and war-lords can cut the Gordian knots of incessant emergencies but they cannot untie these knots in the way of prevention, mitigation, and elimination of calamities from human history. All these tasks have been successfully solved only through the quiet power of constructive creativity. Despite its "silent grace," it can split atoms into its particles and can fuse these particles into new unities. It can eliminate physical and biological causal relationships where they are naturally given and it does impose causal ties upon the phenomena naturally free from causal connections. It has given to man the control over the natural powers of fire and heat, wind and water, animals and plants, up to the powers of steam, electricity, radio, atom, elementary particles, and of other forms of energy.

Only through his constructive creativity has man been able to satisfy, to a notable extent, his material, mental, and spiritual needs, and, only through it has he been able to build a new—superorganic—realm of reality and values in the known universe.

Each creative achievement of man in science or philospohy, fine arts or religion, ethics or law, economics or politics, has produced significant changes in the life of mankind. While small creative achievements engendered small but quite tangible changes, great achievements of the men of genius have caused momentous transformations in man's body and mind, behavior and life, in man's social and cultural universe. Everything truly valuable in this human universe of which man can be proud has been brought into being and developed by his constructive creativity. Among other boons this creativity has given to man all the forms of genuine freedom—freedom from oppression of the destructive physical, biological, and superorganic forces—in contrast to many pseudo-freedoms pompously promised by their human agents. No wonder, therefore, that in human history the periods of blossoming of this creativity have been the periods of great and positive changes in the life of humanity, while the periods of its slackening have been those of stagnation, recession, and destruction.

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In the past man's constructive creativity has been the main factor of all the positive changes in his history. At the present and in the future it will continue to be man's supremely powerful instrument for fruitful solution of all his problems and needs. As long as this grace animates man, his survival and progressive self-transcendence to higher and higher types of man remain secure. For these reasons maximal cultivation and development of this creative grace is man's paramount task of the present and the future.

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CHAPTER IV

A Philosophical View of Civilization

—Radhakamal Mukerjee

Dimensions and Values of Civilization

Civilization is the open, self-prepetuating interchange between man, values and cosmos in their various dimensions and orders. It establishes an enduring harmony and wholeness of meanings, values and strivings necessary for both the unity of the human person and the integralness of the social and cosmic order.

Civilization at the *biological* dimension is the gradual control and direction of human evolution by conscious and emergent values, purposes and ideals that replace the mechanisms and procedures of natural selection and struggle and domination of men over men, and of societies over societies. Human evolution and history select and transmit ever deeper and more extensive social feelings and sentiments that build up ever larger and completer communities. Man is the only animal whose environment has reached a world dimension. Biologically, his evolution is moulded and shaped less by his biogenic impulses and dispositions and more by his acquired external heritage of symbols, traditions and values that extends into the inheritance of the entire species. The unity of mankind is biologically based on the trend of his open, ascendant evolution. A false biologism delays the shift of emphasis from competition and conflict, "red in tooth and claw", to social integration and harmony that ultimately pass into the unlimited communion of the cosmos.

Civilization at the *psycho-social* dimension is a structured, meaningful orientation of the human person and values to society, mankind and cosmos. An integrated, enlarged and deepened psychosocial

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environment facilitates through conditioning and canalization the eradication or assimilation of the person's incompatible, egoistic and fractional systems and impulses, leaving him free for self-extension and self-transcendence. It transforms him into a free and responsible moral agent of unity, wholeness and communication with mankind and cosmos as wholes. These are acknowledged as absolute norms and standards held in their full simplicity and force by entire mankind. A narrow psychologism and lop-sided ethical relativism with a strong bias towards biological and social determinism stand in the way of appreciation of the role of intrinsic values and of value scaling with the intrinsicalities of life at the top of the hierarchy. The various sciences of man, no doubt, recognise values as the basis of the ideal of human growth and development, but neither clarify nor offer them as guides to both the integration of personality and the unity of mankind.

Civilization, finally, at the *spiritual* dimension is concerned with man's interpenetration and osmosis with his total environment, with his cosmic integrations and affiliations that are not supplied by the visible social community. Civilized man discovers his conscience and faith not through biology and sociology but through metaphysics and ontology. He identifies the knowledge of self with the knowledge of intrinsic and transcendent values, and of man not in his existential nature, but in his true or essential Being or cosmos-total. An appreciation of the ontological locus and foundation of values invests these with a profound certitude of guidance for men, societies and civilizations towards perfection. A misconceived sociological relativism and subjectivity ignore the person and cosmos relation which is one of kind and kind, and is the perennial source of the worth and dignity of personality and the sanity, goodness and peace of civilization. Art, myth, religion and morality that embody the meaning and passion of human life and the impulsion and direction of civilization are all rooted in the cosmic as intuition and feeling. Modern social sciences governed by the physicalist assumptions and modes of treatment show no concern with man's interchange with cosmos, with all what leads to mankind's unity, wholeness and transcendence. These can neither interpret the general essence of art, morality and religion nor enter into the vitality and dynamic of civilization.

The Triad of Civilization : Person-Values and Cosmos

A combination of the scientific-empirical and philosophical-normative methods and principles that rejects the present dichotomy between the sciences and humanities and between "naturalism" and idea-

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lism is necessary for a proper undertaking of the triad, Person-Values-and Cosmos, in their progressive interdependence and convergence in civilization. Civllization is value-creation and value-experience. According to Whitehead, "existence, in its own nature, is the upholding of value-intensity."[1] The perennial adventures in civilization, whether in East or West, are threefold: first, to bring forth the integrated and complete kind of man—the Whole or Cosmic Person that has emerged in all privileged epochs of human history; secondly, to discover, clarify and achieve the intrinsic, ultimate and transcendent values of life that represent the perennial, fragrant flowers in the spacious, well-tilled gardens of civilization: and, thirdly, to establish a society or communion that passes towards the unlimited community which is the Cosmos. Whitehead makes this point in a well-known passage in which he asserts that "in each age of the World distinguished by high activity , there will be found at its culmination and among the agencies leading to that culmination, some profound cosmological outlook, implicitly accepted, impressing its own type on the current springs of action."[2] Behind every civilization there is deep and authentic triple vision of the whole or universal man, of cosmic values and of a larger transhuman order of society of which human society is a mere fragment. All true civilizations endeavour to create a community in which entire mankind can live in peace and harmony. A striking convergence is found between the peaks of civilization and peaks of spiritual or metaphysical outlook that builds up an ideal unity of the human race beyond and above civilization itself.

The Unity of Civilization

Civilization inspite of its manifoldness is fundamentally one and inspite of its temporality essentially eternal and transcendent. Each major culture spells out its own notion of complete and cosmic person, its intrinsic and transcendent values of life and its wholeness and harmony with mankind and cosmos, corresponding to its spirit and genius, the accumulated force of myth, value and environment. It is a false, one-sided Western philosophy of history, stemming from Hegel and Marx, that regards human cultures as more or less discrete and successive stages or phases in a unilinear, historical series. Cultures have a parallel evolution, historically and logically, contributing with its universally and rationally human elements towards, and enriching the common heritage of mankind. Civilization is a gorgeous

1. Modes of Thought.
2. *Adventures in Ideas*, pp. 1314.

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multicoloured tapestry made up of threads of diverse hues and shades that the socio-historical development of a particular culture represents in the broad march of mankind. The milestones in the latter reveal, and appeal to, universal human nature, values and experiences. The study of civilization is fundamentally concerned with the integration and wholeness of Persons-Values-and-Cosmos, and this with reference to the common defeats and fulfilments of men and societies and in subordination to the total movement of mankind.

Indian and Chinese civilizations are pre-eminent in the manner in which these have retained their consistency of character, subsisting upon practically the same metaphysical assumptions, myths and cultural values in which these were reared in the 6th-5th century B.C. There are personal and cosmic imperatives in these civilizations derived from certain universal myths and faiths that maintain an easy and smooth subordination of the instrumental to the intrinsic values in man's integral living, and organise and complete the finite realm of human existence. By their very nature they have not been outmoded with time. The greater stability and continuity of Indian and Chinese civilizations than any other civilizations of the world are due, no doubt, to the universal and cosmic myths and norms expounding the true nature and destiny of man and society.

Open Persons, Values and Community

The study of civilization derives its philosophical character from its tendency to transcend time and the mutability of men and the flux of events which amounts to the revealation of changing empirical appearances of men and societies in history into open and durable patterns of Persons-Values-and-Cosmos. Civilization, together with its three integral parts, Man, Values and Community, must be all or nothing.

The key-notions for the analysis and interpretation of civilization, East and West, are the unity, wholeness and transcendence of Man's being; the supremacy of the intrinsic, ultimate and transcendent over the instrumental, proximate and pragmatic values; and the feeling and experience of oneness and communion with Mankind-and-Cosmos-Total, spelling a sensitive and intimate filiation with the Whole, the Eternal and the Universal. The conception of the Universal Man, Cosmic Values and the Unlimited Community is the transcending principle of the knowledge of civilization grasped only as suprahistorical reality. The supreme paradox of civilization, realised as Transhumanism, is that the Universal Person is One's Neighbour, every social relationship is the vehicle of Transcendence, and every people, group

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or institution is an echo of the Cosmic Community. The three entities in constant reciprocal interpenetration—Universal Person, Transcendent Values and Cosmic Community—are facets of the same dynamic of civilization.

The empirical Dialectic of civilization

The dynamic is constituted by the central process of empirical dialectic of nature and of rational human reflection and action. Man and civilization think and live dialectically. This is because man's own nature is ambivalent, and so also are his relationships with fellowmen and cosmos. The major contradictions in societies and cultures echo the polarities or oppositions of forces, principles and values at different dimensions of socio-cultural living and control. It is the tensions and conflicts in the self-maturation of civilization at both the individual and the socio-cultural dimension, arising from a continuum of polarities and complementarities which comprise the theme of the philosophy of civilization. By the resolution of the polarities and complementarities of individuation and order at the *biological* dimension; of impulse and reason, and conscious and unconscious at the *psychological* dimension; of freedom and organisation, community and individual, sensate and ideational mode, and intrinsic and instrumental values at the social dimension and of egoism and altruism, conscience and culture, and self-assertion and self-transcendence at the *moral-spiritual* dimension, person, society and civilization meet new challenges, broaden their experiences and rise to completer truths and more comprehensive values. The process of dialectic, then, unceasingly moves to and fro, and along with this, every human relationship, group, institution and value between opposite and complementary modes of experience that encompass different dimensions of environment and life-experience.

The Dialectical Peril of Civilizations

The human animal is conscious neither of the alternation of powerful physiological forces in his homeostatic balance and control, nor of the ambivalence of his impulses and emotions in his mental integration and adaptation. Similarly neither man nor civilization consciously or deliberately achieves the dialectical truth of all knowledge, values and social relations and trends through the inescapable antinomies and alternatives. "The Wisdom of the Body", of mind and of society equipoises and balances the opposite and complementary forces in a descending order of potency.

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The bio-psychological, the social or institutional and the metaphysical dialectic must conform to one another in order that civilization which always lives in dialectical tension and peril can smoothly and creatively get over its inevitable antinomies and contradictions, excesses and hazards. The metaphysical dialiectic is, of course, final and comprehensive for the reinterpretation and growth of human experience at different dimensions towards rational wholeness. The essence of the metaphysical dialectic, whether in the Orient from Nagarjuna to Sankara or in the Occident from Socrates to Hegel, is that every man as the metaphysical person must seek and achieve the nonself, the neighbour, the beyond and the negative. He can realize the full development of his own nature and values and of his society and civilization in knowledge, art, religion and morality only through his dialectical inclusiveness. A crisis in each major civilization is simultaneously a dialectical issue of metaphysics. The latter alters its shape and import in civilization from age to age. A philosophy of civilization should ground itself, therefore, in the philosophical theory of dialectic that will be as significant a tool of analysis as the cognate doctrine of "complementarity" or "perspectival truth" in the modern philosophy of science.

The Violence of Democracy and Communism

Today both civilization and the human species in Orient or Occident alike are threatened in their very existence by a sense of dogmatism or absolutism that surrounds one or other of the great polarities and complementarities of human life, society and values. Freedom and Organisation, Rights and Order, Individual Liberty and Social Justice, Community and Individual. These opposite and alternative assumptions, truths and values have now been accentuated, and have embodied themselves in the contrasted social and economic systems and cultures of Democracy and Communism, dividing almost entire mankind into two hostile blocs and threatening world war and destruction. Civilization, Orient and Occident, today should lend its ears to Oliver Cromwell's importunate warning: "My brethren, by the bowels of Christ I beseech you, be think you that you may be mistaken."

A philosophical view of civilization finds the unity, wholeness and harmony of civilization and humanity in the blending and fusion of the conflicting assumptions, beliefs, traditions and values of Democracy and Communism, complementary each to the other. That is the way to world peace and progress. It is not by passing or

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